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Two strangers meet far from the reach of organized society. Each must 
decide quickly whether to attack, or await the action of the other. 
Together, they are better off choosing restraint and thus opening up possi-
bilities for mutually beneficial intercourse. Desires for both self-protection 
and possible wealth enhancement, however, impel each of them toward an 
initial and immediate aggressive move. 
The parable of the good Samaritan reminds us that failure to help can 
be hurtful. We can easily overlook the symmetrical point: since we are vul-
nerable to injury from all but the weakest,failure to harm can be helpful. In 
holding in check our ability to damage or destroy, we help our counter-
party, both because she has avoided injury at our hands and because she 
now faces opportunities for gains at our expense that would otherwise 
have been unavailable. And in forgoing potential gains and exposing our-
selves to otherwise avoidable risks, we have harmed ourselves. A surpris-
ing but inescapable conclusion: failure to harm can be altruistic. 
Are we altruistically inclined? Are we, in spite of the counsel of pru-
dence and the temptations of greed, often predisposed, in situations such 
as that described above, to give up the option of making a first aggressive 
move? If it is in our nature to be so inclined, how can this possibly be, 
given what we know of the operation of evolutionary forces? 
Discussions of human altruism often have a nebulous and ill-defined 
quality to them. People commonly question what altruistic behavior is and 
whether it can truly be distinguished from what is selfish. But in a biologi-
cal context, altruism has a very precise meaning: behavior by an individual 
organism that reduces its own reproductive fitness while improving the 
reproductive fitness of at least one other member of the same species (con-
specific). Reproductive fitness affects the relative frequency with which an 
individual's genes appear in the next generation's gene pool. 
Like Robert Frank's book Passions within Reason (1988), this book 
takes as a starting point the proposition that altruistic behavior is an 
important empirical category. Like Frank's work, this book explores evo-
lutionary explanations of this phenomenon. But unlike Frank, this book 
considers the possibility that natural selection-the fundamental motor of 
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evolutionary dynamics-has operated at the group as well as the individ-
ual level. Group selection occurs when selection differentially rewards 
members of a group as a consequence of the frequency of some trait within 
it, for example, when groups with higher frequencies of those altruistically 
predisposed grow more rapidly. 
Group selection is not a new idea, but has only slowly been reemerg-
ing from an intellectual doghouse. The evolutionary models that most 
people carry around in their heads start with the premise that natural 
selection operates exclusively at the level of the individual organism. This 
poses a fundamental problem for the explanation of altruistic behavior, 
since by definition, altruism cannot be favored if selection operates only at 
the individual level. 
Much of the history of the social and biological sciences since the 
1960s has involved attempts to resolve this apparent contradiction. Con-
siderable progress has been made in understanding altruistic behavior 
toward kin: for example, the sacrifices that parents make for their chil-
dren. The theory of inclusive fitness, pioneered by the late William Hamil-
ton, emphasizes that selection occurs ultimately at the level of the gene 
and, since parents share half their genes with each of their children, 
sacrifice for offspring may favor genes predisposing to such behavior, even 
if the sacrifice is not in the material interest of the parent. 
The explanation of altruistic behavior toward non-kin is more 
difficult. The degree of genetic relatedness drops off quickly (second 
cousins share only 1/32 of their genes). Since altruistic behavior favors the 
fitness of other conspecific(s) at the expense of the actor, it is hard to see 
how predispositions to behave altruistically toward non-kin could spread 
or even survive. Were they to arise through mutation or genetic recombi-
nation, such tendencies would seem inevitably to decline in frequency and 
eventually disappear over time through the operation of natural selection. 
If group selection processes are operative, however, it is possible, 
within a population periodically dividing into smaller groups, for behav-
ioral predispositions to be shrinking in frequency within each individual 
group, while they are increasing in frequency within the global population. 
This possibility, admittedly counterintuitive, arises when there is a positive 
covariance between the frequency of altruists within a group and the rate 
at which it grows. Thus while altruistic behavior will engender reduced 
reproductive fitness for the organism exhibiting it within each group, genes 
predisposing to it can be increasing over time within the global popula-
tion. The possibility enables us to understand how altruistic tendencies 
could be favored by evolutionary processes even when they are, by 
definition, disadvantaged within each individual group. 
Most social scientists admit the relevance of altruism in considering 
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relations among kin. But in relations among non-kin, interest seems to 
reign supreme, and suggestions that altruistic predispositions have a role 
to play are, if not rejected, then greeted with considerable skepticism. This 
presumption persists in the face of considerable evidence, experimental 
and observational, inconsistent with it. Part of the explanation for this is 
that we have tended to focus on what sustains or maintains ongoing inter-
action, as opposed to what allows it to originate. 
Altruism may not be necessary to sustain relations of reciprocity. But 
altruism is necessary for them to originate. The description of a contin-
gently cooperative strategy (Tit-for-Tat, for example) will be formally 
identical in an environment in which it or similar strategies prevail at low 
frequency and an environment in which it prevails at high frequency. But 
whether or not such a strategy is altruistic in an evolutionary sense 
depends on the frequency of such tendencies and others within the general 
population. In this respect, inclinations toward such strategies differ from 
the predispositions of parents to sacrifice for their children, which are 
altruistic irrespective of the prevalence of such tendencies among others. 
My interest in what holds human groups together began with disser-
tation research more than a quarter of a century ago (Field 1974). That 
work gave little attention to the possible contribution of evolutionarily 
determined inclinations in allowing reciprocal, cooperative relations to 
develop. It seemed pretty obvious that natural selection, by favoring those 
who helped themselves, meant that Darwin was a problem to be over-
come, not part of the solution. 
The intervening years led to revisiting the question periodically, 
exploring and elaborating on the role of institutions and norms in influenc-
ing behavior (Field 1981,1984,1991). As was true for my dissertation, and 
in line with conventional social science thinking, none of these articles con-
siders genetically or biologically mediated influences on our abilities to ini-
tiate and sustain social and, ultimately, economic intercourse. 
A change in perspective was precipitated by a year-long sabbatical at 
the Social Science History Institute at Stanford University in 1997-98. The 
break afforded me an opportunity to read broadly and without distraction 
in a number of areas, some familiar and some entirely new. The process 
caused a number of inchoate ideas to develop and coalesce in directions 
not entirely anticipated. 
I emerged with a reevaluation of how we can effectively tackle this 
problem, one whose logic and evidentiary foundation I think important 
for social and behavioral scientists to seriously consider. It is now far 
clearer than it was in the 1970s that the natural sciences do more than sim-
ply define a problem that the social sciences must resolve. A more nuanced 
Darwinian approach can enable us to organize and interpret the results of 
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experimental and other research in ways that facilitate understanding of 
biological influences both on universal human behavioral propensities and 
on the structure of our cognitive faculties whereby we acquire knowledge 
about the world. These in turn can help us understand the emergence of 
normative structures without which the origins of reciprocity and complex 
social organization would be impossible. 
Evolutionary, biological reasoning has been frequently misused in the 
past, sometimes in horrific ways, and many readers will approach it with 
reservation. It is important to enumerate several factors that argue in 
favor of our being more receptive to it. First, research and, especially, the-
orizing in this area are, in general, more nuanced and somewhat less prone 
to overreaching than was the case twenty-five years ago. In particular, 
there is now more emphasis on understanding genetic influences on human 
cognitive structure and behavior as reflecting adaptation to the relatively 
stable ancestral environment of hunter-gatherer existence (a period of at 
least two million years duration), as well as earlier, and less emphasis on 
attempts to interpret behavior subsequent to the Neolithic revolution (a 
period of ten or eleven thousand years at most) as necessarily reflecting 
adaptation to encountered environments. Second, the understanding of 
and scientific consensus about the levels at which natural selection can and 
does operate have been refined as the result of observational, experimen-
tal, and theoretical research, as have been assumptions about the interre-
lationships and balance between "innate" and learned cognitive and 
behavioral mechanisms. Third, the fruitfulness of inquiry into biological 
influences on human behavior and cognition has been steadily reinforced 
by an accretion of observational and experimental data and of new ways 
of interpreting such data. 
Overall progress in these areas over a quarter century is striking in 
comparison with what one observes in the social and behavioral sciences, 
and suggests that research along these lines, and perhaps along these lines 
alone, offers the possibility of transcending the most significant and per-
sisting fault line within them. That divide separates the sociological-
anthropological tradition, with its emphasis on culture, norms, institu-
tions, ideology, and emergent properties, from the economic approach, 
with its assumption of rational choice, and ambivalence toward or out-
right rejection of all of these concepts. 
Research by heterodox scholars has tried to bridge this gap. But 
many on both sides alit remain skeptical that these efforts can lead to a sci-
entifically progressive research agenda. This book is intended for those 
who, like me, have thought hard about these issues and have often been 
stymied. Many of us are committed in our work to approaches with 
explanatory deficiencies that at some level we acknowledge. The argument 
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and analysis should be of interest to those identifying with either the ratio-
nal choice or the sociological tradition. But it tries to move beyond the 
ultimately unproductive opposition of one to the other. Rethinking the 
implications of evolutionary theory and processes, and in particular relax-
ing the assumption that natural selection operates only at the level of the 
individual organism, leads to a rethinking of the strengths and limitations 
of each. In the context of serious consideration of experimental and obser-
vational evidence, it lays groundwork not only for some rapprochement 
within the social sciences but also, more generally, between the biological 
and behavioral sciences. This integration, however, entails a different set 
of implications than those traditionally drawn by advocates of such 
unification. 
Some background in game theory is helpful in understanding the 
arguments developed here. This is not because game theory, any more 
than the rational choice approach of which it represents an extension, pro-
vides a universal key to understanding human behavior. But in recent 
years it has become almost impossible to discuss or engage developments 
in social science, and, increasingly, biological science, without employing 
its idiom. The main use of game theory in this book is as a means of orga-
nizing our thinking about what would be likely outcomes if interacting 
individuals were strictly self-interested and/or if natural selection operated 
only at the level of the individual organism. 
Since the main focus is on areas where game theory doesn't predict 
well, it would not be fair to say that the emphasis here is principally on the 
application of game theory to the social or biological sciences. Those inter-
ested in work with more emphasis along these lines, which also treats the 
experimental literature, should consult Anivash Dixit and Susan Skeath's 
Games of Strategy (1999), Herbert Gintis's Game Theory Evolving (2000), 
or a number of other recent texts. 
This book is more wide ranging in scope, more focused on the impli-
cations of evolutionary approaches, broadly conceived, for our under-
standing of essential human predispositions. In exploring the cognitive 
underpinnings of these tendencies, I also emphasize what has come to be 
called modularity. Modularity refers to cognitive adaptations, which 
employ different neurobiological machinery, use different reasoning algo-
rithms, and may lead to different behavioral outcomes depending upon 
the domain encountered. 
As a result of millions of years of selection, humans possess powerful 
reasoning modules that facilitate foraging and its modern equivalents. 
These include facility at Bayesian learning-necessary for forming "ratio-
nal" expectations-as well as competence at, for example, maximizing 
goals such as caloric yield in allocating time among alternative activities. 
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The mathematics of constrained maximization, central to economic the-
ory, provides a useful metaphor for modeling the operation of such mod-
ules. But in the realm of strategic interaction, as the experimental and 
observational evidence makes clear, humans possess other algorithms and 
action inclinations that are equally and in some cases more important in 
influencing behavior. 
The idea of cognitive and behavioral modularity helps explicate a 
variety of otherwise anomalous observations. But, like group selection, it 
is not one that has been widely considered within the social sciences. As a 
consequence, either is likely to be embraced only after the most careful 
consideration. This book recognizes the appeal of the familiar, and that we 
may be drawn to certain explanatory frameworks because of their expres-
sive qualities or their aesthetic appeal, rather than simply their explana-
tory or predictive power. But it is written under the assumption that evi-
dence and argument ultimately matter, and that the vast majority of 
scholars in our disciplines are interested in these issues and committed to 
traditional scientific methods in addressing them. 
The arguments here vary in complexity, but many are quite subtle. It 
is easy to be glib when discussing such matters as essential human predis-
positions, and when there has been a choice I have erred on the side of pro-
viding documentation and seeking clarity of exposition. This makes for a 
lengthier volume but one I hope will ultimately have more impact. The 
ideas, models, and analyses explored represent serious attempts at under-
standing fundamental social phenomena. To analyze them deeply, even if 
at times critically, is to acknowledge the serious efforts made by scholars 
to understand these problems. 
In striking a balance between being too elliptical and making certain 
my meaning is understood, some redundancies have crept in. For those 
readers who get my drift immediately, some tolerance is sought for those less 
well versed in the technicalities. For those who do not, close reading will per-
haps make an argument become clear in a way it had not been before. 
Readers approaching this study with a jaundiced view of economics 
or rational choice theory may question much in the first part of the book 
as belaboring the obvious. In defense, I can only say that the appeal of the 
methods associated with this tradition remains very strong in modern 
behavioral and social science, and that those employing them have a 
justified sense that they explore the implications of some very powerful 
human predispositions. Only by carefully delineating the restricted applic-
ability of the underlying models can one hope to make headway in articu-
lating the case for alternative and complementary approaches. 
Regardless of one's starting point, it is almost inevitable that some 
aspects of this book will challenge firmly held, perhaps unexamined, 
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assumptions. It is helpful to keep in mind that what is obvious and easily 
accepted by one person may represent a challenge to a deeply entrenched 
presumption or point of view to another. One of the objectives of this 
work has been to soften some of the divergences in perspective that define 
disciplinary divides, and this can only be done by probing fundamentals. 
The research and writing of this book have been extraordinarily enriching 
for me and advanced my thinking significantly. I hope readers will share in 
and benefit from those experiences. 
When contemplating a work attempting to cover a broad range of 
material, one often dips into sections where the knowledge base is strong. 
If details and analysis seem on target, we read further. The book aims to 
survive this test from a range of entry points. It covers multiple literatures, 
and considerable effort has been made to get the details right in each of 
them. For those whose ideas or arguments are inadvertently misinter-
preted, my apologies in advance. 
Following a prologue, the first chapter develops the main issues and 
evidence that occupy the study. Chapter 2 discusses the logic and mathe-
matics of group selection models. Chapters 3 and 4 consider other explo-
rations of altruistic behavior, including work by Robert Trivers, John 
Maynard-Smith, Robert Axelrod, and Robert Frank. Chapter 5 covers 
arguments and evidence underlying the concept of modularity. Chapter 6 
addresses the heuristics and biases research program and its more limited 
relevance to the issues addressed here. Chapter 7 considers heterodox util-
ity functions and differences between historical and social scientific expla-
nations, and looks to a more integrated future. 
My intent in these chapters is to probe, enlighten, and ultimately per-
suade. My hope is not that readers will, in light of what is written here, 
immediately abandon their current lines of inquiry, but rather that they 
will emerge with a better sense of where efforts fit within a larger scientific 
enterprise. 
lowe debts of gratitude to a wide range of individuals who have read 
and commented on part or all of this work in manuscript. Particular 
thanks are due to Paul David; Mark Field; Deborah Garvey; Herbert Gin-
tis; Avner Greif; John Heineke; Jack Hirshleifer; Larry Iannaccone; Ter-
ence Kealey; Robert Keohane; Michael Kevane; Daniel Klein; Timur 
Kuran; Deirdre McCloskey; Ross Miller; Douglass North; Robert 
Numan; Mel Reder; Tom Russell; Bill Sundstrom; Rick Szostak; Gavin 
Wright; and participants in seminars at Stanford University, Santa Clara 
University, the University of California at Berkeley, the University of Cal-
ifornia at Davis, and the August 2000 Knexus symposium at Stanford. 
My wife, Valerie, approaching the work as an intelligent layperson, 
asked the toughest questions, insisting I define terms I took for common 
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knowledge, or clarify exposition I thought was clear. If the book is more 
accessible to a wider audience, she deserves much of the credit. My great-
est acknowledgment is to her and my children, for tolerating over an 
extended period what surely seemed to them abstruse preoccupations. I 
hope, in the end, they will understand what has concerned me. 
Prologue: The World's First Prisoner's 
Dilemma Experiment 
By the time Thomas Hobbes published Leviathan in 1651, his observation 
of the English Civil War had led him to develop an intuitive understanding 
of the Prisoner's Dilemma, and his analysis of and solution to it underlay 
what would become one of the most influential treatises in Western politi-
cal theory. In a state of nature, he argued, individuals would find it mutu-
ally beneficial to agree to restrain their tendencies toward mutual harm and 
deception but, having entered into such agreements, would experience an 
overweening incentive to violate them, and would in fact do so. The agree-
ments, in consequence, would not be worth the paper they were written on 
or the airtime consumed in their negotiation. The introduction of a coercive 
state with a monopoly on the use of force, to which individuals would vol-
untarily submit, was, in his view, the only satisfactory remedy.! 
The clear identification of this most fundamental political and social 
question-how and why groupings of apparently egoistic individuals 
extending beyond kin avoid degenerating into a war of all against all-was 
a seventeenth century achievement. But the systematic investigation of 
what is to date the most widely studied strategic game does not begin until 
1950. In that year the Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) was first formally 
described by Merrill Flood and Melvin Dresher, two researchers at the 
RAND Corporation in Santa Monica, California. Flood and Dresher 
described a game in which each of two players chooses between "cooper-
ating" or "defecting," and in which the best outcome for the players con-
sidered as a pair is not the best for each considered individually. 
At roughly the same time, John Nash, a brilliant mathematics gradu-
ate student at Princeton, defined a solution concept2 for a broad class of 
I. "Such gentler virtues as justice, equity, mercy, and in sum, doing unto others as we 
would be done to, without the terror to cause them to be observed, are contrary to our natural 
passions .... And covenants, without the sword, are but words and of no strength to secure 
a man at all" (Hobbes [1651]1909, chap. 17). 
2. A solution concept adduces a set of assumptions about human behavior and expec-
tations formation, intended to be intuitively plausible, that restricts the outcome or set of 
outcomes players are likely to reach in situations of strategic interaction. 
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games of this type, one characterizing no regret noncooperative3 equilibria 
that are today referred to by his name. A Nash equilibrium is a strategy 
profile such that each player's play is the best response to that of the other. 
In this instance, a strategy profile is simply a pairwise listing of the 
plays of the counterparties. In two player single play Prisoner's Dilemma 
games, there are four possible profiles: cooperate-cooperate, cooperate-
defect, defect-cooperate, and defect-defect. The first element of each pair 
indicates the play of the first player, the second that of the second player. 
The unique Nash equilibrium, as the examples that follow illustrate, is the 
last of these pairs, because for that profile, neither player has available a 
better response to the play of the other. When analysis indicates the exis-
tence of a unique equilibrium, theory has provided us with an unambigu-
ous prediction of the outcome of an interaction, assuming the strategic 
options and payoffs have been appropriately characterized and the 
assumptions about how people will behave are realistic. 
In the single play PD game, mutual defection leads to a Nash equilib-
rium. But the theoretical appeal of the strategy is even stronger, because 
for each player defection is also strictly dominant. This means that it 
results in a higher payoff irrespective of the choice of the counterparty. 
Whether one's counterparty makes the normatively "wrong" play of coop-
erate, or the "correct" play of defect, one's best choice ex post is to have 
defected.4 
Following Flood and Dresher's initial description, the Princeton 
mathematician (and Nash's thesis supervisor) Albert Tucker popularized 
the PD in its canonical form, in the process giving it its distinctive name. 
Here is one version. Two prisoners have jointly committed a crime but 
3. The equilibrium is sometimes referred to as "no regret" because since neither player 
has available a better response to the action of the other, there should be, for each individual, 
no ex post desire to have played differently. In their seminal work, von Neumann and Mor-
genstern (1944) thoroughly analyzed two player zero sum games, games in which what one 
wins the other loses. The Prisoner's Dilemma is not such a game: one of the outcomes (coop-
erate-cooperate) is Pareto superior to another (defect-defect), in the sense that both players 
are better off in the first as compared with the second. von Neumann and Morgenstern also 
suggested ways to analyze non-zero sum games, in which players were able (through some 
unexplained mechanism) to enter into enforceable agreements among each other (this came 
to be known as "cooperative" game theory). Nash took the analysis of non-zero sum games 
in a different direction, analyzing outcomes in which such agreements were not possible. The 
distinction between cooperative and noncooperative games originated in Nash's doctoral 
dissertation. 
4. A Nash equilibrium need not necessarily involve a pair or set of strategies each of 
which is strictly dominant. Each strategy in the equilibrium might well be the best response 
to the other. But if one's counterparty had "foolishly" played differently, in some cases, such 
as in the two player fixed and known duration game, it could have paid to select a different 
strategy. In the two player single play PD game, these concerns need not occupy a player. 
Prologue 3 
agreed beforehand that if caught neither will admit involvement. The dis-
trict attorney tries to entice each of them with a deal: "If you confess 
[defect from your original agreement] and your partner does not, you'll go 
free but your partner gets five years. If you both confess it's three years in 
jail for each of you. If you both persist in denying involvement, I'll put you 
away for a year on a minor and unrelated offense." The prisoners are, in a 
sense, in the same situation as Hobbes's individuals prior to the formation 
of Leviathan, because although they may be dealing with a representative 
of a powerful state (the district attorney), in this instance the state is not 
interested in enforcing their agreement. Indeed, the reverse is true. 
The dilemma, a function of the insidious incentives dangled, is that 
regardless of what the other chooses, each prisoner is, from a self-interest 
standpoint, better off confessing, yet if both refrain from so doing, each 
will get off with less jail time (one year each) than if both confess (three 
years each). Not confessing, however, exposes a player to the risk of the 
longest-five-year-prison term. Moreover, if a player believes his coun-
terparty will not confess, he may be tempted by the desire to go free, and 
therefore defect at the counterparty's expense. 
Three of the four strategy profiles are efficient in this sense: compar-
ing the jail terms in any of these three with those associated with each of 
the alternatives, neither player can be made better off without making the 
other worse off. The Nash equilibrium is the only profile that does not 
have this quality. It is the only Pareto inferior outcome, because, in com-
parison to it, cooperate-cooperate yields less jail time for each. The coop-
erate-cooperate profile (the prisoners are cooperating with each other, not 
the authorities) is the best of the three efficient outcomes for the two play-
ers considered jointly, because it minimizes the total amount of jail time. 
But players are sorely tempted, and encouraged by prudence, to move in 
directions that will not result in this outcome. 
The dilemma can be made more dramatic by raising the stakes. Imag-
ine the players as revolutionaries and, as a means of concentrating our 
minds, replace the five-year sentence with death by firing squad. 
TABLE 1. A Prisoner's Dilemma with High Stakes 
Strategy Profile 
Vladimir remains silent; Joe remains silent 
Vladimir remains silent; Joe confesses 
Vladimir confesses; Joe remains silent 
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Vladimir thinks that Joe will remain loyal and keep his mouth shut, 
and hates to betray him, but, as he has been known to say, in order to 
make a revolution one has to break a few eggs. Joe reasons identically, so 
they end up in jail for three years, rather than the one-year sentence each 
could have obtained had both remained silent. Or, fearing that Joe will 
betray him, Vladimir spills the beans out of simple prudential self-preser-
vation, with Joe reasoning in the same fashion. In either event, the out-
come (**) is the same: defect-defect is the unique Nash equilibrium 
because it is the only strategy profile for which each player's play is the 
best response to that of the other. 
The fact that the rational pursuit of individual interest apparently 
drives players to the one Pareto inferior profile helps account for the 
enduring scholarly and popular interest in the game. The conclusion 
appears to violate widely held intuitions that interactions of egoistic agents 
lead to mutually beneficial outcomes, a central tenet of economic thinking. 
Obviously, the context of such interactions must matter. For many, the 
Prisoner's Dilemma resonates as a metaphor for real world dilemmas peri-
odically confronted, and references to it can easily creep into day-to-day 
conversation, particularly among those with exposure to modern analyti-
cal social science. 5 
To Hobbes it was as clear as a geometric proof that the Prisoner's 
Dilemma could not be surmounted in the absence of an all-powerful ruler. 
Nevertheless, because humans often rebel at the conclusion that defection 
is the normatively "correct" play in these instances, the exploration of sit-
uations appropriately modeled as PDs poses problems for social scientists 
interested in predicting behavior. Flood and Dresher were concerned not 
just with the counsel of game theory. They also wanted to know how 
humans, sophisticated humans, would actually play the game. To this end, 
they recruited Armen Alchian, a member of the UCLA economics depart-
ment, and John Williams, chair of RAND's math department and future 
author of The Compleat Strategyst. 6 In the first ever Prisoner's Dilemma 
experiment, Alchian and Williams played one hundred games, one after 
the other. The theoretical convention is then to understand the entire 
sequence as one game, with each of the pairs of plays defined as a stage. In 
5. Flood and Dresher's experiment involved asymmetric returns to the two players and 
points, not jail terms, but the ranking of the payoffs associated with the different strategy 
profiles is identical. The game and the dilemma it captures have spawned an enormous theo-
retical and empirical literature (Roth 1995a; Poundstone 1992,8; Nassar 1998, chap. 13). 
6. In this, the most popular study the RAND Corporation has ever published, Williams 
avoids discussion of the Prisoner's Dilemma. He presumably wished to emphasize the 
explanatory successes of game theory and chose not to dwell on this instance where its pre-
dictions are poor and its counsel so problematic (Williams 1954). 
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a two player game of fixed and known duration, which this was, the 
unique Nash equilibrium is for each player to defect in each of its one hun-
dred stages. Assuming Alchian and Williams believed each other to be 
rational, and were committed themselves to playing rationally, continuous 
defection was the only defensible strategy for either. 
In this inaugural experiment, however, the two subjects behaved quite 
differently from what theory counseled. Contrary to the predictions sug-
gested by Nash's analysis, and in spite of his initial defection, Alchian 
cooperated sixty-eight times; Williams did so seventy-eight times. The play-
ers achieved mutual cooperation (cooperate-cooperate), which is jointly 
better for the players than mutual defection, although defection is always 
individually superior, in sixty of the hundred stages (Flood 1958, 5-26; 
Poundstone 1992, 107-16). 
Nash's subsequent life history has been almost cinematic in its 
pathos, a testimony to the complexities of a human psyche his work 
attempts to model in more unidimensional terms. In 1959 he succumbed to 
severe mental illness, resigned his tenured professorship at MIT, and for 
several decades haunted the halls of Princeton and the Institute for 
Advanced Study, a shadow of his former self. In the last decade, he has 
recovered, at least partially, and, in a poignant moment, shared the Nobel 
Prize in economics in 1994 with John Harsanyi and Reinhard Selten (Nas-
sar 1998). In 1950, however, Nash was visiting RAND and at the top of his 
intellectual form. When he heard about Flood and Dresher's results, 
which deconfirmed his predictions, he wrote a note to the experimenters 
that was eventually included in their final technical report. The note 
included this remarkable and somewhat plaintive comment about the 
observed behavior of (the hardly naive) Alchian and Williams: "I would 
have thought them more rational" (Flood 1958, 16; Roth 1995a, 8-9). 
Nash's comment raises profound issues about what it means for 
humans to be intelligent, smart, or rational. Since humans are generally 
viewed as more intelligent and smarter than other animals, it leads, in a 
related fashion, to questions about the evolutionary contribution of larger 
cranial capacity, generally viewed as facilitating rational choice, to the 
achievement of cooperative outcomes. Because the social sciences are 
today so heavily influenced by the rational choice tradition, it compels us 
to ask what factors or considerations might predispose people to play 
cooperate in such circumstances. 
Defining Rationality 
To be useful, the word rational must be defined with precision. I will for-
mally understand an action to be rational if it satisfies two criteria, the first 
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concerning how and on what basis beliefs are formed, the second how 
actions are chosen. A rational choice must be based first of all on beliefs 
about the state of the world that have been arrived at rationally. I am dis-
tinguishing here between beliefs as values or preferences and beliefs as fac-
tual or probabilistic propositions, meaning the latter. A rational actor 
should devote an "optimal" amount of resources and energy to acquiring 
or improving on the relevant information set, and then apply the best 
available cognitive algorithms, logical and/or statistical, in arriving at 
these beliefs about the actual or likely state of the world (on the practical 
implementation of this, see Gigerenzer and Todd 1999; on the concept of 
a rational expectation as one embodying all "available" information, see 
Muth 1961). 
It would not, for example, be rational to conclude that today it will be 
sunny because so it was last Thursday, when one could easily open the 
shades and see the approach of storm clouds. In this instance, assuming 
there are real costs if it rains and one predicts sunny skies, insufficient 
resources have been devoted to acquiring information, and the expecta-
tion or forecasting algorithm employed is suboptimal: it would generally 
be better to forecast today's weather using yesterday's, or better yet, this 
morning's, rather than last Thursday's. 
Second, conditional on beliefs arrived at rationally, a rational actor 
should choose so as optimally (with the greatest likelihood) to satisfy his 
or her desires or preferences. If one believes it will rain, and one wishes to 
stay dry, one should choose to take an umbrella. Assuming that we can 
usefully view most human behavior as purposive (there is an important 
argument-see Lane 1996-that some is simply expressive), and thus 
behavior reflects instrumental choice of means to achieve ends, what char-
acterizes these ends? Most economic models assume that preferences are 
stable over time; invariant with respect to how formally identical choices 
are presented; transitive (if A is preferred to Band B to C, A must be pre-
ferred to C); that they cover all possible outcomes; and perhaps most gen-
erally, that they are egoistic: reflective of the desires of the individual. 
The assumption of egoism is critical in rational choice models, and it 
is important to explore the implications of how it is understood. In order 
for a rational choice model to be refutable, it must do more than simply 
maintain that individuals act in satisfaction of their desires-clearly a tau-
tology. Almost any behavior can, after the fact, be "explained" within the 
context of that definition. Precisely because the formulation is so flexible, 
it leads away from models capable of making out-of-sample predictions.? 
7. The language is drawn from the statistical literature. The idea is that for a model to 
be tested scientifically, it must be confronted with data other than that used to generate it. 
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Consequently, a theory based on this broad understanding of rationality 
can't scientifically be tested. It becomes easy to provide rationales for 
behavior already observed, but difficult to specify circumstances under 
which a theory of rational choice can be rejected. 
While the tautological definition can still claim to be based on egois-
tic preferences, it imposes few restrictions on what they are. As David 
Hume said, "'tis not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the 
world to the scratching of my finger" (quoted in Leslie 1996, 156). Nor, in 
principle, does it require that preferences be stable or transitive. If your 
preferences are different tomorrow than they were today, or five minutes 
ago, who is to say that your tastes are to be disputed? If you choose to act 
in ways that benefit others and harm yourself, who is to say that the behav-
ior does not satisfy some deep seated psychological need and is thus actu-
ally egoistic? Thus, using the broader definition, one really has no choice 
but to conclude that the widow who throws herself on her husband's 
funeral pyre is being completely rational. 
I don't attempt to engage the tautological version of the theory 
empirically, because it is not so engageable. Instead, I characterize the 
standard economic model as predicting, among actions that might be 
termed rational, those that efficiently advance the material welfare of the 
actor (see Kavka 1986, 35; Samuelson 1993, 143; Elster 1999b, 142--43; 
Frank 2000, xxiv). This narrowing of the definition enables us to posit 
behavior by an agent that would, based on external observation, be incon-
sistent with rational choice. We can identify as irrational the choice of 
death over life or, assuming zero disposal costs, less to more (Arrow 1951, 
136). Such a modeling approach can claim scientific status because it gen-
erates predictions that might not be realized.8 
There is an additional advantage for our purposes in adopting this 
stronger definition of rationality. Choosing life over death and more 
wealth over less will tend to increase an organism's reproductive fitness. 
Choosing this definition has the consequence of aligning rationality 
8. There is an intermediate position, one that theorists such as Gary Becker would prob-
ably characterize themselves as holding, in which one allows greater variation in goals, but 
continues to insist that preferences be stable, transitive, and invariant. Such an approach can 
also be defended as scientific because it is possible to imagine or observe behavior of individu-
als at variance with these postulates. What I have termed "the standard model" embodies a 
stronger version of rationality, and there are several ways in which it can be tested: by search-
ing for revealed intransitive preferences, for choices influenced by irrelevant considerations, or 
for choice ofless over more. In focusing on decision making under uncertainty, the heuristics 
and biases literature has generally pursued the first two of these (see chap. 6). My focus will be 
on the third and on well-defined environments in which the behavior of counterparties 
remains the only real source of uncertainty. In some cases, such as the responder's choice in a 
sequential move ultimatum or dictator game, even that source of uncertainty is removed. 
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closely with the type of behavior likely to be favored by the individual level 
view of natural selection. Consequently, when we say that an action is 
rational, we will also be saying, in evolutionary terms, that predispositions 
toward it would have been favored by individual level selection. Con-
versely, when we say that an action is irrational because it is altruistic, we 
will be saying that predispositions toward it would have required selection 
above the individual level in order to become established in populations.9 
Because rationality is so highly valued in Western culture, we often 
find ourselves pulled in the direction of embracing its broader, more 
encompassing definition, one less likely to be inconsistent with observa-
tion. This is a temptation that must be resisted if we wish to retain sci-
entific aspirations. In many instances we may wish desperately to believe 
that altruistic behavior is rational in the stronger sense. But this cannot be 
so, because biologically altruistic behavior by definition damages the rela-
tive fitness of the actor, whereas rational behavior, as defined here, 
efficiently advances our material well-being. If behavior that benefits oth-
ers turns out to benefit us as well, it is not altruistic but has, by definition, 
become mutualistic. 
Were Alchian and Williams Rational? 
There is every reason to conclude that the beliefs held by Alchian and 
Williams about the game they were playing were rational. As far as we can 
tell they fully understood its rules and the payoffs to the different strategy 
profiles, and understood that the other understood this: the beliefs each 
held were common knowledge. The assumption of rationality as defined 
earlier implies that, if the payoffs had been accurately characterized, each 
player should have defected at the outset and continued along the same 
path. This they did not do. 
What did Flood and Dresher's two subjects think as they played this 
game? We have good evidence on this. Besides recording the sequence of 
plays in the game, the experimenters asked their subjects to keep a written 
log of their thoughts prior to each move. On the first play, Alchian 
defected, reasoning that Williams surely would as well, and therefore if he 
(Alchian) cooperated, it would mean a certain win for his counterparty. As 
Williams made his initial, and to Alchian confounding, cooperative move, 
he wrote down, regarding Alchian, "I hope he's bright," observing, as he 
(Williams) tried cooperation again a second time, "He isn't, but maybe 
he'll wise up." 
9. It is not accidental that the individual level view of evolution is often advanced as 
explanation for why the strong version of rationality should be accepted. 
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Eventually, to a remarkable degree, Alchian did "wise up," to the evi-
dent satisfaction of Williams but not Nash. Nash was unhappy both with 
Alchian's and Williams's choices in the experiment and with Flood and 
Dresher's design, protesting that it permitted too much interaction among 
the players, and that one would see behavior closer to that predicted by his 
(Nash's) analysis if players were rotated through a number of simultane-
ously operating games and thereby deprived of knowledge of previous 
play against a particular opponent. That objection, of course, is obviously 
irrelevant in a single play PD game and, as subsequent analysis showed, 
irrelevant for a repeated game of fixed and known duration, as was the 
Flood and Dresher design, so long as one assumed all counterparties were 
rational. Why? Mutual defection should clearly take place in the very last 
stage because at that point each player faces the equivalent of a single 
game, for which defect is a strictly dominant strategy. Having apparently 
resolved uncertainty about the outcome of the final stage, players should 
conclude that it would be rational to defect on the penultimate play, and, 
continuing to reason by backward induction, eventually conclude that it 
would be rational to defect on the very first play and all that follow (Luce 
and Raiffa 1957,94-102; Kreps et al. 1982,246). 
This argument may strike readers less familiar with the game theory 
literature as somehow wrong, because most people are unprepared to rea-
son more than two or three steps by backward induction (Camerer 1997). 
But its logic is unimpeachable. Estimates or forecasts of counterparty play 
derived from preplay conversation or observation of past behavior are 
simply not relevant from the standpoint of canonical game theory in 
choosing one's best strategy in this game, if one assumes one's counter-
party is also rational. 
There is considerable evidence, however, that such considerations do 
influence how humans actually behave in these kinds of interactions. Many 
readers, indeed, placed in a controlled environment and asked to play one-
shot or fixed and known duration PDs, would, like the two subjects dis-
cussed earlier, probably not act in the way counseled by theory. The use of 
game theory in this instance is to specify very precisely what rational self-
interested players should do. It is to force the issue of what the underlying 
cognitive and behavioral assumptions really imply in these situations. The 
predictions made by theory unavoidably call attention to the implications 
of the evidence that many subjects, as did Alchian and Williams, systemat-
ically ignore the counsel of theory, and in so doing avoid Pareto inferior 
outcomes. But, as Nash observed and complained, in so doing they are not 
choosing according to the precepts of rational choice theory. 
Since that first experiment, the propensity among high proportions of 
subjects to play cooperate, even in single play PD games, has been 
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confirmed experimentally hundreds of times (for a summary, see Roth 
1995a, 27). The willingness to do so, because it offers the counterparty an 
otherwise unavailable opportunity to benefit, and exposes the player to an 
otherwise avoidable risk of loss, is a form of individual sacrifice that will 
unequivocally benefit the counterparty. By playing cooperate, one grants 
to a counterparty an option to obtain the highest possible payoff in the 
game (in the examples, freedom), at the cost of imposing on oneself the 
lowest possible payoff (in the first example, five years jail time, in the sec-
ond, death). Such behavior, because it creates beneficial opportunities for 
an unrelated conspecific and imposes avoidable risks on the actor, is altru-
istic from a biological standpoint, unambiguously so in a one-shot game. 
And, when the choice of cooperate is made in a controlled experimental 
environment in which there can be no expectation that the game will be 
indefinitely repeated, the play simply cannot satisfy the criteria of eco-
nomic rationality as defined earlier. 10 
Why, in this very first PD experiment, did the two subjects each 
choose voluntarily, more than two-thirds of the time, to play in a way that 
cannot be defended as rational according to standard economic criteria? 
This question is particularly striking given Alchian's and Williams's famil-
iarity with logic, mathematics, and economic theory. Subsequent studies 
have deepened our understanding of its dimensions, but the nature of this 
behavioral predisposition-a puzzling anomaly from the standpoint of the 
standard economic model-has been evident from the very start of exper-
imental research on human strategic interaction, if it was not so before. Is 
it possible that there is something common in our constitutive features 
that facilitates solution of these dilemmas? If so, how could it possibly 
have arisen? 
Toward an Improved Behavioral Science 
This book is concerned with fundamental aspects of human nature, and 
with the attempts by economists and other social scientists to identify its 
essential features and explore its implications. At a practical level it asks 
how we can proceed in developing a behavioral science with improved pre-
dictive capabilities. In particular, what should be our practice when the 
predictions of a theory are repeatedly deconfirmed-as they are here-by 
experimental and observational evidence? The answer will appear to many 
to be obvious-modify the theory or model such that its predictions bear a 
closer correspondence to observable data-and one can appeal to Milton 
10. In the fixed and known duration game, this conclusion depends on the assumption 
that counterparties are rational. In the one-shot game, the conclusion that defect is the only 
rational play is independent of how the counterparty chooses. See chapter I. 
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Friedman and many others in support of this course of action. Friedman 
claims that the gold standard for evaluating a model or hypothesis is pre-
diction: out-of-sample prediction, no doubt, with success defined accord-
ing to the purposes for which the model was intended, but prediction 
nonetheless (1953, 40). 
Within the field of philosophy of science, however, matters are rarely 
so simple or straightforward. To illustrate this, consider the views of 
Ronald Coase, another University of Chicago Nobelist. Coase argues that 
we should and do prefer models that accurately capture features of (give 
insight into) how a process works, even if they don't predict well. 11 
Both Friedman and Coase advance defensible positions, and if one 
proceeds carefully it is possible to reconcile them so that they are not nec-
essarily in conflict. 12 Nevertheless, this reconciliation is a delicate business, 
and the attempt eclectically and unreflexively to hold both positions can 
easily degenerate into jeopardizing any claim that what we are doing is sci-
ence. In particular, the habit of moving almost at will between them, 
embracing prediction until it fails and then championing the Coase view, 
particularly where intuition is the standard for judging the degree of 
"insight" provided, reflects a methodological opportunism that can easily 
render the practice of behavioral science impervious to the appearance of 
deconfirming evidence. In the limit, it creates a practice that simply cannot 
justify the designator science, regardless of what definition we may choose. 
It leads to disciplines that are inward looking, often contemptuous of 
work in other areas, yet ultimately insecure in their status as sciences. This 
diagnosis can most easily be made with respect to economics (Reder 1999) 
but can be applied as well to other social sciences, whether or not they fully 
embrace the rational choice paradigm (on anthropology, see Sperber 1996, 
16; on political science, see Green and Shapiro 1994, x-xi, and Lane 1996, 
123-26; on sociology, see Rule 1997). 
Friedman's views are often adduced to counter suggestions that we 
should revise or reject an economic model because its assumptions are 
unrealistic. But when models consistently predict poorly it is both appro-
priate and necessary for us to scrutinize the behavioral assumptions that 
underlie them. Friedman's dictum that we abstain from considering such 
II. "Faced with a choice between a theory which predicts well but gives us little insight 
into how the system works and one which gives us this insight and predicts badly, I would 
choose the latter, and I am inclined to think that most economists would do the same" (Coase 
1982,6). 
12. The domain over which the prediction criterion is evaluated is critical. If the 
domain is narrow, a model may pass the Friedman test-perhaps not surprising, ifit has been 
constructed in part based on data from that domain-but we might still credit the Coasian 
view on the grounds that it wi11lay the groundwork for the construction of a model that in 
the longer run will perform better by Friedman's criterion over a broader purview. 
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issues can be applicable only as long as the model delivers the predictive 
goods. 13 It is one thing, as a scientist, to back away from Karl Popper's 
view that a single deconfirming experiment or piece of evidence can or 
should be grounds for jettisoning a model (Lakatos 1970). It is another to 
be unable or unwilling to specify any conceivable empirical observation or 
series of observations that would lead to the modification of one's theory. 
Yet in a number of areas of social science we have come close to this. 
A casual attitude toward evidence in justifying model assumptions, 
sometimes observed among rational choice or microeconomic theorists, is 
reflected in the influential writings of Lionel Robbins. 
The propositions of economic theory, like all scientific theory, are 
obviously deductions from a set of postulates. And the chief of these 
postulates are all assumptions involving in some way simple and 
indisputable facts of experience .... These are not postulates the exis-
tence of whose counterpart in reality admits of extensive dispute once 
their nature is fully realized. We do not need controlled experiments to 
establish their validity: they are so much stuff of our everyday experi-
ence that they have only to be recognized as obvious. (my italics) 
(Robbins [1932] 1984, 78-79)14 
Robbins was referring to such indisputable "facts" as the existence of 
scarcity, but his reasoning has often been applied by rational choice theo-
rists to the basic assumptions we make about human behavior. 
Scientific advance often involves probing beneath the surface of what 
appears obvious. The striking results of the very first Prisoner's Dilemma 
experiment are the tip of a much larger iceberg. They are complemented by 
a growing body of experimental evidence, as well as a wide range of field 
observation. These data confirm repeatedly that the standard economic 
model predicts poorly in a range of domains, particularly those involving 
strategic interaction. Under these circumstances we are naturally and 
l3. See Friedman 1996 for arguments in favor of and (mostly) against the position 
advanced here. This edited book, in conjunction with Green and Shapiro 1994, to which it is 
a response, provides a sophisticated and methodologically informed discussion of the contri-
butions of rational choice models within political science. My views on philosophy of science 
closely mirror those expressed in Green and Shapiro 1996 (255-61). 
14. See also Koopmans 1957 (l31). Koopmans advocated separating theory entirely 
from observation "for the protection of both" (cited in McCloskey 2000,217). Both Robbins 
and Koopmans are discussed in Hildenbrand 1999 (39); both have for decades been standard 
methodological references for graduate students in economics. Popper's emphasis on the 
requirement that scientific propositions generate refutable hypotheses was forcefully intro-
duced to an economics audience by Hutchinson (1938). Most economists accept the position 
in principle but are often less consistent in adhering to it in practice. See also Lewin 1994. 
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justifiably drawn to examining the model's underpinnings. So long as our 
vehicle gets us where we want to go, we can perhaps eschew interest in how 
it operates. But when that condition no longer holds, we need, as it were, 
to look under the hood. 
The underpinnings of the standard economic model, including the 
common assumption of psychological egoism, comprise an implicit theory 
of human nature. Following Gregory Kavka (1986,29-31), I view such a 
theory as a description of a set of cognitive and behavioral predispositions 
possessed by all or nearly all human beings, tendencies alterable through 
changes in the natural or social environment only with great difficulty. 
Given that the standard model performs poorly in certain domains, we 
may legitimately inquire whether its cognitive and behavioral assump-
tions-its implicit theory of human nature-are adequate enough, com-
plete enough, or realistic enough for the task at hand. 
The Coase position does, after all, and in contrast to Friedman, evi-
dence an interest in how the engine operates. But if we are to select emen-
dations or alterations to the assumptions reflected in the standard eco-
nomic model, the criteria for so doing should be more systematic than 
intuition, ultimately no more an adequate guide in developing alternatives 
than a justification for sticking with a poorly performing model. Persisting 
in regarding the mechanism(s) producing behavior as a black box, and 
continuing to rely only on our intuition, we are likely to end up with 
emended models that provide ex post rationales for anomalous observa-
tions but lack out-of-sample predictive power because they have not ade-
quately captured relevant cognitive or behavioral mechanisms. 
In many cases we can do better predictively than has the standard 
model by considering what the black box was designed for, how natural 
selection achieved this, and the relevance both of experimental data 
focused on its mechanisms and what scientists who have opened it up can 
tell us about its workings. This position meets resistance from those who, 
like Robbins, do not wish to be bothered with experimental results, evolu-
tionary theory and history, or research in such areas as neuroanatomy and 
neuroscience. But this stance returns us to the untenable position of being 
unwilling to modify a model that suffers repeated predictive failure 
because its postulates are assumed to be axiomatic. 
A close and dear relative of mine once maintained with great convic-
tion that the accelerator of an automobile was connected directly to its 
speedometer. This model had intuitive appeal, and so long as one did not 
focus on the consequences of revving the engine in neutral, or coasting 
down a hill with the engine off, it predicted reasonably well. As one might 
imagine, however, performing either of these actions produced anomalous 
observations. 
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Persistent failures of prediction compel those scientifically inclined to 
explore, consider, or develop alternate models. But can intuition alone be 
relied upon to provide the appropriate emendations? Is it not a better 
strategy to dirty one's hands by getting under the hood? In the case of the 
automobile speedometer, this involved thinking about what the 
speedometer was designed for, perhaps even tracing the cable emanating 
from it to its origin. 
The principle illustrated is general. Developing alternatives in the 
behavioral sciences, or justifying staying with an existing approach, needs 
to be done in other than a casual fashion if we are to move forward in 
developing disciplines with improved predictive power. All relevant evi-
dence should be brought to bear. A dismissive attitude toward the value of 
empirical data in general and controlled experiments in particular in eval-
uating the validity of cognitive or behavioral assumptions handicaps this 
effort. 
In progressive sciences, the identification of predictive weaknesses or 
anomalies within existing theoretical approaches has historically proved 
an effective way station in developing alternative or revised frameworks 
generally viewed as superior. A growing body of research on human sub-
jects, both experimental and observational, now makes it possible more 
specifically and less tentatively to identify domains wherein the standard 
economic model performs poorly, and to calibrate these regularities to 
give us some idea of what kinds of deviations we are likely to see, and 
under what conditions we are likely to see them. Observing, identifying, 
and categorizing these anomalies, and clarifying their scope through fur-
ther observation and experimentation-methods common to the sci-
ences-are processes that can help organize and discipline our considera-
tion of alternative sets of behavioral or cognitive assumptions (for similar 
argument, see Ostrom 1998; van Damme 1999, 187; or Schelling 1960, 
162-63). 
The methodology advocated is modern-not postmodern, except to 
the degree that these philosophical currents incorporate a necessary prag-
matism. Francis Bacon protested against scholastics, who continued to 
deduce "new scientific conclusions from premises insufficiently founded, 
as all the premises of the natural sciences must be, on the evidence of the 
senses" (Gross 1990,88). He proposed an empiricism based on the experi-
mental method: a "double scale or ladder, ascendant and descendent; 
ascending from experiments to the inventions of causes, and descending 
from causes to the invention of new experiments" (Bacon 1973, 90-91). 
Science is, to be sure, conducted by humans with all their frailties, and we 
should not fetishize its procedures. Its modes of reasoning rely heavily on 
induction, which, since David Hume, we have known has no firm philo-
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sophical foundation. As Bertrand Russell put it, "Domestic animals 
expect food when they see the person who usually feeds them. We know 
that all these rather crude expectations of uniformity are liable to be mis-
leading. The man who has fed the chicken every day throughout his life at 
last wrings its neck instead" (1974, 21). 
Yet in recognizing the foibles of scientists and the weaknesses of sci-
entific methods, there is no need to celebrate these weaknesses. From a 
pragmatic standpoint, scientific methodologies have been extraordinarily 
productive of real advances in knowledge in biology, chemistry, physics, 
geology, and many other natural sciences. To claim otherwise calls into 
question much of the epistemological foundation of the modern world. 
Since humans are part of the natural world, there is no reason in principle 
why the understanding of our behavior should not be amenable to similar 
methods. Our behavior is not inherently less tractable. In many instances, 
it is easier to predict using simple statistical algorithms, at least in the 
aggregate, than are some other natural phenomena such as the weather. 
The alternative of allowing the social sciences to continue down insu-
lar roads in the direction of a new scholasticism is not to be preferred. 
Advances in the behavioral sciences are likely to arrive, and indeed are 
arriving, from the systematic organization and production of evidence, 
both experimental and observational, in continual dialogue with specula-
tions about causes, not disciplines devoted to the deduction of new "sci-
entific" conclusions from premises insufficiently founded. If the social sci-
ences are to be truly social, they must remain in close dialogue with empirical 
evidence. And if they are to be scientific, the evidence must be treated in a 
systematic way. 
These approaches offer the promise of producing behavioral models 
with superior predictive power. But ultimately we would like to do more. 
We would like to understand why: to understand mechanism and, in the 
final analysis, origin. Why does the standard model perform relatively well 
in some domains and poorly in others? I believe the perspectives of evolu-
tionary history and theory can be of great assistance here, by helping us 
understand what our essential cognitive and behavioral predispositions 
were designed for, and how that design took place. 
Scope, Objectives, and Audience 
The principles advocated here and the research program to which they 
give rise conflict with established ways of doing business within the social 
sciences. Nevertheless, the ingredients for such a program are emerging in 
a range of different intellectual locales, with relevant advances occurring 
in areas both within and outside of the social sciences. Many of these, and 
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the opportunities afforded by them, have been recognized only slowly, 
particularly across disciplinary boundaries, and especially where tradi-
tions of insularity are strong. 
H is now possible for us to reference a range of literatures beyond the 
purview of traditional social science in evaluating and selecting a set of 
cognitive and behavioral assumptions for models of human behavior that 
are likely in the longer run to perform better according to the Friedman 
criterion. These include, in addition to the experimental work, a number of 
areas in the natural sciences that have witnessed important, in some cases 
very rapid recent progress, including molecular biology, in particular that 
underlying genetics; neurobiology and neuroanatomy; evolutionary the-
ory and history; and ethology. By exploring these literatures in a focused, 
analytically rigorous, and empirically disciplined fashion, I hope, within 
the behavioral sciences, to bring to bear in an intelligent fashion the results 
of recent research in the natural, particularly biological, sciences, but also, 
perhaps even more important, to encourage a greater unity of purpose 
among the social sciences. 
Many parts of this story can be found elsewhere, and the extensive 
bibliography provides an entry to these bodies of work. A distinguishing 
feature of this exploration, however, is the joint consideration of two con-
troversial and related ideas: the operation of multilevel (including group) 
selection within early human evolutionary processes, and the likelihood of 
modularity: domain specific adaptations in our cognitive mechanisms and 
behavioral predispositions. Both of these ideas reflect traffic up and down 
Bacon's twin ladders, as we attempt to understand what underlies the 
results of the world's first PD experiment and those that followed. 
These ideas are developed in the light of the growing body of experi-
mental research involving human subjects, one carried forward by behav-
ioral scientists trained in a variety of disciplinary traditions, including eco-
nomics, psychology, sociology, and political science. And they are 
considered within the context of two well-established traditions within the 
social sciences: the sociological/anthropological and the economic or 
rational choice. These traditions are similar in sometimes surprising 
ways. IS But in other important respects they differ, and indeed, those 
trained within one have frequently been at loggerheads with adherents of 
the other. Whereas it is possible to cite instances of apostates now embrac-
ing a framework formerly anathema, it is unclear what the overall net 
migration has been. 
In any event, charting such flows misses the point, because this book 
15. There are analogues, for example, between structural-functional explanation in 
sociology and anthropology and economists' explanation of institutional selection with ref-
erence to efficiency properties. 
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does not argue that either of these traditions offers the one true and cor-
rect foundation for social science, or that progress is to be measured by 
tabulating intellectual demography. I do claim that in the final analysis the 
approach we adopt should be determined by evidence and logic, that the 
divide between these two traditions is both symptomatic of and contribu-
tor to the insularities of the social sciences, and that it needs to be bridged. 
The construction of that bridge requires alterations in foundational 
assumptions in both camps. The task is complicated because those operat-
ing within the sociological/anthropological tradition have been deeply sus-
picious of any discussion of biological influences on cognition or behavior, 
seeing it as a threat to the autonomy of central theoretical concepts such as 
culture or social structure. Rational choice theorists' understanding of the 
import of evolutionary theory for their work, on the other hand, has been 
typically limited by adherence to what one might call pop Darwinism, 
which at the outset conceives of natural selection as operating exclusively 
at the level of the individual organism. Pop Darwinism has provided a 
background reinforcer for the belief that the behavioral postulates of the 
standard economic model are axiomatic. 
Bridging these traditions requires a catholic approach, but one that 
retains willingness to recognize deficiencies on either side of the divide: the 
side one builds from and the side one builds to. Previous attempts have 
foundered, I believe, on an inability to develop and maintain a consistent 
critical perspective. With this challenge of intellectual civil engineering in 
mind, literatures from political science, psychology, sociology, anthropol-
ogy, history, law, and philosophy are addressed, although the point of 
departure and principal point of reference is economics, the most self-con-
sciously "Darwinian" of the social sciences. Although some basic familiar-
ity with the empirical and theoretical literature in game theory is a helpful 
starting point, the book is written with the intent that it might be read with 
interest and profit by scholars and students in any of these disciplines, as 
well as by educated lay readers with exposure to contemporary currents in 
modern behavioral science. 
Having stated some of the book's aspirations, it is important as well 
to stress its limitations. It may be helpful, for example, to make clear at the 
outset that this is not principally a work in moral philosophy or ethics-
concerned with whether we should cooperate or reciprocate, for example. 
It is about what we as humans actually do, and about essential predisposi-
tions that enabled human or hominid ancestors to live successfully in 
groups extending beyond immediate kin. 16 Second, its main interest is in 
16. Hominids include Homo sapiens, his immediate predecessors, such as Homo erectus, 
and other extinct species, such as Homo neanderthalensis. Hominoids include all these plus 
apes, anthropoids all hominoids plus monkeys, and primates all anthropoids plus prosimians. 
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universal features of human societies, not primarily in cultural variation 
and its consequences. 
The Case for Human Universals 
Human groups have differed greatly in their toleration or encouragement 
of cannibalism, slavery, human sacrifice, interminable feuding, head-hunt-
ing, female genital mutilation, violent and painful male initiation rights, 
and ceremonial rape, to name just a few of the culturally variable practices 
Robert Edgerton documents in his book Sick Societies (1992). Edgerton 
reminds us, in sometimes excruciatingly painful detail, that the conse-
quences of such variation can be significant and, within broad limits, that 
cultural practices may be maladaptive as well as adaptive or neutral for a 
group considered as a whole. 
More generally, societies have differed greatly in their political cul-
tures; in their treatment of women, children, and the aged; in their 
stratification; and in their tolerance of inequality of all sorts. Timur Kuran 
(1995) has developed models that help us understand why that variation, 
and the course of development of a particular society's political culture, 
such as that in Eastern Europe or the shah's Iran, is so difficult to predict. 
It is precisely the inability to make such predictions that he advances as 
confirmation of the validity of his analysis. 17 Consistent with these conclu-
sions, I argue that such variation can, after the fact, only be explained his-
torically, a point returned to in chapter 7. No general theory of the deter-
minants of cultural or political variation is here proposed. 
Rather, it is the origin of cultural universals, in particular the degree 
to which they have in part a biological foundation, that I explore. The idea 
that there are such universals conflicts with deeply held views, particularly 
in sociology and anthropology. The principle of relativism, indeed, has 
been so firmly embraced in anthropology that many define the field as the 
study of culture rather than the study of humans (see Brown 1991). 
In the last half century, a variety of research and evidence has made 
more legitimate the consideration of human universals. Noam Chomsky's 
work on universal grammar (1957), discussed in chapter 5, has been 
influential, as has been Paul Ekman and Wallace V. Friesen's on human 
facial expressions (1975). Ekman and Friesen showed members of pre liter-
ate New Guinean tribes photographs of Americans who were angry, 
17. His analysis does, however, contain refutable hypotheses. For example, he predicts 
that sudden unexpected regime changes are more likely to occur in repressive regimes that do 
not allow the results of polling data to be made public. 
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happy, or afraid, and asked them to select one that matched a story such 
as "she is about to fight." Even though subjects had no prior experience 
with U.S. culture, they were able to match photo with affect with little 
difficulty, providing compelling evidence that a subset of facial expressions 
comprises a universal human language. 
On a more informal level one might mention as well the remarkable 
documentary First Contact, which appeared in 1983. The film is based on 
footage taken by three Australian gold prospectors who in 1930 unexpect-
edly encountered over a million highland New Guinean tribespeople who 
had had no prior contact with the outside world. The gestures and facial 
expressions of these individuals, their ability quickly to establish a rough 
understanding with the intruders, and their success in coming to terms 
with westerners and Western civilization, as evident in interviews a half 
century later, is highly suggestive of a core universality in human cognitive 
and behavioral mechanisms. 
Ekman and Friesen's work suggests that a subset of our facial expres-
sions is ultimately governed by biological machinery built according to a 
common set of genetic instructions, Chomsky's that we are biologically 
prepared to learn language according to a set of deep structural rules. It 
appears as well that the taxonomies we use for animals and plants have a 
hardwired component. Scott Atran's cross-cultural evidence suggests that 
all human are born with a set of categories for classifying living things that 
corresponds very closely to outlines of the Linnaean system. In contrast, 
uniformities in "folk biologies" have no counterpart in taxonomies of 
inanimate objects, many of which have been part of the human environ-
ment only in recent centuries or millennia (Atran 1990, 1998). His argu-
ment is that evolutionary advantage accrued to organisms born with pre-
formatted categories for recurring features of the natural world. For items 
of more recent provenance, we lack this head start, and must expend 
energy devising and transmitting filing systems, which are consequently 
more culturally variable. 
In another classic study, Brent Berlin and Paul Kay showed that the 
demarcations of colors in different societies do not reflect arbitrary divi-
sions of a continuously variable visible spectrum. Although cultures use 
different sets of words to characterize colors, the colors to which these 
words correspond are not randomly distributed. Rather, they cluster 
around red, blue, green, and yellow. Subjects from a culture that lacks 
color words learn such words better if they correspond to these colors. 
These focal points have a neurobiological substrate in the sensitivities in 
the retina's color cones and the lateral geniculate body of the thalamus, 
where nerve cells carrying information between the eye and the visual cor-
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tex are divided into four types, apparently corresponding to the four prin-
cipal colors humans discriminate (Berlin and Kay 1969; Lumsden and 
Wilson 1983, 65-67). 
A second type of study has critically revisited seminal contributions in 
the cultural relativism canon. Here one can cite Derek Freeman's (1983) 
deconstruction of Margaret Mead's study of adolescence in Samoa, as well 
as Ekkehart Malotki's demolition of the Whorf-Sapir hypothesis insofar 
as it applies to the Hopi conception of time, published in the same year. 
The Whorf-Sapir hypothesis argued, basically, that variation in language 
structures or determines variation in consciousness. Contrary to their 
claims, however, it turns out that the Hopi conception of time is not very 
different from yours or mine, and the Hopi language is not lacking in 
words to describe it (Malotki 1983). 
These and other works, in conjunction with evidence available in the 
Human Relations Area Files (HRAF),18 provide grounds for questioning 
the fundamental principle of relativism, that culture is an emergent prop-
erty, distinct from the humans whose behavior it organizes, and conse-
quently cannot be explained with reference to characteristics of individu-
als. If this principle is accepted, evolutionary processes as Darwin 
understood them cannot influence culture, since biological attributes 
apply only to individuals. If we begin with the principle of relativism as 
foundational for the study of society and culture, we will be predisposed 
against acknowledging common features (universals) in human societies, 
since such commonalities must then be attributed to a statistically unlikely 
set of coincidences. 
Nevertheless, the evidence for some universals, both cognitive and 
behavioral, is substantial and growing. This book does not consider or 
attempt a comprehensive catalog (for efforts in this direction, see Edger-
ton 1992, 65-67). Rather, the focus is on an important few necessary to 
allow complex social organization to originate. Underlying any organized 
social interaction beyond the level of immediate kin rests a set of predis-
positions that enables solution of the problem Hobbes identified. Experi-
mental evidence will be used to document them systematically. The argu-
ment is strengthened, however, when we can go beyond simple 
enumeration and show not only how these predispositions came to be but 
18. These files, the collection and writing of which began at Yale University in the 
1930s, were originally intended to document cross-cultural variability. But they have also 
provided a database whereby hypotheses regarding universals may be systematically consid-
ered. An organization dedicated to making these materials available for scholarly research 
was established at Yale in 1949. Further information may be obtained at 
<www.yale.edu/hraf>. 
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also the workings of the black box(es) that produce them. Here is where 
analyses of group selection and cognitive modularity, respectively, enter. 
Altruism as Failure to Harm 
The proximate concerns of this book are to explain selection for and per-
sistence of altruistic behavior toward non-kin, to understand the cognitive 
adaptations that enable it, and to consider how such predispositions 
should be incorporated in behavioral models. The ultimate concern is the 
origin of complex social organization, understood to mean networks of 
social and economic relations extending beyond those involving immedi-
ate kin.19 The two are linked because the development of these relations 
requires and presupposes a complex of behavioral predispositions, the 
primus inter pares of which, because it is the sine qua non, is a propensity 
to play cooperate in single play PDs. This predisposition means most fun-
damentally the practice of forgoing the option of first strike when encoun-
tering an unrelated individual. 
In a one-shot PD game, a predisposition to play cooperate is unam-
biguously altruistic. Once one moves to the fixed and known duration 
game, the altruistic character of cooperative or contingently cooperative 
strategies becomes dependent on the frequency of individuals practicing 
similar strategies within the population from which one's counterparty is 
drawn. We are accustomed to thinking of the biologically altruistic charac-
ter of a strategy as dependent only on the description of the strategy itself. 
This is typically the case for altruism toward kin, such as the sacrifices a 
parent makes for his or her children. But it is not true for predispositions 
that foster the development of relations of reciprocity among non-kin. 
The distinction is critical in understanding why continuing interac-
tions that are empirically of mutual benefit may nevertheless originate as 
the result of biologically altruistic behavior. Thus, it may empirically be 
beneficial to playa contingently cooperative strategy in a fixed and known 
duration PD, as turned out to be the case for Alchian and Williams. But 
such strategies benefit those who follow them only when others play them 
19. My use of the term "complex" is different from that of authors who contrast orga-
nization of more "advanced" societies with the simpler forms characterizing hunter-gatherer 
groups (Diamond 1997). The distinction I make is between the simpler social organization 
that characterizes the family, whether involving two parents or simply mother-offspring 
groupings, and more "complex" groups of non-kin. The survival of mammalian species 
requires parental interaction at the time of conception and for varying periods of parenting. 
Many mammalian species, however, unlike humans, lead otherwise solitary lives. Mammals 
aside, parental care among animals is unusual, observed elsewhere only among birds and 
some reptiles, such as crocodiles. 
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as well. Such strategies are unlikely to be favored by individual level selec-
tion when they prevail at low frequencies. Consequently, at low frequen-
cies they are likely to be biologically altruistic. 
Similarly, although the play of cooperate in a one-shot game is unam-
biguously altruistic, it will not be as detrimental to the actor as theory sug-
gests if others play similarly. The high frequencies of strategies in a popu-
lation that end up rewarding contingently cooperative play in the fixed 
and known duration game, or make cooperate not as detrimental as the-
ory suggests it will be in the one-shot game, cannot simply be taken as 
givens. We need to understand the evolutionary mechanisms that have 
allowed altruistic predispositions to become established in populations, 
enabling the development of ongoing social interaction that may then no 
longer require them for maintenance. What altruism initiates, interest can 
help sustain. 
Still, history affords numerous instances of betrayal and treachery 
and of individuals or group leaders who have with premeditation launched 
unprovoked attacks on others. Similarly, some humans will play defect in 
one-shot Prisoner's Dilemmas, even in the context of prep lay communica-
tion. In light of the litany of cruel practices enumerated in Sick Societies, 
one might ask how we can even consider the possibility that altruistic pre-
dispositions underlie complex social organization. The answer is in part 
that the alternative-ruling such predispositions out of bounds on a priori 
grounds-is indefensible given the experimental evidence. Some subjects, 
but often only a minority, will play defect in a one-shot PD, far from the 
100 percent predicted by theory. Hewing closely to the Nash model leaves 
unexplained a wide body of experimental and observational data. More-
over, it leaves a gaping hole in our explanations of how organized society 
beyond kin, whatever the form it has eventually taken, arose. 
This work features a broader understanding of altruistic predisposi-
tions than is common in the literature. The canonical instance of altruism 
toward non-kin is taken to be failure to harm, rather than the affirmative 
acts of assistance with which the concept is typically identified. Failure to 
harm, where one has powerful capabilities to do so, can be as beneficial to 
another organism as active assistance.2o Readers whose intuition tells 
them their altruistic behavior is limited to kin have, perhaps without 
reflection, limited attention to affirmative assistance, rightly perceived as a 
20. Some of those concerned by the relatively weak inclination to render affirmative 
assistance to non-kin have advocated laws mandating aid if it can be provided at minimal 
cost by the as sister. In doing so they have emphasized that failure to help can be hurtful. 
What this analysis overlooks is that failure to harm can be helpful. For a review of research 
on the inclination to render affirmative assistance to non-kin, and the conditions likely to 
induce it, see Hunt 1990. 
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weaker predisposition. That is one reason we spend so much time com-
menting on, praising, being surprised at, and, in many instances, recipro-
cating unexpected acts of kindness or assistance. They are remarked upon 
precisely because they are remarkable-above and beyond what is nor-
mally expected. 
On the other hand, most of the time humans do not walk down the 
street or along a back country trail and return amazed, exclaiming that no 
one tried to rob or murder them. We are not in general grateful for altru-
ism of the failure to harm type, because we generally expect it. An excep-
tion is when credible threats to harm are made and then not carried out-
as in hostage situations, in which captives end up bonding with their 
captors in a seemingly irrational fashion (de Waal1989, 237). 
If we think deeply about the categorical imperative, it becomes clear 
that what we expect of non-kin is disproportionately weighted toward the 
former. When we encounter strangers our greatest expectation of others is 
that they not harm us (and our duty to them is perceived as symmetric). 
This is not a trivial matter, as anyone who has experienced a situation in 
which social organization has disintegrated can attest. We are generally 
surprised, shocked, angered, terrified if this is not the case. We are pleas-
antly surprised if affirmative assistance is offered and typically only mildly 
disappointed if it is not, because we do not as a matter of course expect 
strangers to render affirmative assistance, particularly where we are obvi-
ously capable of taking care of ourselves, nor are humans as inclined to 
proffer such aid in symmetrical situations. 
Some of this, of course, is culturally variable, and the degree to which 
people live in fear of unprovoked attack has varied considerably among 
societies and over time. As I will discuss subsequently, there is a dark side 
to humans' ability to form reciprocal bonds among non-kin. Nevertheless, 
the imbalance in the strength of these two variants of altruistic inclination 
is defensible as a general proposition and mirrors the asymmetry between 
the ease with which humans can take another's life and the difficulty of 
actually saving one by doing other than refraining from taking it. 
If one doubts this, perform the following thought experiment. Imag-
ine yourself for an interval of time placed among a random sample of 100 
human adults with whom you have had no previous interchange and with 
whom you expect none in the future. Ask yourself what fraction, a, of 
these individuals you expect to launch unprovoked attacks on you, and 
what fraction, b, would render affirmative assistance should you suddenly 
be obviously in need. I submit that although these estimates will vary 
among respondents based on personal history and other considerations, 
for each individual a will invariably exceed b, and that in relations among 
non-kin an individual's welfare depends as much, and arguably more so, 
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on a than it does On h. Most ethical and many legal systems emphasize that 
we have a stronger duty to avoid harming others than we do to provide 
them affirmative assistance, here articulating and reinforcing what I see as 
essential predispositions.21 
The imagined situation of two unrelated individuals encountering 
each other, each potentially dangerous to the other, is, as Hobbes under-
stood, a classic Prisoner's Dilemma. Without providing a satisfactory 
explanation of how that dilemma is resolved, one cannot begin to address 
the development of the range of reciprocal behaviors that results eventu-
ally in complex social organization, whose altruistic origin is largely dis-
guised by the benefits individuals typically receive from living coopera-
tively within larger groups. 
Altruism is defined in evolutionary terms as behavior that reduces the 
fitness of the actor and increases that of another organism. Failure to strike 
first-giving up the first move in a game that mayor may not be one shot-
qualifies as such behavior, because the organism loses the advantage that 
accrues to the offense and, by so doing, renders itself more vulnerable to an 
attack from its counterparty. Such behavior satisfies the formal definition 
of altruism as much as does an affirmative act of assistance involving such 
risk and represents, I argue, its more empirically important form. 
No satisfactory explanation within economics or political science has 
emerged for why rational players should cooperate in a single play or fixed 
and known duration Prisoner's Dilemma game, assuming both players 
wish efficiently to maximize their material welfare. Similarly, in evolution-
ary theory, no one has provided, within an exclusively individual level 
selection framework, a satisfactory explanation for how a predisposition 
to refrain from first strike in such situations could have survived the forces 
that would operate against it upon its emergence at low frequencies in a 
population. Upon first emergence, indefinitely repeated interaction could 
not be assumed or expected, and the payoff to the cooperator in a defect-
cooperate profile might be death. In spite of this, the predispos.ition is real, 
there is a substantial body of observational and experimental evidence for 
it in human populations, and its persistence and survival can be accounted 
for by admitting selection at levels above the individual. 
Although sympathetic to the position that most adaptations are pop-
21. I am attempting here to characterize the relative strength of essential predisposi-
tions, reflected to a large degree in common normative structures. As Lorenz notes, the most 
important imperatives of Mosaic (and all other) law are in fact prohibitions, not command-
ments (1966, 110). I do not mean to suggest that the strength of their manifestation cannot be 
altered by training and socialization. Religions will often try to encourage more affirmative 
assistance, at least to coreligionists, and military training may be necessary to overcome aver-
sion to initiating locally unprovoked attacks. 
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ulation or species typical, I do not claim that the genotypic determinants 
of this predisposition have necessarily evolved to the point of fixation: 
polymorphism22 is possible and deviant tendencies may persist at low and 
stable levels. Moreover, in any individual the predispositions identified 
must, almost certainly, be evoked by environmental cues and can be extin-
guished or attenuated in their absence or in the presence of different ones. 
Differences in culture, particularly the political culture of a group or 
region, can and will have important influences on how these tendencies are 
manifested (Bar-Tal and Leiser 1981).23 More generally, their expression 
will be affected by one's personal history as an infant, child, adolescent, 
and adult (Lewis, Amini, and Lannon 2000). But these environmental 
influences flesh out a structure whose scaffolding, like that of the human 
body, is constructed according to a genetic blueprint, one with variation 
but remarkable commonality across the human species. 
To the degree that we may view some of these predispositions as 
morally praiseworthy, it is hard to improve on Aristotle in specifying the 
respective roles of nature and nurture in determining them: "The virtues 
are neither innate nor contrary to nature. They come to us because we are 
fitted by nature to receive them; but we perfect them by training or habit" 
(Aristotle 1963, 303, cited in Binmore 1994,26). The difficult evolutionary 
issue, however, not of concern to Aristotle, is how we became "fitted by 
nature" to receive them. 
Summary Plan 
Two big ideas, that of modularity in cognition and that of multiple levels 
of selection in evolution, are central to this book, as is a novel and broader 
conception of altruism emphasizing failure to harm as its canonical form. 
The idea of modularity in cognition refers to the conception, championed 
by structural linguists and evolutionary psychologists, that the mind is not 
a single, general-purpose computer but a network of systems, some 
22. Fixation refers to achievement of 100 percent frequency for an allele or a group of 
alleles that begins in a population at a lesser frequency (Cavalli-Sforza, Menozzi, and Piazza 
1994,6). The consequence of fixation is that the design feature encoded by the allele(s) is now 
species typical. The basic layout of the human eye or stomach is species typical; eye color, on 
the other hand, exhibits multiple forms (polymorphism). D. S. Wilson (1994) criticizes Cos-
mides and Tooby for pushing too hard on the prevalence of species typical design--empha-
sizing that polymorphism can and does survive in the presence offrequency dependent selec-
tion (see chap. 2). 
23. As both Aristotle and Hobbes observed, our ability to consider and choose differ-
ent forms of political structure, a function of our reason and speech, critically distinguishes 
our social existence from that of the social insects (ants, bees, and termites) (Wrong 1994, 2). 
Edgerton (1992, 2) provides vivid reminders of the consequences of some of those differences. 
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domain general and others functionally specialized to particular 
domains.24 Just as our body contains specialized internal organs, so too 
does our brain. The effect of the operation of these mental organs can be 
observed experimentally and in field data, and increasingly the locus of 
different subsystems can be mapped through techniques of neurobiology 
and clinical and experimental neuroanatomy (see chap. 5). 
The other big idea (see chap. 2) is that natural selection can some-
times operate at levels above that of the individual organism-and that 
such a mechanism has permitted the evolution in humans of behavioral 
and associated cognitive modules critical for the development of complex 
social organization. These include predispositions to play cooperate when 
in one-shot PDs and, when repeated interactions have been established, to 
punish violators of social rules or norms even when so doing cannot be 
rationalized ex ante as in the interest of the organism. 
A concern with these issues, and a need for models in the behavioral 
sciences with better predictive and explanatory power, is motivated by 
consideration of a broad range of experimental evidence from Prisoner's 
Dilemma, public goods, ultimatum, and dictator experiments, and field 
data ranging from voter participation rates in national elections to the 
control of international conflict. These issues are discussed within the con-
text of two important and often conflicting traditions in social science: the 
sociological/anthropological and the economic. Chapter 1 details this evi-
dence and expands on the issues involved in its explanation. 
Chapter 2 discusses the logic, mathematics, evidential foundation, 
and intellectual background of evolutionary models embodying multilevel 
selection and their role in understanding human altruism. Chapters 3 and 
4 address alternate explanations for the emergence of complex social orga-
nization. Chapter 3 considers Robert Trivers's model of reciprocal altru-
ism, the concept of social norms, and research in evolutionary game the-
ory, particularly that of John Maynard-Smith and Robert Axelrod. 
Chapter 4 deconstructs Robert Frank's 1988 book Passions within Reason, 
illustrating the problems that result when attempting to explain altruistic 
behavior within an economic/evolutionary framework limiting selection to 
the individual level. 
Chapter 5 covers research in a diverse range of fields, including pale-
ontology, molecular biology, ethology (in particular the study of close ani-
mal relations), infant cognition, language acquisition and structure, neu-
robiology, and neuroanatomy. Collectively, these studies underlie the case 
for modularity in the cognitive and behavioral mechanisms that organize 
24. For example, people may reason about and react differently to a formally identical 
logical problem when it concerns social relations than when it does not (see chaps. 5 and 6). 
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our social relations. The chapter proposes a different solution to the prob-
lem Konrad Lorenz posed in On Aggression (1966), one that emphasizes 
the existence in humans of hardwired restraints on intraspecific violence.25 
The final section of the chapter provides a detailed discussion of experi-
mental work by Leda Cosmides and John Tooby on "cheater detection" 
modules, the cognitive underpinnings of a behavioral predisposition to 
punish violators of social norms, a key pillar, along with a willingness to 
give up the option of first strike, of Tit-for-Tat. 
Chapter 6 addresses the second major interdisciplinary conversation 
engaged in by economists over the last quarter century: that with the 
heuristics and biases research program pioneered by the psychologists 
Daniel Kahneman and the late Amos Tversky and introduced to econo-
mists through the work of Richard Thaler and others. Their work has 
encouraged social scientists to be more receptive to the results of experi-
mental research and introduced the concept of framing to our vocabulary. 
In so doing it has opened our minds to the possibility that modularity is an 
important phenomenon. For example, we may think and behave differ-
ently depending on whether or not a situation is framed as one involving 
strategic interaction. But its lack of an explicitly evolutionary perspective 
and its focus on decision theory and in particular judgment under uncer-
tainty, irrelevant for the PD and a number of other games of strategic 
interaction, limit its ability to resolve the issues addressed here. Within the 
domains it does address, moreover, the program is currently suffering 
from an explosion of heuristics-behavioral rules of thumb-a develop-
ment that has tended to reduce the predictive value of anyone of them 
considered individually. The chapter illustrates this through a discussion 
of the application of behavioral economics26 in finance, one of the hottest 
current areas of research within this program. 
The concluding section, chapter 7, considers the place of econom-
ics/rational choice models within an empirically based and evolutionarily 
informed behavioral science and how its self-conception and practice 
might differ were the two big ideas adduced in this introduction fully 
accepted. In so doing, it returns to the question of how we should distin-
guish between historical and social scientific explanation. 
25. The original title of this manuscript was "On Altruism," which I thought a clever 
and subtle allusion to Lorenz's work, which everyone read when I was in college. It was such 
a subtle reference, however, that most readers missed it, although fully recognizing it once it 
was pointed out. Another rejected candidate was "Altruism as Failure to Harm." 
26. "Behavioral economics" should not be confused with behaviorist psychology. 
Behavioral economics emphasizes the study of what individuals actually do, as opposed to 
what economic theory predicts they will do or counsels they should do. Behavioral econo-
mists have no inherent aversion to the concept of modularity, which implies domain specific 
mental organs. Such a concept, however, is anathema for behaviorist psychologists. 

CHAPTER 1 
Evidence and Logic 
This chapter develops broad contours of the book's argument, adduces 
additional experimental and observational evidence, and establishes foun-
dations for the more detailed treatments of chapters 2 through 6. It extends 
the prologue's discussion of the limits of rational choice theory as well as 
the sociological/anthropological approach in understanding the empirical 
evidence, themes developed in detail in chapters 3 and 4. It addresses the 
relevance to these questions of the heuristics and biases research program, 
the subject of chapter 6. And it contextualizes the key elements of the alter-
nate route proposed to the solution of the Hobbesian problem, the con-
cepts of multilevel selection and modularity, the subjects of chapters 2 and 
5. The emphasis is on the relationship of these concepts to, respectively, tra-
ditional evolutionary biology and behaviorist psychology. 
On the empirical side, the chapter summarizes experimental results 
beyond those involving PD games, including those concerned with the vol-
untary provision of public goods, ultimatum, centipede, and dictator 
games. It probes the claim that failure to harm is the canonical form of 
human altruism, and thus that the phenomenon is more widespread than 
commonly appreciated, through the historical consideration of what 
appears to be the strongest countercase: war and genocide, in particular 
the war of extermination against the Jews conducted by the Third Reich. 
It discusses the interactions of nation-states, which operate in the absence 
of the coercive ruler Hobbes identified as necessary to solve the PD. 
Finally, in addressing why democracies do not fight each other, the chap-
ter reaffirms that variations in political culture will influence the expres-
sion of essential predispositions. Born though we are with similar biologi-
cal scaffolding, our continuing efforts to fashion, refashion, maintain, and 
change political structures have real consequences. 
The limits of Game Theory 
As the prologue suggested, game theory, the branch of microeconomic 
theory addressing strategic interaction, faces severe difficulties in account-
ing for observed behavior in Prisoner's Dilemmas. In the single play game 
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the unique Nash equilibrium is for each player to defect, but many players 
do otherwise. When games are repeated a fixed and known number of 
times, defecting at every stage remains the unique Nash equilibrium, 
although the strategy is no longer strictly dominant. If there is some prob-
ability one's counterparty might not be entirely rational, or might tremble 
a bit, it could pay (be rational) to employ other strategies (Kreps et al. 
1982). 
This conclusion does not, however, follow if both players are assumed 
rational. Nevertheless, many sophisticated subjects cooperate throughout 
much of a finitely repeated game, the Alchian-Williams pairing a case in 
point. Models of single play and of finitely repeated PD games engaged in 
by rational players therefore imply unique equilibria and lead to clean, 
unambiguous predictions of behavior, predictions consistently at variance 
with the experimental evidence. 
More complex models do raise the possibility of explaining the per-
sistence of cooperative outcomes within a rational choice framework. 
When PD games are repeated indefinitely, there may exist Nash equilibria 
involving some degree of cooperation, provided players do not discount 
future payoffs too much (Fudenberg and Maskin 1986; Fudenberg and 
Tirole 1991, chap. 5). The discount rate matters because the higher it is, the 
less important are later stages of the game, and the closer the interaction 
comes to being equivalent to a single play game. If we accept these 
assumptions, it is possible to "rationalize" how cooperative outcomes are 
sustained as an outcome of egoistic choice. Unfortunately, these models 
feature multiple equilibria, and not all of them involve cooperation. If we 
are interested in prediction, what grounds do we have for knowing which 
one will obtain? In what sense has theory predicted or explained a partic-
ular outcome? 
These conclusions, widely understood, help account for the strong 
predilection of game theorists (e.g., Binmore 1994, 1998a) to begin by 
assuming an environment of indefinitely repeated interaction. If one is 
interested in squaring theory with data, having a model that at least allows 
for the possibility of cooperation as an outcome is surely preferable to one 
that precludes it. 
One must keep in mind, however, that what is being accounted for is 
the maintenance of an equilibrium, not its origin. Moreover, the applica-
bility of the underlying assumption to real world situations is often ques-
tionable. A marriage may be modeled as involving indefinitely repeated 
interaction, but since in principle either party may end it, each has the 
option, at his or her own initiative, of converting the interaction into one 
of fixed and known duration. Moreover, the marriage may well have 
begun with an interaction that, ex ante, looked to both parties as if it 
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would be one time (one night?). How did the time horizon get extended? 
The same considerations apply with greater and lesser force to many other 
continuing relationships that began with meetings that could well have 
ended as one-time encounters only. One-shot dilemmas existed in the past 
and continue to confront us today. We need to understand why they did 
not and do not defeat us more often. 1 
To summarize: (1) Ifwe are rational and egoistic, we can only choose 
defect in single play PD games, regardless of what we believe will be the 
play of our counterparty. The strict dominance of the strategy of defection 
means that even if we think our counterparty will irrationally choose 
cooperate, as a rational agent, we should play defect. Our ability to fore-
cast counterparty play is irrelevant-worthless-because that estimate 
cannot affect our choice. (2) In repeated games of fixed and known dura-
tion, rational agents can, assuming their counterparty is also rational, only 
choose continuous defect: a strategy that requires defecting at each stage 
of the game. Continuous defect by both parties forms the unique Nash 
equilibrium profile, although if we thought our counterparty might be 
irrational, it could make sense to playa different strategy. (3) If the dura-
tion of interaction is indefinite, it becomes possible for mutual cooperation 
to be sustained as a Nash equilibrium, although so can mutual defection 
and many other profiles. (4) The predictive or explanatory utility of the 
conclusion of this last point, by no means clear cut, must be further 
qualified because the assumption of indefinitely repeated interaction-an 
environment in which neither party can control the timing of an unknown 
endpoint-can be at best approximately true when characterizing any real 
social interaction. 
The longer and more indefinite the horizon of interaction, the more 
possibilities open up that rational egoistic behavior can sustain coopera-
tive equilibria. But which is cause and which effect? Do indefinite horizons 
of interaction explain cooperative outcomes, or does (and did) our ability 
to reach cooperative solutions in single play games help explain their 
extension into extra innings? 
1. Bendor and Swistak (1997, 294) express a commonly held view when they observe 
that one period games with a single stage "are games oflittle substantive importance." I dis-
agree. It is true that in day-to-day life with my family or at work, I engage in interactions that 
have long and indefinite time horizons. But every time I venture on the freeway, walk down 
the main street of a new city, get onto a crowded subway car, or hike down a sparsely trav-
eled backcountry trail, I engage in encounters that are, in al1likelihood, one shot. The "social 
structure" that makes the assumption of indefinitely repeated interaction realistic is one we 
are continually creating and re-creating. It is not some reified force that exists separately from 
the humans whose behavior and preferences generate and sustain it, although it may be per-
ceived as such, a perception that is strengthened when multiple parties are involved. See also 
Barry and Hardin 1982 (385). 
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Even were the assumption of indefinite interaction more widely 
applicable, we would want to understand how environments in which it 
could reasonably be assumed developed in the first place. A central and 
unresolved problem in strategic analysis, therefore, the one that Hobbes 
identified, is explaining how rational individuals transition from single 
play environments to those where repetition may more reasonably be 
anticipated. A central challenge in evolutionary analysis is accounting for 
the increase from low to high frequencies in cooperative predispositions 
within populations in which humans interact. 
In addressing how these transitions came about, and come about, we 
will need to consider, in a manner inconsistent with the standard economic 
approach, whether humans possess essential tendencies that might contra-
vene the counsel of logic and mathematics, predisposing them, in one-shot 
interactions, to play cooperate, a strictly dominated strategy. If we have 
these tendencies, we need to understand how we acquired them. The sug-
gested solution to the problem of transition lies outside of the realm of 
strategic analysis as commonly understood. It lies rather in the realm of 
evolutionary theory, albeit a more nuanced version of it than that with 
which most people are familiar. 
Hobbes's enduring contribution was in posing the problem; his reso-
lution of it, however, for reasons to be discussed, is inadequate. So too is 
that of other social contract theorists, including John Locke and Jean-
Jacques Rousseau. Locke's solution emphasizes mutuality of interest, 
which anticipates the arguments of economists and game theorists but 
confuses an account of how cooperation may be sustained with an expla-
nation of how it originated. The same can be said for Rousseau's analysis, 
which stresses consensus on norms, anticipating key sociological argu-
ments (Wrong 1994,9). Where do norms come from if we begin with sin-
gle play interaction? The problem of the origin of complex social organi-
zation is recapitulated every time individuals face the challenge of building 
an ongoing personal relationship. Norms specific to a relationship develop 
and are reinforced and sustained by continued interaction. They cannot 
explain the ability of a pair of individuals to move from one-time to ongo-
ing intercourse because they arise as the consequence of that outcome. The 
same will be true of norms organizing multiparty interaction. 
Experimental Methods 
Experimental methods are particularly useful for exploring these issues 
because they allow the study of behavior in single play situations, where 
considerations of reputation and the anticipation of repetition may be 
controlled for. The resulting body of research in this area is now so large, 
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generally so carefully conducted, and so consistent in many of its findings 
that it commands our attention, even if we are initially inclined to be skep-
tical of what it can tell us. A leitmotiv in what follows is the contrast 
between the predictions (and counsel) of canonical game theory as applied 
to such games, and what the evidence reveals. 
Economists have tended to adopt a rather unvariegated view of 
human nature, sometimes questioning whether it is even meaningful to 
talk about altruistic or nonrational behavioral tendencies among humans, 
particularly where such behavior involves non-kin. When pressed, the 
underlying assumptions about rationality and egoism often turn out to 
involve a tautology: the presumption that individuals act in satisfaction of 
their own desires. If narrower and potentially refutable definitions are 
adopted, leading to the presumption that people act efficiently to advance 
their material interests, then Prisoner's Dilemma experiments form part of 
a body of experimental results that leads us to reject this view as univer-
sally applicable across all domains. 
They point in a different direction, in particular toward the conclu-
sion that predispositions to engage in other-regarding behavior toward 
non-kin form part of a range of essential human characteristics.2 These 
inclinations can be difficult to identify through field observation alone. 
Ambiguity arises because where group beneficial behavior is mutualistic, it 
is consistent with egoistic as well as altruistic inclinations.3 What field 
observation may sometimes only hint at, however, experimental methods 
can pinpoint. Under controlled conditions altruistic and nonrational pre-
dispositions are isolatable and identifiable and represent, I will argue, part 
of the legacy of the evolutionary trajectory that produced the human 
genotype. 
The evidence suggests, for example, that as the result of a long history 
of natural selection, we are born, hardwired, with the fundamentals of a 
PD solution module, a module with both cognitive and behavioral dimen-
sions. It follows that there is an essential biological component to what is 
universal about human societies, although our reason and speech have 
2. Use of the Aristotelian term here is designed to differentiate the approach from 
behaviorist views common in the social sciences, which imply that almost all action can be 
explained with reference to circumstance and past learning, rather than inherent inclinations. 
The proposed methodology for identifying these traits is empiricist. I make no claim that 
nonrational predispositions are necessarily morally praiseworthy, although they often are. 
3. Both Locke and Adam Smith in the Wealth of Nations ([1776]1937) can be read as 
articulating mutualistic accounts of how cooperation is sustained. Mutualistic behavior 
benefits others as well as the actor. It is in the interest of the actor and in the interest of the 
group of which the actor is part. Altruistic behavior imposes a fitness cost on the actor but 
benefits at least one other con specific. The term mutualism is most commonly applied to 
interactions between species but can also be used to apply to behavior among conspecifics. 
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given us the ability, within that framework, to develop different political 
cultures. An understanding of the solution of the basic problem of order, 
however, precedes exploration of the consequences of such differences. 
How natural selection could have allowed a PD solution and related mod-
ules to survive is a principal concern of chapter 2. 
Beyond the Prisoner's Dilemma: Public Goods, 
Ultimatum, and Dictator Games 
Predispositions that cannot be squared with criteria of rational action 
manifest themselves in a broad range of contexts beyond those Flood and 
Dresher examined. Studies of the voluntary provision of public goods, to 
take a related example, show an irreducible propensity among some sub-
jects voluntarily to provide such goods, in spite of Nash equilibrium analy-
sis, which counsels and predicts universal free riding (Ledyard 1995). 
Such experiments typically involve a group of subjects, say, seven, 
each of whom is given a sum of money, say, $10, and told they can either 
keep it or (secretly) deposit it in a group account whose total will be, say, 
doubled and then equally divided among the group. The best of the Pareto 
efficient solutions for the individuals considered as a group is for everyone 
to put the entire sum in the collective account, enabling each in this 
instance to double his or her endowment. But the unique Nash equilib-
rium solution is for each to put nothing in the account, in which case 
everyone ends up with his or her original $10. Each individual following 
the egoistic Nash-prescribed strategy hopes he or she will be the only one 
failing to contribute and will thus be able to free ride on the voluntary con-
tributions of others. Contributing to the common pool is a risky strategy 
since, in the worst case, if one is the only contributor, one will end up with 
substantially less than if one had retained the entire initial endowment. 
Such voluntary contributions can legitimately be characterized as altruis-
tic, because they result in a benefit to others and, whatever the contribu-
tion profile of the other players, an individual would, ex post, have done 
better by contributing nothing. In these experiments, an outcome involv-
ing any positive amount of voluntary contribution cannot be a Nash equi-
librium. 
Nevertheless, some subjects persist in rejecting the prescriptive coun-
sel of game theory, even when it is clear they fully understand it. Although 
contribution rates can be manipulated experimentally by, for example, 
altering the magnitude of temptations for defection, such rates cannot be 
driven to zero. Moreover, such rates can be increased by providing oppor-
tunities for preplay communication even though, in the absence of 
enforceable agreements, such opportunities should, according to theory, 
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have no effect on the outcome. Remarkably, contribution rates sometimes 
rise, rather than fall, as group sizes are increased or, in learning experi-
ments, as the number of iterations is increased (Hoffman, McCabe, and 
Smith 1998, 340; Ostrom 1998). In a variety of political and economic are-
nas, such as managing common resources or dealing with shirking where 
groups are jointly responsible for work output, this research has important 
implications. Free riding, though a very real phenomenon, is not as inex-
orably insurmountable as rational choice theory suggests it will be. 
Consider a variant of the design with somewhat more restrictive strat-
egy options. Robyn Dawes has conducted experiments in which groups of 
individuals (e.g., seven) were given choices of keeping $6 or having $12 dis-
tributed in equal shares to the other six players ($2 to each). The strictly 
dominant strategy for each player is to retain the $6, but if all distribute to 
each other, each ends up with $12. Dawes found in his experiments a hard 
core of 25 to 50 percent of subjects who would altruistically distribute even 
under the most unfavorable circumstances; that rate went up dramatically 
if relevant communication was permitted, even where choice was anony-
mous and subjects could be more or less guaranteed they would never see 
each other again (Dawes 1988, 197).4 
Behavior in these experiments, just like that in the PDs discussed in 
the prologue, is not rationalizable from the standpoint of normative game 
theory. It is the watermark left on our phenotypes by evolutionary pres-
sures that selected for cooperation toward non-kin, through mechanisms, 
including group level selection, described in chapter 2. 
Some field observation is unambiguous in its consistency with these 
conclusions. A large literature in political science, for example, is devoted 
to the explication and prediction of voting behavior based on the assump-
tion that citizens are rational. Its soft underbelly is the phenomenon of 
voting itself.5 Voting takes time and energy. The likelihood that one vote 
will influence a national election outcome is very small, unless one happens 
perhaps to be a Supreme Court Justice. Yet in spite of what is apparently 
an unfavorable benefit-cost ratio, tens of millions of people vote in 
national elections. Participation rates in the United States have fallen from 
a peak of 80 percent of eligible voters at the end of the nineteenth century. 
But rates today continue in the range of 50 percent, in spite of a subs tan-
4. The effect of preplay communication existed only when players communicated 
about the choice and believed the results of cooperation would go to the group of which they 
were part. However, if groups were initially told the group would share the benefits of coop-
eration, but were subsequently told the benefits would go to strangers, some carryover of 
cooperation above the 25-50 percent baseline could still be observed. 
5. The political scientist Morris Fiorina calls this "the paradox that ate rational choice 
theory" (Fiorina 1990). Joking about the paradox doesn't eliminate it! 
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tial expansion of the electorate, which now includes women, an increased 
share of African Americans, and eighteen to twenty-one year olds. Facili-
tated in part by the Nineteenth, Twenty-fourth, and Twenty-sixth Amend-
ments to the U.S. Constitution, voting in national elections as a propor-
tion of the total population has actually risen during the twentieth century 
from under 20 percent to its current rate of around 40 percent. 6 In the 1992 
U.S. presidential election, the number of those voting exceeded 101 mil-
lion. At this writing, returns are not final for the 2000 election, but it 
appears as if participation will have exceeded 104 million. 
If one views broad based participation in democratic decision making 
as providing a benefit shared by many in society, then we have a clear illus-
tration here of the paradox of the voluntary provision of public goods. 
Political scientists in the rational choice tradition have performed triple 
somersaults trying to account for these data, without much success (see 
Green and Shapiro 1994, chap. 4). Ordinary citizens in Western democra-
cies, along with media commentators, are also deeply involved in this 
effort, as we sometimes try to provide an instrumental interpretation of or 
rationale for behavior that can ultimately only be viewed as expressive. 
Witness for example serious discussions of whether or not one should 
"throw one's vote away" on a third party candidate. If one accepts that 
there is an infinitesimal probability of one's vote affecting the outcome of 
a national election, it is difficult to see how this discussion can be taken 
seriously, if it is intended literally. 
My intent here is to point out (a) that people do vote and (b) that we 
often "rationalize" behavior by persuading ourselves that this is an activ-
ity that can be analyzed as if it were pursued on instrumental grounds. The 
tendency to engage in such self-deception is a special occupational hazard 
for those operating within a rational choice tradition. I use the term haz-
ard advisedly, however, because the predisposition may serve socially use-
ful purposes, as in the case of voting but also, for example, in nuclear strat-
egy. It is common to worry that a counterparty might "irrationally" 
launch a first strike. Given our belief in the normative and predictive value 
of the rationality assumption, it is simply too frightening to confront head-
on the conclusion that if we and our counterparty are rational, first strike 
might be the only theoretically defensible option for either of us. The logic 
of this possibility is discussed in greater detail in chapter 4. 
6. In 1900, the top three presidential candidates received approximately 13.8 million 
votes; U.S. population was about 75 million. In 1992, the top three candidates received over 
101 million votes; U.S. population was about 250 million. Data are from Historical Statistics 
of the United States and Statistical Abstract of the United States (1999). In the last three 
decades, participation among the voting age population has fluctuated around the 50 percent 
level (Statistical Abstract 1999,280; table 8.1). 
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Willingness to Punish 
The evidence from single play PD experiments, both two player and those 
involving the multi player provision of public goods, confirms a wide-
spread human tendency to play cooperate, even in the absence of any 
anticipation of repetition. This does not mean that people who choose to 
do so are indifferent to what their counterparties play. In two stage exper-
iments involving public goods, if, after the first stage, subjects are given an 
opportunity to punish defectors, at some cost to themselves, they will do 
so. This is true even when group composition changes every round, so that 
such behavior cannot be motivated by the hope that one will benefit from 
the greater cooperation in future plays of those punished (Ostrom, 
Walker, and Gardner 1992; Fehr and Gachter 2000). 
Fehr and Gachter's work is particularly striking in demonstrating 
that humans are predisposed to punish rule violators for reasons that can 
have nothing to do with a desire to establish a "reputation" for toughness 
or vindictiveness. The unique Nash equilibrium in the games they study 
should be one involving no punishment, since the costs are borne by the 
punishers and the possible benefits (of altered behavior on the part of the 
punishees) are received mostly or entirely by others. 
A willingness to punish defectors, or those perceived as such, even 
when such behavior cannot serve the interest of the punisher, is also evi-
dent in asymmetric bargaining, or ultimatum games. In ultimatum games, 
discussed in more detail in chapter 4, a proposer is given a sum of money, 
say $10, and told she may propose a division of this amount between her-
self and another subject. The catch is that if the other subject rejects the 
proposed division, neither receives anything. If $0.01 is the minimum 
denomination, the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is for the 
proposer to suggest $0.01 for the other subject and $9.99 for herself.? But 
proposals for anything less than about $3 for the other subject are rou-
tinely rejected. These are typically single play games, so the rejecter cannot 
be "efficiently advancing his or her material welfare" by apparently pre-
ferring nothing to something. 
7. Any proposed division can be the consequence of a pair of strategies that satisfies the 
Nash equilibrium criterion. If the responder's preannounced strategy is to reject all offers 
below $3, then an offer of $3 completes a Nash equilibrium profile (each is the optimal reply 
to the other). But this equilibrium is not "subgame perfect," because the threat of rejecting a 
lower offer is not credible if one believes counterparty behavior to be rational, an assumption 
generally viewed as inconsistent with preferring nothing to something. Sub game perfect equi-
librium, an equilibrium "refinement" due to Reinhard Selten (1965), requires that the out-
come in each of a series of stages in a sequential game be itself a Nash equilibrium. It thus 
precludes strategies that, in initial stages, involve threats of behavior in subsequent stages 
that, if carried out, would be irrational. 
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These experiments have been run in a number of countries around the 
world, including some in the third world, such as Indonesia, where the dol-
lar stakes, although small, represent a more sizable fraction (as much as 
three months worth) of annual income (Cameron 1999; Camerer 2002). 
The results in other countries are similar, although some cultural differ-
ences have been identified. Israelis, for example, play somewhat closer to 
the NashlSelten prediction (Roth et al. 1991), although the probability 
that an offer is refused differs little cross-culturally. 
Another sequential move game with startling experimental outcomes 
is centipede, so called because of the appearance of the diagram of possi-
ble plays in it. The experimenter puts, say, a dollar on the table. Player A 
can either take it or leave it. If she takes it, the game is over. If money is left 
on the table, a dollar is added. Player B can then either take the $2, in 
which case the game is over, or leave it, in which case the experimenter 
adds another dollar. Both players know in advance that when a limit, say, 
$10, is reached, no more will be added. Since A expects that player B will 
take the $10 should they get to the final stage, it is clear, reasoning by 
backward induction, that the only rational decision for A is to take the 
dollar at the outset. Every time a player leaves money on the table, she is 
behaving altruistically, because the action gives the counterparty an other-
wise unavailable option to obtain a higher payoff, at the risk for the actor 
of ending up with nothing. The only way leaving money on the table can 
be rational is if one assumes one's counterparty is not. Experimental evi-
dence overwhelmingly contradicts the prediction that play will never move 
beyond the first stage. 
The results of dictator games provide perhaps the starkest confirma-
tion of altruistic and irrational behavior among humans. In dictator 
games, subjects are provided with a sum of money and asked to divide it 
with a counterparty, often with the opportunity to remain completely 
anonymous (Eckel and Grossman 1996). In contrast to an ultimatum 
game, in which a counterparty's refusal to accept an offered division 
means that neither party gets anything, in a dictator game the offerer 
keeps his or her share regardless of whether or not the counterparty 
accepts the proposed division. Although some subjects will keep all of the 
money, not all will. Indeed, in recent experiments only 20 percent of sub-
jects kept all the money: a more frequent outcome was to split it down the 
middle, with the remaining offers distributed roughly evenly between 50 
and 0 percent (Forsythe et al. 1994). Again, these rates can be manipulated 
through different experimental treatments, but they cannot be driven to 
zero. Such behavior can easily be made consistent with tautological ego-
ism, the presumption that people act in satisfaction of their own desires, by 
altering in an appropriate but ex post fashion the arguments of the utility 
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function each is presumed to maximize (see Fehr and Schmidt 1999).8 But 
it cannot be viewed as consistent with the hypothesis that people act so as 
efficiently to advance their material self-interest. 
These baseline levels of cooperation in PD games, voluntary contri-
bution and defector punishment in public goods experiments, rejection of 
positive offers in ultimatum and dictator games, and play beyond the first 
stage in centipede games are all anomalies vis-a-vis the behavior an analy-
sis of Nash equilibria predicts. In each of these experimental domains, 
research provides repeated laboratory confirmation of what is intuitively 
clear to most humans. Our behavioral decision processes cannot be gov-
erned entirely by those presumed in the standard economic/rational choice 
model or canonical game theory. Other predispositions are operative, 
including some warranting the descriptor altruistic, and although some of 
these are more likely to be displayed toward family members, their expres-
sion is not restricted to kin. The empirically observed disjunctures between 
behavior and theoretical prediction are real. And they are important, I 
argue, because the human propensities that underlie them form the foun-
dation upon which has been built social organization beyond groups of 
immediate kin.9 
In many situations for which the Prisoner's Dilemma is a useful 
metaphor, the payoff realized by a cooperator in the face of a counter-
party's defection can involve death, a point Hobbes understood well. 
Restraint on defection-altruistic because of the avoidable risks it imposes 
on the cooperator and the opportunities for gain presented to the counter-
8. It is unlikely that a concern with fairness is all that is involved in the results of ulti-
matum games experiments (see chap. 4). Falk, Fehr, and Fischbacher (1999) have already 
questioned the adequacy of the Fehr and Schmidt model (1999): other, less praiseworthy 
other-regarding motives, such as envy, are almost certainly implicated. 
9. For a contrary view, see Ken Binmore. He and others believe that the behavior 
observed in one-shot experimental games "survives because it is needed to sustain equilibria 
in repeated games .... Nor should we be surprised if the physiological and psychological 
mechanisms that have evolved to sustain equilibria in repeated games should somehow be 
triggered inappropriately in one-shot situations" (1994, 183). In other words, people bring to 
these games rules of thumb derived from their day-to-day experience and need practice in 
order to learn how to play them correctly. Theorists who follow this route argue that the 
experimental stakes are too small (but see Cameron 1995) or emphasize that repetition pro-
duces movement toward the Nash predictions. But any positive deviation remains a violation 
of the normative predictions, and in experimental research involving strategic 
interaction/bargaining, such deviations remain substantial, even where subjects are experi-
enced. Binmore's statement that "In the long run, behavior tends to converge on whatever 
the equilibrium of the game under study happens to be" (1994, 185-86) seems to be based as 
much on faith as it is on evidence, at least in strategic interaction/bargaining games. The fre-
quency of cooperation in the Alchian-Williams pairing increased as the subjects "learned how 
to play" (see subsequent discussion), and they were scarcely naive when they started. Pre-
sumably Binmore shares Nash's reaction to their behavior. 
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party-is therefore essential in enabling the transition from environments 
of single play interaction to ones where repetition may be anticipated. It is 
among an important range of predispositions that enables complex social 
interaction. Some of the central questions posed in this book are how, 
from an evolutionary standpoint, we came as a species to possess them, 
what is their specific character, and what cognitive and neurobiological 
mechanisms underlie them. 
The Sociological Tradition and the Role of History 
Some of the limitations of game theory and the rational choice approach 
in understanding these results have now been laid out. What of the socio-
logical/anthropological tradition? This alternative tradition and its associ-
ated concepts (norms, culture, social structure), although helpful descrip-
tively, offers only limited assistance from an explanatory perspective. 
Understanding these limits opens the way for consideration of evolution-
ary/biological influences on predispositions reflected in cultural universals. 
Like sociologists and anthropologists, economic historians and stu-
dents of comparative systems, because of the nature of their subject mat-
ter, consider the consequences of variation in institutions, culture, and 
norms in ways that economists conducting analysis within structures 
assumed stable can often sidestep. A recurring question has been whether 
such concepts can explain what rational choice theory apparently does 
not. A critical issue in addressing such variation is whether or not it is nec-
essarily efficient or adaptive. If so, institutions and norms are ultimately 
inconsequential, because they are derivative and reflective of more funda-
mental determinants. 
Economists, sociologists, anthropologists, and sociobiologists have, 
within disciplines, not spoken with unanimity on this issue. The structural-
functional approach in sociology/anthropology, early work in the new 
institutional economics, and sociobiological analyses in the 1970s all 
tended to start with the presumption that norms or institutions were 
efficient or adaptive. In the last two decades, however, there has been 
movement among scholars in each of these disciplines away from that 
position. 
The answer one gives to this question has important implications. If 
norms and institutions are reflective of currently available resources and 
technologies, then knowledge of past states of the system cannot add value 
in explaining them. If they are not necessarily so reflective, then historical 
analysis, historical explanation, and historical data all become relevant. 
Once one admits a role for historical influence, the possibility of maladap-
tation, within limits, arises. 
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Since the evolutionary process that gave rise to the hardwired predis-
positions underlying universals is ultimately historical, the issue is not 
whether or not we need historical explanation, but rather the time frame 
over which it is to be invoked. The historical explanation of human uni-
versals takes place in a distant evolutionary past. The role of historical 
considerations in accounting for political and institutional variation is 
charted over a much more recent time frame, in units of years or decades 
rather than hundreds of thousands or millions of years. In trying to predict 
human behavior, it is important to distinguish between the explanatory 
role of essential human predispositions, unchanged for at least thirty thou-
sand years, and the influence of cultural variability on their expression. 
The determinants and consequences of behavior not strictly self-inter-
ested were central concerns in my dissertation research. My thesis investi-
gated the economic returns realized from socializing schoolchildren in 
nineteenth century Massachusetts as well as helping them learn reasoning 
skills and master particular domains of knowledge in public (common) 
schools. 10 It was difficult to understand the common school revival dating 
from the late l830s using a standard human capital model. In such a 
model, increased derived demand for cognitive skills raises the private 
return to schooling, leading, in a democracy, to political pressure for tax-
subsidized primary education. The problem with this story was that the 
necessary trends in the demand for skills simply are not evident until per-
haps the end of the nineteenth century. 
In contrast, the documentary record suggested that, in the context of 
universal male suffrage, elite perceptions of external benefits associated 
with school provision (greater willingness among schooled children to be 
punctual, respond positively to authority figures outside of the family, and 
respect others' property and persons) were critical in terms of political 
motivation, regardless of what may have been the long term, perhaps 
unintended, economic consequences of compulsory, tax-supported educa-
tion. The thesis emphasized the economic benefits from effective socializa-
tion but eschewed a simple rational choice model of its provision. As is 
common in the area of economic history, the scholarship reflected an 
attempt to bring to bear concepts and tools from a variety of the social sci-
ences on a historical problem. These themes continue to be developed and 
explored in broader comparative contexts by other scholars (Lindert 1999; 
Engerman, Mariscal, and Sokoloff 1999). 
The analysis of the role of schools as agents of socialization is, of 
course, not at issue in this book. What is of concern is the larger question 
10. Field 1974, 1976a, 1976b, 1979b, 1980. See also Field 1978 on labor market context 
and 1979c for extension of the model to British data. 
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of the mechanisms responsible for the control among humans of intra-
specific harm, and the extent to which this restraint is influenced by hard-
wired (biological) predispositions, the result of evolutionary processes. A 
satisfactory explanation of how that control is achieved is necessary for a 
coherent account of the origin of complex social organization. 
Sociologists and anthropologists have emphasized culture, norms, 
and institutions in accounting for that restraint, but have generally 
eschewed an interest in their micro foundations and in particular the pos-
sibility that biological processes might have an influence on them. The 
appeal of these concepts is their apparent ability to address phenomena 
for which micro economic theory, premised on strictly self-interested 
agents, often seems inadequate. Receptivity to elements of the sociologi-
cal/ anthropological tradition among specialists in economic history, eco-
nomic development, comparative systems, and other subdisciplines, 
along with the appeal of rational choice approaches among growing con-
tingents within sociology, anthropology, and political science, is indica-
tive of the fact that the influence of the two core social scientific traditions 
identified does not map precisely onto departmental or disciplinary 
affiliations. 
A chapter of my thesis ("On the Explanation of Rules Using Rational 
Choice Models") focused specifically on the limitations of standard eco-
nomic models in explaining the origin of social rules, and was eventually 
published as a separate article (l979a). These themes were extended in an 
Explorations in Economic History paper (Field 1981) critical of Douglass 
North and Robert Paul Thomas's attempt to provide in 158 pages a sys-
tematic account of institutional variation in Europe over an eight-hun-
dred-year period based solely on variation in such "economic" variables as 
technologies and land-labor ratios (North and Thomas 1973). High land-
labor ratios led to conditions offree labor (as North and Thomas pointed 
out for Europe) except where they did not (in the U.S. South or Eastern 
Europe), and, I argued, one needed to introduce variation in social norms 
or structure to close the model and account for such variation. 11 My 1984 
Economic Development and Cultural Change paper more explicitly 
addressed the need for norms to close micro economic models, with 
emphasis on game theoretical models and in particular the analysis of 
II. Evsey Domar, for example, had used high land-labor ratios to account for coerced 
labor regimes (slavery) in the U.S. South as well as the recrudescence of feudalism in eastern 
Europe after the great plague (Domar 1970). North no longer assumes that institutions are 
necessarily efficient, opening the door to the possibility of maladaptation and its conse-
quences (North 1990). In his more recent research he places much more emphasis on the role 
of ideology and beliefs in accounting for cultural variation, a position consistent, for exam-
ple, with that taken by Kuran. 
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games of coordination (those that involve, e.g., the choice of which side of 
the road to drive on) as well as the more emotionally complex PD games. 
This emphasis on norms counterpoised the traditions of classical soci-
ology and anthropology to those of economics. The view of social struc-
ture as emergent and "superorganic" is evident in Durkheim's work and in 
anthropological writings such as those of A. L. Kroeber, and was force-
fully articulated by Talcott Parsons in his earliest and most influential 
book, The Structure of Social Action (1937), a work that directly engages 
the development of economic theory. Parsons took Hobbes as his starting 
point but, in lieu of Hobbes's coercive state, adduced a shared and 
autonomous normative structure as the cement of society. 
My appeal to social norms, in the tradition of these disciplines, did 
not offer a systematic explanation of their origin but instead insisted that 
we explicitly acknowledge the limits of our knowledge. This was far better, 
I thought, than offering incomplete models that claimed to do more. My 
1991 article "Do Legal Systems Matter?" argued that although "func-
tional" constraints imposed limits on the norms or institutions (structure) 
that could persist, within that range, idiosyncratic variation in legal rules 
or norms could have real and potentially significant economic effects, in 
ways extending beyond those involving transactions costs emphasized by 
Ronald Coase. 12 
That is, while technologies and resource endowments might restrict 
the range of institutional regimes in a particular region at a particular time 
to those with survival potential, they did not narrow it to one. Structural-
functionalism was simply not powerful enough to explain the prevalence 
of a particular institutional regime from within that restricted set. A vari-
ety of case specific factors, in other words, historical explanation, would 
invariably also be necessary for such an account, and the work of anthro-
pologists, sociologists, historians, and students of comparative political 
institutions was critical for that characterization. Finally, the historically 
specific selection from within the set mattered for economic performance, 
in ways that economic historians were well situated to analyze. 13 
This position is consistent with the more recent work of North (1990); 
12. Coase (1960) argued that in the absence of transactions costs, the particular assign-
ment of individual property rights would have no effect on the sectoral allocations of inputs 
or composition of output. 
13. They mattered because institutions could not simply be viewed as epiphenomenal. 
Once institutional structures were "selected," they could persist for idiosyncratic and inde-
terminate periods of time, in spite of changes in underlying resources, available technologies, 
or demographic factors. Or they might change, sometimes suddenly, in the absence of alter-
ation in such "underlying" factors. Thus, from both a cross-sectional and a time series per-
spective, institutions could differ while underlying conditions were similar and could be sim-
ilar while underlying conditions differed. Appreciation of the consequences of institutional 
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with game theoretic work showing that inefficient conventions, once 
established, may persist (Sugden 1989); with Kuran's analysis (1995) of 
interactions of public and private opinion; and with a developing strain of 
thinking emphasizing path dependency that has been applied principally 
to arguments about technology (Arthur 1989; David 1985). The path 
dependency literature retains the assumption of rationality and does not 
explore the possible implications of cognitive modularity for decision 
making. Like the arguments of this book, however, it emphasizes the 
importance of distinguishing between the explanation of origin and the 
explanation of stability. Path dependency stresses the need to adduce his-
torical accident in explaining retrospectively a particular trajectory. So 
does evolutionary analysis, but the relevant time frame for these "acci-
dents" is much earlier insofar as it applies to universal norms. 
Although any evolutionary account is by necessity historical, the role 
of evolutionary forces in changing our wiring has been inconsequential in 
the eleven thousand years since the beginnings of the Neolithic revolution. 
By that time we were, biologically, essentially what we are now,14 and my 
concern is understanding how evolutionary legacies help account for a set 
of altruistic inclinations and a subset of norms, common to all human 
groups, that reflect them. I return in chapter 7 for a more extended discus-
sion of the meaning of historical explanation. 
In the meantime, my focus is on why the traditional use of the norms 
approach does not push the analysis far enough and why I now believe 
that the rejection of methodological individualism, with which this 
approach is typically associated, is unwarranted. For economists, "primi-
tives" of theory have traditionally been recognized as tastes, technologies, 
and endowments. My work insisted, as did that of many others within and 
outside of economics, that one needed a fourth: rules, norms, or institu-
tions. The unanswered, indeed, unasked, question, however, has been 
variation has been reinforced by observation of the breakdown of the former Soviet Union 
and the strong recent interest in the role of institutional design in affecting economic perfor-
mance in transition economies. In a similar vein, Laporta et al. (1998) consider the conse-
quences of historical variation in legal systems (English, French, German, and Scandinavian) 
for financial structure and economic performance. 
14. By this I mean that our biological potential is essentially unchanged. Experimental 
research has now shown that experience, and the learning that goes with it, physically 
changes brain tissue at the molecular level by enhancing linkages between concurrently firing 
neurons (Ahissar et al. 1992). This confirms the theory of how neural networks encode mem-
ory first proposed by Douglass Hebb in 1949. Because his experience has been different, the 
average adult human's brain today is physically different from that of Cro-Magnon man. But 
the differences are analogous to the molecular realignment that takes place when data are 
recorded on a hard disk. The basic specifications of the drive, to extend the analogy, are what 
they were before the Neolithic revolution. 
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whether it is possible to account more systematically for the origin of those 
norms or rules that appear more or less invariant: in the Aristotelian sense, 
essentially human. In particular, does one need a somewhat different 
approach for understanding norms that are essentially human and those, 
the subject of cultural anthropology or comparative political economy, 
that characterize what differs among societies? 
Although the sociological/anthropological tradition has championed 
the relevance of norms, it has from its origins distinguished itself from the 
rational choice approach with the view that the whole is greater than the 
sum of the parts and cannot be understood with reference to them alone. 
Consequently, adherents have manifested great reluctance to explore any 
microlevel, and thus possibly biological or genetically influenced, under-
pinnings of cognition, culture, or social structure. In contrast, rational 
choice theory has enthusiastically endorsed methodological individualism, 
appealing to Darwin in support of it, but its resulting models of strategic 
interaction, as we have seen, exhibit great predictive inaccuracy. Some-
thing apparently is missing. 
Evolutionary Theory and levels of Selection 
When, in the past, economists have been dissatisfied with the gap between 
observed human behavior and the predictions of normative models, they 
have typically turned in one of two directions: toward evolutionary mod-
els, or toward the heuristics and biases program in psychology pioneered 
by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky. These conversations have not, 
however, resolved puzzles encountered when trying to fathom the logic of 
human behavior and social relations. Why do substantial numbers of 
experimental subjects play cooperate in fixed duration (in the limit single 
play) Prisoner's Dilemma games, even after, and indeed in some instances 
more frequently after, the payoffs have been carefully articulated (Rapa-
port and Chammah 1965, 53-54; Dawes 1988; Dawes and Thaler 1988)? 
Why did sophisticated students of game theory submit strategies like Tit-
for-Tat lS to the first Axelrod (1984) computer tournament, and why did 
such strategies do so well (see chap. 3)? 
There are a couple of explanations for the failure to make more 
progress. First, the evolutionary models accessed have, in a sense, been 
artificially restricted to permit selection to occur only at the level of the 
individual organism. The evolutionary biologists' "consensus" position 
15. Tit-for-Tat, which cooperates in the first stage and then matches a counterparty's 
play on subsequent moves, is normatively irrational in a two player PD game of fixed and 
known duration, assuming one believes one's counterparty to be rational. 
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that selection above the level of the individual organism was empirically 
unimportant had been translated, through the equivalent of a bad game of 
telephone, into the economists' understanding that it was impossible: sim-
ply inconsistent with the principles of natural selection. Thus these models 
lead over and over again into the same culs-de-sac encountered in explor-
ing rational choice models where such choice is defined as that which 
efficiently advances the material welfare of the actor. 
When one recognizes, in the context of multilevel models, that natural 
selection can sometimes favor behavioral predispositions not in the inter-
est of the individual organism manifesting them, provided such predispo-
sitions give the gene(s) inducing them a fitness advantage, it becomes pos-
sible to tell a coherent story about the origin of restraints on defection and 
other behavioral tendencies essential to the emergence of complex social 
organization. Necessary conditions for this to happen, addressed in chap-
ter 2, include populations that separate into groups (e.g., of thirty to one 
hundred individuals) for one or several generations, a positive covariance 
between group growth rates and the frequency of the altruistic trait(s) 
within each group, and a periodic dispersion back into a general popula-
tion and re-formation into new groups through exogamy and/or group 
splintering and recombination. Under such conditions a group beneficial 
trait may, remarkably, be declining in frequency within every group but, 
over time, increase in global population frequency.16 
Allowing for the possibility of multilevel or group selection is not 
equivalent to proving that such selection was operative in Pleistocene 
hominid populations or earlier, a task made difficult by the fragmentary 
nature of the archaeological and paleontological record. It is nonetheless 
critical that we adopt an explanatory framework, consistent with known 
evolutionary mechanisms, that permits an adequate account of human 
predispositions observable in modern experimental data. 
Multilevel selection models provide a plausible explanation of the 
origin of key human behavioral propensities, an explanation that has 
proved maddeningly difficult within evolutionary frameworks allowing 
selection only at the level of the individual organism. Multilevel selection 
models make use of evolutionary mechanisms recognized by Darwin and 
indeed encouraged by him for the explanation of the behaviors at issue 
here. Finally, such mechanisms can be precisely described theoretically, 
and have been documented in a number of species both experimentally 
and observationally. 
For reasons detailed in chapter 2, a strong consensus among biolo-
16. This is an instance of the Simpson paradox (Simpson 1951), explicated through the 
use of the Price equations discussed in chapter 2. 
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gists in the 1970s and 1980s attributed minimal empirical importance to 
group selection. That consensus has broken down in the past decade, and 
the treatment of the levels at which selection may occur is more catholic 
than it was even relatively recently (Wade 1978; Boyd and Richerson 1990; 
Wilson and Sober 1994; Sober and Wilson 1998). In particular, dismissal 
of the empirical likelihood of selection above the level of kin groups any-
where within the biological realm, now or in the past, common fifteen 
years ago, is less frequent and, where it appears, more restrained. Theoret-
ical refinements, in particular contributions by George Price (1970, 1972), 
evidence from both experiments and field observation, and extended and 
often heated discourse have been responsible for this change. 
Resistance to such models has been reinforced by belief that existing 
rational choice and/or individual level evolutionary explanations are ade-
quate for the explanation of cooperative behavior. Chapters 3 and 4 dis-
pute that view, emphasizing the need to distinguish carefully between 
accounts of the maintenance of "end state" equilibria and the explanation 
of the dynamic trajectories that led to them. 
Recent game theoretic investigations of cooperation have tended to 
explore behavior within an environment in which indefinitely repeated 
interaction may be assumed. The corresponding assumption within evolu-
tionary models has been of a very large population with pairs of individu-
als repeatedly selected at random to play the game (Sugden 1998,86). One 
or the other of these assumptions defines the preferred work space for game 
theorists (see Binmore 1994, 1998a) and creates necessary but not sufficient 
conditions for cooperation to be sustained in an environment in which indi-
viduals can be assumed to be rational and/or in which selection operates 
only at the level of the individual organism. These conditions are only nec-
essary because of the likelihood of multiple equilibria in such models. 
If one believes that the appropriate metaphor for the "original state" 
is an environment in which interaction is characterized by one-shot PDs, 
then one must provide a coherent account of the transition from that state 
to an environment in which it becomes realistic to assume a pattern of 
indefinitely repeated interaction-or of a large population repeatedly 
interacting with each other. In order to address the issue of transition we 
must explain why an organism would play cooperate in a one-shot PD 
and/or why a predisposition to do so would not be extinguished by the 
operation of natural selection. The modeling of the original state as 
involving one-shot Prisoner's Dilemmas is particularly appropriate when 
dealing with predator species capable of visiting serious harm on each 
other, an issue addressed more extensively in discussion of Konrad 
Lorenz's views on the evolution of restraints on intraspecific harm (chap. 
5). The assumption retains considerable and justifiable appeal in philoso-
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phy, political science, and economics (Kavka 1986), and well-established 
traditions in these fields take it for granted that the one-shot PD is the 
appropriate metaphor for the original state. 
As has been noted, experimental evidence going back to Flood and 
Dresher shows a widespread willingness to play cooperate in single play or 
fixed and known duration PDs. Two common interpretations of this evi-
dence have emerged, each of which in a different way seeks to preserve the 
assumption that humans are rational. One concludes that since it is obvi-
ously not rational to play cooperate in a one-shot PD game, and since we 
assume that humans are rational, we should be highly skeptical of experi-
mental evidence suggesting the contrary and certainly not predict or make 
policy based on these data (Binmore 1994). The other approach reasons 
that since experimental evidence overwhelmingly shows that some individ-
uals will play cooperate even in a one-shot PD, and since we assume that 
humans are rational, it must therefore be rational for them to do so (see, in 
general, Gauthier 1986; or for application to the phenomenon of voting, 
the large literature summarized in Green and Shapiro 1994, chap. 4). 
But neither line of argument is satisfactory. The first approach dis-
misses a large and growing body of experimental and observational evi-
dence. It is difficult to accept the idea that experimental "anomalies" sim-
ply reflect the importation of rules of thumb honed in environments of 
indefinitely repeated interaction (Binmore 1994).17 Humans do play coop-
erate in single play PDs, even when they are scarcely naive, fully under-
stand the game, and are guaranteed complete anonymity. Such a predis-
position is, moreover, essential in any account of the transition from 
one-shot environments to those where repeated and indefinite interaction 
may reasonably be presumed. 
The latter approach, on the other hand, concluding that it is some-
how rational to play cooperate in a one-shot PD, has been effectively crit-
icized by Binmore (1994, chap. 3), who argues persuasively that if the term 
rational is to retain meaning, it cannot describe the implementation of a 
strictly dominated strategy. 18 
17. The argument that experimental subjects have been "contaminated" through their 
prior social experiences cuts both ways. Suppose 65 percent of experimental subjects play 
cooperate in one-shot PDs with opportunity for preplay communication. Binmore's view is 
that this majority has not had time to adjust to the experimental environment. But what of 
the other 35 percent? Could one not equally well conclude that some of those playing defec-
tion are applying rules of thumb honed in the competitive marketplace (competition is not a 
tort; cooperation in restraint of trade is a felony)? Evidence that economics students play 
closer to Nash equilibrium predictions might support this view. 
18. Contra Binmore, I interpret the deviations from Nash equilibrium play in one-shot 
PDs as reflecting an essential human behavioral predisposition. But like Binmore, I reject the 
suggestion of Gauthier and others that it is rational to playa strictly dominated strategy. I 
personally may be prepared to do so but will not defend the playas rational. 
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An advantage of moving to an evolutionary framework is that we can 
dispense with the question of whether or not a behavior is rational. All 
that now matters is whether it favors gene(s) predisposing to it. Adoption 
of an evolutionary approach does not, however, in and of itself resolve the 
conundrum. In particular, if at the outset the model precludes any role for 
group selection, it enables no more progress on the problem than do ratio-
nal choice models. Many analyses such as that offered by Trivers (1971) 
claim to provide an account of transition within a framework admitting 
selection only at the individual level, but, as chapter 3 argues, all Trivers 
actually establishes is how an equilibrium involving reciprocity, once 
attained, can be sustained by individual level selection or, for that matter, 
rational choice. 
If we define rationality narrowly and precisely, and we have accu-
rately characterized the payoffs in a game, it cannot be rational in a one-
shot PD game to play cooperate, a strictly dominated strategy. Similarly, 
if the payoffs to a single play PD game are viewed as affecting fitness, it 
cannot be possible for a predisposition to play cooperate to be favored at 
low frequencies in an evolutionary model of one-shot interaction (pairs of 
individuals chosen repeatedly at random to play such games) with selec-
tion limited to the level of the individual organism. 
The Inverse Genetic Fallacy 
The work of Robert Trivers (1971), Robert Axelrod (1984), and Robert 
Frank (1988) is representative of an existing and widely cited body of 
research originating within both the biological and the social sciences that 
claims or appears to prove otherwise, or, as Binmore puts it, to square the 
circle (1994, 173). All of these analyses appeal to evolutionary models that 
explicitly preclude selection above the level of the individual organism. 
Each claims to provide accounts of the origin of altruistic, cooperative, or 
other-regarding behavior among non-kin. 
But the appearance is an illusion, because each of these efforts suffers 
in varying degrees from the inverse genetic fallacy.19 Each confuses a 
demonstration that, within models assuming either individual level selec-
tion alone, or rational (egoistic) choice, mutualistic behaviors once estab-
lished can persist with a demonstration that the origin of cooperative 
behavior in the context of one-shot encounters has been accounted for. In 
19. The genetic fallacy is the attribution to a mature organism or phenomenon ofa fea-
ture characteristic of its development. I characterize the inverse genetic fallacy as the reverse 
attribution: in this instance the inappropriate attribution of mechanisms that may be sus-
taining cooperation to the explanation of its origin. Both the original and its inverse are 
sometimes termed "the" genetic fallacy (Flew 1979,130). I am indebted to Mel Reder for sug-
gesting this formulation. 
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two player game theoretic models assuming rational choice, cooperative 
outcomes are made possible, although not guaranteed, by the assumption 
of indefinitely repeated interaction. In evolutionary game theory models, 
cooperative outcomes are made possible, although not guaranteed, by the 
assumption of a large population repeatedly interacting with each other. 
And getting to a point where it is reasonable to make either of these 
assumptions remains a central part of the explanatory challenge we face. 
It is possible, of course, that economists, political scientists, philoso-
phers, and biologists simply have not thought long enough or hard enough 
about the problem. Given the attention devoted to individual level selec-
tion/rational choice approaches, however, it is my conclusion, and Bin-
more's-this is an area of strong agreement-that the routes lead 
inevitably into the same cul-de-sac. If we restrict evolutionary models to 
those allowing selection only at the individual level, we cannot get beyond 
the dilemma of a one-shot PD. Binmore's solution, however, is simply to 
declare that this is not the right problem and move on. His position is that 
if we wish to account for the persistence of complex social organization, 
we must retain the behavioral assumption that individuals are narrowly 
egoistic and begin with the environmental assumption of indefinite inter-
action (Binmore 1998a, 10). 
Binmore's ability to provide individuallevellegoistic explanations of 
how cooperative outcomes can maintain themselves once established is, 
however, purchased at a considerable price. In particular, there is now no 
place for an account of the replicator dynamic that might convert an orig-
inal state environment of one-shot PDs into an environment of indefinitely 
repeated interaction.2o Why? Because the problem is assumed away at the 
outset. Binmore's approach, although forthright and intellectually coher-
ent, can offer no help in addressing the problem of origin. We need to 
reflect on this as we evaluate future directions for research. 
The experimental results summarized at the start of this chapter 
remind us that the predictions of Nash equilibrium analysis are contra-
dicted even when one controls for reputational effects, by assuring 
anonymity, or the effects of repetition, when one studies single play games. 
Such factors are commonly adduced to explain human willingness to 
engage in apparently other-regarding behavior, but even after controlling 
for them, the behavior persists. 
We are therefore offered a choice in dealing with the issue of transi-
tion: (1) continue to pour treasure and intellectual resources into what is a 
losing battle (account for cooperative play in one-shot PDs using individ-
20. The technical definition of the replicator dynamic is that a strategy's growth rate is 
a linear function of its payoff relative to the average payoff (Young 1998, 27; Taylor and 
Jonker 1978). 
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uallevellrational choice explanations), (2) abandon the problem (this is 
essentially Binmore's solution) because it cannot be resolved in a fashion 
one finds intellectually congenial, or (3) favor lines of inquiry that admit 
rather than try to explain away behavioral predispositions that could lead 
to the play of cooperate in a one-shot PD, and attempt to provide 
accounts of their origin consistent with known biological mechanisms. 
What are some of the key predispositions that must be accounted for? 
The most central is a willingness to refrain from defection in PD games, a 
predisposition historically essential in the conversion of single play games, 
over time, into ones in which indefinite interaction may reasonably be pre-
sumed. As horizons of expected interaction increase, a predisposition to 
retaliate after what is perceived as a defection, even when such retaliation 
may be detrimental to the fitness of the individual organism, also becomes 
important. Finally, as interactions persist and become more multilateral, a 
willingness to retaliate against third parties, even when the agent retaliat-
ing is not the one against whom the original attack was directed, becomes 
relevant. In sum, we need restraint on primary (unprovoked) aggression 
and predisposition toward secondary (retaliatory) action. The first cannot 
satisfy any standard criterion of economic rationality, and the second can-
not be rational from the standpoint of subgame perfection (see chap. 4). 
Yet each of these predispositions has been well documented in exper-
imental research, the first in the play of cooperate in one-shot PDs and the 
second, for example, in the rejection of positive offers in single play ulti-
matum games. With respect to retaliation against third parties, roughly 
three-quarters of experimental subjects in an ultimatum game will reject 
an opportunity to split $12 50/50 with someone who has previously made 
an offer they deem too low to a third party, preferring to split $10 50/50 
with someone who has previously made what they view as an acceptable 
offer to a third party (Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler 1986; see also 
Boyd and Richerson 1992). Tit-for-Tat, a strategy with strong descriptive 
and some normative resonance in research on human behavior (see Axel-
rod 1984), combines two of these tendencies, requiring the practice of giv-
ing up the option of first strike, an ability to monitor defections, and a pre-
disposition to punish them. 21 
In a context of one-shot games the behavioral predisposition (forgo-
21. In a two person game of indefinite length, cooperative behavior can be sustained as 
a rational choice equilibrium, but not one that is unique. If the predispositions underlying 
TFT are among those central to the transition from an environment of one-shot PDs to one in 
which indefinite interaction can be presumed, the hardwired legacies of that transition might 
be thought of as a "focal point," contributing to humans' ability to coordinate on this as 
opposed to other possible equilibria. Once we move to a multi player ecology, matters become 
even more complex. See Hirshleifer and Martinez-Coli 1988 and more recently Bendor and 
Swistak 1997 for explorations of what can and cannot be concluded under these conditions. 
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ing first strike) that lays the foundation for complex social organization 
cannot be rationalized as in the interest of the organism. In evolutionary 
terms, particularly if the payoff to the cooperator in a cooperate-defect 
profile is death, the persistence of genes favoring such behavior following 
their emergence at low frequencies cannot be accounted for on the basis of 
selection at the level of the individual organism. Cooperation in the one-
shot game is unambiguously altruistic. 
Assume that this inclination has allowed the development of repeat 
interaction among a group of cooperators. What of a propensity to retali-
ate against defecting invaders? Iteration allows a big increase in the com-
plexities of the strategy space. But one can easily appreciate that at low fre-
quencies, such a retaliatory inclination would be altruistic, benefiting 
other third parties at cost to oneself. Punishing defectors is costly, and it 
pays to free ride and let others play the sheriff. Upon first emergence, such 
an inclination would also not be favored by individual level selection. 
Although these inclinations are critical for the origin and develop-
ment of complex social organization, once that has been attained, they 
may seem transparently rational and self-serving as well as of benefit to 
others. But how can these inclinations be altruistic if they end up 
benefiting the actor who undertakes them? The answer is that they cannot. 
In an infinitely repeated game, a contingently cooperative strategy will be 
altruistic when practiced in an environment in which the frequency of 
cooperative strategies in the population from which one's counterparty is 
drawn is low. But it will cease to be so as the frequencies of such strategies 
rIse. 
If one walks into a room of players one believes with high probability 
to be full of Tit-for-Tat players, particularly if they will interpret an attack 
on one as an attack on all (this was the foundational language for the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization), it certainly seems rational, even for 
a purely egoistic actor, to behave in a manner observationally indistin-
guishable from everyone else. The argument can be made more vivid by 
assuming everyone is packing heat and carrying gold. In such circum-
stances one will conclude that it is rational, contingent on beliefs about the 
strategies to be played by others, to behave in a manner that is apparently 
"moral" or other regarding, even if one is completely "amoral" and exclu-
sively self-regarding (Andreoni and Miller 1993). The self-regarding 
invader will, to the extent that all other players are truly Tit-for-Tat, find 
herself favored, ex post, by such other-regarding behavior. And if there is 
any concern that the native population may punish those who do not pun-
ish, one will go along and join in punishing the behavior of any less astute 
invader. 
From an evolutionary standpoint, this favoring of strategies wide-
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spread in a population is an instance of frequency dependent selection. 
Such selection can sustain an equilibrium characterized by behavior that 
would be altruistic were it practiced in an environment in which it 
obtained at lower frequency, even though all of the selection will be occur-
ring at the level of the individual organism. At high frequency, behavior 
that would be altruistic at low frequency can become mutualistic, 
benefiting both the individual and others in the group. 
Why is it then necessary to consider a role for group level selection, if 
the behaviors of interest, such as restraint on first strike, can be accounted 
for without appealing to it? An adequate account of such behavior 
requires that we explain not just persistence as the consequence of fre-
quency dependent selection, but also origin (Dugatkin 1998,41). How did 
such behavioral predispositions move from low to high frequency in a 
population? From an evolutionary standpoint, they will not be favored by 
individual level selection if they suddenly appear at low frequencies, in 
which case they will be unambiguously altruistic. 
Yet the experimental data suggest very strongly that propensities 
enabling cooperation represent essential human characteristics operative 
even in one-shot interactions. Recall that many of the experiments control 
for the effects of iteration or concern with reputation that figure so promi-
nently in explanations of how cooperative behavior is sustained by egois-
tic individuals and/or selection at the level of the individual organism 
alone. It is apparent from the experimental evidence that we have acquired 
predispositions (and we must have done so through evolutionary mecha-
nisms) that in certain circumstances or domains short-circuit or con-
traindicate behavior that our rational faculties would counsel. 
How else are we to interpret the persistent rejection of positive offers 
in ultimatum games? The willingness to leave money on the table in a cen-
tipede game? The behavior of over 101 million citizens who voted in the 
1992 presidential election and over 104 million in the most recent contest? 
Finally, how else are we to interpret the behavior of Williams, and eventu-
ally Alchian, that so troubled Nash? It cannot be because they were naive 
or did not understand the structure of the game at the outset. Do we wish 
to argue that each thought the other irrational? An alternative hypothesis 
is that they were "oversocialized." Binmore suggests that subjects need 
time to break away from culturally reinforced habits of play in games of 
repeated interaction, time to "learn" how to play "correctly," that is, 
according to the Nash prediction. 
Let us take Binmore's hypothesis seriously and examine more closely 
the data from the Alchian-Williams experiment. After all, if any subjects 
had the capacity to learn how to play "correctly," it should have been they. 
If we divide their hundred plays into groups of ten, here is the changing 
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frequency of cooperate (the number of cooperative plays out often in each 
decile) for each of the two players. 
TABLE 2. Cooperative Play in the First Finite Duration PD Experiment 
1-10 11-20 21-30 31-40 41-50 51-60 61-70 71-80 81-90 91-100 
A1chian 1 6 5 7 8 8 7 9 9 8 
Williams 4 6 6 8 9 10 7 10 9 9 
Source: Poundstone 1992, 108-17. 
There is no evidence here that they moved systematically closer to the 
Nash prediction as the game proceeded. In fact, we observe the contrary. 
Modularity in Cognition and Behavior 
There are two distinct ways in which the action of an egoistic actor may 
fail to satisfy the criterion of rationality (see the prologue). It may fail 
because the action is conditioned on beliefs that have not been arrived at 
rationally, either because a "nonoptimal" amount of energy and resources 
has been devoted to acquiring and processing information relevant for 
forming them, or because they have not been reached using the best avail-
able logical and/or statistical algorithms. An action may also fail to satisfy 
the criterion because, conditional on some beliefs, it does not efficiently 
advance the material welfare of the individual. The first type of "failure" 
involves primarily cognition, the second, choice. 
Failures of rationality of the first sort are the main focus of the heuris-
tics and biases research program, addressed more systematically in chapter 
6. The experimental behavior catalogued at the start of this chapter, how-
ever, represents failure of the second type. Why? Because there is little reason 
in any of these experiments to conclude that the beliefs possessed by subjects 
about the structure of the games were in any way irrational or even subject 
to any uncertainty. And we must use the term "failure" here advisedly. It has 
a pejorative connotation, and we may hesitate before concluding that it 
would be desirable if each and every one of these "failures" were eliminated. 
Both laboratory evidence and field observation suggest that "fail-
ures" of both types are real and are sufficiently common that they may 
reflect human predispositions that can reasonably be termed essential. If 
that is so, the hypothesis that human cognition and behavior are 
influenced by a modular design of mental organs, with modules function-
ally specialized to particular domains, may help us understand why.22 The 
22. The concept of a mental organ is originally due to Chomsky. A domain is under-
stood to mean a particular type of encountered environment. 
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proposition is not easily entertained, however, because it presents a chal-
lenge to our self-conception as possessors of an integrated learning and 
reasoning capability applicable across all encountered environments that 
in most cases does or should drive behavior. 
Subject to the assumption of a limited number of innate drives (to eat, 
to drink, to procreate), behaviorist psychologists, and, implicitly, many 
social scientists, have tended to assume that human action is determined in 
the following manner. Within any specified category of behavior (oper-
ants), infants engage initially in an essentially random range of actions. 
Those that produce pleasure are reinforced, and thereby the behavior that 
led to them is conditioned. This is known in the psychology literature as 
the law of effect. 
The passive stimulus-response connection central to behaviorism has 
been softened somewhat with an emphasis on a conscious hypothesis test-
ing mechanism that intermediates between the two (e.g., Bower and Tra-
baso 1963). But the dominant perspective within academic psychology, at 
least for the last half century, has nevertheless conceived of the mind as a 
general purpose tabulator devoted, through such calculations, to effi-
ciently advancing the material interest of its possessor. Our faculties for 
acquiring and processing information are assumed to be dedicated, almost 
exclusively, to computing correlations between actions and sensations, 
maintaining updated tables of conditional probabilities, and choosing 
actions based on those that best satisfy the organism's desires. The behav-
iorist model assumes that the function of the mind is to assist the organism 
in making choices that are rational, in the sense in which that term was 
defined in the prologue. 
The model of learning based on classical and operant conditioning 
embodies the principle of equipotentiality, which assumes that learning 
mechanisms are similar irrespective of the character of the stimuli, the 
responses, or the reinforcers. It assumes we are not born with "preformat-
ted" taxonomic or conceptual categories but are equally receptive to any 
range of sensory input. In conjunction with the assumption of a very lim-
ited number of innate drives, the model gives environmental influences 
enormous and almost exclusive power in influencing behavior. Ivan 
Pavlov, in his Nobel Prize-winning experiments with ringing bells and 
salivating dogs, showed that involuntary reflexes could be associated with 
new stimuli and thereafter be reliably produced by such stimuli. B. F. 
Skinner, behaviorism's most famous exponent, demonstrated repeatedly 
how voluntary responses could be associated with rewards and thereby 
increase in frequency. Their experimental results, and those of many oth-
ers, reinforce a presumption that tabulated frequencies of conjoint (asso-
ciated) occurrences and extrapolations to similar situations (reasoning by 
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resemblance) govern human belief about how the world works and, by 
indicating the direction in which pleasure can be obtained, determine 
behavior. From the standpoint of behaviorism, the most important hard-
wiring is a general ability to learn through the correlation of actions with 
reinforcing consequences. 
The behaviorist tradition in U.S. psychology advanced by John Wat-
son, the anthropological perspective associated with Franz Boas and 
Alfred Kroeber, and the development of European sociology reflected in 
the writings of Emile Durkheim are all closely associated with this view of 
cognition and the determination of human behavior. Without giving the 
matter a great deal of thought, most economists implicitly accept this 
view, which derives originally from the seventeenth and eighteenth century 
writings of Hobbes, John Locke, and David Hume and characterizes an 
undeniably important learning mechanism. What is increasingly at issue, 
however, are the claims that our knowledge base arises exclusively through 
this association of pleasant or unpleasant sensory experiences with behav-
iors and that consequently our mind at birth can usefully be pictured as a 
blank slate, a tabula rasa as Locke put it, on which experience writes. 
A powerful set of experiments in the 1960s by John Garcia and his 
colleagues challenged the fundamental principle of equipotentiality. Gar-
cia found that he could easily get rats to associate tastes with nausea 
induced by X rays and to associate lights or sound with electric shocks but 
that it was very difficult to get them to associate tastes with electric shocks 
or nausea with lights or sounds (Garcia and Koelling 1966). In other 
words, rats seem to be differentially prepared to make certain types of 
associations. Garcia's work struck at the heart of behaviorist psychology 
and received a very hostile initial reception. 23 But its implications have by 
now been more broadly accepted. 
A closely related area of controversy concerns the extent to which 
innate drives, representing evolutionarily favored strategies that are 
wholly or partly unconditioned, influence behavior. The larger are the 
variety and power of innate drives, the more restricted is the scope for 
environmental influence on or modification of behavior. 
Where have economists typically stood on these issues? With its com-
mon assumptions that tastes are stable, given, and not to be disputed, the 
field allows for a somewhat broader role for inborn drives than a Skinner-
ian might feel comfortable with. With very limited exceptions, behaviorists 
concern themselves only with behavior and its antecedent conditions 
23. Garcia's original paper was turned down by top journals, and one reviewer dis-
missed the results of a subsequent paper as "no more likely than birdshit in a cuckoo clock" 
(Seligman and Hager 1972, 15). 
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(response and stimulus, respectively), eschewing discussion of conscious-
ness, the actual process of cognition, or motives. In contrast, the standard 
economic model imposes fewer restrictions on variation in motives and 
encourages us to focus on how these motives, along with beliefs and how 
we acquire them, determine action. 
On the other hand, the differences between the standard economic 
model and that common in behaviorist psychology can easily be over-
stated, since economists, unable to observe tastes directly, try to deduce 
them from behavior, using the principle of revealed preference. The eco-
nomic assumption that individuals maximize utility subject to constraint 
in no way conflicts with the behaviorist model of operant conditioning, 
which specifies that individuals choose actions that produce pleasure and 
avoid those that do not. Nor is there conflict with the economist's instru-
mental interpretation of rationality as involving the effective choice of 
means to attain ends. 
Finally, with respect to the assumed cognitive and learning mecha-
nisms, there is little variance between the two approaches: the tabula rasa 
assumption is as consistent with the standard economic model as it is with 
traditions in U.S. psychology, sociology, and anthropology.24 Indeed, in 
all of these disciplines there is little allowance, within dominant research 
paradigms, for the possibility that learning mechanisms might be special-
ized to particular domains, in other words, that equipotentiality might be 
violated. In all but economics the significance of innate behavioral predis-
positions is downplayed, with economists displaying somewhat more flexi-
bility with regard to their role (beyond drinking, eating, and procreating) 
in influencing behavior. 
The work of Leda Cosmides and John Tooby builds on the work of 
Garcia, Ekman, and Berlin and Kay in forcing one to question the ade-
quacy of these views of cognition and the determination of behavior. It 
does so both through its attack on the Standard Social Science Model, 
shocking in its undifferentiated lumping together of economics with soci-
ology and anthropology as target, and in the authors' experimental work, 
which shows evidence of a powerful "cheater detection module" in 
24. The differences between the economist's perspective and that of a behaviorist can 
be illustrated as follows. An economist believes some people are born liking oranges, some 
liking apples. A behaviorist would grudgingly grant that people are born liking to eat but 
believes that it is possible, through appropriate reinforcement, to condition an infant to like 
apples or oranges at will. The economist and the behaviorist share a common view about how 
knowledge of oranges, apples, and where to find them is acquired and doubt that we are dif-
ferentially prepared to learn about certain kinds offruit. Perhaps this is so with respect to this 
domain. The question is whether the principle of equipotentiality can be maintained as a cog-
nitive axiom. 
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humans, a module that at times improves performance on problems 
involving the propositional calculus, although in other contexts worsening 
it (Tooby and Cosmides 1992; Cosmides and Tooby 1992). Their research 
develops the implications for social science in general and economics in 
particular of extending the modularity central to the work of Noam 
Chomsky on language acquisition as well as the well-developed research 
program in visual perception to the area of social relations. Chapter 5 sur-
veys evidence from a number of disciplines supporting this approach. 
Modularity-the idea that cognitive processes or behavioral choice 
mechanisms may be functionally specialized to deal with particular 
domains of knowledge or types of situations-is relevant not only in 
thinking about the mechanisms whereby we acquire beliefs about the 
nature and structure of the world but also in understanding how appar-
ently inconsistent behavioral predispositions may simultaneously charac-
terize, and thereby appear to coexist within, the same individual. That pos-
sibility has bedeviled economists, who generally assume the self is unitary, 
with consistent preferences invariant to encountered environments (Kuran 
1995, 43). If our cognition is modular, with mental organs specialized to 
particular domains and closely linked to particular behaviors, then it 
becomes plausible to hypothesize that we possess apparently inconsistent 
predispositions that pull in different directions, with the outcome proba-
bilistically dependent on the type of situation (domain) encountered, in a 
manner that mayor may not leave the actor with any sense of behaving 
inconsistently. 
The issues here go beyond concerns about the number and/or power 
of innate drives. Some hardwiring for drives is accepted, grudgingly, even 
by strict behaviorists. A behaviorist psychologist or an economist may dif-
fer regarding their range but will generally agree on at least a basic subset. 
Moreover, he or she will assume that such goals are pursued with means 
that are rational. This implies that, where relevant, expectations are con-
ditioned by past stimulus/response pairings and means (behaviors) are 
selected in pursuit of the satisfaction of these ends. 
Restraint on first strike, cheater detection modules, or predispositions 
to follow through on retaliation threats even when such threats have failed 
to deter reflect hard wiring at a different level. These behaviors generally 
fail the criterion of rationality, and if they are essentially human, they 
involve hardwiring of instruments (means), not just ends. This poses a 
more serious challenge to modern social science than simply navigating 
among different views regarding the range and power of innate drives. It 
goes beyond demonstrations of violations of equipotentiality. And it 
addresses a different type of rationality failure from that which principally 
concerns researchers in the heuristics and biases program. 
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Behavioral economists, whose contributions challenge different 
aspects of the standard economic model, in particular transitivity and the 
invariance postulates, have at times seemed comfortable with what could 
be interpreted as a modular approach.25 But what has increasingly been 
lacking in this work is a clearer specification of the relationship between 
encountered domains and the probabilities of different predispositions 
asserting themselves. Absent that, we run the risk of developing long 
menus of predispositions (heuristics and biases), some of which operate in 
opposing directions and one or more of which can, after the fact, be 
selected to "account" for almost any behavior or judgment. Unless these 
deficiencies can be overcome, these models will have only limited ability to 
predict human behavior, even in an aleatory manner (see chap. 6).26 
The work done by Cosmides and Tooby is not subject to this criti-
cism. On the basis of a series of carefully designed experiments, they make 
a compelling case that reasoning involving problems in propositional logic 
differs in systematic and predictable ways whenever the domain of social 
rules is encountered. While their research on cheater detection is first and 
foremost a study in cognition, the specialized cognitive processes it 
identifies are implicitly associated with behavioral predispositions to pun-
ish violators of social rules, propensities apparently hardwired and not 
necessarily in the organism's individual interest.27 They stress the implica-
tions of their research for our understanding of the process of cognition 
and in particular for the support their work provides for a modular 
approach. My argument, however, places equal emphasis on the behavior 
with which this specialized module is associated (a propensity to seek out 
and punish violators of social rules) and the evolutionary explanation of 
its origin. The cheater detection module (a cognitive adaptation) exists in 
service of a cheater punishment module, an adaptation at the behavioral 
25. See for example Thaler and Shefrin 1981, which posits, within a single individual, a 
rational "planner" coexisting with a more emotional "doer." 
26. The distinction between aleatory and epistemic explanation is emphasized in Beach, 
Barnes, and Christensen-Zalanski 1986. Epistemic reasoning, which clinical psychologists 
generally employ, treats each individual as unique, not as a member of a larger class for 
which base rate data may be relevant in predicting behavior. Aleatory reasoning involves the 
attempt inductively (or, as in games of chance, analytically) to forecast events probabilisti-
cally. In general, social scientists aspire to aleatory but not epistemic predictions of human 
behavior. 
27. Such behavior is not necessarily in the organism's individual interest because it 
would always "pay" to free ride: to let others use up valuable energy punishing transgressions 
of social rules (which might contribute to a more favorable reproductive environment for the 
collectivity). The issues involving the rationality of punishing defection differ in scale from 
those associated with the rationality of nuclear retaliation after a devastating first strike, but 
they involve the same basic concerns. These issues, which have been only partially explored 
by Cosmides and Tooby, are discussed in more detail in chapters 3 and 4. 
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level, for which substantial experimental evidence is available (see the ear-
lier discussion of Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler 1986; Fehr and Giichter 
2000).28 Cosmides and Tooby argue that such predispositions would have 
been favored by natural selection, but they do not systematically explore 
the level at which selection favoring them would have had to have 
occurred. 
To the extent that we treat social rules as public goods, a willingness 
voluntarily, and at some positive fitness or welfare cost, to punish viola-
tors can be seen as closely related to the irreducible willingness to make 
voluntary contributions to public goods discussed in the first section of 
this chapter. Just as the origin of that willingness is difficult to account for 
within individual selection models, so too is the propensity to seek out and 
punish "cheaters." We may react ambivalently to observing the collective 
punishment of violations of social norms, particularly when, because of 
differences in political culture, we are ambivalent about the norm itself. 
We are generally less ambivalent when witnessing the punishing of codify-
ing norms that reinforce essentially universal human predispositions. Thus 
regardless of culture, few will experience ambivalence witnessing punish-
ment of an unprovoked and premeditated murder, or a father's abuse of 
his daughter, although westerners may feel ambivalence at the punishment 
of a woman who appears without a veil in an Islamic country, and there 
may be widespread revulsion at actions designed to enforce a practice of 
female genital mutilation. But in each of these cases the predispositions 
underlying and enabling these behaviors are cut from the same cloth as 
those that generate, in more antiseptic experimental environments, a vol-
untary willingness to provide public goods. 
A willingness to seek out and punish violators of social norms, 
although essential, is not, however, the most important foundation for 
complex social organization. A propensity to punish defections presumes 
there are established rules or norms from which one can defect. Without a 
history of repeated interaction, there can be no trust or norm to be vio-
lated, just as in an iterated PD game, retaliation has no meaning absent a 
prior record of cooperative outcomes. Accounting for a predisposition to 
play cooperate in one-shot PDs is therefore an explanatory challenge that 
must, logically, be given first priority. 
I go beyond Cosmides and Tooby in arguing that a propensity to 
practice restraint on defection (the PD solution module) has as much evi-
28. The Cosmides and Tooby research program represents a shift from the earlier 
sociobiological emphasis on selection for behavior to an emphasis on cognitive adaptations, 
from Darwinian behaviorism to Darwinian psychology, as Sterelny and Griffiths put it 
(1999,324--28). The two are, however, related, since cognitive adaptations clearly may have 
important influences on behavior. 
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dential foundation and evolutionary rationale as the predispositions asso-
ciated with detecting and punishing cheaters that they have identified.29 In 
both instances we have, apparently, specialized cognitive processes associ-
ated with behavioral propensities specialized to particular domains. In 
both instances we have behavioral evidence consistent with the operation 
of neurobiological subsystems persistently capable of overriding the coun-
sel of our rational (self-serving) faculties. Both propensities are critical in 
understanding the origin of complex social organization (although forgo-
ing first strike is logically prior), and both would have to have been 
favored by evolutionary forces above the level of the individual organism. 
Although influenced by and sympathetic to the research of Cosmides 
and Tooby, my argument is not simply an extension of their framework. 
Whereas Cosmides and Tooby appear to view the problem of the origin of 
social organization as largely "solved" by the Trivers model of reciprocal 
altruism, augmented perhaps by their cheater detection module, I do not. 
This is because the Trivers model, which claims to operate only at the indi-
vidual level of selection, does not adequately explain how a willingness to 
play cooperate in what might well be one-shot PDs could survive were it to 
appear initially at low frequencies where indefinitely repeated interaction 
cannot be assumed (see chap. 3). We need to extend the concept ofmodu-
larity to encompass the cognitive underpinnings of a propensity to play 
cooperate in a one-shot PD and more explicitly consider the nature of evo-
lutionary mechanisms that permitted such a module to survive and spread. 
In other words, we should entertain the likelihood of a PD solution mod-
ule, along with a cheater detection/punishment module. According to this 
line of argument, then, Cosmides and Tooby have not pushed modularity 
far enough in developing a coherent account of the origin of complex 
social organization. 
Modularity and the Kahneman and Tversky Program 
It seems initially ironic that one of the key targets of Cosmides and Tooby 
was the Kahneman and Tversky program, which has attracted consider-
able attention among economists and is discussed in detail in chapter 6. 
When Leda Cosmides first explored the "elusive content effect" in experi-
ments involving the Wason selection test, the principal existing explana-
29. The term first mover altruism is sometimes used to mean any cooperative move in a 
PD or PD-like game, whether or not the game is single play or repeated and whether or not 
moves are entered sequentially (as in the game of trust) or simultaneously. For that reason, I 
refer to it more generally as first move(r) altruism. A propensity to make such moves, and the 
cognitive and behavioral mechanisms responsible for them, is what I have in mind in refer-
ring to a PD solution module. 
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tions involved decision making based on the "availability" heuristic and 
the tendency to seek confirming, rather than deconfirming, evidence, both 
staples of Kahneman and Tversky reasoning.3o The irony was that if any-
one's research had raised doubts among economists with regard to the 
proposition that our brain operated like a smoothly functioning com-
puter, it was that of Tversky and Kahneman (1974). Although they ini-
tially followed in the Herbert Simon tradition of emphasizing how these 
heuristics often worked tolerably well, the overwhelming preponderance 
of their research and that which it inspired has stressed the reverse: the 
existence of systematic biases and their consequences.31 All the biases that 
their research program apparently documented made it look like our "wet 
computers" had some seriously frayed insulation inside. 
Again, if we think of rational choice as involving both the formation 
of rational beliefs or expectations and the rational selection ( choice) of 
actions conditional on those beliefs and the organism's desires, it is clear 
that the Kahneman and Tversky program is principally concerned with 
defects in the first stage (the title of their 1982 book, with Slovic, is Judg-
ment under Uncertainty). To the degree that their work studies action, it is 
most relevant for decision theory (the study of games against nature).32 
The "defects" reflected in the experimental data summarized at the start of 
this chapter do not involve failures in the formation of rational beliefs. 
And they do not involve games against nature. Thus it may not be sur-
prising if the work of Kahneman and Tversky ends up shedding relatively 
little light on why Alchian and Williams behaved the way they did. 
At the same time, in many cases judgment (belief or expectation for-
30. The Wason selection task measures competency in solving problems of logical 
inference involving statements of the ifp then q type (see chap. 5). The "elusive content effect" 
is a reference to the title of Cosmides's 1985 doctoral dissertation in psychology at Harvard. 
It refers to the fact that performance varies according to the differing content of logically 
equivalent problems. Within the Kahneman and Tversky framework, the "availability" 
heuristic explains exceptionally good performance as resulting from content with which sub-
jects were familiar or that was similar to other problems with which they were familiar. Poor 
performance is attributed to a human tendency to search for evidence confirming, rather than 
deconfirming a conditional statement (rule) (Cosmides, 1985; Camerer 1995,609). 
31. "In general these heuristics are quite useful, but sometimes they lead to severe and 
systematic errors" (Tversky and Kahneman 1974, 1124). Compare with the more consistently 
negative emphasis on the role of biases in Dawes 1988 (7): "The basic point of this book is 
that we often think in automatic ways about choice situations, that these automatic thinking 
processes can be described by certain psychological rules ("heuristics"), and that they sys-
tematically lead us to make poorer choices than we would by thinking in a more controlled 
manner about our decisions." 
32. In technical terms, a game against nature involves optimization against a fixed envi-
ronment-not one that may be trying to figure out what you are going to do and altering its 
behavior in response to such calculations. 
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mation) and choice are intimately linked, and to the degree that the Kah-
neman and Tversky program has identified truly universal judgmental 
defects, or biases, we should pay close attention to them. Because of the 
multiplication of posited heuristics and biases, however, there are increas-
ing grounds for concern about the extent to which the research program 
they have inspired has succeeded in this effort. A troubling general ques-
tion, for example, is why evolution should have endowed us with such a 
poorly functioning set of belief or expectation formation algorithms, par-
ticularly for the important inductive task of statistical inference, a highly 
desirable capability in updating conditional probabilities in interactions 
with the nonhuman as well as human environment. 
Binmore, in general, vigorously resists crediting experimental 
research with demonstrating systematic deviations in human capabilities 
and/or predispositions from those implied by the assumptions that indi-
viduals make rational choices. The one exception he is prepared to grant 
is, ironically, in this area. He sees the results of the Kahneman and Tver-
sky program as showing "perhaps that real people have little natural 
capacity for statistics .... As a consequence, it is in this area that I believe 
modeling homo sapiens as homo economicus has least to recommend it" 
(Binmore 1994,273-74). In the domain where Binmore is most receptive 
to crediting the experimental research, however, my argument, following 
Gigerenzer, Cosmides, and Tooby (see chap. 6), expresses doubt as to 
whether the deficiencies in our statistical capabilities are as significant as 
some experimenters have suggested they are. 
The key difference between the Cosmides and Tooby approach to 
modularity and the Kahneman and Tversky research program has been 
the explicitly evolutionary perspective in the former, a perspective that 
emphasized asking first what the mind was "designed" for before postu-
lating research hypotheses. It is also clear that this approach, whether 
serendipitously or not, has permitted these researchers to hit experimental 
pay dirt. That fact is one of the strongest pieces of evidence in support of 
their approach. 
A new body of research is now emerging, questioning why evolution 
should have made us such poor intuitive statisticians, particularly in the 
light of research on animal foraging indicating that birds and bumblebees, 
among others, seem quite good at these tasks (Stephens and Krebs 1986, 
chap. 9).33 The fact that the specialized neurobiology of animals is supe-
33. Human memory capacity, although remarkable, is exceeded along some dimen-
sions by that possessed by animals. A humpback whale can sing a song thirty minutes long 
and then repeat it note for note without error. Honeybee workers, after only limited condi-
tioning, will remember the locations of up to five beds of flowers and at precisely what time 
of day they will yield nectar. One species of sparrow can remember ten thousand hiding 
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rior to ours in certain dimensions does not automatically call into question 
the Kahneman and Tversky conclusions. Our senses of smell and hearing 
are, after all, markedly inferior to those of dogs and many other animals. 
Still, the findings provide pause, given the centrality of efficient foraging to 
the survival of our ancestors. As they evolved, hominids, along with many 
animals, faced issues of foraging for food as well as dealing with other 
organisms, problems that benefit from, as Stephen Pinker puts it, "com-
plex algorithms for multivariate, nonstationary time series analysis (pre-
dicting when events will occur, based on their history of occurrences)" 
(1997, 182). From an evolutionary perspective, then, there is a presump-
tion that humans should be relatively good at keeping track of histories of 
occurrences, updating them, and basing decisions on updated conditional 
probabilities. The ability to tabulate such frequencies and perform such 
calculations is central to the traditional behaviorist model of cognition 
that, although diminished in scope or compartmentalized by the emphasis 
on modularity, remains an essential human learning mechanism. 
New experimental results suggest that some of the results within the 
Kahneman and Tversky program are the consequence of presenting prob-
lems in an information format the easy processing of which the brain has 
not been selected for. In many cases, the way problems have been posed to 
subjects within the heuristics and biases literature has been a bit like ask-
ing a hand calculator to process binary numbers, or insisting that children 
do long division with roman numerals. When problems are restated in for-
mats that humans can more easily process (for reasons that are compre-
hensible from an evolutionary perspective) many of these biases go away. 
In particular, human subjects do much better processing data on frequen-
cies than they do in reasoning about single event probabilities (Gigerenzer 
1991; Gigerenzer and Hoffrage 1995; Cosmides and Tooby 1996). 
Obviously, proficiency in maintaining and updating frequency tables 
was extraordinarily valuable in the search for food, that is, in interactions 
with the nonhuman environment. A key question is whether the tools that 
make us good decision theorists are also relevant for how we interact with 
other humans. Canonical game theory answers this question, in a number 
places for its food caches. Beyond simple feats of memory, animal learning competencies can 
be quite remarkable. Birds navigate thousands of miles using celestial navigation. They have 
to learn the position of the North Star, because of the "wobbling" of the celestial poles, a 
twenty-seven-thousand-year cycle known as the precession of the equinoxes that takes place 
too quickly to permit evolutionary hardwiring. They do so by staring at the sky and noting 
the point around which all the stars appear to rotate. Learning the nearby constellations they 
are then able in subsequent periods to keep a steady bearing (Lumsden and Wilson 1983, 105; 
Pinker 1997, 181). At the same time, although animals are generally quite good at foraging, 
they appear to exhibit the same violations of expected utility theory as do humans (Camerer 
1995,641). 
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of instances, in the negative. In choosing how to play in a one-shot PD, it 
should not matter whether we are good at predicting whether our counter-
party will cooperate, since defect is a strictly dominant strategy. In reality, 
good statistical intuition probably complements behavioral propensities 
toward cooperation in one-shot PDs in helping to account for the origin of 
complex social organization beyond the family unit, as well of course as 
being extremely useful in foraging. 
While both Cosmides and Tooby and Kahneman and Tversky can be 
interpreted as consistent with a modular approach to cognition, the Cos-
mides and Tooby approach privileges modules that would have been rein-
forced by natural selection in the environment of evolutionary adaptive-
ness34 and is skeptical of those for which there is no coherent evolutionary 
rationale. For the latter, the approach has mandated careful scrutiny of 
experimental design and further testing, again, with quite striking results. 
Thus while on the one hand pressing us to consider the importance of 
domain specific modules in human reasoning about social relations, their 
work and that of others also pushes us to accept, contrary to Kahneman 
and Tversky, that we are, after all, rather good intuitive statisticians (a 
domain general competency) provided inputs and outputs to Bayes' theo-
rem are in frequency terms, rather than in terms of subjective probabilities 
of single events (see chap. 6). 
Thus there appears to be a paradox. In order to construct a coherent 
theory of human behavior, in particular those aspects related to social 
relations, we may need on the one hand to adopt a view of cognition that 
extends the results from language acquisition and visual perception to 
other arenas, a view that sees the brain as an interconnected set of infor-
mation appliances, exhibiting a modularized design, with many of the 
component neurobiological subsystems specialized to particular domains 
of cognition.35 At the same time, the body of research that has perhaps 
done most to sensitize economists to the possibility of modularity, that 
there may be cognitive processes that systematically short-circuit "nor-
mal" human reasoning, such as Bayesian inference, may have to be ques-
tioned. 36 
34. This awkward phrase refers to the roughly two-million-year period of Pleistocene 
hunter-gatherer existence that presaged the Neolithic revolution. 
35. This model necessarily represents a challenge to behaviorist models of cognition, 
and indeed, it was in opposition to Skinner's interpretation of the acquisition of language 
that Chomsky first developed his insights embodying concepts of modularity and specialized 
mental organs (Chomsky [1957]1965,1959). 
36. This argument reflects one of several ways in which the heuristics and bias program 
and the research in behavioral economics to which it has given rise provide a challenge to the 
standard economic model that is only partially successful as foundation for a comprehensive 
empirically based behavioral science. See chapter 6. 
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The resolution to this apparent paradox is this. Domain specific rea-
soning or behavioral modules have been selected for because they repre-
sented an adaptation to environmental challenges that recurred over thou-
sands of generations of Pleistocene existence or earlier. An example is 
aversion to sexual relations among children reared together. By hard-
wiring these modules into the human brain, evolution spares us the neces-
sity of trying to learn these lessons again every generation. On the other 
hand, not all challenges to survival and procreation recur generation after 
generation in the same form. Natural selection has also endowed us with 
certain domain general learning technologies, including the ability to be 
good intuitive statisticians, provided the data are presented in formats we 
have been selected for to interpret well, because these skills are central to 
addressing the life cycle-specific challenges that confronted and confront 
individuals, challenges whose details varied from individual to individual 
and generation to generation (this position is at variance with that 
adopted by Binmore 1994, 152). 
These domain general competencies lie at the heart of the traditional 
learning model reflected in behaviorism, one that has achieved many suc-
cesses in accounting for both human and animal behavior. My intent, and 
I believe that of Cosmides and Tooby, is not to reject the relevance of this 
mechanism but rather to recognize that it is more limited in scope than its 
most ardent supporters have suggested. My argument goes beyond Cos-
mides and Tooby, however, in emphasizing behavioral as well as cognitive 
modules. Certain of these modules give rise to altruistic behavioral predis-
positions that, definitionally, could not have been favored by individual 
level selection upon initial appearance. 
These two principles, involving first, more flexible thinking about the 
levels at which natural selection has influenced gene frequencies in human 
populations (an issue about which Cosmides and Tooby have conven-
tional views) and second, rethinking the scope of domain general and 
domain specific cognitive competencies (where they do not), provide the 
basis for a coherent account of the origin of complex social organization 
and a sounder foundation on which to build a more progressive empiri-
cally grounded social and behavioral science. 
Model-Behavior Interaction and the Making of 
Rational Judgments 
Evidence that the models of human behavior we advance may, to a limited 
degree, affect behavior itself adds complexity to but does not render nuga-
tory the task of developing and adopting accurate models, a point rein-
forced to me while drafting this book. At one point one of my children 
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said, offhand, after reading a particularly depressing article in Newsweek, 
that "People will do anything for money." At one level, my daughter did 
not really mean this. But at another level, her view reflected a model of 
human behavior actively advanced in the media, the result of drawing out 
the implications of rational choice theory, narrowly defined, to its logical 
conclusion. It was Nash's model. 
Since I had been pondering these issues, my response was more 
reflective than it otherwise might have been. "No," I said, "people will do 
many things for money, but it is not true that they will do anything for 
money." The standard economic model, as here characterized, assumes 
that people will act efficiently to advance their material interest. My state-
ment reflected a view that this hypothesis was refutable, at least if it was 
viewed as universally applicable across all domains, and that there were 
some domains, particularly those involving strategic interaction, where it 
was often a very poor predictor. I considered and consider the statement 
to be based on a broad range of experimental and observational evidence 
and consistent with the logic of evolutionary theory, if one allows for 
selection above the level of the individual organism. It does not reflect 
wishful thinking that might somehow be self-validating, or a teleological 
view of human nature lacking scientific support, or simply an attempt to 
balance an inaccurate model with one known to be equally inaccurate.37 
Our duty as behavioral scientists (and as parents) accurately to char-
acterize the phenomena we examine or describe is complicated because the 
object of inquiry in this instance is the behavior of our own species. What 
if modeling behavior in certain ways changes it? Experimental evidence 
has shown that the study of economics (specifically, price theory) pushes 
subjects' behavior closer to the Nash equilibrium prediction in games of 
strategic interaction (Frank 2000, xxv). Cooperation rates in PD games 
and voluntary contribution rates among students who have studied eco-
nomics are lower than among students who have not (but they are not 
zero) (Marwell and Ames 1981; Frank, Gilovich, and Regan 1993b, 1996). 
These results are not simply a matter of self-selection, since the differences 
with respect to the general student population are not observed in students 
who will but have not yet taken the economics course (Frank, Gilovich, 
and Regan 1993b, 170). There is also evidence that economists are less 
prone to make charitable contributions than are other social scientists. 
One interpretation is that economic students have an essentially cor-
37. By teleological I mean an argument from design: the claim that our eye is a marvel 
of engineering because it was infact designed; humans have the behavioral tendencies they do 
because they were designed to have these tendencies. The power of evolutionary theory has 
been its provision of an alternate mechanism-natural selection-to explain the appearance 
of complex design. 
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rect view of the world but have discovered through course work the joys 
and wealth-enhancing benefits of free riding. A second view is that students 
taught the rational choice model have adopted a positive (and according to 
this book, false) view of the world consistent with the assumption that the 
average person follows its normative counsel. Defection, then, becomes 
justifiable as a matter of prudence, rather than just greed. 
Either interpretation legitimately feeds concern that models cannot be 
formulated without altering the behavior they are intended to illuminate or 
explain-a potentially serious objection to the proposition that scientific 
methods should or can be applied to the study of human behavior. Indeed, 
utopians or reformers might seize on these results and argue that if this is 
the result of allowing students to study economics, there is full justification, 
as a counterweight, in disseminating a putatively positive view of human 
nature consistent with romantic idealism on the grounds that it too could 
be self-fulfilling. Neither the proposal nor the reasoning underlying it can 
be dismissed out of hand. But each has important defects. 
First, the analysis incorrectly presumes that cooperative behavior is 
necessarily morally praiseworthy, whereas selfish behavior is not. In some 
instances we may applaud selfish behavior and censure that which is coop-
erative. Second, cooperative or contingently cooperative behavior is not 
necessarily altruistic: this may depend on frequencies of different strategies 
in the population. Favoring a model of human nature that maintains 
people are more or less altruistic than they are because of belief the model 
can and should be self-fulfilling reads too much into model-phenomenon 
interaction that, although perhaps real, is of limited empirical importance. 
In the final analysis, allowing what we think should be to influence state-
ments of what is creates a volatile brew that not only threatens the ratio-
nale for our endeavors but may also explode in ways not anticipated. The 
best strategy from a scientific perspective is simply not to pull intellectual 
punches and to try to keep discussion of how people ought to behave or 
society ought to be structured on a different page. 
The description of the human ethogram38 suggested in this book 
reflects neither a tendency toward unconditional altruism of which utopi-
ans and romantics are often enamored nor the strict egoism underlying the 
hardheaded rational choice approach. Humans, in general, refrain from 
first strike, but they will also commonly retaliate if attacked and some-
times retaliate even if third parties are attacked. 
Evidence in favor of model-behavior interaction can seem to threaten 
38. Ethogram is a term used by students of animal species to signify a complete list and 
description of naturally occurring behaviors characteristic of a particular species, often illus-
trated pictorially. 
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to obliterate the traditional lines separating positive and normative social 
science (for recognition of this concern in political science, see Green and 
Shapiro 1996, 270). But to embrace uncritically this blurring of distinc-
tions as a description of "how science really operates" opens the door to a 
descent into relativism and subjectivism from which scientific methods 
cannot emerge intact. It is true that the pursuit of an objective study of 
human behavior rests on some shaky philosophic foundations. But the 
alternative of abdicating that pursuit is worse. 
If the phenomena of model-behavior interaction is real, we need to 
know how large an effect it creates and why. In answering that question, 
evidence still matters, and experimental and observational techniques used 
in the natural sciences are still relevant to the study of human behavior. It 
is not true that anything goes. 39 Our generalizations about and our predic-
tions regarding human behavior should be rational in the sense in which 
we apply the term to human judgment: they should make use of all avail-
able information processed according to the best available logical and sta-
tistical algorithms. A rational prediction may be that less than 100 percent, 
perhaps substantially less than 100 percent, of experimental subjects will 
defect in one-shot PDs. In other words, a rational prediction may forecast 
behavior other than what rational choice theory, as understood by Nash, 
would predict. 
In this context, rational forecasts are what we mean by truth, which is 
what we should seek to impart to our children. At the same time, we may 
attempt to instill in them certain types of nonconsequentialist ethical pre-
cepts.40 My interest, both as a parent and as a behavioral scientist, is not in 
arguing that people are more altruistic than they are, in hopes of produc-
ing a self-fulfilling prophecy. At the same time, I have no hesitation in 
countering, with data, logic, and argument, inaccurate models that suggest 
we are less altruistic than we are (for a similar point of view, see Ostrom 
1998, 7, 18). If we are to assume that there is an inherent altruistic compo-
39. If any of these statements is false, we should abandon at once any references to 
behavioral science or social science and refrain from submitting further applications to the 
National Science Foundation. Thus while sympathetic to Deirdre McCloskey's recent 
attempts to have economists consider a broader range of essential human predispositions in 
modeling behavior (1996), I am less so with respect to her attacks on traditional scientific 
epistemology (1995), although acknowledging that her efforts have encouraged us to focus 
more on what scientists actually do. 
40. Thus I desire strongly that my children vote in national elections when they come of 
age, because I believe that high voter participation contributes to a healthy democracy and 
because healthy democracies contribute to healthy international relations. I vote, and I want 
them to vote, because it is the behavior I would wish others to follow. But I will not encour-
age such behavior through the fiction that their action (or mine) has any measurable proba-
bility of affecting specific electoral outcomes. I do not see these positions as in conflict. 
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nent to human behavior, we need, however, to be as precise as we can 
about its nature and the domains within which it is likely to apply. 
Arming people with an inaccurate model of human behavior is like 
giving them a bad map. With confidence in one's guidance they may try for 
some time to navigate by it, but as deconfirming evidence and evidence of 
uncharted shoals accumulate, they will eventually discard or modify it. 
How long this will take is uncertain, and in the meantime, much damage 
can accrue. In a related manner, a discipline cannot ultimately survive as a 
scientific enterprise if it is not prepared to confront the predictions of its 
models with evidence and if it is unwilling to modify them when they con-
sistently fail to perform well. 
Science, which can be thought of as the pursuit of rational judgments, 
has a defensible record as a progressive endeavor, albeit one pursued by 
humans with their attendant frailties. In progressive disciplines such as the 
natural sciences, more accurate models do eventually triumph over less 
accurate models in the war for intellectual shelf space in the minds of both 
scientists and nonscientists.41 We should have confidence that the same 
will ultimately be true in our own areas of inquiry. 
The use of the plural (people) in my daughter's question and in my 
response is significant. My answer did not mean that there might not be 
some individuals who would do anything for money or that a given indi-
vidual at some time in his or her life in some domains might not fit this 
description. It leaves open the likelihood that, in the aggregate, willingness 
to engage in certain behaviors may alter as a consequence of changes in 
monetary or other material incentives (there is much evidence in support 
of this proposition). It does, however, make a statement about baseline 
levels of behavior and, in turn, about what is a reasonable inductive pre-
diction (based on experimental and field data) of what one could expect 
from the typical human being in social groupings she is likely to encounter. 
In particular, given the widespread media coverage of deviant behavior to 
which she is exposed, she needed to be reminded that in fact the likelihood 
that other conspecifics will launch unprovoked harmful attacks on her is 
low-not zero-but low. Chapter 5 will argue, contra Lorenz (1966), that 
such probabilities are low not principally because of a thin veneer of civi-
lization imparted to us by socialization and enculturation, although these 
processes are important, but because, as humans, most of us possess, as do 
other animals, strong hardwired predispositions restraining intraspecific 
violence. 
41. But it may take some time. Lane (1996, 125) points out that the influence of 
Freudian (psychoanalytic) treatments of mental illness did not wane until the National Insti-
tute of Mental Health refused to fund therapies that could not be shown to work better than 
other less expensive treatments. 
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Neither the economic nor the sociological/anthropological tradition 
within social science has seriously addressed these questions, the economic 
because of lack of interest in explaining or denial of the importance or 
reality of these behavioral anomalies; and the sociological/ anthropologi-
cal because of belief that one can fully account for them by appeal to the 
aggressively nonbiological concept of culture. For different reasons, nei-
ther of these conflicting positions is satisfactory. We need to move beyond 
simply opposing one to the other from behind the fortresses of established 
disciplinary traditions. 
Limits of Microeconomic Theory as a 
Predictive Enterprise 
Emphasis so far has been on the failures of rational choice theory in the 
realm of strategic interaction: the purview of game theory. Consideration 
of the explanatory successes of micro economic theory in general can enable 
us to make some of the same points. Competitive markets in their pure 
form disguise intricate interdependencies among people by confronting 
decision makers with prices, rather than the actions or likely actions of 
other individuals. The predictive power of microeconomic theory derives 
largely from assumptions that, everything else equal, people prefer more to 
less goods, and less to more bads, and that these categories are not entirely 
subjective. In the right domains these assumptions allow good predictions 
of human behavior in the absence of data on the past actions of the partic-
ular individual(s) involved. If there are five lines at a tollbooth, and one is 
much shorter than the others, I can predict pretty accurately that the next 
arrival will join it, even though I have never met the driver of the car in 
question. I can also predict, although this is a more complex problem, that 
if I double the toll on the bridge, fewer people will drive over it and more 
will take the roundabout route that avoids the charge. The power of the 
theory arises because of the existence in groups of at least a few decision 
makers who will change their behavior in response to changes in material 
incentives. Its apparently axiomatic foundations derive from the universal-
ity of sophisticated foraging algorithms among humans, a result of millions 
of years of evolutionary history. These algorithms facilitate optimization in 
games against nature, and competitive markets turn interactions among 
humans into what appear to be games against nature, because prices con-
front the individual as parametric. 
The assumptions of the theory, however, provide no characterization 
of the scope of its applicability. They do not tell us within which domains 
we will see violations of the prediction that people will choose more over 
less. We can only find that out empirically. Nor does theory by itself 
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explain what the quantitative dimensions of individual response will be. In 
the second problem just presented, I can predict that fewer people will take 
the bridge (direction of change), but I cannot predict how many fewer. To 
do so I need to employ statistical or econometric methodology bringing to 
bear data on past behavior of drivers under various circumstances. In 
either event, the underlying determinants of how many fewer, such as indi-
vidual preferences, are assumed. They are primitives of the system. 
To take another example, if I consider two items in my house, a high 
value, easily carried item, such as a camera, for which there is a well-devel-
oped resale market, and a large, difficult to transport item, such as a sofa, 
for which secondary markets are thinner, I can predict with good accuracy 
that it is more likely that the first item will be stolen. The prediction is 
based on the assumption that thieves, like other humans, are likely to be 
good economists. But microeconomic theory per se does not permit me to 
predict what the overall probability of theft of either item will be. It may pre-
dict the response of thieves to changes in incentives but does not predict 
the level of criminality. To go beyond this I will need data. 
Consider, for example, the following dichotomous choice: steal if 
punishment is low and/or there is no probability of detection; otherwise do 
not. Researchers in the economics of criminal behavior have argued, and 
evidence supports them, that increases in the severity of punishment 
and/or the probability of detection will reduce the frequency of a 
specifically targeted behavior. But the more fundamental question, which 
the standard economic model does not explain, is why the baseline 
propensity to steal, with a zero likelihood of punishment, is not 100 per-
cent (Field 1979c).42 The fact that the baseline is not 100 percent reveals 
that a lot of people, in this domain, are choosing less over more. 
This question is closely related to experimental "puzzles" already 
encountered: why don't 100 percent of experimental subjects defect in sin-
gle play PD experiments, why do subjects persist in making voluntary con-
tributions to public goods, why don't players always take what is put on 
the table in the first stage of a centipede game, and why don't subjects in 
42. The English jurist Sir Henry Maine observed: "men do sometimes obey rules for 
fear of the punishment which will be inflicted if they are violated, but compared with the mass 
of men in the community this class is but small-probably it is substantially confined to what 
are called the criminal classes-and for one man who refrains from stealing or murdering 
because he fears the penalty there must be hundreds or thousands who refrain without a 
thought on the SUbject" (1888, 50). Maine considered the teaching of parents, religious edu-
cation, and custom as "explanations" for this fact; he did not explore evolutionary influences. 
Much more recently, Jon Elster observes: "As is often the case in the social sciences, we may 
be able to explain the slope of a relationship but not its intercept" (l999a, 28). This book 
asks, in a sense, whether we must accept this as inevitable. 
Evidence and Logic 73 
dictator games keep 100 percent of the money? Manipulation of coopera-
tion and voluntary contribution rates through variation in experimental 
treatments is consistent with the hypothesis that some people at some 
points in their life in some circumstances will change behavior in response 
to a small change in material incentives. The fact that baseline rates are 
what they are, on the other hand, shows that not everyone, at every point 
in the life cycle, in all domains of decision making is inclined to take more 
over less.43 In studies of strategic interaction, such as those involving the 
voluntary provision of public goods, Nash equilibrium analysis assumes 
the contrary. 
Of course, my daughter-she with the interest in appropriate models 
of human motivation-basically knew this. Most people know intuitively 
that there is in the realm of human interaction (and in their own decision 
making) both kindness and viciousness, both restraint and aggression, 
both self-regarding and other-regarding behavior; that it is sometimes 
difficult to tell the difference; and that behavior can be at times totally 
impervious and at other times exquisitely sensitive to changes in material 
incentives.44 She understood that the predispositions underlying human 
behavior were more variegated than the "granite of self interest" George 
Stigler viewed as undergirding social science and in particular the palace of 
economics (1975, 237).45 
To add complexity, other-regarding behavior is not necessarily 
morally praiseworthy, as in instances of selfless cruelty, where humans 
viciously risk and give their lives in order to wreak havoc on group ene-
mies (Holmes 1990). And self-interest may be socially desirable, where it 
short-circuits such zealous behavior or leads to the breakup of a producer 
cartel. One must keep in mind that altruism corresponds only to a subset 
of other-regarding behavior. At the individual level, malice, envy, and jeal-
ousy are all part of the human panoply of emotions, are not generally 
viewed as praiseworthy, yet may well motivate other-regarding behavior. 
Nevertheless, the view I advocated to my daughter, with its indication 
that we needed a human geology more complex than Stigler's, seems 
somehow quaint, old fashioned, at variance with and lacking the vigor and 
strength of the hardheaded and unidimensional vision advanced in some 
43. Successes in predicting changes in behavior in response to changes in incentives 
have been repeatedly used in the political science literature, as in economics, to draw atten-
tion away from failure to account for levels (see Green and Shapiro 1994, chaps. 3-5; 1996, 
251,252). 
44. In a famous experiment, Lepper, Greene, and Nisbett (1973) showed that external 
rewards can sometimes reduce the frequency of behavior otherwise intrinsically motivated. 
45. Stigler uses these words to characterize Smith's The Wealth of Nations ([1776) 
1937), widely viewed as the founding treatise in economics. 
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economics writing, in political science by advocates of realpolitik or the 
"new realism," and in evolutionary writing emphasizing selection at the 
level of the individual organism alone. This latter view of human nature, 
however, has a problem from a scientific standpoint. It fails the test Fried-
man, and Karl Popper before him, set for it. 
The standard economic model does reasonably well in predicting, in 
the aggregate,46 the direction of change in behavior in response to a 
change in a particular direction in material incentives. This is true in mod-
els of strategic interaction and in models of nonstrategic interaction in 
which prices confront individuals as parametric, as they do in competitive 
markets. In a great many instances, however, the standard economic 
model leaves baseline behavioral levels essentially unexplained.47 Thus 
changing the temptations for defection can reduce the amount of volun-
tary contributions to public goods. But such manipulations do not drive 
the rate to zero. Nash equilibrium analysis predicts that people will never 
cooperate in single play PD games, that they will never voluntarily provide 
public goods, that they will never move beyond the first stage of a cen-
tipede game, and that they will always keep all of the money in dictator 
games. 
In a commentary on an article summarizing experimental results on 
the voluntary provision of public goods, a Scandinavian biologist indi-
cated his own presumably Bayesian belief that the data did not invalidate 
for him the assumption of strict behavioral egoism (Stenseth 1989, 722). 
He recognized, however, that others might see things differently and that 
the matter was uncertain. Nevertheless, in the presence of such uncer-
tainty, he argued, it was safer to assume that individuals were essentially 
selfish: if we were wrong, he maintained, the cost was nil, whereas great 
potential damage would result if we made the reverse error. What were 
these costs? Presumably the breakdown of social order from within and/or 
46. In general, economics, like most of the social sciences, aspires to actuarial (aleatory) 
but not clinical (epistemic) prediction (Dawes 1994, 79; Beach, Barnes, and Christensen-Sza-
lanski 1986). Using standard price theory economists will predict that some individuals will 
curtail their cigarette consumption if a $2/pack tax is imposed. They will perhaps even pre-
dict, based on econometric estimates of the price elasticity of demand, the total amount of the 
cutback. But they will not usually predict which particular individuals will cut back. On the 
other hand, within the analysis of strategic interactions (game theory), some conclusions are 
so broad and universal (players will always defect in a single play PD game) that they imply 
(clinical) predictions of individual level behavior. Nash was disappointed by the specific 
behavior of Alchian and Williams in the first PD experiment. 
47. "Economics as a positive science is a body of tentatively accepted generalizations 
about economic phenomena that can be used to predict the consequences of changes in cir-
cumstances" (Friedman 1953, 39). 
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the overrunning by more hardheaded and less deluded groups of societies 
made vulnerable by such beliefs. His loss function defined over Type I and 
Type II errors on this issue is implicit in the attitudes of many social scien-
tists, particularly economists and others attracted by the apparent predic-
tive power of rational choice theory. 
But the assumption that there is no cost of assuming strict egoism 
when the hypothesis is wrong is questionable. The assumption leads inex-
orably to the conclusion that giving up the first strike option is not ratio-
nal: the Nash equilibrium prediction, and its normative counsel to deci-
sion makers, is to defect. Relatively few people are aware that John von 
Neumann and Bertrand Russell both advocated a nuclear first strike 
against the Soviet Union in the early 1950s (see chap. 4). Suppose von 
Neumann's and Russell's argument had prevailed. Would this outcome 
have been without cost? It is at least a matter for debate. 
When we realize how easy it is for others to end our lives (by failing 
to give up the first strike), or when we feel murderous impulses ourselves, 
we may suddenly appreciate how truly fraught with potential danger is 
the world. When we realize how infrequently we must concern ourselves 
with these dangers, we cannot but be struck by how remarkably safe the 
world is. These dual observations are apparently inconsistent: the world 
cannot at the same time be both more dangerous and safer than it 
appears. It is one of our jobs as behavioral scientists to illuminate and 
resolve this paradox. 
Romanticism and cynicism define two polar views of essential human 
nature. The first is associated, to some degree unjustly (see Wrong 1994, 
90-99), with Rousseau's idealized vision of a state of nature inhabited by 
noble savages, happy, but with virtually no intercourse with each other 
save that necessary for reproduction. The second is associated with 
Thomas Hobbes and his vision of a world prior to Leviathan in which life 
was not only solitary but also nasty, brutish, and short. Each can be 
refuted on the basis of experimental and observational data, including 
anthropological studies of hunter-gatherer societies. Each invokes a 
demonstrably inaccurate view of human nature and the range of political 
cultures it enables, and the adoption of either can be dangerous to health 
and welfare. The former view might be problematic, for example, if one 
were strolling through a high crime area, or a war zone at night, particu-
larly if one could not be identified as a member of an "in-group" control-
ling the region. But the latter view can be equally damaging as a prescrip-
tive guide, because it leads inexorably, as it did for von Neumann and 
Russell, to the logic of first strike. Even before the Neolithic revolution, 
our tool use enhanced already existing asymmetries between our ability to 
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end the life of other humans and our ability to forestall the end of life in 
others through means other than refraining from harming them. Techno-
logical progress leading ultimately to nuclear, chemical, and biological 
weapons has only amplified this asymmetry. 
The assumption of strict egoism, with its implication of Nash equilib-
rium outcomes, is inconsistent with a large body of empirical and obser-
vational evidence. It leaves us with no coherent account of how coopera-
tion beyond kin groupings emerged and leaves largely unexplained the 
origin of the coexistence, often peaceful, of powerful sovereign nations. 
Initial forbearance (cooperation in what might well be a one-shot PD) is 
the foundation without which a range of altruistic and increasingly mutu-
alistic behaviors cannot develop. It is upon that rudimentary foundation 
that complex social organization is built. 
My daughter did not need me to tell her that there were individuals 
who would steal from her or otherwise do her harm when it was in their 
individual interest to do so. The news media do an effective job of making 
her aware of this. And were she to take a course in price theory, the nor-
mative relevance of the individual benefit/cost calculation would be drilled 
into her, with perhaps little regard to the domain of its applicability. 
But she perhaps needed to be reminded of another truth, one also 
consistent with her knowledge and experience. And that is the truth about 
baseline levels of human behavior. Not everyone will steal or stab her in 
the back under such circumstances; indeed, if one takes a random sample 
of ten individuals, it is quite likely that none of them will. Her concerns 
that doors be locked, however, are not without foundation. If one takes a 
large enough sample, the probability rises of encountering individuals 
who practice first strike for reasons of both opportunism and prudence. 
Such individuals are sometimes referred to as sociopaths.48 It is because 
of the risk of encountering individuals of this type, generally greater in 
the absence of established social organization, that a willingness to forego 
first strike is biologically altruistic when manifested in low frequency 
environments. 
48. Sociopaths are estimated by criminologists to comprise between 3 and 4 percent of 
the male population and less than I percent of the female population and to account for 
roughly 20 percent of those incarcerated. Personality attributes include "egocentrism, an 
inability to form lasting personal commitments, and a marked degree of impulsivity. Under-
lying a superficial veneer of sociability and charm, sociopaths are characterized by a deficit of 
the social emotions (love, shame, guilt, empathy, or remorse). On the other hand, they are 
not intellectually handicapped, and are often able to deceive and manipulate others through 
elaborate scams and ruses, or by committing crimes that rely on the trust and cooperation of 
others" (Mealey 1995, 523). Would it be unfair to define Homo economicus as a sociopath 
without the charm? 
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The Dark Side of Cooperation and the Significance of 
Political Culture 
Variation in the development of distinctive political cultures can dramati-
cally affect the manifestation of tendencies toward restraint, particularly 
as directed toward out-groups. Thus risk of harm may increase not only as 
the number of individuals encountered grows but also as does the number 
of cohesive groups of individuals. Contacting a variety of different cul-
tures, regrettably, increases the probability one could find oneself, for rea-
sons unrelated to behavior, defined as an individual who does not warrant 
such restraint. There is, in other words, a dark side to the apparently vir-
tuous circle whereby mutual forbearance leads to cooperation with its 
attendant benefits. Evidence from throughout human history and from 
studies of chimpanzees, our closest relatives,49 suggests that growing 
strength of within group reciprocity is sometimes paired with an increasing 
propensity, particularly among males, to deny forbearance to nongroup 
members, making critical (in humans) the political definition of what in 
fact are the boundaries of relevant groups (Weart 1998,235-36). 
Humans throughout history have been prepared to risk and/or give 
their lives in support of or solidarity with a group or faction extending con-
siderably beyond immediate kin and have frequently done so in a wantonly 
cruel fashion. The ease with which hostility can be directed against out-
groups stems from the same underlying inclination that Fehr and Gachter 
document in their investigation of how internal order is sustained: a will-
ingness to punish those, including third parties, who in a real or imagined 
fashion, violate norms of behavior. In these instances self-interest, or con-
cern with interests of immediate family, could operate as a check on such 
behavior. That it fails often to do so is testimony again to the fact that there 
are other essential predispositions underlying human behavior. 50 
By essential, I mean so commonly exhibited as to warrant inclusion in 
a human ethogram. This does not, however, mean strictly universal. That 
is, I do not mean that the predisposition is driven entirely by genetic fac-
49. An organized unprovoked attack by a group of chimpanzee males on a member of 
a different group was first witnessed by a member of Jane Goodall's research team in Gombe 
National Park in Tanzania in January 1974. Her team concluded that the attack was most 
likely ultimately fatal. The episode led to a radical rethinking of assumptions about essential 
characteristics of chimp behavior. To date, Homo sapiens sapiens and Pan troglodytes (the 
"common" chimpanzee) are the only species in which such behavior has been observed. It has 
not been reported for bonobos (Pan paniscus). For discussion of ethological research on the 
behavior of members of the two Pan species, our closest living relatives, see chapter 5. 
50. Ethnocentrism-preference for people "like us "-is a real phenomenon, but con-
trary to what has been frequently argued, in-group definitions are not governed principally 
by identifiable racial or ethnic characteristics. See Brewer 1982; Vail 1989; Peters 1998. 
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tors or that genetic influences have necessarily evolved to fixation. Even if 
a propensity to play cooperate in one-shot PDs with non-kin is an almost 
universal human predisposition, not all will share it or have it evoked by 
experience to the same degree, and within groups, such "deviants" have a 
high potential to be differentially advantaged (the political implications of 
this are discussed subsequently). Given that reality, how selection pres-
sures ever permitted those who generally cooperate in one-shot PDs to 
become statistically if not always politically dominant within human pop-
ulations is one of the central puzzles of social and natural science, at least 
as important as the study of how complex organization is sustained. In 
order to resolve that puzzle we must consider the possibility that natural 
selection among our ancestors occurred not only at the level of the indi-
vidual organism but also above it. Doing so permits us to consider the pos-
sibility of a broader range of behavioral predispositions and evaluate the 
relative importance of each in a way that is not biased from the outset 
against certain conclusions. 
Genocide 
How pessimistic should we be about a propensity for violent group-ener-
gized attacks on those viewed as "the other"? First of all, as we recognize 
the widely recorded instances of xenophobic behavior by humans orga-
nized in groups, we should also acknowledge its paler complement in the 
historical record. These are instances in which humans, often at great risk 
to themselves, aided members of out-group(s), simply because they too 
were conspecifics. The most carefully documented instances of such 
behavior took place in the context of the most extreme xenophobic behav-
ior on record: the unprovoked war against the Jews waged by the Third 
Reich between 1933 and 1945, in most severe form between 1941 and 1945. 
In 1953, after the Holocaust, the Israeli government established the Yad 
Vashem foundation to honor the memory of the six million who perished, 
but also, as stipulated in the founding legislation, to recognize the actions 
of the "Righteous among the Nations": non-Jews who, without expecta-
tion in advance of monetary reward, risked their lives to save Jews from 
death or deportation to death camps. Awards have been made to those 
both living and dead only when a variety of criteria have been satisfied and 
after careful investigation by a commission headed by a justice of the 
Israeli Supreme Court. 
The efforts of Raoul Wallenberg and Oskar Schindler are perhaps 
best known, but there are others: approximately sixteen thousand men 
and women have been honored to date. In many of these instances, careful 
investigation permits us with considerable confidence to reject a desire for 
reward, fame, or approbation as motives for such behavior. Indeed, a 
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number of individuals, sought out so that the Yad Vashem Medal might 
be bestowed on them, declined the honor. The Danes, as individuals and 
as a nation, for example, succeeded in saving the lives of all but a few of 
their Jewish compatriots, in marked contrast to what happened in other 
nations. After the war, Danish war veterans as a group refused to accept 
individual Yad Vashem Awards (Monroe 1996, 142). They did, in their 
view, only what others would have done in their place, and others, they 
felt, had done much more. This is a common sentiment expressed by those 
honored for heroism. But while acknowledging their efforts, we must dis-
count the truth-value reflected in their humility. Were it truer, we would 
not so honor these individuals. 
If the behavior of these honored individuals was exceptional, how-
ever, so too, in the broad sweep of history, was that of the Nazis who 
elicited it. As shocking, in some senses, as the sheer magnitude of the 
crimes committed is the evidence of the tens of thousands who willingly 
participated in them. Nevertheless, organized genocide on this scale was 
not and is not the historical norm, one reason why German Jews, twelve 
thousand of whom died serving their country in World War I, could not 
believe anything of this nature would actually happen to them. The behav-
ior of the Third Reich and those who supported it, precisely because of its 
exceptional and horrific character, requires that we recognize the power, 
extent, and pervasiveness of normaPl human predispositions against 
intraspecific violence of this nature. Similarly, it is because of the abnor-
mal character of his or her predispositions and behavior that we stigmatize 
the individual actions of a sociopathic killer, no matter how intelligent and 
no matter how rational he or she may be in forming beliefs or pursuing 
aIms. 
While the behaviors ofYad Vashem honorees, or winners of Carnegie 
Hero Awards are often taken as archetypal examples of altruism, the more 
empirically significant form in originating and sustaining complex social 
organization is the more quotidian restraint on first strike. Restricting our 
understanding of altruism to affirmative acts of assistance leads to an 
improper circumscription of a phenomenon that has much broader mani-
festation. A predisposition toward such restraint has, as far as we can 
infer, always been an essentially human predisposition, just as it is among 
lions, wolves, and many other animals capable of harming each other. 52 
We speak of the competitive environment as being a "dog-eat-dog" world, 
51. I use the term in its statistical sense of referring to the central tendency of a 
distribution. 
52. The emphasis is on restraint on intraspecific harm. Lions and wolves are predator 
species that earn their protein by hunting down, attacking, killing, and eating members of 
other species, including, according to Ridley (1999, 33), close relatives: lions eat leopards, 
and wolves eat coyotes. 
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but in fact dogs do not eat other dogs, and wolves do not eat other wolves. 
Chapter 5 considers the argument of a broad stream of writers, including 
Lorenz, who have maintained that although such patterns of hardwired 
intraspecific restraint may well characterize animals, comparable mecha-
nisms are lacking in humans. 
The Nazi program of extermination directed against Jews is an excep-
tional event, yet the more general and widespread phenomenon of "civi-
lized" war might seem to argue in favor of Lorenz's view. But the phe-
nomenon of war is not simply an illustration of humankind's inherently 
violent and aggressive tendencies. War gives rise to extremes of both coop-
eration and conflict. Some of the most impressive (because they are rare) 
examples of affirmative altruism toward non-kin take place in situations 
of organized conflict, such as instances in which a soldier throws himself 
on a grenade to save his buddies. Absent a PD solution module, organized 
war would be impossible. So too, for that matter, would peace. 
Evolutionary history has endowed us, like other animals, with extra-
ordinary drives facilitating self-preservation and a powerful learning tech-
nology permitting us efficiently to act in pursuit of their satisfaction. But 
such capabilities cannot account for initial interactions characterized by 
mutual forbearance of first strike. These propensities are complemented 
by others that underlie and enable the complex social and economic orga-
nization we today take for granted. This is not to argue that altruistic 
behavior toward non-kin is necessarily praiseworthy from a moral stand-
point (although it may be and often is). Nor is it to suggest that psycho-
logical design determines behavior: rather, it embodies developmental 
programs whose phenotypic expression may vary depending upon envi-
ronmental cues. 
Our understanding of essential features of human nature is clouded 
by our existence within established social groupings. That is why experi-
mental evidence, in which researchers can control otherwise uncontrol-
lable features of the environment, is particularly important in isolating 
irreducible human predispositions. Such evidence, in conjunction with a 
wide range of field data, requires us to chart a careful path between 
romantic idealism, a view that might deny the existence of backstabbers, 
and the narrow cynicism of one strain of individualist models carried to 
their logical conclusion, suggesting that we are all, all the time, backstab-
bers if it pays us to do so and that every person we encounter should be 
treated as a potential backstabber or, in the limit, a sociopath. 
Economists are generally reluctant to accept or adopt the language of 
abnormal psychology, and thus to describe sociopaths as "deviant" per-
sonalities. But is it simply a matter of luck or happenstance that so few 
individuals happen to have this particular preference ordering? Are we to 
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attribute this entirely to the consequences of effective socialization among 
the rest of the population? These are issues that have remained essentially 
unaddressed by those adhering to the intermediate position described in 
note 8 of the prologue. 
Humans have aggressive, cruel, and sometimes vicious impulses, to be 
sure, and are quite capable of acting on them in ways that seem obviously 
to increase the fitness of the actor and reduce that of the target-the oppo-
site of altruistic in an evolutionary sense. The puzzle is why actions based 
on such impulses are so frequently absent, among individuals as well as 
among interacting groups or nations. 
This is a problem economists sometimes dismiss with a nod to the 
invisible hand or the civilizing role of trade, the doux commerce thesis 
(Smith [1776]1937; Hirschman 1982). But the twin and related traditions, 
when examined closely, are simply vehicles for marveling at and celebrat-
ing the reasonableness of acting cooperatively within a group when others 
are, particularly where there is expectation that, if provoked by defection, 
cooperators will match like with like, even directing punishment toward 
third party violators. When one is a marginal invader and (inductively) 
extrapolates native behavior based on observed frequencies, doing in 
Rome as the Romans do may well appear to be the reasonable, rational, 
self-serving course to pursue. In the limiting condition, were one certain all 
other players were irrevocably committed, or in other ways driven to Tit-
for-Tat, the behavior of the rational invader, no matter how egoistic and 
otherwise prone to first strike, would be observationally indistinguishable 
from that of the rest of the population. This remarkable and somewhat 
counterintuitive result does not, however, provide us with a good account 
of the origin of such behavior. 
Hobbes, the State of Nature, and Democratic Peace 
Hobbes began by assuming that the most important shared attribute of 
humans, their common denominator, is their ability to kill each other 
([1651]1909, chap. 13). His analysis is thus congruent with the emphasis of 
many twentieth century writers such as Sigmund Freud and Konrad 
Lorenz on a "thin veneer of civilization" standing between us and an apoc-
alypse in which we would tear each other apart (on the similarities between 
Freud's and Hobbes's views of human nature, see Montagu 1956, 38). 
There are, however, two weak points, related to each other, in 
Hobbes's analysis. The first involves contract. Without an external 
enforcer, he argues, contracts are cheap talk, because each person, having 
made an agreement, can and will benefit from violating it ([1651] 1909, 
chap. 14). Leviathan solves the problem of the one-shot PD by allowing 
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people within the scope of its embrace to play cooperative game theory, 
that is, to enter into enforceable contracts. But the solution is a deus ex 
machina and finesses the question of how the grandest contract of them 
all-the social contract--could be entered into without some other exter-
nal enforcer, one logically prior to the existence of Leviathan. 
The second issue concerns the actual character of the state of nature. 
Hobbes's picture of it is not pretty: it involves a state of perennial violence, 
or threat of violence, that divides humans into small kin groupings-fam-
ilies-"the concord of which depends on natural lust." 
In such condition there is no place for industry, because the fruit 
thereof is uncertain: and consequently no culture of the earth; no nav-
igation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by sea; no 
commodious building; no instruments of moving and removing such 
things as require much force; no knowledge of the face of the earth; 
no account of time; no arts; no letters; no society; and which is worst 
of all, continual fear, and danger of violent death; and the life of man, 
solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short. ([1651] 1909, chap. 13) 
The state of nature was one suggested to Hobbes by conditions in 
England during its civil war and one that resonates with our contempla-
tion of late twentieth century Somalia or Bosnia. 
I do not wish to diminish how unpleasant and anxiety provoking life 
in any of these environments is or was. But here is the truly tough question 
for Hobbes: if the state of nature is unimaginably horrible, why did it not 
lead to the extinction of the human race?53 (Lorenz solved this problem 
implicitly by hypothesizing that "civilization" was invented in the 
nanosecond after humans became truly dangerous to each other by dis-
covering tools.) And if the state of nature can and does persist for more 
than a nanosecond, what human predispositions make this possible? 
Might these predispositions involve a more extensive repertoire of human 
motivations than those allowed by Hobbes-and might relaxation of the 
assumptions we make about human nature also help resolve the first issue: 
53. In fact, in some passages, Hobbes's description of the state of nature is not one of 
unmitigated violence: "if there be no power erected, or not great enough for our security, 
every man will and may lawfully rely on his own strength and art for caution against other 
men. And in all places where men have lived by small families, to rob and spoil one another 
has been a trade, and so far from being reputed against the law of nature that the greater 
spoils they gained, the greater was their honour, and men observed no other laws but the laws 
of honour; that is to abstain from cruelty, leaving to men their lives and instruments of hus-
bandry ([1651]1909, chap. 17; my italics). 
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how does a social contract get established in the absence of an external 
enforcer? 
Standard game theoretic analysis actually provides a less than airtight 
justification for the necessity of a Hobbesian state as a means of preserving 
order. If one can establish an environment of indefinitely repeated interac-
tion, and can coordinate on a cooperative equilibrium, such an equilib-
rium might be self-enforcing (see Ellickson 1991), particularly if the num-
ber of parties is small and exit from continuing interaction is difficult. 
One can't, however, jump to the conclusion that states are necessarily 
superfluous. Theory remains silent on how transition from one shot to 
repeated interaction might take place, why it leads to one rather than 
another of the multiple equilibria that could ensue in environments of 
indefinitely repeated interaction, and what guarantees the inability of indi-
viduals simply to exit from indefinite interaction, thus avoiding the penal-
ties for defection that are essential in allowing the equilibrium to be self-
enforcing. 54 
There is a related question based on the evidence discussed earlier. If 
humans possess predispositions to play cooperate in one-shot PDs, pre-
dispositions with an important genetic component, then our ability to 
coexist in an environment sufficiently peaceful to allow the species to per-
sist does not inhere fundamentally in Leviathan. The strongest proof of 
this can be found in the realm of international relations. Hobbes himself 
agreed that sovereign states operated within a state of nature. How have 
we survived in the absence of a world state? 
The observation of international relations thus gives us insight into 
the problems that the organized state, according to Hobbes, was intended 
to solve. Ifwe take this project seriously, we must begin to be more realis-
tic about the actual character of a state of nature. Historical and contem-
porary evidence indicates that, in spite of periodic and sometimes horrific 
outbreaks of interstate violence, international relations do not degenerate 
into a spate of conflicts so terrible that the species is extinguished. Given 
the availability today of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, it 
appears likely that that could happen. But it hasn't. In other words, sover-
eign states are not constantly at war with each other, and we do not liter-
ally experience an international war of all against all. 
One can argue that a non-war equilibrium among states is self-enforc-
ing based on the material interests of individual countries, due to an 
indefinite horizon of interaction. But several familiar difficulties present 
54. The relatively small number of nations-less than 200---makes it easier collectively 
to monitor behavior and, through threat of punishment, deter defection. 
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themselves. With nuclear weapons, a superpower has the capability of 
effectively destroying a counterparty, rendering the horizon of interaction 
a matter of choice rather than an environmental given. Second, environ-
ments of indefinitely repeated interaction support multiple equilibria: why 
this one? Finally, and this is related to the second problem, we return to 
the issue of origin: how did this environment of repeated, relatively peace-
ful coexistence ever come about? 
To be sure, international tranquillity is periodically rent with out-
breaks of war. But armed conflict is not typical of interactions among sov-
ereign states. There is, in addition, persuasive evidence that the path taken 
by individual states in achieving complex social organization has important 
influences on the degree and targets of interstate conflict. Neither of these 
empirical regularities is fully explicable within the Hobbesian framework. 
The final section of this chapter considers international relations as 
providing an additional range of field observation inconsistent in many 
ways with the predictions of the standard economic model and relevant in 
evaluating Hobbes's proposed solution to the PD. Much field observation 
of behavior of individuals within nations is confounded not only by the 
existence of social norms that may result in the punishment by private par-
ties of defection, but also by the existence of formal governmental struc-
tures and enforcement mechanisms. If one is dismissive of the power of 
social norms, one can argue that individuals are restrained from poten-
tially self-serving but socially damaging acts by the anticipation of third 
party retribution through the formal agency of the state. The study of 
international relations involves the interactions of powerful sovereign 
actors unconstrained by a supranational world government with effective 
police power. 
Within the field of international relations, generally domiciled in polit-
ical science departments, the doux commerce thesis draws support from the 
coupling of two propositions, one well established and the other less so. 
The less firmly established claim is that countries or groups with highly 
developed national and international commercial cultures are less likely to 
go to war with each other. Harold Nicolson, for example, an experienced 
British diplomat, contrasted the behavior of Britain and other democracies 
during the interwar period with that offascist and communist regimes. The 
former, he suggested, reflected the virtues of the merchant class, "modera-
tion, fair dealing, reasonableness, credit, compromise," in contrast with the 
first move(r) aggression and deception characteristic of the warrior mental-
ity (Nicolson 1963, 132, 144). Note, however, that Nicolson's argument 
couples the doux commerce argument with an assumed correlation 
between commercial culture and democratic political regime. 
Qualitative observations of the sort made by Nicolson do not support 
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the inference, often drawn, that the establishment of or strengthening of 
commercial relations between nations will reduce or eliminate the proba-
bility of war between them. Indeed, systematic studies cast considerable 
doubt on this proposition (Barbieri 1996; although see Oneal and Russett 
1999). In contrast, empirical evidence strongly supports the view that war 
between two nations can be avoided by assuring that a firmly rooted demo-
cratic political system prevails in each. Thus in rereading Nicolson's obser-
vation, we must ask whether Britain's diplomatic style was driven by its 
democratic political system or by its flourishing commercial culture. 
Evidence suggests the former. A recent book, building on a well-
established literature in political science and based on an exhaustive read-
ing of history and a detailed consideration of ambiguous cases, concludes 
with little qualification that "well established democracies have never 
waged war on each other" (We art 1998, 13).55 The more firmly established 
proposition is that democratic states simply do not go to war with each 
other. Note, remarkably, that this proposition is advanced as something 
far stronger than simply a probabilistic statement, highly unusual in social 
science. In an influential article published in 1988, Jack Levy maintained 
that this regularity was "as close as anything we have to an empirical law 
in international relations" (Levy 1988, 662).56 
Democratic governments are only marginally less prone to war: they 
have a high propensity to join preexisting conflicts (partly because they are 
much better than other forms of government at maintaining leagues or 
alliances), they will respond to attack, and they will sometimes attack non-
55. Weart defines a democracy as a political system in which at least two-thirds of adult 
males are enfranchised, a "well established" democracy as one marked by the toleration of 
dissent (no exile, imprisonment, or execution for political opposition) for a period of three 
years or more, and a war as cross-border violence organized by political units resulting in two 
hundred or more deaths in organized combat (Weart 1998, 13,293-95). To the degree that 
results are driven by differences in political culture, not just differences in formal institutions, 
Weart's three-year criterion suggests the possibility of relatively rapid transformations of 
political culture, even after decades of stasis, a position consistent with Kuran's. This book 
builds upon a well-developed body of literature in political science. The idea of the demo-
cratic peace is not new. Kant suggested the hypothesis in 1785, although he was wrong in 
maintaining that democratic peoples were necessarily less belligerent. Weart's contributions 
include extending the scope of inquiry to classical Greece and medieval Italy (most other 
studies focus only on modern democracies) and establishing that oligarchic republics (those 
in which less than a third of adult males were enfranchised) rarely went to war with each 
other, reinforcing the view that political regimes make grants of first move(r) altruism to 
other regimes they view as "like us" and making a convincing case that republics, and only 
republics, have been capable of forming durable, peaceful leagues. 
56. This regularity continues to attract an extraordinary degree of attention from polit-
ical scientists; see in particular recent issues of the Journal of Conflict Resolution or the Jour-
nal of Peace Research. 
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democratic regimes. They thereby end up engaging in war almost as fre-
quently as autocracies (Raknerud and Hegre 1997, 387). But they do not 
go to war with each other. 
The empirical regularity that underlies this conclusion stands as a 
challenge to the dominant realist, neorealist, or realpolitik approach in 
political science, which maintains that international relations are, and 
argues normatively that they should be, governed strictly by considera-
tions of national advantage, just as Nash's model of human behavior pre-
sumes that decisions are and should be governed solely by considerations 
of individual advantage. If the neorealist approach is correct, we should 
not see correlations between the regime character of state dyads and the 
propensity for armed conflict between them. But we do. 
The realpolitik or neorealist approach to international relations 
finesses an important problem. Most interstate relations have about them 
a strategic structure of gains and losses similar to those faced by experi-
mental subjects in PD games. The biggest gains to "national interest" 
corne when a belligerent stance is matched with a conciliatory response, 
the biggest losses when a conciliatory stance is met with a belligerent 
responseY Mutual conciliation is a Pareto efficient solution. But since, 
regardless of the position adopted by one's counterparty, belligerence is 
the individually superior stance, belligerence is the dominant strategy and 
a defect-defect pairing is, as before, the unique Nash equilibrium. It does 
no good to object that belligerence is not necessarily a dominant strategy 
if interactions are repeated. We must explain transitions from single play 
interactions to those where repeated interactions may be presumed. 
War is in fact a relatively rare event in international relations. Ifneo-
realism is truly correct, then it would also be true that international diplo-
macy is epiphenomenal: cheap talk, without any real consequence for out-
comes. Studies of diplomatic history, such as that leading up to World 
War I, World War II, and most other significant international conflict, 
suggest otherwise. Indeed, it is because humans possess both PD solution 
modules that enable them to abide by agreements in the absence of an 
external enforcer and foraging modules that might incline them to violate 
those agreements that diplomatic skills have value. 
Henry Kissinger, the twentieth century's foremost advocate and prac-
titioner of realpolitik, argued repeatedly that the character of regimes was 
57. If one argues, instead, that the biggest losses for both parties occur when a belliger-
ent stance is met with a belligerent response, then the game becomes the related one of 
chicken, or, as Maynard-Smith described it, hawk-dove. The issue of how to characterize the 
game is ultimately philosophical. Is it better, under threat, to surrender one's sovereignty and 
live like a slave or to fight to the death in a potentially unsuccessful attempt to preserve lib-
erty? The issue is discussed in greater detail in chapter 4. 
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irrelevant to international diplomacy: what mattered were hardheaded 
calculations of national interest. In practice, however, his comments show 
that he recognized the empirical likelihood that regime character 
influenced international behavior. With regard to the Soviet Union, for 
example, he observed that their rulers "had prevailed in a system that ruth-
lessly weeds out the timid and the scrupulous" and that this domestic his-
tory made them disinclined to conciliation abroad (Kissinger 1982, 245). 
Similarly, Nicolo Machiavelli, who praised treachery and deceit among 
princes, conceded as an empirical matter that republics had a higher 
propensity to bargain honestly (We art 1998, 79) and would be less likely 
unilaterally to abrogate a treaty. In both the history of classical Greece 
and that of Italian city-states, there is evidence that republics, which had 
learned how to reconcile competing interests domestically, attempted to 
apply this same model to their international diplomacy. 
The explanation for this phenomenon of peace among democracies 
needs to be developed against a larger backdrop. From an evolutionary 
standpoint, the most important challenge is not to explain why there is so 
much conflict between individuals beyond the level of immediate kin 
groups but why there is so little; the same challenge applies to behavior 
between states (on this point, see Zahavi and Zahavi 1997, 16). 
Evidence from more than two millennia of recorded history is consis-
tent with the view that an established (more than three-year-old) demo-
cratic political culture in two regimes prevents conflict between them. The 
phenomenon of democratic peace illustrates two characteristics of the 
human predisposition to make grants of restraint on first strike: such 
grants are not restricted to kin, but they can, with higher probability, be 
restricted to those deemed worthy of equal treatment because they are 
"like us." It also reminds us of what is not largely determined by genetic 
factors in human affairs, that is not simply a predictable consequence of 
species typical behavioral propensities. Regime choice is, ultimately, a col-
lective decision that can go and has gone in different directions and has 
important consequences. 
Moreover, the in-group/out-group demarcation, so central to ethno-
centrism, is only partly-some argue minimally-explicable with reference 
to identifiable intergroup differences in physical characteristics. Such dif-
ferences are neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for strife. There 
are many instances of bitter divisions among populations that are ethni-
cally and racially indistinguishable (e.g., some of the conflicts in the 
remains of Yugoslavia) and other instances in which in-groups encompass 
a racially and ethnically diverse population (e.g., current day Switzerland). 
Cultural, ethnic, religious, or racial uniformity has never provided insur-
ance against violent intra- or intergroup conflict. More frequently than 
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not, politics and history have determined national or cultural identity, 
rather than the reverse. This view is supported by experiments in social 
psychology demonstrating that even when subjects are assigned to groups 
randomly, they can very quickly be made to believe that members of the 
other group are inferior and less deserving of rewards (Brown 1986, chap. 
5). The criterion of differentiation can be as inconsequential as whether 
members of "their" group are (supposedly) more inclined to overestimate 
or underestimate the number of dots appearing on a computer screen in a 
given time interval (Tajfel and Billig 1974). 
What gives political culture and structure, then, such apparent power 
to influence the probability of violence among state dyads? Suppose we 
grant that natural selection above the level of the individual organism has 
endowed most humans with a predisposition most of the time to play coop-
erate in one-shot PDs. Such tendencies must still be evoked by environ-
mental cues and can be attenuated in their absence or in the presence of dif-
ferent ones. For both environmental and genetic reasons, those with higher 
predispositions to practice first strike will persist in every group in a minor-
ity status. Moreover, as the analysis of chapter 2 indicates, such individuals 
will, within each group, be differentially advantaged. In nondemocratic 
societies, one aspect of differential advantage, aside from greater reproduc-
tive success, is a greater probability of exercising political power (this like-
lihood is reflected in Kissinger's remarks). Thus in nondemocratic societies 
ruthless individuals (those lacking aversion to first strike, those who win by 
intimidation and are used to doing so domestically) can more easily lead 
societies into aggressive wars not necessarily reflecting the predispositions 
of the majority of the population. They do so in part because they may mis-
read a conciliatory negotiating stance on the part of another regime as evi-
dence of exploitable weakness, in particular an unwillingness to bear the 
costs of conflict if attacked or otherwise provoked. 
Democracies are somewhat less likely than autocracies to launch 
aggressive war, even against nondemocratic societies. Democratic forms 
of government require leaders to be responsive to the will (predispositions) 
of the majority. An unprovoked attack during the Cold War by the United 
States and Britain on the Soviets, a nondemocratic society, would, how-
ever, not have violated the democratic peace regularity, was not beyond 
the realm of possibility, and could have been sold to the U.S. public had 
the enemy been sufficiently demonized. Game theoretic analysis (read 
Nash equilibrium analysis) supported it, as did the nation's most promi-
nent game theorist. 
Nevertheless, in the early 1950s, advocates of first strike against the 
Soviets faced an uphill struggle to persuade citizens that aggressive war 
was consistent with democratic principles. One advocate urged the United 
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States to overcome its aversions and become comfortable with being an 
"aggressor for peace" (see chap. 4). In contrast, the doctrine of massive 
retaliation was easily salable within the United States, Britain, and other 
democratic countries, even though both elements of the strategy are widely 
recognized as irrational from the standpoint of an egoistic actor. 58 Democ-
racies, like the humans whose will their leaders reflect, tend to be proto-
typical Tit-for-Tat players, universally when interacting with other democ-
racies and frequently in interacting with others. They make grants of 
restraint on first strike to those they believe merit such treatment, espe-
cially other democracies. They apparently take the existence of an estab-
lished democratic system in a counterparty as an observable cue that lead-
ers are "like us," which means not necessarily that they are ethnically or 
racially similar but rather that they will be held accountable by those they 
rule, and are more likely to interpret a conciliatory negotiating stance as 
reflecting a desire to avoid war (the lose-lose Nash equilibrium) as 
opposed to a sign of weakness and an invitation to go for the big gains by 
talking and acting belligerently. The democratic nature of a political 
regime is a readable signal to another democracy that the dyad will be able 
to work out differences through negotiation and avoid resort to force. 
Similarly, for the same reason that completely self-regarding invaders 
of a society of Tit-for-Tat players will find it prudent to act in an observa-
tionally equivalent fashion, autocracies, even when their leaders possess 
much stronger penchants for aggressive war, may be dissuaded from bel-
ligerent moves when they perceive themselves to be in an environment of 
Tit-for-Tat players. This was the underlying basis of the post-World War 
II doctrine of containment. 
Political scientists have long assumed that the same kind of analytical 
tools can be used to understand interactions among nations as is used to 
understand interactions among individuals, and as we have seen, there is 
considerable merit to this view. Certainly game theoretic concepts such as 
the Prisoner's Dilemma are useful in understanding options faced by states 
as well as individuals. And certainly the standard economic model and its 
neorealist sibling in political science face isomorphic difficulties in explain-
ing actual outcomes of individual interactions and international relations. 
Some object that the analogy fails because states are not unitary 
58. Although the United States has never officially forsworn the first use of nuclear 
weapons, it is generally assumed that such use would take place only in the context of a severe 
unprovoked threat to the national interest. The strategy of massive retaliation is a reactive 
stance that requires one to give up the advantages that might obtain from an offensive first 
strike. von Neumann did not think this was rational. Second, deterrence requires forming an 
intention to retaliate, a threat to perform an action it would not be in one's material interest 
to undertake in the event deterrence failed. 
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actors. The concept of the unitary actor is an abstraction at the level of 
states, and understanding the different accountabilities faced by leaders in 
democracies as compared with autocracies gives insight, for example, into 
why regime character affects outcomes. But the objection is less com-
pelling once one begins to adopt a modular approach to cognition. For the 
concept of the unitary actor is also something of an abstraction at the level 
of the individual. Just as opposing points of view coexist in polities, so do 
sometimes opposing predispositions coexist within individuals. 
As members of established social groups, for example, we are each of 
us, as a matter of fact, both invader and native, coolly assessing the scene 
from the standpoint of hard nosed game theory, as if human-human inter-
actions were strictly a foraging problem and part of the background blur 
that makes cooperation (forgoing first strike) the generally reasonable 
thing to do. This duality implies that inconsistent behavioral propensities 
supporting these two roles coexist within individuals, although natural 
selection has heavily influenced the domain specific probabilities that these 
propensities will be expressed. We (at least westerners) are largely unaware 
of this contradictory coexistence because of what psychologists call the 
fundamental attribution error (Jones and Nisbett 1972). We attribute our 
own behavior too much to situational factors-we are simply rationally 
responding to costs, benefits, and opportunities-while explaining the 
behavior of others too much with reference to dispositional factors or per-
sonality traits-behavioral regularities resistant or less responsive to such 
factors. 
This bias may be particularly helpful for those steeped in individual-
istic traditions (see Wilson 1999,284). By suggesting a higher predictabil-
ity and a lesser reliance on rational calculation in the behavior of others 
than we attribute to ourselves it may make it easier for us to preserve the 
view that we, at least, are Nash optimizers, while at the same time allow-
ing us to reconcile this view with the incorporation of empirical data on 
the past behavior of counterparties in making our decisions (Kreps et al. 
1982). But it is also a reminder that introspection is a poor guide to under-
standing how much our responses in particular situations may actually be 
constrained by behavioral predispositions, tendencies that have been evo-
lutionarily favored and that are central to the understanding of complex 
social organization. 
The consequence of restraint on first strike, the control of direct 
unprovoked aggression, is never entirely complete because of the persis-
tence at low frequencies of deviant propensities, or low probability 
propensities within particular individuals. But it is still remarkably com-
plete, helping, in conjunction with very small numbers of police or their 
equivalent, to create the security of persons and security of property that 
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are, within states, preconditions for reciprocity, whether it be in the more 
primitive non simultaneous form identified by anthropologists as general-
ized reciprocity or its more modern manifestation in market exchange. 
Restraint on first strike also facilitates the emergence of coexistence 
among sovereign nations, even though it may be possible to account for 
the preservation of peace through collective security as reflecting the ratio-
nally pursued interests of particular states. 
Sociologists and anthropologists attribute restraint almost exclu-
sively to enculturation and/or the effect of socialization. Many political 
theorists attribute it to the institution offormal government, although that 
can be only part of the answer, since at the micro level people seem capable 
of establishing workable rules in its absence (Ellickson 1991) and powerful 
nations manage more frequently than not to avoid conflict even in the 
absence of world government. Rational choice theorists emphasize how 
the pursuit of material interest can contribute to the maintenance of recip-
rocal relations. 
My argument is that explanation of these phenomena, which must 
account also for their emergence, is to be found not just in self-interest nar-
rowly defined, but in a complex of human behavioral propensities selected 
for over thousands of generations prior to the arrival of Homo sapiens 
sapiens and evident in the behavior, neurobiology, and cognitive mecha-
nisms of humans today. This model can be empirically validated and 
shown to be consistent with evolutionary theory, in contrast to the stan-
dard economic model, particularly in its application to strategic interac-
tions, which is based on a priori assumptions buttressed by a flawed read-
ing of evolutionary theory and evidence. 
Some version of this model of human behavior, steering a course 
between romantic idealism and cynicism, is what children should and for 
the most part do carry into the world as they update and modify its pre-
dictions on the basis of personal experience; knowledge about the external 
world obtained through the study of history and current events; and per-
spectives on human interaction gained through art, literature, and other 
forms of fiction. We are doing both science and humanity a disservice if we 
give people a choice between the seriously incomplete standard economic 
model, justified by improper appeals to evolutionary theory and data, 
which if carried to its logical conclusion leaves virtually no room for altru-
istic inclinations, and different assumptions about human behavioral pre-
dispositions based only on blind faith. Presuppositions about human 
nature of the latter sort are vulnerable irrespective of their truth content 
absent some kind of scientific foundation. 
Virtually all known ethical systems contain some version of the cate-
gorical imperative (although, regrettably, the fine print reveals that such 
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rules have almost always been intended to apply only to within group, not 
out of group members). These imperatives are intended both as a norma-
tive/prescriptive guide to behavior among those who merit equal treat-
ment (the relevant in-group) and as an implicit positive description of gen-
eral tendencies in human behavioral propensities within the group. 
Because these characterizations are so similar across groups, however, we 
can conclude that they reflect essential features of human nature reflected 
in the experimental results with which this chapter began. This is so even 
though these descriptions in each instance claim to be applicable only 
within a particular group, and are often contrasted with the purported 
barbaric, uncivilized ways of outsiders. Behavioral science should aim for 
an accurate characterization of essential human predispositions, and the 
respective domains in which they are likely to be stronger or weaker, a char-
acterization that must lie at the foundation of any social scientific model with 
aspirations to improved predictive power. 
CHAPTER 2 
Multilevel Selection and Restraint 
on Harm 
Skepticism about the existence of any type of "true" altruism beyond that 
displayed toward kin draws powerful support from a widespread belief 
among social scientists and others that such predispositions, had they 
arisen initially at low frequencies in a population, could not have with-
stood the disadvantageous force of natural selection operating on individ-
ual organisms. Organisms exhibiting such traits or practicing such strate-
gies, it is thought, would necessarily have faced reproductive fitness 
penalties leading to the extinguishing of whatever genetic predisposers 
influenced the behavior. 
This view frequently appeals to Darwin for support, but the appeal is 
unwarranted. What may appear on the face of it to be simply inconsistent 
with the theory of natural selection is not. No reputable biologist disputes 
the proposition that it is possible for a trait imposing a fitness disadvan-
tage on the actor but benefiting one or more conspecifics to increase in fre-
quency in global populations. This can involve not only predispositions to 
sacrifice for offspring but also, under the right conditions, to behave altru-
istically in ways that benefit non-kin and are disadvantageous to the actor. 
The debate among biologists has not been around the theoretical possibil-
ity of group level selection. It has concerned the nature and empirical like-
lihood of mechanisms allowing such traits to increase in frequency, and 
important changes in the character of consensus thinking on these issues 
have occurred in the past decade (see, e.g., Maynard-Smith and Price 
1973, 15; Wilson and Sober 1994; Sober and Wilson 1998). 
Altruistic behavior, defined in evolutionary terms as behavior that 
reduces the probability that the organism exhibiting it will survive and 
propagate in a manner that increases survivability and propagation likeli-
hoods of at least one other conspecific, cannot by definition withstand the 
force of natural selection operating only at the level of the individual 
organism. Debate about the conditions under which traits predisposing to 
altruism might originate and increase in frequency has consequently been 
an important issue for biology. Accounting for altruistic behavior, or 
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explaining why apparently altruistic behavior is not in fact so, has also 
been a central concern for social science since its origins and consequently 
for economics as a social science. It is critical, therefore, that we under-
stand what biology, and in particular the theory of natural selection, does 
and does not tell us about this issue. 
A relatively uncontroversial avenue through which altruistic traits 
may survive favors sacrifice for kin. The theory of kin selection is based on 
the concept of inclusive fitness (Hamilton 1964), which considers the 
impact on gene propagation of selection at all levels, not just that of the 
individual organism. Behavior that benefits three children, or three sib-
lings, at the expense of the actor's survival, will not necessarily reduce 
inclusive fitness, since although the actor suffers, even to the point of 
death, the propagation of genes predisposing to such behavior will be 
enhanced by the increased survival probabilities of progeny or kin. 
Benefits are weighted by the number of benefited con specifics and their 
genetic propinquity and measured against reproductive costs to the actor. 
If the overall (inclusive) benefit-cost ratio is favorable, then natural selec-
tion will favor genes predisposing to such behavior, even if the behavior 
damages the life prospects of the actor manifesting it. The theory of kin 
selection is broadly accepted and has provided important insights into the 
behavior of both human and nonhuman animal species. l 
But altruism toward kin does not exhaust the range of behavior dam-
aging to individual fitness that we must account for. For example, parents 
of adoptive children often exhibit behavior remarkably similar to behavior 
toward biological offspring, an observation that has been made with 
respect to humans and other primates (Wilson 1978, 151).2 Individuals 
give anonymously to charities, and there are well-documented examples in 
war and elsewhere of individuals sacrificing themselves to save the lives of 
others in their group or otherwise acting as good Samaritans (Frank 1988, 
1. Inclusive fitness is a gene's eye perspective that considers the impact of behavioral 
tendencies on the subsequent global frequency of genes that predispose to them. It takes into 
consideration the fitness benefits that behavior may confer on kin or other conspecifics. Stan-
dard textbook usage (e.g., Strickberger 1996, 603) interprets inclusive fitness to include mech-
anisms favoring kin selection but to exclude mechanisms that may benefit non-kin. Hamilton 
(1975), the originator of the concept, grants that the terms are commonly used in this sense 
but observes that inclusive fitness in principle includes the effects of selection at all levels. 
Thus the suggestion that inclusive fitness theory is an alternative to multilevel selection 
models is unwarranted. In fact, kin selection is an instance of group level selection. 
2. When families contain both adopted and biological children, parents, on average, do 
favor their biological children (Buss 1999, 196-204). However, the baseline level of adoption 
is not zero. Substantial numbers of humans are clearly willing to sacrifice their own material 
welfare to raise children who are known not to be theirs biologically. 
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chap. 11).3 And, we must consider what is the more empirically important 
form of altruism toward non-kin: failure to harm, or a willingness to forgo 
the option of first strike. 
We are faced with a conundrum: the apparent inability of models 
based on natural selection to account for predispositions underlying the 
experimental and field data referenced in chapter 1. In a range of publica-
tions culminating in their 1998 book Unto Others, Elliott Sober and David 
Sloan Wilson (1998; see also Wilson and Sober 1994) provide an accessible 
articulation of what is the only viable mechanism capable of resolving it. 
Their solution, building on a theoretical and empirical literature that 
begins with Charles Darwin (see Wade 1978; Sober and Wilson 1998, 56), 
is not to dispute the proposition that the forces of individual selection 
operate against the survival of altruistic behavior, and that genes predis-
posing to such behavior will be selected against if this is the only force 
operating on their survival probabilities. Rather, their analysis is based on 
the proposition that multilevel selection-selection at the group as well as 
the individual level-is both logically possible and empirically important. 
Their argument is consistent with Hamilton's concept of inclusive fitness 
but emphasizes the operation of selection at levels above that of the family 
or kin groups. It incorporates the insights reflected in the Price equations 
(Price 1970, 1972; see the subsequent discussion in this chapter) and pro-
vides a more empirically plausible account of the operation of group selec-
tion than did earlier explorations such as that of Sewall Wright (1945). 
Group Selection Theory: Intellectual Background 
Wright recognized the fitness disadvantage experienced by altruists within 
each group. But he suggested that if groups were small enough and iso-
lated enough altruism might by chance, that is, through the mechanism of 
genetic drift, evolve to fixation within some groups, and that such groups 
could then outcompete others by persisting longer and colonizing new ter-
ritories by contributing more dispersers. The Wright approach to group 
selection involves differential extinction of separate groups. 
3. The U. S. Infantry Manual advises a GI confronted with a live grenade in a trench to 
cover it with his body. By allowing himself to be killed a soldier can save the lives of several 
other soldiers, so the behavior is clearly adaptive from the standpoint of the squad. It is 
equally clear that such behavior is not adaptive for the individual, particularly if others are 
prepared to step in. Not moving first is a weakly dominant strategy, and the Nash equilib-
rium is for no one to move and for everyone to die. Of the 207 Medals of Honor awarded dur-
ing the Vietnam War, 63 went to soldiers who threw themselves on exploding devices (Blake 
1978, 53-58). Similarly, Secret Service agents are trained to take a bullet for their president. 
These instances show how training or enculturation can strengthen otherwise weak predis-
positions. 
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The conditions necessary for this model to operate continue to be 
viewed by evolutionary biologists, including Sober and Wilson, as unlikely 
to obtain. Evolution to fixation is considered improbable in the first place, 
since it relies on small numbers of similarly altruistic individuals finding 
themselves by chance in the same group. Second, if there is enough disper-
sion to permit the colonization of new territories, there is also likely 
enough dispersion to permit dispersing nonaltruists from other groups to 
invade existing altruist groups (Maynard-Smith 1964; Wade 1978). 
Sober and Wilson's model, in contrast, does not require evolution to 
fixation within some groups or a high degree of geographical isolation and 
differential extinction rates: only a positive covariance between altruist 
gene frequency and group growth rates combined with periodic dispersal 
into the general population followed by group re-formation (see the dis-
cussion that follows). 
Although appeals to group selection were common in the 1940s and 
1950s among biologists, ethologists, and some social scientists, the concept 
came under withering attack in the 1960s by a more self-consciously ana-
lytical generation of biologists (e.g., Williams 1966). In the light of these 
attacks, and, at least initially, in the absence of empirically plausible theo-
retical models explaining how group selection could operate, the predom-
inant position among biologists from the late 1960s through the early 
1990s was that these processes were empirically unimportant in the evolu-
tion of human and other species.4 The position is still held by many, 
although it is now generally articulated with more qualification. To the 
degree that the concept of inclusive fitness has been embraced, the suprain-
dividual levels at which it can operate have typically been assumed to 
extend no higher than family or kin groups. 
The consensus position was based in part on the argument that a 
4. Kavka provides an excellent summary of conventional wisdom on this subject in the 
mid-1980s. He begins by describing conditions that, he understood from the biological liter-
ature, would have had to obtain for group selection to operate: small groups, so that altruism 
could become fixed in some groups by random variation; and isolated groups, so that free 
riding nonaltruists could not frequently join altruistic groups. Finally, he summarizes, selec-
tion pressures would have had to be severe, so that group selection did not proceed at a very 
much slower rate than individual selection. The first two assumptions are those embodied in 
Sewall Wright's analysis. Having laid these conditions out, Kavka then concludes, "Since 
these restrictive conditions are not often satisfied in nature, sociobiologists downplay the 
importance of group selection in explaining altruism" (Kavka 1986, 58). Pointing to the 
unlikelihood that altruistic traits could evolve to fixation in individual demes is also central 
in Maynard-Smith's 1964 downplaying ofthe empirical importance of group selection. In the 
Sober and Wilson analysis, however, although isolation for part of the life cycle is necessary, 
isolation is not permanent, and indeed cannot be permanent, since periodic mixing through 
migration and/or exogamy is essential to prevent the otherwise inexorable triumph of nona 1-
truists within each group. 
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number of animal behaviors previously "explained" on the grounds that 
they benefited (were adaptive for) a group could now be shown to be 
favored by the forces of individual level selection alone and were therefore 
not "altruistic" at all (Williams 1966). Because the conditions necessary 
for group selection were assumed unlikely to have obtained, it was argued 
that natural selection could not have favored truly altruistic predisposi-
tions except (the one widely admitted exception) in circumstances where 
the benefit to kin, weighted by numbers and genetic propinquity, out-
weighed the potential or actual harm to the organism undertaking the 
behavior. If behavioral predispositions benefited a group of non-kin, it 
was because they benefited these individuals and the actor (in other words, 
the behavior was mutualistic, not altruistic). The apparent coup de grace 
in the argument against group selection was the more systematic demon-
stration that traits that provided benefit to a group, provided they were 
initially widespread, could be sustained (protected from invasion by other 
strategies) by individual level frequency dependent selection alone (May-
nard-Smith and Price 1973). 
To the degree that arguments dismissing the empirical importance of 
group level adaptation were applied to human behavior, evolutionary 
biologists took a position contrary to traditional midcentury structural-
functional arguments in sociology and anthropology that sometimes 
explained the origin and persistence of group beneficial traits (behavioral 
propensities perhaps damaging to individuals but beneficial to the group) 
by appeal to the "evolutionary" argument that such behavior benefited the 
group. What seemed obvious to a generation of sociologists and anthro-
pologists through the 1940s and 1950s, and to many evolutionary biolo-
gists (Wynne-Edwards [1962] 1967) and ethologists (Lorenz 1966), was 
rejected as wishful thinking that failed to recognize that in natural selec-
tion all that ultimately matters is the inclusive fitness of organisms and, in 
the limit, individual genes (Williams 1966; Dawkins 1976).5 
The rejection of group level selection was hailed as a victory over 
decades of loose argument in which "evolutionary" analysis "explained" 
individual and group features with reference to adaptation at different lev-
els. In a number of respects the controversy mirrored that surrounding the 
critique of the traditional sociological/anthropological tradition by eco-
nomic or rational choice theorists. It is true that structural-functional 
analysis at the level of the group often said little about, or simply did not 
consider, how such adaptations, practiced by individuals, originated and 
how they persisted in the face of the weight of individual level selection 
5. Sober and Wilson quote a colleague's advice from a "very distinguished evolution-
ary biologist" as late as the 1980s: "There are three ideas that you do not evoke in biology-
Lamarckism, the phlogiston theory, and group selection" (1998, 40). 
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pressures. But, as we shall see in chapters 3 and 4, evolutionary analyses 
limiting selection to the level of the individual organism also often have lit-
tle to say about the issue of origin, just as do rational choice models whose 
conclusions such evolutionary analyses reinforce. 
The individual level selection program, in the hands of its most enthu-
siastic proponents, has attempted with great vigor to eliminate altruistic 
behavioral predispositions as a relevant empirical category by showing 
how behavior previously attributed to these predispositions could in fact 
be favored by individual level selection. The effort parallels and mirrors in 
its conclusions the efforts of rational choice theory. To the degree that a 
trait is favored by individual level selection, it cannot be altruistic. Never-
theless, both experimental and field evidence suggest that the category of 
biologically altruistic behavioral predispositions remains significant, in 
human as well as in nonhuman species (Frank 1988; Sober and Wilson 
1998; deWaa11982, 1996; Axelrod 1984, 91). 
The research program based exclusively on the study of individual 
level selection has not adequately accounted for the ability of such traits to 
establish themselves in populations initially lacking them. At some point 
in our evolutionary past, such traits were absent, whereas now they appear 
to be widespread. We lack a coherent historical account of that transition, 
just as in the rational choice/game theory literature, we lack a coherent 
account of transition from one-shot to repeated PD games. 
Species in which an altruistic predisposition such as restraint on 
intraspecific violence may be widespread will frequently be observed in sit-
uations in which the behaviors are sustained and reinforced by frequency 
dependent selection operating at the individual level alone. In such 
instances we will have difficulty identifying altruistic or irrational predis-
positions from field data alone because, if continued interaction may rea-
sonably be presumed, observed behavior is theoretically consistent with 
their absence. That is why experimental studies of human subjects that 
control for such factors as concern with reputation or anticipation of sub-
sequent encounters are so important in isolating essential predispositions. 
The results of such studies (see chap. 1) indicate that we are simply not 
justified in defining away the category of other-regarding behavior, of 
which altruistic action is an important component, or in predicting that we 
will eventually be able to do so. 
The Modern Group Selection Argument 
Instead, Sober and Wilson argue, the focus should be on providing a rig-
orous theoretical account that acknowledges that, by definition, the prac-
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tice of altruistic behavior reduces the relative fitness of those organisms 
exhibiting it but that also explains how such behavior can survive and per-
sist, increasing and/or maintaining its frequency in global populations. 
Note that while individual organisms can, by this definition, be altruistic, 
genes cannot, and the possibility that predispositions toward such behav-
ior can spread continues to depend on the ability of such behaviors to 
affect gene frequencies in subsequent generations. 
The central argument depends on organisms separating or being sep-
arated into groups for part of a life cycle, or perhaps for a period of several 
generations, and then reentering a global population before again reas-
sorting into groups. Genetic recombination, outcrossing,6 and infrequent 
mutation are sufficient to produce variability in individuals. In small 
groups, average group predispositions toward altruistic behavior will not 
be identical, even where initial assortment into groups is done randomly 
(Cavalli-Sforza, Menozzi, and Piazza 1994, 13). Within each group, altru-
ists will lose out in the competition for resources and in particular in the 
competition to pass on their genes to the next generation. Consequently, 
their share of each group will fall (or at best stay even in the unlikely event 
altruists completely dominate a group) throughout the period of time that 
the group has a distinct existence. This point, that altruists, and the genes 
predisposing toward such behavior, will be evolutionarily disadvantaged 
from the standpoint of selection at the individual (within group) level, is 
the central core of the attack on group level structural-functional explana-
tions, and Sober and Wilson do not take issue with it. But, and here is the 
critical proposition, because the behavior of altruists differentially benefits 
groups in which their frequencies may be relatively higher, the proportion of 
altruists in the global population may rise in cases where the forces of group 
selection are stronger than the forces of individual selection. 
Examples of circumstances favorable to group level selection include 
the life cycle relationships between parasites and other disease vectors and 
their hosts. Suppose groups of a polymorphic virus with more and less vir-
ulent versions invade a number of host organisms, let us say rabbits. 
Among the rabbits, chance variation will result in varying mixtures of the 
two forms within each of them. Within each host, the more virulent ver-
sions enjoy a fitness advantage and increases in frequency. But organisms 
6. Genetic recombination refers to reproductive process in diploid species. Pairs of chro-
mosomes trade segments before the final random assignment by meiotic division of one or 
the other of each recombined pair to produce germ cells (sperm or eggs). The latter process is 
sometimes referred to as outcrossing: the random selection of a single set of chromosomes 
from the mother (one from each recombined pair) and a single set of chromosomes from the 
father (one from each recombined pair) to produce a zygote. 
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infected with high frequencies of the more virulent strain die quickly, 
before they can infect many other hosts. In contrast, hosts infected with 
less virulent mixtures live longer, more successfully spreading the disease. 
The longer living hosts therefore exercise a greater weight in determining 
the frequencies of the two versions in subsequent time periods, and each of 
their "votes" carries higher proportions of the less virulent strain. Para-
doxically, the less virulent strain will be decreasing in frequency within 
every host, yet increasing over time within the global population. 
In fact, such a scenario has been documented among rabbits in Aus-
tralia in the early 1950s when confronted with the myxoma virus intro-
duced by the government to control their exploding population. Initially 
mortality was very high, but gradually it declined, suggesting that the rab-
bits were acquiring resistance. Subsequent testing revealed two outcomes, 
one of which was surprising. First, the rabbits had indeed, on average, 
become more resistant to myxoma, which would be expected from indi-
vidual level selection operating through differential mortality within the 
rabbit population. The surprising and unexpected conclusion applied to 
the viral population. The virus itself had become on average less virulent, 
as measured by extracting blood from rabbits in the wild and comparing 
samples so obtained with original viral samples stored in a laboratory. 
This outcome would not be expected if natural selection were operating 
only at the level of the individual virus, as it was indeed within each host 
(Lewontin 1970). The initial interpretation of this episode as reflecting the 
operation of group selection was controversial; most evolutionary biolo-
gists, including George Williams, now accept it (Williams and Nesse 1991, 
8). The mechanism is essential, indeed, to the burgeoning field of Darwin-
ian medicine. 
Wright's analysis of group selection relied on the evolution to fixation 
of altruistic traits within some groups, combined with interdemic (inter-
group) competition. The Sober and Wilson analysis does not require evo-
lution to fixation in any group but emphasizes the necessity of periodic 
recombining of or migration between groups-called trait groups by Wil-
son-in order for group selection to occur. Altruists from the faster grow-
ing, more altruistic groups must periodically disperse throughout the 
global population (for discussion, see Wade 1978). Absent such a mecha-
nism, the forces of individual selection will eventually triumph, and the 
selection against altruistic behavior within groups will drive such behav-
ioral propensities to extinction, as those emphasizing the forces of individ-
uallevel selection have repeatedly emphasized. 
The possibility that altruists may be declining in frequency within 
every group and yet rising in frequency in the global population-an 
apparent contradiction-can be more easily understood with reference to 
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the Simpson paradox.? A compelling example of this was an investigation 
at the University of California at Berkeley in the 1970s of alleged discrim-
ination against women in admissions to graduate study. Aggregate data 
showed that admission rates for women were lower than for men. But 
when administrators looked at the data department by department they 
found no evidence of discrimination: in each department women were 
being admitted at approximately the same rate as men. 
The explanation for the paradox was that the distribution of appli-
cants by department was not the same for the two sexes. In particular, 
women were applying disproportionately to departments in which it was 
more difficult for an applicant of either sex to gain admission. This covari-
ance meant that the averages of the departmental admission rates, roughly 
equivalent for men and women, differed from the global average admis-
sion rates, in which women did less well than men. What was true at the 
level of each individual group (department)-roughly equal admission 
rates-was not true for the entire population of applicants (Dawes 1988, 
297). 
Similarly, in considering the fate of altruists, what is true for each 
individual group (altruists are losing out) may not be true for the global 
population, because groups in which altruists are differentially concentrated 
may grow more rapidly. The argument, at first glance, seems akin to the 
story of the retailer who lost money on every sale but made it up on vol-
ume. Upon careful examination, however, the Simpson paradox is not 
based on such an inherently contradictory claim. 
Consider another concrete example: the forces determining the male-
female ratio in sexually reproducing organisms. Suppose some females in 
a population develop a tendency to produce more female than male off-
spring. The forces of natural selection operating on individual organisms 
within the group will tend to drive the ratio back toward approximate 
equality. Females who give birth to more females than males will lose out 
to females who give birth to balanced numbers of males and females 
because the latter type of female will have more grandchildren. Why? 
In the second generation, males will be scarce, and the second type of 
female will have produced relatively more of them. These scarce males will 
disproportionately impregnate daughters of both types of females, giving 
the second type of female more grandchildren, and passing on genes pre-
disposing to roughly equal numbers of male and female children. Traits 
predisposing to having a higher ratio of female offspring will decline in sub-
sequent generations, until the sex ratio returns to balance. This is the fun-
7. The paradox exists when a population divided into groups exhibits a population 
average that differs from the average of the group averages. See Simpson 1951. 
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damental evolutionary explanation for the approximately equal sex ratio 
observed in our own species (Fisher 1930; Maynard-Smith 1993, 12). It is 
an archetypal case of frequency dependent selection and operates irrespec-
tive of whether a fraction of males never mate. It is an example of frequency 
dependent selection because the fitness of a particular gene depends on its 
own frequency and the frequency of other genes in the population. 
On the other hand, consider again the introduction by mutation or 
genetic recombination of a tendency within some females to produce a 
higher proportion of female offspring. Assume now that the population is 
randomly sorted into a number of smaller groups, or demes. Groups that 
happen to possess a higher frequency of females with this trait will, for 
obvious reasons, grow faster, and thus, provided this covariance is 
sufficiently strong, it is theoretically possible for group selection to pro-
duce populations with an unbalanced (female dominated) sex ratio. The 
operation of group selection also requires that the groups periodically 
break up and disperse into a general population and then reassort into 
smaller groups. Otherwise the frequency dependent selection described 
previously will inexorably, within each isolated group, return the sex ratio 
to balance. 
No mammalian species has a significantly unbalanced sex ratio. But 
many arthropod species do (Hamilton 1967; 1975, 136), providing strong 
empirical confirmation of the operation, in some contexts, of group level 
selection.s Cases of female biased sex ratios are typical of small inverte-
brates who occupy habitats for several generations before dispersing more 
widely-thus providing the mixing of group progeny that is essential to 
prevent the inexorable forces offrequency dependent selection within each 
group from eliminating the group-positive9 trait (Sober and Wilson 1998, 
41). 
The Price Equations 
More generally, consider a species whose population periodically divides 
itself into a large number n of groups. Some of the individuals in the pop-
ulation possess a certain trait, whose frequency in each group i is, at the 
beginning of the analysis, Pi' Each group i begins with size qi' Organisms 
interact and receive payoffs that affect relative fitness and contribution to 
the next generation. After this process, the size of group i is q/, and the 
8. Arthropods are members of the invertebrate phylum that includes insects, spiders, 
and crustaceans. 
9. I use the term group-positive to refer to a trait that, when prevalent in a group, per-
mits it to grow more rapidly. Similarly, the term individual-negative refers to a trait that 
decreases the relative fitness of the organism within the group. 
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gene frequency is Pi'. If the gene is group positive and individual negative 
(altruistic), then q/ > qi and p/ < Pi: all groups will grow in size (but pos-
sibly at different rates), and in all groups the frequency of the trait will 
drop. Depending on the covariance between group size and gene fre-
quency, however, it is possible for the global gene frequency to rise even 
though it drops within each group. 
Here is why. The global frequency of the gene P initially is equal to 
the average frequency in each group P plus a covariance term that reflects 
the degree to which larger groups also contain higher frequencies of the 
gene. More formally, if the average of the group gene frequencies 
n 
P = (~Pi)ln 
.=1 




and the covariance of Pi with qi 
1 n 
COV(Pi,qi) = n L (Pi - P)(qi - q), 
i=1 
then the initial global gene frequency 
Global gene frequency equals the average group gene frequency P 
plus the covariance between group size and gene frequency divided by the 
average group size (q). If the covariance between group size and gene fre-
quency is 0, the initial global gene frequency P will be identical to the aver-
age group gene frequency p. 
Now interaction takes place within the groups, and the various 
organisms receive payoffs in the form of differential evolutionary fitness 
that is reflected in the number of their progeny. After one generation, the 
new global frequency 
P' = P' + cov(p;,q;)lq'. 
If the measure Si of a particular group's benefit, and thus growth factor 
104 Altruistically Inclined? 
then the change in global gene frequency can be decomposed into two 
terms, the first reflecting the effect of within group selection and the second 
the effect of between group selection. 
n n 
JJ.P = pi - P =:L «p; - p)(q;/:Lqm + cov(si,p)ls. 
i=! i 
The first term is a weighted average of the changes in group gene fre-
quencies (Pi I_p ), with the weights (q/I'iq/) reflecting the ex post size of 
the groups. Under the assumptions that the trait in question is group pos-
itive and individual negative, this term must be negative, reflecting the 
effect of within group selection. The second term, on the other hand, 
reflecting the effect of between group selection, may be positive. In this 
term s is a weighted average of the group growth coefficients, the weights 
(qJ'iq) reflecting the initial sizes of the groups: 
n n 
S = :Ls/qil:L q), 
i=! i=! 
and cov (si'p) is a weighted covariance, with the weights based on initial 
group sizes. 10 
This decomposition clearly separates the effect of within group selec-
tion (the first term) from that of between group selection (the second 
term). As the evolutionary biologist Steven Frank describes them, the 
Price equations are "an exact complete description of evolutionary change 
under all conditions" (Frank 1998, 13). If the gene is an altruistic one, the 
first term will be negative because in no group will the new gene frequency 
p/ exceed the initial frequency Pi' But if there is a sufficiently large covari-
ance between the group growth coefficients Si and the initial gene frequen-
cies Pi within the group, then the global frequency P of the gene may 
increase even if the frequency falls within every particular group. Hamil-
ton's model of kin selection (1964) can be interpreted as a special case of 
this more general model. 
Observed evolution toward lower virulence in pathogens, along with 
unbalanced sex ratios in certain arthropod species, provides strong prima 
facie evidence of the operation of group selection in nonhuman popula-
tions. Another design that would seem to have required selection above 
10. In calculating a weighted covariance, the means for both variables are also calcu-
lated as weighted averages, using the original sizes of the groups (qj) as weights. Thus the 
mean used for the group gene frequencies Pj is not the arithmetic average of the group means 
P but rather the weighted average, using group sizes qj as weights. This yields the global pop-
ulation gene frequency P as the appropriate mean. 
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the level of the individual is the system of sexual reproduction itself that 
prevails among mammals and many other plants and animals. ll John 
Maynard-Smith has emphasized that in order to outcompete partheno-
genetic organisms (those that produced by mitotic asexual reproduction), 
sexually reproducing organisms would have had to have possessed a 
twofold competitive advantage, because 100 percent of gene endowment 
can be passed on through the former mechanism, as opposed to only 50 
percent in diploid species (those that receive half their genetic complement 
from their mother and half from their father). Biologists have argued that 
a system of sexual reproduction provides the possibility of a greater reser-
voir of variability, but as Maynard-Smith observes, the advantages of 
greater plasticity (phenotypic variation) due to genetic recombination in 
sexually reproducing organisms appear to accrue at the group or species 
level, not at the individual level (1993, 202--4). 
Why would maintaining a greater reservoir of variability be beneficial 
to a species? Bacteria and viruses have life cycles orders of magnitude 
shorter than those of humans. Consequently, their rate of evolution is 
much faster, as evident in the moving target represented by the AIDS 
virus, or the rapid development and epidemic spread of new variants of 
flu. A large reservoir of variability means that a species maintains a more 
diversified portfolio of possibilities should a new pathogen attack. This is 
not the same as saying that sexual reproduction increases the directional 
rate of evolution through provision of a larger pool of variability. In con-
stantly reshuffling genes in response to new disease attacks, organisms are 
running as fast as they can just to stand still: thus the reference to the Red 
Queen (from Lewis Carroll's Alice in Wonderland) in the title of Matt Rid-
ley's 1993 treatment of the topic. 
But explanation of the evolutionary advantage enjoyed by sexually 
reproducing species, and its resistance to invasion by other strategies, is 
not the same as an account of the origin itself of this peculiar system of 
reproduction. Ridley and the biologists whose work he cites write some-
times as if they believe they have solved that challenge without appealing, 
implicitly or explicitly, to group selection in any form. But the literature 
Ridley summarizes offers an astute analysis of the maintenance of the sys-
tem. It is a functional analysis, not necessarily wrong, but on the other 
hand not necessarily providing much insight into phylogeny. Maynard-
Smith's concern remains: upon first appearance, a sexually reproducing 
variant of a species would have had to possess a twofold reproductive 
advantage over its parthenogenetically reproducing cousin in order to 
evolve without group selection, and the advantages of a greater reservoir 
11. This interpretation remains controversial. 
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of genetic variability would have accrued at the group or even the species 
level, not at the individual level. Some group selection would appear to 
have been necessary to allow sexually reproducing organisms to gain a 
foothold, even though today such selection may play no role in the main-
tenance of the system. 
The intense effort to avoid appeal to selection above the level of the 
individual organism (except for kin selection) misconstrues the message of 
a gene-centered view of evolution. We seek to identify those mechanisms 
that have permitted genes predisposing to certain behaviors or designs-
those that have survived-to have persisted and spread. Genes increase in 
frequency because they control or regulate designs or strategies that foster 
survival and propagation within a selection environment determined by 
other genes in the same organism, other living organisms of the same and 
other species, and inanimate features of the natural environment. 
When, in spite of repeated efforts to find plausible explanations for 
selection at the level of the individual organism or below, none is forth-
coming, consideration of a group level mechanism is appropriate. Evident 
in Ridley 1993 are the passion with which some scholars and writers are 
determined to avoid multilevel selection models, and their faith that it will 
be possible to do so. In light of the evident widespread preference for indi-
vidual level selection models, mirroring the appeal of rational choice 
approaches in the social sciences, I critically examine proposed individual 
level explanations for the origin of reciprocal relations among non-kin, 
such as that of Trivers, in chapters 3 and 4. 
Ideology and Levels of Selection 
With a few notable exceptions, in particular work by Gary Becker (1976, 
284, 294), Jack Hirshleifer (1977, 25; 1982, 30-33), and Paul Samuelson 
(1993), models of group selection have received little attention and are lit-
tle known within the economics profession. 12 Each of these authors favor-
ably considers group selection as a plausible explanation for some of the 
behavioral predispositions at issue here. But aside from these important 
contributions, there is very little on group selection in more than a century 
of economic discourse. 
In contrast, such models, and the theoretical possibility of multilevel 
selection, are well known among evolutionary biologists. Nevertheless, 
12. A search of the JSTOR archive, scanning the texts of thirteen major economicjour-
nals from 1890 to 1994, picked up only ten hits for the term group selection. Four of these 
were to works of the previously mentioned three authors, and a fifth was to an American Eco-
nomic Review piece by E. O. Wilson. The other hits involved use of the words group selection 
in different contexts. 
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throughout the late 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, group selection explanations 
served repeatedly among biologists as objects of derision, as examples of 
intellectual error, to be disdained just as thoroughly, but for different rea-
sons, as creationist fallacies. 13 The enthusiasm with which these approaches 
were rejected went beyond what can readily be accounted for on the basis 
of defects in their earlier formulations, and reflected an attitude of at the 
same time condescension and righteous triumphalism of those fighting the 
good fight to vanquish the forces of obscurantism and ignorance. 
Part of the distaste for such models seems to have been driven by a 
preference for methodological individualism combined with a belief that 
group selection approaches necessarily entailed its rejection. This view is 
false. Among biologists who have seriously entertained selection above 
family or kin units, and those who have not, there is no longer much dis-
agreement that what matters ultimately for natural selection are environ-
mental effects on gene frequency operating over time on phenotypic 
expression. Thus debate about the empirical importance of multilevel 
selection is not necessarily debate about the relevance of a "gene's eye" 
view of the world. 
That perspective actually poses a greater challenge to the rational 
choice emphasis on the individual organism as the only relevant unit of 
analysis than it does to the evolutionary model of group selection devel-
oped in this chapter. Again, that is because there is nothing to preclude 
genes adopting "devious" strategies that disadvantage their carriers but 
result in higher frequencies of such genes in the future. This is exactly what 
happened in the evolution toward less virulence of the myxoma virus. 
An example of rhetorical overkill is found in the work of Richard 
Dawkins, a writer whose writings have in other contexts been unfairly crit-
icized. 
As for group selection itself, my prejudice is that it has soaked up 
more theoretical ingenuity than its biological interest warrants. I am 
13. Equally controversial have been explanations invoking genetic drift. Drift can 
affect traits with relatively little reproductive significance: for example, variations in col-
oration providing little differential camouflage. Such traits are selectively neutral. Drift can 
occur in populations, initially identical in gene frequency, that have become separated. If the 
resulting groups are small, chance differences in the survival of particular organisms may 
cause a divergence in coloration among descendants of the two parts of the original popula-
tion. Random drift from this source may be augmented because in small samples heterozy-
gous individuals will not contribute alleles on a strict 50:50 basis. Drift can also be used to 
account for the evolution to fixation of a trait that is selectively disadvantageous, as did 
Wright in his model of group selection. Biologists are urged (e.g., Mayr 1983, 326) to adopt 
drift explanations only after all possible selectionist explanations have been explored and 
rejected. See also Gigerenzer et al. 1989 (154-57). 
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informed by the editor of a leading mathematics journal that he is 
continually plagued by ingenious papers purporting to have squared 
the circle. Something about the fact that this has proved to be impos-
sible is seen as an irresistible challenge by a certain type of intellectual 
dilettante. Perpetual motion machines have a similar fascination for 
some amateur inventors. The case of group selection is hardly analo-
gous: it has never been proved impossible and never could be. Neverthe-
less, I hope I may be forgiven for wondering whether part of group 
selection's enduring romantic appeal stems from the authoritative 
hammering the theory has received ever since Wynne-Edwards 
([1962] 1967) did us the valuable service of bringing it into the open. 
Anti-group selection has been embraced by the establishment as 
orthodox, and, as Maynard-Smith (1976) notes, "It is in the nature of 
science that once a position becomes orthodox it should be subjected 
to criticism ... " This is, no doubt, healthy, but Maynard-Smith dryly 
goes on: "It does not follow that, because a position is orthodox, it is 
wrong." (Dawkins 1982, 115; my italics) 
Dawkins has in this passage turned his considerable rhetorical skills, 
skills frequently deployed against creationists or, with more restraint, 
against punctuationists such as Stephen Jay Gould, against group selec-
tion. The rhetoric here is slippery, however, and casual readers are invited 
to draw precisely the analogy between efforts to demonstrate perpetual 
motion and defenses of the possibility of group level selection. If the case 
of group selection is "hardly analogous," why are the cases so carefully 
juxtaposed? And, one might respond to Maynard-Smith, simply because 
the claim that group selection is biologically unimportant is or was ortho-
dox does not imply that it is or was correct. 
Earlier in the book from which this passage is drawn Dawkins dis-
cusses "how we painfully struggled back, harassed by sniping from a 
Jesuitically sophisticated and dedicated neo-group selectionist rearguard, 
until we finally regained Darwin's ground" (Dawkins 1982,6). Again, this 
is slippery rhetoric, since Darwin explicitly recognized the possibility of 
selection at the group level as part of the explanation for certain features 
of human behavior. Evolutionary theorists commonly, and with some 
justification, portray themselves as heroic warriors against the obscuran-
tism reflected in various attempts to reinstate creationist alternatives to the 
theory of evolution. It has been easy for some to don the same rhetorical 
garb in countering an idea that, as Dawkins states, has never proved 
impossible and never could be, because it is not inconsistent with evolu-
tionary theory and indeed the gene's eye view that Dawkins advances. 
Whether or not it is a plausible explanation for a human behavioral 
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propensity depends, in part, on how it stacks up against alternate explana-
tions of the phenomenon. These are scientific, not ideological, questions. 
The same kind of remarks that Dawkins makes about papers on 
group selection might easily be applied to the enormous outpouring of 
work devoted to explaining the existence of nondefection behavior by 
strictly egoistic players in Prisoner's Dilemmas. That extraordinary effort 
within economics, political science, and psychology has illuminated much 
about the mechanisms sustaining mutuality and reciprocity when games 
are iterated. But it has come up dry with respect to why people would play 
cooperate in a one-shot PD or even why people would "coordinate" on a 
cooperative equilibrium in an indefinitely iterated game. This has not been 
for want of effort. 
In contrast, evolutionary theory provides a coherent account of how 
natural selection may benefit genes predisposing to certain behaviors 
through selection at levels other than the individual organism-and thus 
an evolutionarily consistent rationale for the persistence of a widespread, 
although not universal, tendency within humans to practice restraint on 
first strike. Organisms so predisposed may play cooperate in a one-shot 
PD, particularly if they are armed with an ability to forecast "trustworthi-
ness" from verbal and nonverbal cues (see chap. 5).14 What is important in 
these debates is the logical consistency of arguments and their evidential 
foundation, not the amount of effort that mayor not have been devoted to 
addressing the problem. 
In his controversial 1975 book Sociobiology Edward O. (E. 0.) Wil-
son identified the explanation of altruistic behavior as the central problem 
in evolutionary biology (Wilson 1975,20).15 It is also, arguably, the central 
14. The ability to make such forecasts in the one-shot simultaneous play game does not 
change the strict dominance of the defect strategy. But it might reduce somewhat the 
expected disadvantage of irrationally playing cooperate. A two stage sequential move variant 
of the one-shot PD, sometimes called the game of trust (Giith and Kliemt 1994), is suggested 
by some to be a more realistic way of modeling the "original state" (Mantzavinos 2001, 
133-34). In the first stage player 1 must either cooperate or defect. If player 1 defects, the 
game is over. If he cooperates, player 2 can either cooperate or defect. Player 1 does best if 
both cooperate but does worst if he cooperates and player 2 defects, a profile that, in turn, 
yields the highest payoff to player 2. Realizing that a rational player 2 will defect, player 1 
does so initially, leaving them both with lower payoffs than could be obtained under the 
cooperate-cooperate profile. Like the fixed and known duration simultaneous play game, this 
variant allows forecasts of counterparty behavior to become relevant in deciding how best to 
play. If you can accurately predict that your counterparty will irrationally play cooperate in 
the second stage, it can be rational for you to play cooperate in the first. But if you are ratio-
nal, and assume your counterparty is as well, you will never get to the second stage, any more 
than you will in the centipede game, to which this is closely related. 
15. By 1983, on the other hand, Wilson was of the opinion that the problem had largely 
been solved, due to theoretical and empirical work by Hamilton, Trivers, and Maynard-
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problem in modern social science. Although Wilson did not give much 
emphasis to group level selection (beyond kin selection) in his 1975 work, 
the consensus in evolutionary biology has changed in the last quarter cen-
tury, and E. O. Wilson, Williams, and others are today more circumspect 
in their evaluation of its empirical importance. E. O. Wilson is quoted, rel-
atively favorably, in the cover copy of Sober and D. S. Wilson 1998, and 
George Williams, whose 1966 book launched the attack on group selec-
tion, now recognizes evidence of unbalanced sex ratios as indicative of its 
operation (Williams 1992,49). 
Economists are largely unaware of these changes in the intellectual 
landscape-in some cases even unaware that group selection is a possibil-
ity within the framework of evolutionary theory. It is time to consider the 
import of the sophisticated restatement of the logic of multilevel selection 
as well as the biological evidence in support of it. Too often economists 
and rational choice theorists appealing to evolutionary theory have simply 
used it as a convenient means, when challenged, to provide a rationale for 
assuming strict behavioral egoism. The argument has been that assuming 
maximization of material self-interest as the key human motivation is 
justified by evolutionary theory and evidence: over eons, natural selection 
must have culled out all those who were not individual maximizers. Armen 
Alchian's 1950 Journal of Political Economy article, which derived profit 
maximization as a consequence of differential firm extinction, is often 
cited in support of this kind of reasoning. 
As the preceding discussion makes clear, this is too simplistic a read-
ing of the theory and evidence of evolution and their import for social sci-
ence. Whereas Alchian's argument may have some plausibility with 
respect to business firms, its applicability to individuals is questionable if 
the mechanisms of natural selection that have operated in human evolu-
tion differ from those we posit affect companies. Dawkins is right that a 
gene-centered view, and the related concept of inclusive fitness, implies 
that the traditional opposition between selection at the level of the indi-
vidual organism and at the group level poses alternatives poorly. But the 
question that always underlay that debate with respect to humans 
remains: what are our essential behavioral predispositions? Are we essen-
tially social, as Aristotle insisted, or is war of all against all (outside possi-
bly of family units) the default in the absence of government, as Hobbes 
suggested? 
Smith (Lumsden and Wilson 1983, 49). Whereas the Hamilton work stands up well as an 
explanation of altruism toward kin, subject to the predictive imperfections he himself recog-
nized, the Trivers model is much less than it seems as an explanation of origin of altruism 
toward non-kin. And Maynard-Smith's concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy, 
although useful in understanding stability, was not intended to explain origin. See chapter 3. 
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Although eschewing the Leviathan explanation of social order, econ-
omists have tended to embrace the Hobbesian assumptions about under-
lying human behavioral predispositions. Rational choice theorists have 
traditionally accounted for social order by identifying individual level 
forces that sustain it once established, believing incorrectly that in so 
doing they have thus adequately accounted for origin. 
In a celebrated passage in The Wealth of Nations Adam Smith 
observed that we do not depend on the benevolence of the butcher, the 
brewer, or the baker for our sustenance ([1776] 1937, 14). This passage, 
and the metaphor of the invisible hand of which it was part, describes 
mechanisms that sustain and maintain complex social organization. For 
Smith, origin was less of a concern in his second book. Unlike many mod-
ern rational choice theorists, he was quite comfortable assuming a range of 
human motivation (behavioral predispositions) extending beyond strict 
egoism, a range he had detailed in his earlier work The Theory of Moral 
Sentiments (1759 [1976]). 
In that work he described how mutuality could be fostered by "love, 
gratitude, from friendship, and esteem," in which case society "flourishes 
and is happy." In the immediately following passage, anticipating the con-
clusions of modern day game theorists and his emphasis in The Wealth of 
Nations, he also detailed how, in environments of indefinitely repeated 
interaction, mutuality could be sustained as the consequence of purely 
self-regarding motivations. 
Society may subsist, among different men, as among different mer-
chants, from a sense of its utility, without any mutual love or affec-
tion; and though no man should owe any obligation, or be bound in 
gratitude to any others, it may still be upheld by a mercenary 
exchange of good offices according to an agreed valuation. (Smith 
1759 [1976], 85-86) 
The Wealth of Nations addressed how interest maintains order, not 
what gives rise to it. Ifwe take seriously the likelihood that group selection 
was important sometime in our evolutionary history, we need to rethink 
foundational assumptions of economics, sociology, and the other social 
sciences. And, in ways that may not be immediately apparent, allowing for 
its likelihood can have a substantial impact on the tenor of conclusions 
arising from sociobiology/evolutionary psychology research. The implica-
tions of group selection cannot simply be pasted on to a set of positions 
developed under the understanding that its operation was impossible or 
unlikely. 
I argue, in that spirit, that the behavioral assumptions incorporated 
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in the standard economic model are at best incomplete and that the Aris-
totelian position-that we have essential predispositions facilitating socia-
bility beyond kin based groups-has more empirical validity. I begin with 
the claim that humans possess a widespread tendency to practice restraint 
on first strike and that the success of this trait cannot be accounted for by 
selection at the level of the individual organism alone. Ockham's razor, 
however, counsels that we should prefer simpler explanations to more 
complicated ones, and certainly models of individual level selection are 
simpler than the group selection mechanisms detailed earlier. Chapters 3 
and 4 therefore extend the discussion of whether there are satisfactory 
explanations of the origin of these predispositions consistent with the 
operation of selection at the level of the individual organism alone. 
Differential Role for Group Selection in Altruism toward 
Kin and Non-kin 
Before leaving Sober and Wilson and the intellectual battles they chroni-
cle, it is worth reflecting on the different intellectual fates of arguments 
regarding altruism toward kin and non-kin. Whereas the Hamilton kin 
selection mechanism is broadly accepted, arguments about altruism 
toward non-kin remain controversial. Like Hamilton, Sober and Wilson 
interpret the kin selection mechanism as an instance of group selection. 
They then proceed as if the phylogenies of altruism toward kin and altru-
ism toward non-kin are similar in all fundamental respects and as if what 
is necessary to persuade skeptics of the role of group selection in each is the 
same. Here I think they are mistaken. 
Certain behaviors expressed toward non-kin are indubitably altruistic 
(and not rational for egoistic self-interested agents) upon first appearance 
at low frequency. When established at high frequency, however, they may 
well be mutualistic (in the interest of both the actor and the group) as 
Adam Smith intuited. Such behaviors, established at high frequencies in a 
population, will comprise evolutionarily stable strategies in the sense that 
they are resistant to invasion by any other strategy. They will then be sus-
tained by frequency dependent selection, a mechanism that requires none 
of the apparatus associated with group selection.16 
16. Sober and Wilson have, I believe, erred in trying to interpret the frequency depen-
dent models of equilibrium maintenance developed by Maynard-Smith and Price as instances 
of group level selection, where the group is any pair of interacting individuals. In thinking 
about altruism toward non-kin, the role of group level selection is in accounting for a partic-
ular evolutionary trajectory, not, primarily, in maintenance of an equilibrium once estab-
lished. 
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Once we admit the possibility of frequency dependent selection, a 
strategy's altruistic character can depend in part on the frequency with 
which that and other strategies are expressed among other members of the 
relevant population. A trait that is indubitably altruistic at low frequency 
will, by definition, be driven to extinction by within group individual level 
selection. The same strategy, present at high enough frequencies, however, 
may enter a basin of attraction for an end state equilibrium in which it per-
sists at high frequency, an equilibrium that will return to the end state if 
shocked by a minor perturbation. 17 The phylogeny of the strategy can 
therefore entail a historical role for group selection in counteracting the 
negative within group selection encountered upon first appearance and 
allowing the strategy to attain a high enough frequency such that it can 
enter a basin of attraction in which group selection is no longer necessary 
for its maintenance. 
We are therefore able to distinguish between behavioral predisposi-
tions that require group level selection to increase in frequency in the first 
place and to be sustained at high frequencies and those that require group 
selection to spread upon initial appearance, but at high enough penetra-
tion no longer require it. We thus differentiate between a role for group 
selection in determining the evolutionary trajectory that drives a trait from 
initial appearance to high frequency or in the limit fixation and its role in 
maintaining a high frequency equilibrium once established. In particular 
one can distinguish among traits initially altruistic between those whose 
ultimate within group fitness is frequency dependent and those whose 
within group fitness is not frequency dependent. Traits in the latter cate-
gory (e.g., sacrifice for kin) are altruistic at the beginning, middle, and end 
of their trajectory. Traits in the former category (those involved in what is 
commonly called reciprocal altruism) can, at the end state of their evolu-
tionary trajectory, no longer be characterized as altruistic (they have 
become mutualistic), because they no longer impose a within group fitness 
disadvantage. 
Consider two archetypal examples: (a) a behavioral predisposition to 
sacrifice one's own fitness in order to improve the survival of offspring and 
(b) a package of traits involving refraining from first strike, retaliating if 
attacked, and punishing first strikes on third parties. Upon first appear-
ance at low frequencies in a population, both impose a within group fitness 
disadvantage on the actor but benefit at least one conspecific. Both, upon 
17. I do not mean to suggest that there is some final goal toward which evolutionary 
trajectories move. The terminology is intended more formally to draw a distinction between 
the study of evolutionary trajectories, which addresses origin, and maintenance of equilib-
rium, which addresses stability. 
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initial appearance, are thus altruistic from a genetic standpoint. Both will 
therefore require group selection (or the far more unlikely process of 
genetic drift) if they are to evolve to higher frequencies. 
But the willingness to sacrifice for offspring retains its within group 
fitness disadvantage throughout its evolution to what we will assume is 
close to fixation. It was altruistic upon first appearance and remains unam-
biguously so today. Frequency dependent selection within the group plays 
no role in its maintenance: the fitness disadvantage is completely indepen-
dent of whether the other parent or other parents possess the trait. 
Now consider the package of traits that underlies behavior toward 
non-kin. These traits are subject to within group frequency dependent 
selection. Although the predispositions impose a fitness disadvantage and 
are thus altruistic upon first appearance at low frequencies, the disadvan-
tage will decline as within group frequency rises. These traits initially 
require between group selection if they are to rise in frequency. But above 
a certain frequency, group selection may no longer be necessary to sustain 
them, because the traits, if exhibited within a group with a high enough 
frequency, no longer possess an individual level within group fitness dis-
advantage. They still benefit the group, but they no longer disadvantage 
the individual. 
Whereas the kin selection mechanism-which involves group level 
selection at the level of the family unit-has been relatively uncontrover-
sial among evolutionary biologists,18 the same has not been true for group 
selection explanations of altruistic behavior toward non-kin. The initial 
Maynard-Smith and Price work (1973) investigating restraints on 
intraspecific harm and subsequent development of the concept of an evo-
lutionarily stable strategy (ESS) explored the implications of frequency 
dependent selection in equilibrium maintenance. In their analysis group 
selection played no role. They analyzed the operation of the end state of a 
long evolutionary trajectory, one in whose early stages group level selec-
tion may well, however, have played an important role. Their great insight 
was to understand and explain how strategies that might benefit a group-
such as refraining from first strike-could be sustained in the absence of 
any selection at the group level. Initially, a number of theorists-perhaps 
even Maynard-Smith and Price themselves-believed mistakenly that this 
conclusion provided the explanation for the persistence and the emergence 
of altruistic behavior as the consequence of individual selection forces 
18. Its interpretation as an instance of group level selection has not been widely adver-
tised (perhaps due to the group selection controversies) or seriously disputed (it has, after all, 
been proposed by the originator of the mechanism). 
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alone. 19 But this is an error-again, the inverse genetic fallacy-that arises 
from confusing the explanation of forces that sustain an equilibrium with 
those responsible for the trajectory that led to it. 
In many ways analogous have been developments in iterated game 
theory. The "folk theorem" indicates, assuming indefinitely repeated inter-
action and sufficiently low discount rates, that a package of traits such as 
(b) can be sustained by rational choice provided it is once established, but 
the theorem leaves unanswered how that equilibrium from among a mul-
tiplicity is selected (Fudenberg and Tirole 1991, chap. 5). 
Within the language of the Price equations (see the preceding discus-
sion), we can posit that for traits subject to frequency dependent selection, 
there is, within each group, some critical level e, 0 < e < 1, such that if Pi> 
e, then p/ > Pi' This is a statement about the replicator dynamic-and 
indicates that if the within group frequency of the altruistic trait is above 
e, then the trait is no longer truly altruistic, since its frequency will grow or 
remain stable even within the group as a consequence of frequency depen-
dent selection. Once global frequency P > e, group selection will no longer 
be necessary to prevent P from falling or to enable it to grow.20 
Suppose one has a large population with pairs randomly interacting 
to play one-shot PDs. The fitness payoffs are as follows: cooperate-coop-
erate: 3,3; defect-defect: 1,1; cooperate-defect: 0,5; defect-cooperate: 5,0. 
Consider now the effect of frequency dependent selection on the fitness of 
cooperators and defectors. Let P = the frequency of cooperators. 
Fitness of Defectors: Wd = 1 (1 - p) + 5(P), 
Fitness of Cooperators: We = 0(1 - p) + 3(P). 
The fitness of both cooperators and defectors will rise with an 
increase in the frequency of cooperators . .But since the fitness of defectors 
19. Dawkins, for example, wrote the following comment: "there is a common miscon-
ception that cooperation within a group at a given level of organization must come about 
through selection between groups .... ESS theory provides a more parsimonious alternative" 
(1980, 360; cited in Sober and Wilson 1998,79). According to Maynard-Smith (1993), it is 
Dawkins who suffers from the misconception: ESS does not provide such an alternative 
because it addresses the stability of an outcome, not its origin. 
20. In his 1975 work, E. O. Wilson is acutely aware of the problem: "Granted a mech-
anism for sustaining reciprocal altruism, we are still left with the problem of how the behav-
ior gets started." He goes on to talk about a critical frequency above which altruist genes will 
spread as a result of frequency dependent selection, but is unable to explain how that critical 
frequency is attained initially, saying that this remains "unknown" (Wilson 1975, 120). It is 
simply not possible within an individual selectionist framework to provide such an account. 
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is greater at any frequency, as can be seen in figure 1, cooperators can 
never gain a foothold, and defectors will dominate the population. 
Now posit a slightly different strategy among the cooperators: call it 
cooperate*. In addition to cooperating in any pairing, they scan the hori-
zon and (at some cost to themselves) punish any defectors they see as well 
as any who fail to punish. One of these punishments is a minor annoyance 
(and imposes a minor fitness cost), but the total punishment costs received 
and fitness costs imposed will vary with the frequency of cooperators* and 
defectors in the population. The following equations assume that the cost 
to the punishee is triple that to the punisher, but the asymmetry is not crit-
ical to the analysis. Let p = the frequency of cooperators* and Wd * the 
fitness of defectors, now vulnerable to punishment. 
Fitness of Defectors: Wd* = 1(1 - p) + 5(p) - 3(P), 
Fitness of Cooperators*: We* = 0(1 - p) + 3(p) - 1(1-p). 
At low frequencies of cooperators* (high frequencies of defectors) the 
punishment tendency imposes substantial additional fitness costs on a 
cooperator* and is only a minor annoyance to a defector. But above a 
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erators* rises above that of defectors, and at any frequency above that e 
(in this case, 2/3), cooperation will evolve to fixation and be resistant to 
any invasion of (a small number) of defectors (see fig. 2). 
Below e, individual selection alone will consign cooperators* to 
extinction. Suppose, however, that group selection enables cooperators* 
to grow initially above e. If one then studies the mechanics of equilibrium 
maintenance in the end state, one will see no evidence of currently operat-
ing group level selection, even though the historical operation of such 
selection would be critical in providing an account of the phylogeny of the 
behavior. Explanation of origin may require different assumptions about 
levels of selection as compared with explanation of maintenance. 
In more complex models, P may not necessarily increase to 1 (evolve 
to fixation); there may be some 'I, e < l' < 1, at whichp/ = Pi' There will 
then exist a polymorphous equilibrium in which some actors with selfish 
predispositions, a minority, survive. 
It would be overly optimistic to expect this formulation to resolve the 
contentious and continuing disputes about the role of group selection. But 
it has the advantage of drawing attention to the distinctions between the 
modeling of evolutionary dynamics and the modeling of evolutionary sta-
bility. The most widely accepted examples of group selection-unbalanced 
sex ratios in arthropods, the evolution of virulence in pathogens, the will-
ingness of parents to sacrifice for offspring (see Sober and Wilson 1998, 
chap. 2)-all involve cases in which group selection is necessary not only 
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to account for the historical evolutionary trajectory but also to maintain 
the equilibrium end state. Within groups,p/ <Pi always holds. The special 
conditions that Sober and Wilson enumerate as hallmarks of group selec-
tion-separation into groups or demes for part of a life cycle, or for sev-
erallife cycles, combined with pooling of offspring and their re-formation 
in new or modified groups, in the context of a positive covariance between 
Pi and group growth rates, are clearly identifiable in each of these cases. In 
the second instance, for example, pathogens inhabit a host, within which 
they will replicate until the host dies and the offspring are pooled into the 
general population and subsequently compete in infecting new hosts. In 
the last instance offspring are raised in small separated family groups 
before dispersing into the general population and ultimately re-forming in 
family groups. 
When, in contrast, we examine predispositions controlling intra-
specific violence, the existence of such conditions today is not so apparent. 
Beyond families, humans are no longer organized in tightly knit groups 
with little interaction among them for sustained periods (although these 
conditions may have prevailed earlier in our evolutionary history). And, if 
we begin by considering restraint on first strike to be an altruistic act, it 
quickly becomes clear that, within complex social organizations, such 
behavior is not necessarily altruistic in the sense that it imposes a fitness 
disadvantage on the actor. Indeed, if a willingness to punish third party 
defectors is widespread, it may be first strike that imposes the negative 
fitness consequence. First-degree murder is currently punishable by death 
in a number of U.S. jurisdictions. 
Those skeptical of the evolutionary importance of group selection, 
such as Maynard-Smith or Williams in their earlier work, hold up with 
pride models elucidating how group beneficial but no longer altruistic (i.e., 
mutualistic) predispositions are maintained in the absence of any group 
level selection. Proponents of group selection insist correctly in asking 
how such (originally altruistic) predispositions could ever have survived 
upon first appearance at low frequencies in a population. The proposed 
resolution of these two positions is this. For a class of predispositions, in 
particular those involving altruistic behavior toward non-kin, frequencies 
rose initially through a process of group selection. The population is 
assumed to have divided into small groups (say, thirty to one hundred 
individuals) such that random assortment permitted some variation in the 
average phenotype of each group.21 As the result of a positive covariance 
of group growth rates with the frequency of the altruistic predisposition 
within each group, P increased, even though with initial frequencies in 
21. Group selection requires such variation, which will be larger the smaller the size of 
the group; assortative mating or an ability to recognize other altruists is not required for the 
model, although it will tend to strengthen the effect of group selection. 
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each group below e, p/ < Pi within each group. As global frequencies rose, 
first one and then several groups began crossing the threshold, with Pi > e, 
and consequently p/ > Pi' In groups with frequencies of the gene(s) above 
this critical level, there ceased to be a within group fitness penalty for the 
altruistic strategy: the strategy ceased to be strictly altruistic from a bio-
logical standpoint, although it continued to benefit the group. When the 
global population P attained this critical level, group selection no longer 
was necessary to prevent P from declining or to allow it to rise: like pro-
tective tariffs, it could now decline or fall by the wayside, and the predis-
positions originally altruistic-think industries no longer infant---could 
survive on their own as the result of frequency dependent selection at the 
individual level. 
Proponents of group selection, such as Sober and Wilson, have gone 
too far in suggesting that the neglect of group selection is always the result 
of what they call the "averaging fallacy": the tendency to look only at the 
overall effect of a behavioral tendency on genes predisposing to it without 
concern for the respective roles of group and individual level selection. The 
observation that a "cooperative" or group beneficial strategy can be sus-
tained in equilibrium in the absence of group selection is simply not an 
instance of this "fallacy." Group selection may play little or no role in the 
maintenance of this equilibrium (even though it may have played an essen-
tial role in evolution to the equilibrium). 
If we expand the strategy space, a population of cooperators* is not 
necessarily evolutionarily stable (see chap. 3). It could, for example, be 
invaded by those who refrained from third party punishment, which 
would make it vulnerable to invasion by defectors.22 Nevertheless, the for-
mulation proposed here has the advantage of preserving the intuition that 
there is something different about the mechanisms involved in kin selec-
tion-interpreted by Sober and Wilson (and Hamilton) as an instance of 
group selection-and those underlying reciprocity toward non-kin (both 
required group selection in their origination, whereas only the former 
exhibits it in its maintenance). It helps us appreciate the logic of the advice 
to Robert Trivers that he entitle his 1971 article "A Theory of Reciprocal 
Selfishness" (see chap. 3). And it helps us understand why Robert Frank is 
continually reduced to describing one and the same action as both selfish 
and altruistic (chap. 4)-the action may be altruistic in a biological sense 
in an asocial state, but gradually becomes consistent with selfishness 
(mutualistic) as global population frequencies of conspecifics following 
this strategy surpass e. 
22. Indeed, one would need to posit individuals who also punished those who didn't 
punish those who didn't punish, etc., in an infinite regress, to have a monomorphic popula-
tion entirely proof from invasion. 

CHAPTER 3 
Reciprocal Altruism, Norms, and 
Evolutionary Game Theory 
In complex social settings where people have established reputations they 
care about and where they may anticipate repeat engagements with their 
counterparties, most people most of the time play cooperate when finding 
themselves in PD-like situations. They do so without even thinking about 
whether this is the "smart" thing to do. In many instances such behavior 
turns out, ex post, to benefit the actor. Indeed, the very fact that such 
behavior later appears to have been "smart" or "intelligent" sometimes 
feeds skepticism that there is anything altruistic about the behavioral 
motivators that may underlie it. 
Grounds for such skepticism weaken, however, when we move to the 
laboratory and control experimentally for the expected amount of repeti-
tion. The altruistic origins of reciprocal behavior now become more dis-
cernible. In a one-shot PD, cooperation is always altruistic and can never 
be rational. Things are a bit more complex in a fixed and known duration 
game, in which the altruism of cooperative or contingently cooperative 
strategies may be frequency dependent. 1 Assuming counterparties are also 
rational, however, such strategies, as in the single play game, can never be 
rational. Alchian and Williams, both sophisticated students of rational 
choice, knew that their game was of fixed duration but began their one-
hundred-play interaction with rather different views of what was the 
"smart" thing to do. The explanatory challenge from an evolutionary 
standpoint remains one of accounting for how predispositions, such as 
that manifested by Williams on his first play, or by subjects who play 
cooperate in a one-shot PD, could have survived in an environment where 
they were not already widespread. 
A coherent explanation is that at critical points in our long evolution-
1. Another illustration of the concept: we may characterize as courageous advocacy of 
an idea or a view that, although shared by few, we believe to be true. The attribution of 
courage to the act of advocacy is inversely frequency dependent. In the limit, we attribute no 
courage at all to the advocacy of a view we believe to be true when such a view is already 
widely shared. Kuran's analysis of the phenomenon of preference falsification also makes use 
of this mechanism. 
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ary history, group selection permitted such predispositions to gain a 
foothold in populations, evolving through replica tor dynamics not neces-
sarily to the point of fixation but to a point of predominance within a poly-
morphous equilibrium that no longer depended on group selection for its 
maintenance. Thus, while much reciprocal interaction in modern society 
can be "rationalized" as mutually beneficial, supported by the cognitive 
modules we associate with logic, mathematical reasoning, and foraging 
behavior, a different set of modules favored by group selection remains in 
the background, a legacy of our evolutionary trajectory and a backstop in 
the event environments of repeated interaction cannot, or can no longer, 
be reasonably assumed. 
This chapter addresses the model of reciprocal altruism developed by 
Robert Trivers, the concept of social norms as commonly used in tradi-
tional sociology and anthropology, the definition of an evolutionarily sta-
ble strategy (ESS) as reflected in the work of John Maynard-Smith, and 
the experimental/theoretical contribution of Robert Axelrod. I conclude 
with a brief discussion of the similarities and differences between evolu-
tionary and economic models. Chapter 4 takes up the influential work of 
Robert Frank, one of the most ambitious recent attempts to blend eco-
nomic and evolutionary analysis. 
The Trivers Model of Reciprocal Altruism 
Among evolutionary biologists and psychologists the paradigmatic 
account of the origin and persistence of altruism toward non-kin is that 
provided by Robert Trivers's theory of reciprocal altruism (Trivers 1971; 
for a recent textbook treatment see Buss 1999, 253-55). Trivers's model 
explicitly eschews appeal to group level selection, but although it provides 
a plausible account of persistence (as does the standard game theoretic 
model assuming repeated and indefinite interaction that underlies it), it 
lacks an explanation consistent with individual level selection for the mak-
ing of initial grants, a precondition for establishment of a relationship of 
generalized reciprocity among previously unacquainted individuals. In 
other words, it does not adequately address the problem of origin. 
Trivers posits a drowning man who will die with .5 probability if no 
rescue is attempted. A rescuer can save the man with a .05 probability that 
both will die. Clearly, propensities to behave altruistically in such 
instances will be selected against by individual level selection, since those 
who do not rescue will have a slightly higher probability of survival and 
procreation. "Were this an isolated event, it is clear that the rescuer should 
not bother to save the drowning man. But if the drowning man recipro-
cates at some future time, and if the survival chances are then exactly 
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reversed, it will have been to the benefit of each participant to have risked 
his life for the other" (Trivers 1971, 36), True enough, but here Trivers 
falls prey, as do others, to the inverse genetic fallacy. Marveling at the 
mechanisms that sustain mutuality in an environment of repeated interac-
tion, he believes that in identifying these he has identified the mechanism 
responsible for origin. 
At the hypothetical first such encounter between unrelated and pre-
viously unacquainted individuals, the situation of attempting to rescue is 
analogous to refraining from first strike, even though the former is an act 
of commission and the latter one of omission. In both cases the action 
benefits the recipient at some risk to the grantor. And in both instances 
we have behavior that would be disadvantaged by individual level selec-
tion. Similarly, the explanation for why the initial recipient does not 
"cheat" (fail to reciprocate when the tables are turned) is that "Selection 
will discriminate against the cheater if cheating has later adverse affects 
[sic] on his life which outweigh the benefit of not reciprocating." Again, a 
defensible position-but one that represents a description of mechanisms 
that sustain an equilibrium, not those that may have been necessary to 
establish it. 
Explaining cooperation in one-shot Prisoner's Dilemmas always 
poses a problem for rational choice models or evolutionary analyses based 
on individual level selection. The play of cooperate is unambiguously 
altruistic and irrational, yet the cooperate-cooperate profile is the best of 
the three efficient outcomes for the players considered jointly. If one can 
transition to an environment in which repeated interaction, particularly 
indefinitely repeated interaction, can more reasonably be assumed, then 
interest, along with altruistic inclinations, can work together to sustain 
intercourse. But assuming one is in such an environment is not an adequate 
explanation of transition from one-time encounters. 
In discussing the Trivers model, Ken Binmore comes to the same con-
clusion. "Reciprocal altruism is about how equilibria in the Game of Life 
are sustained" (l998a, 185; his italics). The Trivers analysis is therefore 
mistakenly interpreted as an account of origin. But what does Binmore 
have to tell us about origin? As we saw in chapter 1 (n. 9), rather little. He 
insists, and rightly so, that we define the term rational precisely and having 
done so convincingly rejects argument after argument designed to demon-
strate that it is somehow "rational" to play cooperate in a one-shot PD 
game. He therefore reasons that "It is impossible for reciprocity to emerge 
in a one-shot game" and insists that we only concern ourselves in analyz-
ing the "Game of Life" with games that are indefinitely repeated: "If our 
Game of Life really were the one-shot Prisoner's Dilemma, we should 
never have evolved as social animals" (1998a, 10, 263). But since this 
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assumption of indefinite interaction is a large part of the description of 
what needs to be explained, this is no more a solution to the problem of 
origin than is the approach adopted by Trivers. In fact it is the same "solu-
tion," except that Binmore is more explicit about what he has and has not 
assumed. 2 
Once mutual relations and more complex social organization have 
been established, they can be sustained both by evolutionary mechanisms 
operating at the individual level and by the sort of cost-benefit calculations 
emphasized by economists: both point in the same direction. Yet absent 
that achievement, any expectation of reciprocity by the first rescuer must 
be a matter of blind faith, and so must it be by the second. 
Trivers indicates that one of the preconditions of his analysis of the 
emergence of reciprocal altruism among humans is "life in small, mutually 
dependent, stable, social groups" (1971, 45); his assumption is that this 
was a feature of Pleistocene existence. I would add that it probably also 
was of hominoid and anthropoid ancestors. But if groups of these fore-
runners extended in membership beyond immediate kin, we must inquire 
how continuing interaction could have emerged without the benefit of a 
propensity to play cooperate in one-shot interactions with non-kin, altru-
istic behavior that, by definition, would have been selected against by indi-
vidual level selection. 
If one strips away the biological examples, Trivers's analysis is simply 
an evolutionary variant of the myriad attempts by economists and politi-
cal scientists to explain the origin of cooperation without abandoning the 
egoistic assumptions common in rational choice theory. One is continually 
left with the puzzle of how one gets from the "asocial" to the "social" state. 
Trivers dismisses any possible role for group selection as "not consistent 
2. Within the framework of canonical game theory, the outcome we can interpret as 
consistent with reciprocal inclinations (cooperate-cooperate) cannot emerge in a one-shot 
PD game. But that is different from concluding that it cannot do so in actuality. Binmore 
casts doubt on many of the experimental results that show such emergence by arguing that 
subjects initially do not fully understand the game and that when thrust into unfamiliar 
experimental situations they carryover behavior that is the result of previous interactions in 
nonexperimental situations. With repetition and learning, he argues, they will eventually 
come to play according to Nash predictions. As we have seen, his view is not consistent with 
the sequence of plays in the very first PD pairing, that between the hardly naive Armen 
AIchian and John Williams. Is Binmore prepared to argue that he can successfully "debias" 
subjects who persist in playing cooperate in a single shot PD by pairing them with a succes-
sion of anonymous partners, so that they eventually "learn" the "correct" play? His position 
on these issues is completely consistent with his view that "insofar as true altruism is mean-
ingful in a biological context, it is discussed under the heading of kin selection" (1998a, 185). 
How does he know that truly altruistic acts, including passive altruism (failure to harm), let 
alone the admittedly rarer active assistance ofYad Vashem honorees, are restricted to that 
which can be accounted for under the heading of kin selection? 
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with the known workings of natural selection" (1971, 44), Although the 
statement is made with reference to the explanation of warning calls in 
birds, it is clearly intended to have more general applicability and as such 
is far too strong. Again, with respect to human reciprocal altruism, "no 
concept of group advantage is necessary to explain the function of human 
altruistic behavior" (48). Insofar as the statement refers to the mainte-
nance of reciprocal relations once established, it can be true, although one 
might object that the behavior is now mutualistic, not altruistic. Explana-
tion of maintenance is distinct from an account of origin, which requires 
unambiguously altruistic behavior. 
Why does the first rescue take place? One might argue that the rescue 
was made in error, that the rescuer mistook the drowning man for a close 
relative. But there is no suggestion in the 1971 article that this is a feature 
of the Trivers model. Were it to be a feature, one could surely argue that 
organisms less prone to such errors would have advantages in individual 
level competition, particularly where the process involves species that can 
be dangerous to each other, such as early hominids. And we are still left 
with the question of why the individual rescued does not simply "take the 
money and run" but rather is now differentially predisposed to recipro-
cate, should the tables be turned. 
The common hypothetical example used to illustrate the emergence 
of reciprocal altruism is of a bird afflicted with a disease-bearing tick. The 
bird can groom all parts of its body but its head. Clearly the species as a 
whole will be better off if propensities to groom con specifics spread. Seek-
ing to avoid appeal to group level selection, the Trivers model posits the 
spread of Tit-for-Tat playing birds, "after a few of them had gained a toe-
hold." How could such behavior ever gain a toehold, given the disadvan-
tages to the individual who first practiced it? 
The theory downplays the obstacles necessary for reciprocity to 
emerge by emphasizing that the cost to the grantor must be less than the 
benefit to the grantee. This is an example of the same strategy we will 
observe in the next section with respect to social norms. The emergence of 
altruism is made contingent on initial behaviors whose fitness cost is so rel-
atively small that we are tempted to ignore it. Once that step has been 
granted, of course, a chain of conclusions follows. And of course, once the 
reciprocal relation has been established, this condition will hold trivially, 
as it does for almost everything else the organism does. In reciprocity sus-
tained by mutual interest, the cost of expending energy will in almost all 
instances be less than the benefit enjoyed. Once established, the reciprocal 
relation becomes just an indirect means of obtaining the benefit, in the 
same way the United States uses foreign trade as a "machine" for turning 
grain into oil. 
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But if the reciprocity is just an indirect means of obtaining a benefit 
more valued than the cost expended, why do we call it reciprocal altruism? 
Why not reciprocal selfishness, wording suggested to but rejected by 
Trivers when he originally wrote the article (see also Hardin 1977, 14, in 
which the author proposes the term coupled egoism)? Ambiguity arises 
because, once we are in the realm of iterated games, the altruistic charac-
ter of contingently cooperative strategies depends on their frequency and 
that of other strategies in the general population. 
We cannot simultaneously describe an action as both altruistic and 
selfish, yet we find ourselves repeatedly drawn into this bind. The problem 
is that we are used to thinking of the character of an action, altruistic or 
not, as determinable through consideration of the action or strategy in iso-
lation. For some types of behavior, for example, sacrifice for kin, no 
difficulty arises from this habit of thought. But in considering relations 
among non-kin, it leads us into contradiction, because whether or not an 
action or strategy is altruistic may depend not only on the description of 
the strategy itself, but also on an environment composed of other organ-
isms and the strategies they are playing. 
The frequency dependent and thus ambiguously altruistic character 
of cooperative behavior among non-kin is reflected in E. O. Wilson's dis-
tinction between the "hard core" altruism of parental sacrifice for children 
and the soft core altruism of reciprocity (i.e., where there is expectation of 
reward) (Wilson 1978, chap. 7). A lack of precision remains, however, in 
Wilson's formulation: what exactly does the distinction between hard and 
soft mean in this case? The biological definition of altruism is quite precise, 
and a behavior in a particular context either does or does not satisfy it. 
Focusing on the frequency dependence of the altruistic character of a 
behavior can help resolve the ambiguity. 
Two armed men with fingers on triggers, each carrying quantities of 
cash, confront each other. In one sense, restraint on first strike is cheap: 
not pulling the trigger requires less energy than pulling it, and the benefit 
to the counterparty is large. On the other hand, if a delayed squeeze means 
the counterparty gets off a shot first, the cost of the grant may be fatal. 
Restraint is altruistic in low frequency environments, mutualistic where 
frequencies of similar strategies are high. Tooby and Cosmides's tentative 
exploration of the problem (1996) does not adequately address the evolu-
tionary hurdle faced by strategies of restraint, in part because it persists in 
understanding altruism to be limited to affirmative acts, not crediting the 
more empirically important form of failure to harm. 3 The most empirically 
3. Their observation about how relatively easy it is for evolution to produce means of 
disrupting another organism's existence, as opposed to actively benefiting it, only adds to the 
strength of this argument (Tooby and Cosmides 1996, 124--25). 
Reciprocal Altruism, Norms, and Evolutionary Game Theory 127 
important behavior in the category of cooperative plays in situations 
appropriately modeled as PDs may simply be not attacking. 
The Trivers theory is therefore less than it may initially appear to be. 
The idea that "I'll scratch your back if you'll scratch mine" seems at one 
level to be an account not only of why such cooperation is individually 
rational, and would be favored by individual level selection once widely 
established in a population, but also why it would be favored by the forces 
of individual level selection upon initial appearance in small numbers. But 
if matters were so simple there would be no issue or dilemma faced by 
players in a two stage Prisoner's Dilemma in which the choice at stage 1 is 
for player 1 to groom or not groom player 2 and at stage 2 for player 2 to 
groom or not groom player 1.4 The players would have no difficulty in 
reaching the Pareto efficient outcome best for them jointly. 
The problem, as economists repeatedly emphasize, is that of free rid-
ing. It pays player 2 to allow himself the luxury of being scratched (or 
groomed) without then expending the energy of reciprocating. Knowing 
this, it is not rational for player 1 to groom, and it is unlikely either will get 
groomed unless player 1 is willing to make a grant of first move(r) altruism 
and player 2 irrationally reciprocates. Both parties are of course worse off 
if there is no mutuality, but that is the essence of a Prisoner's Dilemma in 
the first place. 
It is hard to see how Trivers has overcome this difficulty. Emphasiz-
ing that the cost of granting the favor to the grantor must be less than the 
benefit to the grantee seems to lower the bar for such behavior to originate. 
But a cost is a cost, and at the individual level, selection should favor 
organisms that do not waste energy, even in activities that seem to cost lit-
tle. Trivers seems to be saying that we are more likely to see reciprocal 
behavior develop when each organism faces the following choice: if I pay 
$1 you will get $10, as opposed to a structure where each animal says, if! 
pay $10, you will get $1. But this is really a statement about a condition 
that obtains once the reciprocity equilibrium has been established. This 
condition must apply to any established relation of reciprocity sustained 
by individual level rationality or selection. It certainly applies in market 
exchange, where goods and services move from lower valued to higher val-
ued locations. No organism will thrive by spending $10 in energy to pro-
vide itself with $1 of benefits, whether it does so directly for itself or indi-
4. This sequential move version of the PD is sometimes refered to as the game of trust. 
Formally, if the first player chooses not to groom, the game ends. If she grooms, then the 
game moves to the second stage, where the second player has a choice of grooming or not 
grooming. Grooming is an instance of first move(r) altruism because it provides the second 
player with the option of earning the highest return, at the cost of exposing the first player to 
the risk of the worst return. 
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rectly through some form of reciprocal relationship such as trade or non-
simultaneous exchange. 
Perhaps we should understand Trivers's argument as an attempt to 
explain where, among different possible loci, we are most likely to see re-
ciprocal relations originate. Here there may be some traction. lfpeople or 
organisms are going to sacrifice in favor of others, it is plausible that they 
are more likely, on average, to do so under circumstances where the costs 
to them are relatively low and the benefits to the target relatively high. 
Thus we would predict that "heroes" would be more likely to risk their 
own lives to save that of a drowning person than to obtain an additional 
pencil for someone in need of a writing instrument to complete a cross-
word puzzle. Indeed, we could imagine the recipient of such "largesse" in 
the latter case berating the donor for his or her foolhardiness. 
But the fundamental problem on the table is not how to account for 
the differential geographical or situational incidence of such acts. It is to 
explain why any such behavior occurs. Nash equilibrium analysis predicts 
that no one should cooperate in a one-shot or fixed and known duration 
PD, that voluntary contributions to public goods should be zero. The 
irreducible fact is that in the initial rescue attempt, the rescuer expends $1 
to get nothing. It does no good to point out that perhaps he will get $10 
down the road. Since this individual is illustrating by his very action the 
possibility that a drowning person might expect with some positive prob-
ability to be rescued by someone for whom the now water challenged 
individual has provided no prior favors, and since logic and the analysis of 
individual level selection lead to the conclusion that it is in the interest of 
the rescued party to accept the rescue and then not to reciprocate, it is 
hard to see how the rational rescuer can make any reasonable conclusion 
other than that the cost and risk of the rescue are a pure grant, unlikely to 
change in any way the subjective probability that he will be rescued were 
he similarly distressed in the future. And, to switch back to an evolution-
ary perspective, it is hard to see how such grant making behavior could be 
favored by the forces of individual level selection upon initial appearance 
at low frequencies. 
We are back to the "Yossarian" problem. Yossarian doesn't want to 
fly bombing missions because of his reasonable concern that he might be 
killed. When asked what would be the consequence if everyone felt that 
way, his reply is that he'd be a damn fool to feel any differently.5 
Zoologists have objected to Trivers's theory on the grounds that re-
ciprocal altruism is rare in the animal kingdom: vampire bats, which share 
5. The reference is to the protagonist in Joseph Heller's novel Catch 22 ([1961]1995). 
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regurgitated blood among each other, are a prime but exceptional exam-
ple, This objection arises in part because of the implicit restriction of "re-
ciprocal altruism" to behaviors involving affirmative assistance. If we take 
into account the more widespread phenomenon of failure to harm, the 
existence in many animal species of restraints on intraspecific violence 
indicates that the phenomenon is more important than has been recog-
nized, even in nonhuman species. 
What makes human behavior distinctive in this regard is the cou-
pling of failure to harm altruism with an important, albeit weaker, pre-
disposition to make affirmative grants to non-kin, rare elsewhere in the 
animal kingdom. The development of both types of altruism required the 
evolutionary favoring of a whole range of specialized brain subsystems 
that permit the systematic rejection of the counsel of logic and mathe-
matical reasoning. Some of these subsystems, particularly those restrain-
ing intraspecific violence, most probably predate the evolution of an 
expanded cerebral cortex that now allows us to be decent logicians and 
mathematicians.6 
Grants of first move(r) altruism, retaliation when costs have already 
been sunk, punishing third party defectors: none of these can easily be 
shown to have a rational foundation when practiced in asocial environ-
ments (in economic terms, those lacking the expectation of indefinitely 
repeated interaction; in evolutionary terms, those lacking high frequencies 
of similarly predisposed organisms). Yet, when attacked by someone they 
have never seen before and are unlikely to see again, many people reject 
the counsel of reason and respond in kind, even though the ex ante will-
ingness to strike back has clearly failed to deter the initial attack and the 
retaliation may invite another round of aggression. Rapists, muggers, and 
military strategists may try to subdue their counterparty with an over-
whelming show of force. In doing so, they appeal to their victims' ratio-
nality to get them to submit. The response of the individual under attack 
reflects the outcome of a war between the counsel of different cognitive 
modules. 
6. Both paleontological evidence charting the growth of cranial capacity and the fact 
that our closest animal relatives have smaller skulls and lack these latter capabilities suggest 
that they are of relatively recent evolutionary origin (no chimpanzee has come close to solv-
ing Fermat's Last Theorem). At the same time, both of our chimpanzee relatives-Pan 
troglodytes and Pan paniscus-live socially in troops of between thirty and one hundred, 
making it very likely that our common ancestor six million years ago did so as well. Thus the 
inference that the predispositions enabling our social existence predate the refinement of cog-
nitive abilities we generally see as underlying rational choice by humans. See chapter 5 for 
further discussion. 
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The behaviors listed at the start of the last paragraph generally 
impose a fitness cost on the individual conducting them, although they 
may benefit others. They are either unambiguously altruistic in a biologi-
cal sense or are likely to be altruistic in environments where manifested at 
low frequency. Consequently, evolutionary mechanisms cannot allow 
them to spread if the possibility of multilevel selection is excluded. 
Trivers's apparent individual level selection solution to one of the most 
vexing problems in evolutionary biology-and social science-is a mirage. 
Reciprocal Altruism and International Law 
The solution proposed here is that natural selection operating at the 
group as well as the individual level has endowed most of us with predis-
positions to act, in certain domains, in biologically altruistic ways, pre-
dispositions mirrored in certain universal features of human culture. 
Whereas most social scientists accept at least parts of this argument inso-
far as it applies to relations among kin, skepticism reigns in regard to its 
applicability to relations among non-kin. The difference is partly attrib-
utable, I have suggested, to the frequency dependence of the altruistic 
character of cooperative behavior in the latter case, a dependence that is 
poorly understood. 
Consider another "Prisoner's Dilemma." What should an army do 
with captured soldiers? Prisoners of war are expensive to feed and guard, 
and if allowed to escape represent additions to an enemy force that may 
contribute in the future to harming one's own soldiers. Failure to exe-
cute represents a grant of first move(r) altruism with potential fatal con-
sequences for the grantor. The commander faced with this life and death 
choice is in a situation remarkably analogous to Trivers's man on the 
riverbank. At some small cost to himself and his troops (risk that the 
captured soldiers will escape and wreak violence on the releaser's forces, 
costs of feeding and guarding captives) he may confer a large benefit 
(life) on the POWs. One can argue that it is efficient for all armies not to 
execute, but the first commander to adopt such a policy has no reason, 
from a strictly self-interest standpoint, for supposing that others will 
reciprocate. 
The conventional wisdom has been that a more liberal attitude 
toward POWs reflects the gradual progress of civilization and culture. But 
given the logic that apparently favors execution, we need to ask how con-
ventions regarding the "humane" treatment of POWs and the "humane" 
conduct of war ever became established. Sir Henry Maine's classic 1888 
treatment of the subject is still worth reading. He observes that it cannot 
be because a world government legislated these rules (thus the Hobbesian 
Reciprocal Altruism, Norms, and Evolutionary Game Theory 131 
solution cannot apply). Legislatures, he points out, are relatively modern 
and in any event played little role in the evolution of international law. 
In truth, far the most influential cause of the extension of particular 
laws and of particular systems of law over new areas was the approval 
of them by literate classes, by clergymen and lawyers, and the acqui-
escence of the rest of the community in the opinions of these classes. 
When then we are asked by what legislative authority International 
Law came to be adopted so as to make it binding on particular com-
munities, we should rejoin that the same question must first be put 
respecting the extension of Roman Law and of every other system of 
law which, before the era of legislatures, gave proof of possessing the 
same power of propagation. (Maine 1888, 19) 
Rules mandating the humane treatment of captured soldiers appear 
to have achieved a similar resonance among opinion leaders in different 
states. The question now becomes whether this was just coincidental. 
Aware of these remarkable commonalities, jurists often mystified them 
with reference to natural law, by which they usually meant that the shared 
mentalities that led to the widespread resonance of "appropriate" rules 
were of divine origin. 
If our modern sensibilities lead us to reject divine inspiration as the 
explanation for this resonance, the phenomenon perceptive observers such 
as Maine were addressing is nevertheless one that needs explanation. My 
argument is that differential receptivity to norms that are more or less uni-
versal in human cultures is influenced by hardwired predispositions in 
much the same way as receptivity to learning language is hardwired (see 
chap. 5). The basic predispositions that give rise to holding rather than 
executing prisoners are those that give rise to cooperative behavior in one-
shot PDs. 
The anthropologist Robin Fox argues similarly, in discussing ritual-
ized restraints on violence. 
These rules and regulations ... are the labels that speaking men use 
for the kinds of behaviors that nonspeaking men would have indulged 
in anyway .... even nonlanguage men did not fight without rules .... 
These may not have been explicit, but they existed; and when he came 
to speak and to symbolize he gave them expression. In other words, 
the rules of fighting are as natural as the fighting itself. (Fox 1989, 145) 
In most instances war is not unrestrained, goalless violence. And 
when it does involve the mobilization of aggressive impulses in support of 
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attacks on out-groups, one can argue that the predispositions appealed to 
are closely related to those involved in the maintenance of social order 
through the punishment of those violating internal rules. 7 
If these arguments are correct, we should not necessarily see a linear 
trend over time favoring more humane treatment. And in fact, we lack 
clear evidence that the Geneva conventions, for example, have been asso-
ciated with a reduction in the frequency with which prisoners of war are 
killed or mistreated. POWs were slaughtered prior to its passage and con-
tinue to be slaughtered, even by signatories, subsequent to it (Schaller, 
Scharf, and Schulzinger 1998, 77). These events are today generally per-
ceived as atrocities, except perhaps by those who perform them, but the 
record preconvention was not one of unmitigated barbarity, any more 
than postconvention has been marked by its absence. In many respects, 
the twentieth century has been not only bloodier than, but at least as 
marked by atrocities as, the nineteenth, particularly if we begin the nine-
teenth century in 1815 and end it in 1914. Maine quotes the Swiss jurist 
Vattel, writing well before the first Geneva convention, that "what struck 
him most in the wars of his day was their extreme gentleness" (1888, 24). 
In suggesting that conventions regarding the treatment of prisoners 
represent the codification of a "natural law" in the sense that they are con-
sistent with and reinforce hardwired predispositions, one must proceed 
with caution. Many practices such as toleration of slavery have been ratio-
nalized and defended over the years using similar language. The argument 
here is simply that a human willingness to ascribe to and act in accordance 
with certain more or less universal "norms"---codifying norms in the lan-
guage of chapter I-has a biological determinant, in the sense that we are 
differentially prepared to accept, live by, or promulgate such behavioral 
rules. This argument is anticipated by Aristotle, who, as Dennis Wrong 
observes, "carefully distinguished between 'natural' social relations and 
those created by 'law and custom,' devoting considerable effort, notably in 
his discussion of slavery, to deciding which was which" (Wrong 1994, 2). 
The outcome of that "considerable effort," nevertheless, was that 
Aristotle ended up endorsing slavery as natural, indicating how delicately 
this kind of argument must be used. Toleration of slavery is today widely 
viewed as culturally variable, and there is overwhelming evidence to sug-
gest that its practice is diminished in comparison to its prevalence as 
recently as two centuries ago. Involuntary servitude does, it is true, persist 
in parts of Asia and Africa. But it is not legally recognized, and few would 
claim that the overall incidence of slavery is near what it was in the heyday 
of the Atlantic slave trade and legally sanctioned systems in North and 
South America. 
7. Genocide can be thought of as the metastasis of these tendencies. 
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Social Norms 
Historical evidence of gallantry in war and the informal development of 
conventions governing treatment of prisoners, even amid the chaos and 
organized violence of armed conflict, offer observational evidence in favor 
of the existence of a hardwired PD solution module. War involves extremes 
of both cooperation and conflict: its conduct would not be possible in the 
absence of such a module, nor would be the ability to wage peace. 
Influential traditions in sociology, anthropology, and certain 
branches of psychology and political theory, however, maintain that 
human behavioral predispositions toward cooperation are the exclusive 
product of culture: we are born into the world as "savages," and it takes 
the combined efforts of such institutions as family, school, and religion to 
impart a veneer of civilization to our innate asocial and violent impulses. 
But how, if we are essentially as so described, did complex organization, 
which at least the latter two of these institutions presuppose, ever come 
into existence? 
Altruistic behaviors, whether they be forgoing the advantage of first 
strike or more affirmative action, such as risking one's life to defend a 
group or save a drowning man, are definitionally at risk from the forces of 
individual selection and are not rational, as that term has been defined 
here. Recognizing this, traditional sociologists and anthropologists devel-
oped the concept of social norms to explain how "society" rewarded and 
punished certain behaviors in general depending on whether they were 
group positive or group negative. James Coleman, for example, equates 
culture with social norms that "mandate action that is not in one's own 
interest, or proscribe behavior that is" (DiMaggio 1995, 29; Coleman 
1990). Thus, the explanation for why people might act in a way that did 
not necessarily benefit them individually is that they are encouraged to do 
so or constrained to do so by social norms. 
Norms do not have an ethereal existence, independent of the individ-
uals whose behavior they regulate. This is true both of universal norms 
and those more culturally variable. But whereas culturally variable norms 
support behavior that many might privately want changed (see Kuran 
1995), universal or codifying norms are not affected by this tension. They 
can be seen as articulated descriptions of behavioral predispositions 
widely manifested. But how did such predispositions survive the forces of 
natural selection and become widespread? 
Whether or not adherence to norms imposes a fitness disadvantage 
from selection forces at the individual level depends on the frequency of 
such adherence in the population. If frequency is low, then adherence to a 
promulgated norm is altruistic. Since adherence to norms, upon initial 
articulation or promulgation, is likely disadvantaged by the same evolu-
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tionary forces that militate against more life-threatening altruistic behav-
ior in the first place, sociologists and anthropologists who appeal to them 
are no closer to an explanation of how such behavior originated than is 
Trivers. 
A number of authors, including Sober and Wilson (1998, 143-45), 
distinguish between primary altruistic behaviors, such as risking one's life 
to defuse a threat that jeopardizes an entire group, and secondary behav-
iors that may reinforce or support such efforts. Primary behaviors, under-
stood to be those that often involve a significant decrease in the probabil-
ity of an individual's survival or procreation, can be favored in the 
aggregate if the between group selection in favor of them more than coun-
terbalances the within group selection against them (see chap. 2). The lat-
ter, however, may represent a very substantial barrier that group selection 
must overcome if altruism is to emerge and persist. At low frequency, 
adhering to secondary norms, however, would also involve a negative 
impact on relative fitness at the individual level, albeit one that is generally 
smaller. In economic language, adherence to social norms, regardless of 
whether they are primary or secondary, is likely to involve some reduction 
in the relative welfare of the individual undertaking it. 
A decision to shun a transgressor against a third party, for example, 
may preclude what might otherwise have been profitable opportunities for 
exchange. Supporting the widow and children of a dead "hero" in accord 
with a group norm will involve some individual sacrifice of resources. 
From an evolutionary perspective emphasizing individual level selection 
alone, social norms can never be the complete explanation for the origin 
and persistence of primary behaviors for two reasons: first, because 
although they may reduce somewhat they are unlikely in practice to elimi-
nate entirely the disadvantage associated with such behaviors; and second, 
because the individual evolutionary incentives that militate against behav-
ing in accord with norms would have obstructed their spread or evolution 
to higher frequency. One should not minimize the degree to which adher-
ence to secondary as well as primary norms will be evolutionarily disad-
vantaged, if such adherence is practiced in an environment in which a pre-
disposition to do so is low. Particularly at low frequency, adherence to 
norms is altruistic behavior writ small. As economists have noted, behav-
iors that promote public goods are themselves public goods. 
Positing norms that punish those who don't punish (or punish those 
who don't reward) is not a solution to the problem of origin, since adher-
ence to secondary norms must also overcome the initial incentives against 
adhering to them. Proceeding down this route invites an infinite regress 
(norms to punish those who do not punish those who do not punish ... ). 
Secondary or even tertiary norms can be descriptively relevant for under-
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standing how end state equilibria are sustained by frequency dependent 
selection, but positing them does not effectively deal with the problem of 
origination within a framework that limits selection to the level of the indi-
vidual organism alone (Boyd and Richerson 1985, 229-30), 
In general, the pursuit of such explanations is reflective of a particu-
lar strategy to resolve the conflict between, on the one hand, defining altru-
istic action as behavior that benefits another con specific at the expense of 
the actor and, on the other hand, insisting that the origin and persistence 
of propensities favoring such behavior be favored only by individual level 
selection, The strategy involves making more costly altruistic behaviors 
depend on behaviors with smaller fitness costs until one has reached a 
behavior whose fitness cost seems so small that a bit of intellectual sleight 
of hand makes it apparently disappear, This is precisely the mechanism 
Binmore attempts to use in justifying the transition from one-shot games 
to games involving indefinite repetition (1994,120,124-25), But no matter 
how small the fitness cost, if the behavior is indeed altruistic, it cannot, by 
definition, be favored by individual level selection. 
The most significant benefit that an organism can give another may 
simply be not to attack it. This confers large fitness benefits on the receiver 
but may expose the acting organism to substantial risk. Unless one can get 
beyond that, it is not worth talking about the logic of sacrificing for the 
group, let alone norms that might support such behavior, The analysis of 
secondary norms presupposes cohesive and persistent groups whose exis-
tence is logically prior as an object of explanation. The elucidation of 
mechanisms that sustain complex social organization once established is 
not the same as the provision of a coherent account of origin. 
Kuran's work (1995) discusses how maladaptive (inefficient) norms 
may solidify and persist and how individuals who suffer from them may 
find it rational to participate in the perpetuation of their own oppression. 
His definition of rationality, broader than that used in defining the stan-
dard economic model, distinguishes between the utility individuals get 
from speaking their minds and the disutility they get from articulating an 
unpopular position. Critical to his analysis is the idea that expected public 
opinion may differ from average (true) private opinion, that the former 
will typically be estimated from past observations, and thus that past his-
tory can produce a lock-in on norms that a majority of the affected popu-
lace might actually like changed. 
Kuran's analysis is a significant contribution to our understanding of 
the mechanisms whereby cultural and institutional variation originates 
and persists. My analysis in this book is principally directed at a subset of 
norms, those common to all known human societies. In his language they 
can be understood as those in which there is in fact no divergence between 
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private and public opinion. My explanation both for this lack of diver-
gence and for the universality of these norms is that we are differentially 
prepared-hardwired-to find these norms reasonable or appealing. 
Unlike the particular pattern of cultural and institutional variation, which 
can be seen in part as the result of accidents within the time span of 
recorded history, the existence of universal norms appeals to historical 
forces at a much earlier phase: those that determined the evolutionary tra-
jectory giving rise to the human genotype. 
The origin of the fundamental behavior that codifying social norms 
are designed to account for, behavior that presupposes a willingness of 
individuals to abide by them even when so doing does not advance their 
material and/or reproductive interest, cannot be fully accounted for either 
within the standard economic model as the outcome of the interactions of 
purely egoistic agents or, within an evolutionary framework, as the result 
of selection at the level of the individual organism alone. Nevertheless, the 
phenomena that the concept of norms attempts to illuminate/explain are, 
indeed, real and important. 
A number of scholars, some of whose work is described in this and the 
next chapter, have attempted to bridge the divide between sociology and 
economics by considering the implications of evolutionary processes. But, 
following the conventional wisdom in biology, and almost to an individ-
ual, these thinkers have taken it as a given that natural selection can take 
place only at the level of the individual organism. The assumption clearly 
makes it impossible for any form of hardwired altruistic predispositions to 
evolve from initial appearance at low frequency. 
The analysis developed in this book offers an opportunity to preserve 
the principle of methodological individualism and at the same time account 
for some of the phenomena that sociologists, anthropologists, and experi-
mentalists have documented and explored. But it does so at the cost of 
rejecting strictly self-regarding egoistic preferences. It is a sociobiological 
model, but one capable of accounting for a range of behavior anomalous 
within the rational choice tradition. It is also a methodologically individu-
alist model. Adhering to methodological individualism, in other words, does 
not require assuming that individuals are strictly individualistic. 
Accounting for Universal Human Norms 
If norms are not the explanation for human altruism and the complex 
social organization it permits, what do they represent? To the degree they 
are more or less universal, they are simply words we give to the codification 
and reinforcement of essential human tendencies. Why would one need 
words for them, beyond describing them, if the tendencies are essential? 
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For three reasons, First, the predispositions may not have evolved to 
fixation (deviant tendencies may subsist at stable levels). Second, these 
programmed tendencies may need to be evoked by environmental cues 
and run the risk of being extinguished or weakened in their absence-or in 
the presence of different ones. Finally, even though powerful predisposi-
tions may override the counsel of reason and logic on a systematic and pre-
dictable basis, individual humans are free to choose and to overrule in the 
opposite direction. Thus sexual relations among children reared together 
and murder within established groups both indubitably occur, although 
the rates are minuscule in comparison with the opportunities presented for 
such behavior. That these actions sometimes do occur is neither evidence 
against the existence of powerful innate predispositions militating against 
them nor evidence confirming the role of cultural norms as the exclusive 
explanation for why such "deviance" is not more widespread. 
On the other hand, as Edgerton reminds us vividly in Sick Societies 
(1992), some norms do vary cross-culturally (as does the content, but not 
the deep structural grammar, oflanguage). That variation has been widely 
documented by anthropologists and catalogued in the Human Relations 
Area Files (see Sober and Wilson 1998, chap. 5). Norms differ, and these 
differences have consequences because norms may be both maladaptive 
and persisting. This variation occurs within limits, nevertheless, reflecting 
evolutionary pressures that have placed a premium on addressing recur-
ring environmental challenges over millions of years. As obvious examples 
of these limits, no society has a norm sanctioning matricide by young chil-
dren or mandating that men drive on the right, women on the left (Field 
1984). 
From an evolutionary perspective, the central task is explaining what 
is universal about human norms. 8 These include, inter alia, articulated 
standards of obligations toward kin; restraints on harming other members 
of one's group; and in general, some version of the categorical imperative 
regulating reciprocal relations among non-kin.9 We can take this subset of 
norms as codifying what is essentially human. Since these norms are uni-
versal, they play no role in accounting for cultural variation. 
8. Similarly, the evolutionary challenge in linguistics is to explain what is universal 
about human language acquisition, not the particulars of different languages. 
9. For example, a version of the golden rule is common to the normative belief systems 
of virtually all cultures. A few instances: Kant's categorical imperative is presaged in Chris-
tian ethics ("In everything, do to others what you would have them do to you"-Matt. 7:12) 
and, in reverse chronological order, in writings by the Jewish spiritual leader Hillel, the Greek 
philosophers Aristotle and Plato, and the Chinese philosopher Confucius (Poundstone 1992, 
123). On support for ethical universals among anthropologists, see Edgerton 1992 (35). Clyde 
Kluckholm, a cultural relativist for much of his career, endorsed the idea of cultural univer-
sals in 1955 (Kluckholm 1955). 
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The explanation of norms that do vary, and consequently may have 
independent consequences, is an important but subsidiary issue, the prin-
cipal subject matters of cultural anthropology and the comparative and 
historical study of political, legal, and economic systems. It is possible that 
such variation has been influenced by specialized algorithms: hardwired 
rules that do not determine behavior or culture but canalize learning in 
certain directions depending on the particular environmental conditions 
encountered. Because I endorse the possibility of persisting maladaptive 
(inefficient) institutions, however, I think this mechanism, which seeks a 
microlevel cognitive foundation for the conclusions of structural function-
alism, is weaker than its proponents suggest (see Lumsden and Wilson 
1981). Instead, we need explicitly to acknowledge accidents of history in 
determining cultural variation. 
Within evolutionarily determined limits, an idiosyncratic component 
of culture remains, even after taking account of what can be attributed to 
hardwired behavioral predispositions or differential learning receptivities 
interacting with regional environments. The causes of such idiosyncrasies 
are historical and case specific (path dependent), and consequences for 
social and economic performance can be real. For norms that are univer-
sal, however, reflecting common human behavioral propensities, we need 
to adopt a somewhat different strategy. Their explanation is also histori-
cal, but in a more explicitly Darwinian sense, and the relevant periods of 
historical time are orders of magnitude longer. 
The characteristics of this universal component of human culture 
reflected in universal norms have been determined by the same influences 
that wrote the rules of universal grammar or delineated the universal blue-
print of the human anatomy. Over thousands of generations of prehistory, 
natural selection favored designs that led organisms based on them to 
experience greater reproductive success, because such designs were well 
suited to deal with recurrent features of the natural environment. The 
impact of current environmental conditions on design is vanishingly small, 
although, because there is also some continuity between contemporary 
conditions and those of human prehistory, much of our design continues 
to be adaptive. 
My claim is that a tendency to practice first move(r) altruism toward 
humans outside of the immediate kin group is part of universal human cul-
ture, and that it evolved because groups with high frequencies ofindividu-
als with such propensities tended to grow more rapidly. They did so 
because they were more successful at coordinated foraging as well as coor-
dinated defense (preemptive or otherwise) against other groups and 
because such groups suffered less from internal conflict. All of these fac-
tors contributed to greater reproductive success relative to other groups. 
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Within each group, however, individuals with propensities to display 
this behavior lost out, in the sense that their relative fitness within each 
group was 10wer.1O The inexorable tendency for such within group selec-
tion to eliminate the propensity within each and every group was defeated 
by intergroup migration or population exchange combined with periodic 
group combination and splintering. Hamilton (1975) suggested that con-
ditions likely prevalent in the middle to late Pleistocene were particularly 
favorable for the operation of group level selection. These conditions 
included small groups, partly isolated from each other, that tended, never-
theless, to practice exogamy (exchanging mates with neighboring groups). 
The importance of continuing genetic exchange, even after the exit from 
Africa 100,000-120,000 years ago, is consistent with morphological simi-
larities in Homo erectus fossils from Asia and Africa. 
Evolutionary Game Theory 
It is tempting to take for granted the social environment that provides the 
background to everyday life and, in ways sometimes unrecognized, condi-
tions expectations of the behaviors of others. It is fallacious, however, to 
conclude that because certain behaviors are rational for egoistic actors 
conditional on that background, it therefore follows that the collective 
behavior that ensues must have been predictable ex ante as the result of 
rational action of strictly egoistic individuals. This kind of reasoning 
unjustifiably mixes normative and descriptive game theory, to use Rein-
hard Selten's (1998) terminology. According to Selten, normative theory, 
which aims to deduce a guide to best strategy, as well, in principle, as a 
description/prediction of human behavior, treats empirical evidence as 
irrelevant (his italics). For descriptive game theory, on the other hand, only 
empirical evidence is relevant.!! Selten argues that we must practice a strict 
methodological dualism, making a sharp distinction between normative 
and descriptive theory (22). His position on this issue is notable given his 
theoretical contributions to game theory. Normative game theory can help 
us understand the structure of social dilemmas we face but often fails as a 
guide to how we should act or as a very good descriptive prediction of how 
people do act. 
John Maynard-Smith and George Price are responsible for launching 
10. Thus Chagnon's finding that humans who have killed (and thus might be presumed 
to be less frequent granters of first move(r) altruism) enjoy higher reproductive success and 
have higher prestige does not necessarily mean such tendencies dominate among humans 
because they have been evolutionarily favored, even though such individuals may be rela-
tively advantaged within each group (Chagnon 1988). 
II. Selten is a bit redundant here, since evidence by its nature must be empirical. 
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the field of evolutionary game theory, an approach that enables us, when 
applying it to human behavior, to bypass debate about whether or not an 
action is rational. In a seminal 1973 article exploring the regulation of 
intraspecific conflict among animals, they introduced the concept of an 
evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS). Maynard-Smith and Price defined an 
ESS as a strategy that, given that it predominates within a population, 
cannot be successfully invaded by any mutant strategy. Stated another 
way, the best counter to an ESS must be itself: no other strategy can do 
better, because if that were possible, the ESS would be invadable and 
therefore no longer evolutionarily stable. An ESS is therefore a Nash equi-
librium, often polymorphic, involving more than one strategy in stable 
proportions (Binmore 1998a, 279).12 Their analysis helps us understand 
how group beneficial strategies may sustain themselves once established 
through frequency dependent selection. The paper, however, was intended 
to offer an alternative to group selection explanations of the evolution of 
restraints on intraspecific harm. 
The word evolution in the last sentence is critical, because it implies a 
trajectory, driven by a replicator dynamic, that over time transforms the 
proportions of gene frequencies in a population as natural selection differ-
entially rewards different phenotypes. The ESS concept actually says very 
little about that trajectory and the extent to which the replicator dynamic 
is driven solely by selection at the individual level. What the paper and the 
subsequent development of the ESS concept actually show is that individ-
uallevel selection alone can sustain an end state equilibrium characterized 
by such restraint, not that individual level selection would necessarily have 
led to it. The idea behind frequency dependent selection is that the fitness 
of a particular strategy may depend on the strategies followed by other 
members of the population. 
It is important to understand the differences between frequency 
dependent selection and group selection, of which the Hamilton kin selec-
tion mechanism is an instance. The former has nothing necessarily to do 
with the latter. Hamiltonian kin selection, for example, both originates as 
the consequence of and is sustained by group level selection and depends 
not at all on frequency dependent selection. The inclusive fitness enhanc-
ing effects of a gene suddenly appearing that predisposes to sacrifice for 
offspring will be independent of the number of similarly motivated con-
specifics in the local or global population. Provided the benefits to kin 
weighted by genetic propinquity are greater than the costs to the actor, 
12. Although all ESS are Nash, not every Nash equilibrium is ESS. Because ESS is a 
stronger, more restrictive criterion, it is considered, in technical terms, an equilibrium 
refinement. 
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such a gene will tend to evolve toward fixation, as we may assume it has in 
humans and other mammals. It will then also be sustained (protected by 
invasion from genes less prone to induce sacrifice by parents) by group 
level selection, so long as parents tend to raise their own offspring. 
In contrast, frequency dependent selection doesn't require the subdi-
vision of a population into separate groups (here family units) for part of 
a life cycle. It doesn't depend on a covariance between group growth rates 
and the frequency of genes in particular demes, or subpopulations. 
Instead, the effect on fitness is a function of the proportion of strategies in 
the entire population, in which pairs of organisms are assumed to be 
repeatedly selected at random for interaction. 
A population in which all but a small minority practice Tit-for-Tat, 
and in which members must interact with each other more than once over 
an indeterminate planning horizon, and in which the discounting of the 
future is not too great, is proof to immediate invasion by a strategy of con-
tinuous defect. 13 From an economic perspective, we might in this instance 
speak of complex social organization being sustained by frequency depen-
dent selection. 
On the other hand, since a given structure may have multiple equilib-
ria, showing that a strategy profile involving some cooperation may be a 
Nash equilibrium or, to use the stronger criterion, an evolutionarily stable 
strategy, does not adequately address the problem of origination. Writing 
in 1993, Maynard-Smith states clearly that the analysis of an ESS, which 
centers on the effect of frequency dependent selection, provides little 
insight into origins or generally what we understand when we use the word 
evolution. It is concerned with explaining the stability of evolutionary envi-
ronments once established (Maynard-Smith 1993, 11-12). 
Although the point is recognized,14 the concept of an ESS continues 
to be used, sometimes rather casually, in two different senses. Dixit and 
Skeath, for example, offer the Maynard-Smith definition and then go on 
to say, "This is a static test, but often a more dynamic criterion is applied: 
starting from any mixture of phenotypes, a particular phenotype is evolu-
tionary stable if the population evolves to a state in which this phenotype 
dominates" (1999, 321). The latter definition is more restrictive, since it 
implies a unique equilibrium end state, irrespective of starting point. May-
13. Tit-for-Tat is not, however, strictly speaking, ESS. It can first be invaded by less 
retaliatory strategies, such as All Cooperate, which then render the population vulnerable to 
continuous defect. 
14. For example, Weibull: "as with Nash equilibrium, the evolutionary stability prop-
erty does not explain how a population arrives at such a strategy. Instead it asks whether, once 
reached, a strategy is robust to evolutionary pressures" (1995, 33); or Fudenberg and Levine: 
"an ESS ... is a static concept that was inspired by, but not derived from, considerations of 
evolutionary dynamics" (1998, 52). See also Hirshleifer and Martinez-Coli 1988 (368). 
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nard-Smith takes pains to emphasize the possibility of multiple ESS, 
whereas the dynamic criterion suggested by Dixit and Skeath excludes that 
possibility. To quote Dixit and Skeath again: "The eventual outcome of 
the population dynamics, or a strategy that, when used by all players can-
not be upset by any successful invasion of another, will be an evolutionary 
stable strategy" (322; my italics). The sometimes unrecognized conflation 
of Maynard-Smith's original ESS idea with the more restrictive dynamic 
definition is again testimony to the power of the inverse genetic fallacy. 
Evolution is a historical process, one in which selection at the indi-
vidual level is always a potent force. Altruistic behavior, by definition, will 
be disadvantaged by selection pressures at this level. Any explanation of 
the emergence of cooperation must provide an account of how such forces 
are overcome. The Hamilton kin selection mechanism does so: it accounts 
both for the replica tor dynamics that lead to evolution toward fixation 
and the mechanisms that sustain and protect this equilibrium once estab-
lished from less sacrificing invaders. The Maynard-Smith-Price analysis 
does not provide such an account. The replica tor dynamics that lead to 
widespread behaviors that favor groups require group level selection early 
in their evolutionary trajectory, even if they do not, once established at 
high frequencies in populations, require it for maintenance. At that point, 
frequency dependent selection at the individual level alone can be enough 
to sustain the equilibrium. 
The Axelrod Computer Tournaments 
Two of the most striking contributions to debates about the conditions 
under which cooperation can emerge have been the computer tournaments 
organized by Robert Axelrod (1984). His tournaments personalized the 
issues in a way they had not been since the initial Alchian-Williams pairing 
three decades earlier. Subjects were, once again, not "naive" college stu-
dents but sophisticated students of human interaction, a number of whom 
were encouraged to examine and consider their own behavior and, in most 
instances, make their approach public. The results of these tournaments 
have been widely viewed as evidence that cooperation can be expected to 
evolve as the result of the interactions of purely self-interested agents. As in 
the case of Trivers's analysis or the concept of an evolutionarily stable 
strategy, I will argue that such an interpretation is not warranted. The play 
of Tit-for-Tat in the first tournament cannot be defended as rational under 
the assumption that one's fellow contestants are also rational. And the evi-
dence in the second tournament that sophisticated contestants will coordi-
nate around one of a number of rational choice equilibria does not in and 
of itself provide insight into why this particular one was selected. 
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Axelrod invited game theorists and other social and behavioral scien-
tists familiar with the Prisoner's Dilemma to submit strategies for a multi-
player PD tournament, In the first of these contests each strategy was 
paired with itself, a random strategy, and each of the other submitted 
strategies, with each strategy pair playing a round of two hundred (these 
rules were preannounced), Strategies could take into account the record of 
prior plays in a given round in determining responses and were scored 
according to the total number of points earned in all of these pairings, with 
3 points each for mutual cooperation, a 5/0 split where one defected and 
one cooperated, and I point each if both defected, Payoffs were not dis-
counted: a point earned later in a series was worth as much as one earned 
earlier, Thus a record of mutual continuous cooperation throughout two 
hundred plays of a pairing earned 600 points for each of the strategies, 
while a strategy that cooperated for two hundred plays while its counter-
party played defect for two hundred plays would earn 0, with the counter-
party earning 1,000. Axelrod then averaged scores earned by each strategy 
in each of its pairings, creating a grand tournament score, which he used to 
rank strategies and determine the winner of the contest, 
How should a rational player have selected a strategy, assuming all 
other players were rational? Consider how Nash might have reasoned. The 
grand score was to be determined as the result of scores earned in pairings 
with every other strategy and itself. A potential submitter could at random 
choose anyone pairing to begin with. Since the play was of fixed duration 
(two hundred moves), it is clear that game theory prescribes defection on 
the last play. Since we "know" what will happen on the last play, defection 
on the next to last play is also the "correct" approach to take. And so 
forth, like a row of dominoes, backward induction operates until one 
reaches the conclusion that defection on the first (and all subsequent plays) 
is the correct course of action. If one assumes one's counterparty reasons 
similarly, one reaches the stable, unique, no regret Nash equilibrium 
profile of ALLD-ALLD, where ALLD stands for a strategy of defecting at 
each and every stage of the game. Having reasoned this way about the first 
pairing, one can reason similarly for the second and all subsequent possi-
ble pairings. ALLD is the only defensible strategy for a rational player in 
this tournament, assuming all submitters were also rational. 
ALLD Is the Only Rational Strategy in the First Tournament 
This conclusion can be tested by considering alternatives. For example, 
why couldn't TFT by all also be Nash, that is, the best response to itself in 
each pairing? Obviously, there are some responses, such as continuous 
cooperation, that are just as good a response to TFT as itself. But does 
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there exist an unambiguously better choice? If the answer to this question 
is affirmative, TFT by all cannot be Nash. And the answer is affirmative, 
for the simple reason that a strategy of cooperating on all but the last play 
would always yield a higher payoff, giving one an extra 2 points on the last 
stage, and imposing a cost of 3 points on one's counterparty, in compari-
son to the alternative of playing cooperate. 
Would it be better to begin defecting earlier against TFT? The answer 
is no. For example, if one began defecting on the second to last play, the 
gain of 2 on the penultimate play (5 as opposed to 3) is just compensated 
for by the loss on the last play (1 as opposed to 3). 
TFT by all cannot be Nash, because TFT is not the best response to 
itself. However, if one believes one is playing against a TFT player, it is the 
strategy of cooperating on all but the last play, not the Nash mandated 
play of ALLD, that is to be recommended to the rational player (see Dixit 
and Skeath, 1999,258-62). In the context of the Axelrod first tournament 
structure, this would mean cooperating through the first one hundred 
ninety-nine stages of the game and then defecting. Although ALLD is 
Nash in the first tournament, it is not strictly dominant. 
Could cooperating on all but the last play by all be Nash? Player 1 
could reason that ifshe could predict that player 2 (and all others) would 
play TFT, it would be rational to cooperate on all but the last play. And 
player 2 could reason that ifhe could predict that player 1 (and all others) 
would play TFT, it would be rational to cooperate on all but the last play. 
But we cannot describe a strategy profile based on this logic as Nash, 
because each player would be reasoning asymmetrically about their own 
rationality and that of their counterpart(ies). Obviously, both sets of 
assumptions could not be true, since each is reasoning that the others are, 
for whatever reasons, irrational, affected by behavioral dispositions, not 
just the structure of the situation. 
Nash required that expectations of the play of counterparties be 
formed using a deductive methodology premised on the assumption that 
people chose so as to maximize their material self interest, given the payoff 
structure of the game and the assumption that their counterparty reasoned 
and chose similarly. Estimates of counterparty behavior based on a statis-
tical methodology could have no place in the analysis: indeed, the assump-
tion that such methodology was irrelevant was in part what distinguished 
decision theory from game theory. The use of an empirical, inductive strat-
egy in forming expectations of counterparty play is therefore inconsistent 
with the Nash solution concept. 
The issue of how one forms expectations of counterparty behavior is 
irrelevant in games, such as the one shot PD, where one strategy is strictly 
or strongly dominant. But it can be important in games with a pure strat-
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egy equilibrium comprised of strategies that are not strictly dominant. The 
two player fixed and known duration game, or its multiparty variant in the 
first Axelrod tournament, are examples of such games. ALLD is not the 
best response to all possible strategic choices of one's counterparty, but it 
is the only strategy that can be defended as rational under the assumption 
that other players are also rational. 
Another way to understand these points is to suppose one is consid-
ering "invading" an Axelrod first (Axelrod I) tournament one predicts to 
be dominated by TFT players. Can one earn a higher tournament score by 
submitting ALLD? Even though a continuous defect (ALLD) invader 
wins or ties each of its individual pairings with a Tit-for-Tat, its aggregate 
score is pitiful. In each pairing with a TFT, ALLD gains on the first play 
compared to a cooperative strategy (it earns 5 rather than 3) but loses in 
stages two through two hundred, in which it earns 1, rather than the 3 it 
could have received by playing cooperate. Although each of the TFT play-
ers loses in its pairing with continuous defect, it has many opportunities 
for "tying" at higher score levels in its plays with other TFTs. 
Thus, in a population of ninety-nine Tit-for-Tat players and one con-
tinuous defector, with each strategy paired against itself and all others, 
continuous defect earns 200 against itself and 204 against each of the other 
ninety-nine Tit-for-Tat players. By contrast, each Tit-for-Tat player earns 
199 against the one continuous defector but 600 against each of the other 
Tit-for-Tat players, including itself. One ALLD invader of a population 
of ninety-nine TFT players therefore earns 20,963 fitness points, vs. 59,599 
for each of the TFT players. ALLD is clearly not the best response in this 
case, though it does boast the superior win/tie/loss record. 
But of course the strategy space may be more complex than just these 
alternatives. A number of writers have emphasized that, where the dura-
tion of interaction is indefinite, TFT can first be replaced by less retribu-
tive but equally "good" strategies, such as All Cooperate, which then 
makes the population vulnerable to invasion by ALLD. But in the fixed 
and known duration structure of the first tournament, the vulnerability of 
TFT is even greater. It can immediately be invaded by the strategy of coop-
erate until the last play. Such an invading strategy earns 60,196 points: 602 
against each of the other ninety-nine TFT players, plus 598 against itself. 
Each of the TFT players, in contrast, earns 59,997-600 against each of 
the other 98 TFTs and itself, and 597 against the invader. In sum: in the 
first tournament, TFT is not Nash, it is not ESS, and it cannot be defended 
as rational under the assumption that all other players are rational. On the 
other hand, even though ALLD by all is Nash, the best response to TFT is 
cooperate until the last play, not ALLD. 
Like the Alchian-Williams pairing, both Axelrod tournaments offer 
146 Altruistically Inclined? 
empirical evidence on how smart people actually play. What they do not 
do is provide insight into how environments characterized by one-shot 
PDs could have evolved into the repeated play environment assumed in 
either. In a tournament in which the pairings consisted of single play 
games, the play of cooperate (the initial move of a Tit-for-Tat player in a 
repeated game) would clearly be neither Nash nor ESS. A population of 
ninety-nine cooperators invaded by one defector would eventually be 
overrun by defectors. The defector would earn 1 in its pairing with itself 
and 5 in its pairing with each of the other ninety-nine cooperators, for a 
total of 496 fitness points. Each of the cooperators would earn 0 in its pair-
ing with the defector, and 3 in each of its pairings with itself and the other 
98 cooperators, for a total of 298 fitness points. Assuming frequencies in 
subsequent generations are related to these fitness scores, the cooperators 
would soon be gone. 
A tournament involving single play games, in which defection is the 
unique Nash equilibrium and strictly dominant in each of the pairings, 
illustrates the very significant hurdles that need to be overcome for iter-
ated interaction to become common. This observation illustrates a general 
proposition: if a game has a dominant strategy, as does the one-shot PD, 
that strategy (defect) will also be the unique ESS (Dixit and Skeath 1999, 
326). The relevance of this observation for the subject of this book is this: 
Something other than a propensity to choose rationally must lie behind the 
ability of humans to transcend the Hobbesian dilemma. 
Returning now to the fixed and known duration environment, once 
one abandons the Nash prescribed methodology for forecasting counter-
party behavior, the choice of strategy becomes heavily influenced by esti-
mates of what one believes others will do. That is what made the tourna-
ment, one without great interest in theory, so interesting in practice. Since 
the success of a strategy in the first tournament was frequency dependent, 
choosing a winning submission depended in part on forecasting the uni-
verse of other submissions. 
What convinced Anatol Rapaport (the winner of both tournaments) 
that this universe would contain a high enough proportion of strategies 
involving cooperation to allow TFT to be a superior strategy? Most likely 
his observations as an experimentalist in his studies of two player fixed and 
known duration games. As he and his coauthor wrote acerbically in 1965, 
"The predominance of the [continuous cooperate] lock-ins in the favor-
able conditions shows that our subjects are not sufficiently sophisticated 
game-theoreticians to have figured out that [continuous defect] is the only 
strategically defensible strategy. Apparently this lack of strategic sophisti-
cation allows many of them to find the commonsense solution, namely the 
tacit collusion, and so to win money instead of losing it" (Rapaport and 
Chammah 1965,66). His evidently superior forecasting ability encourages 
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us to reflect again on the likelihood that a rational forecast of human behav-
ior, including our own, is one that is reached empirically, allowing for behav-
ior that may not always meet John Nash's definition of rational choice. IS 
Axelrod II: The Second Tournament and Model Massaging 
In the follow-up tournament, each submitted strategy was paired with 
itself and every other strategy five times, with the length of each round 
chosen from a probability distribution consistent with a median game 
length of 200. After the entries had been submitted, Axelrod selected the 
five game lengths-identical for each pairing-to be 63, 77, 151, 156, and 
308. I have stressed in the previous section that TFT, or indeed any strat-
egy involving even the slightest degree of cooperation, could not be Nash 
in the first tournament. This observation is relevant in considering why 
Axelrod changed the rules between the first and second competitions. He 
states that he made this change to eliminate "end game effects." Maynard-
Smith, in summarizing Axelrod's work, explains that this modification 
"avoids the complication that programs may have special rules for the last 
game" (1982, 168). But what was wrong with allowing strategists to con-
sider special rules for the last games or stages? 
Axelrod seems to have been concerned with the widely known result 
just elaborated: in two player fixed and known duration games, continu-
ous defect was the only Nash equilibrium, and the only defensible strategy 
for a rational player, if players are assumed to choose rationally. He points 
out, for example, that if interactions are indefinitely repeated then cooper-
ation may emerge, implying that it cannot emerge as the result of rational 
choice except under this circumstance (1984, 10-11). 
Theory specified that in order to permit a rational choice cooperative 
equilibrium in such a pairing, subjects could not know the exact end of the 
interaction. As Binmore describes it, "the famous folk theorem of game 
theory ... says that almost any outcome of the static game that gets 
repeated can be sustained as a Nash equilibrium of the repeated game pro-
vided that the players never have reason to think that any particular repe-
tition is likely to be the last" (1998a, 280). All of the theoretical work in 
Axelrod's appendix pertains to the two person game, indefinitely repeated. 
The fact that cooperation emerged in the first tournament appears to 
15. The defining feature of a rational expectation in John Muth's sense is that it uses all 
available information in forming a forecast. In macroeconomics, rational expectations are 
often contrasted with those that are adaptive. Adaptive expectations may, however, some-
times be justified as rational, particularly where there is uncertainty about, for example, the 
credibility of a monetary authority's commitment. The Nash approach views prior evidence 
of human behavioral predispositions, above and beyond the almost axiomatic presumption 
that they are strictly egoistic, as irrelevant (see also Selten 1998). 
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have been retrospectively perceived as something of an embarrassment. 
One cannot help thinking, therefore, that at some level the modification in 
the rules for the second tournament was at least partly intended to bring 
the empirical (descriptive) results into conformity with what Axelrod saw 
as a conflict between his data and the theoretical (normative) conclusion 
that an indefinite number of plays was a necessary condition for coopera-
tive behavior to be sustained by rational players in two player games. If 
theory tells one that cooperative behavior cannot emerge among rational 
players with a fixed number of plays, but evidence (from the first round) 
shows that such behavior does manifest itself when strategies designed by 
humans are paired with each other, why would one then lower the bar, 
making it easier, according to theory, for cooperative behavior to emerge? 
I do not have an exact name for what Axelrod has done. The more 
common problem when data are inconsistent with favored theories is to 
ignore or massage the data. To his credit, of course, Axelrod did none of 
that, but there does seem to be a bit of "model massaging" here-massag-
ing the tournament design to eliminate an apparent contradiction between 
theory and data. Would not the results have been even more striking had 
the tournament continued with fixed game length? A well-developed 
experimental literature going back to Flood and Dresher showed that 
human subjects, sophisticated and otherwise, were quite willing to play 
strategies that simply could not be defended as rational. Why be con-
cerned about adding to it? 
How important was it for Axelrod to show that the emergence of 
cooperation was the result of rational choice? On the one hand, "There is 
no need to assume that the players are rational. They need not be trying to 
maximize their rewards. Their strategies may simply reflect standard oper-
ating procedures, rules of thumb, instincts, habits, or imitation .... The 
actions that players take are not necessarily even conscious choices" (1984, 
18). At the same time, he talks several times in his first chapter about the 
bearing of his work on "the emergence of cooperation among egoists with-
out central authority" (24; see also 6); these words echo the title of his 1981 
American Political Science Review article. Thus, he does seem determined 
to reach the positive and normative conclusion that "egoists" do and 
"should" practice some form of Tit-for-Tat. 16 
A final note: Axelrod places considerable emphasis on the require-
ment that a strategy, in order to be effective, "must be able to take into 
16. As Jonathan Baron has noted, "When we study performance in laboratory games 
... we must be aware of the fact that repeated games may not actually involve social dilemmas 
at all" (1988, 402). So long as two player games are of fixed and known duration, however, 
they do. Axelrod's modification of the rules between the first and second tournaments was 
designed to turn an interaction apparently involving a social dilemma into one that did not, 
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account the history of the interaction as it has developed so far" (1984, 30), 
This conclusion is stronger than is warranted. Tit-for-Tat, as the winner, is 
certainly an effective strategy. But this rule, requiring only four or five 
lines of programming, cooperates on the first play and then simply echoes 
whatever the opponent did on the previous play. The "look back" horizon 
is at best one play. Tit-for-Tat did better than other, often complex strate-
gies that tried to exploit knowledge of a round's entire past history 
(34-35). A more defensible conclusion from these tournaments would be 
that a strategy, in order to be effective, "must take into account what hap-
pened on the previous play." This is an interesting conclusion in itself, rel-
evant perhaps to research that has emphasized the surprising power of 
simple forecasting heuristics compared to more complex alternatives 
(Gigerenzer and Todd 1999). 
Axelrod's Simulations 
In the latter chapters of his book Axelrod reports on his simulations of 
successive rounds of the second tournament, with a replicator dynamic 
such that the frequency of each strategy in subsequent rounds was depen-
dent on its success in the previous round. The evolutionaryl7 ambitions of 
this modeling are reflected in his comments: 
The idea is that the more successful strategies are more likely to be 
submitted in the next round, and the less successful strategies are less 
likely to be submitted again. To make this precise, we can say that the 
number of copies (or offspring) of a given entry will be proportional 
to that entry's tournament score. We simply have to interpret the 
average payoff received by an individual as proportional to the indi-
vidual's expected number of offspring. (1984,49) 
He finds that TFT players tend to increase in frequency, which is not sur-
prising, given that the second tournament had initially attracted a high fre-
quency of conditionally cooperative strategies. 
But this is not an explanation of the origin of cooperation because it 
accounts neither for the distribution of initial submissions nor for the 
repeated nature of interaction built into the tournament structure. Hamil-
ton's theory of kin selection was a major step forward because it offered an 
evolutionary account of the origin of altruistic behavior toward kin. It 
partially eliminating the conflict that his empirical results otherwise seemed to pose to nor-
mative theory. 
17. He described his approach as ecological, since he did not allow for mutations (new 
strategies) to appear. 
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explained how organisms with a higher propensity to sacrifice for their 
children (or kin) could successfully invade a population in which such 
propensities were lower or absent, even though such traits might adversely 
affect the survival of the organisms exhibiting them. The Trivers model 
and most of the work in economics and political science on iterated 
(repeated) games, on the other hand, are expositions of maintenance. 
Without accounting for transition from single to repeated play, or, within 
the context of indefinitely repeated interaction, for the selection of one 
among a number of possible equilibria, we do not have a coherent account 
of the origin of cooperative or altruistic behavior toward non-kin. 
Hamilton, who coauthored a chapter of Axelrod's 1984 book, some-
times failed fully to appreciate the strength of his own theory vs. the expla-
nations advanced for altruistic behavior toward non-kin by Trivers and 
others. A commentary (with a different coauthor) on work regarding the 
voluntary provision of public goods begins discussion of the argument of 
a target article as follows: "[the authors say that] according to El [egoistic 
incentive] theory, people will always choose the selfish strategy in social 
dilemmas. This is not true if kinship is involved or if there are repeated 
interactions" (Houston and Hamilton 1989, 709). 
This is not quite accurate. Egoistic incentive theory, strictly speaking, 
predicts that parents will selfishly choose not to sacrifice for their children. 
The parent who does practice such sacrifice is being unselfish, even if the 
genes that may predispose to such behavior are not. Second, the parallel 
treatment of the theory of kin selection on the one hand and the elucida-
tion of mechanisms sustaining cooperation pursued by egoistic individuals 
locked into a series of repeated interactions of unknown duration, on the 
other hand, obscures the different achievements of these models. 
Evolutionary Models Are Not Identical to 
Economic Models 
Economic and game theoretic ideas have influenced the work of Trivers 
and Maynard-Smith, just as evolutionary concepts influenced Axelrod's 
work. Generally speaking, an economic model can be translated into evo-
lutionary language, although the converse is not necessarily so easily done, 
since an evolutionary framework makes no assumptions about whether 
organisms maximize utility or even pursue purposive action. 
The economic framework of utility maximization provides, of course, 
a large tent in which all variety of motivational goals may be posited. Pure 
altruists, for example, "solve" the single play Prisoner's Dilemma without 
difficulty, since for them, cooperate is a strictly dominant strategy. Com-
mon usage, however, restricts microeconomic models to those in which 
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agents efficiently advance their own material interest. Thus the action of 
the soldier who throws his body on a grenade to save the lives of his bud-
dies is generally evaluated by economists as being objectively irrational, as 
is the action of an experimental subject who rejects a positive offer in an 
ultimatum game, apparently preferring nothing to something. 
Some will argue that if this is what the dead man or the subject 
wanted, and so it is, as they have revealed by their actions, then it is ipso 
facto rational. But many analysts within the rational choice tradition are 
wary about proceeding down this route, because it vitiates claims econom-
ics might have to making predictions about behavior independently of 
empirically derived knowledge of human behavioral propensities. Why 
would we, usually posthumously, award Medals of Honor to soldiers who 
cover explosives with their bodies if we thought such actions were basically 
selfish? I have adopted the convention of restricting economic models to 
those that posit an efficient pursuit of an actor's material welfare, because 
I believe this is a reasonable characterization of much contemporary prac-
tice within the profession. 
Models in evolutionary biology avoid discussions of motivation and 
what rationality means, and they put much less focus on instrumental 
means-ends choices by individual actors. Models in evolutionary biology 
are as relevant for worms or viruses as they are for primates. Economic 
models are not, because they focus on rational choice. Rational choice 
models are not relevant for worms, unless one is willing to grant the con-
cepts of consciousness and purposive action much wider purview than has 
been traditional. 
Game theory has been used both in evolutionary biology and in eco-
nomics, but what the theory models is somewhat different in the two cases. 
In evolutionary biology, there is no consideration of motives and no con-
sideration of conscious thought or choice, or intentionality. Individual 
variation produces propensities toward different behaviors that are acted 
upon by the forces of natural selection; the benefits or payoffs come in the 
form of increases in fitness. Altruism is simply behavior that increases the 
fitness of others and reduces that of the actor. In game theoretic models in 
economics, the emphasis is on rational choice; the payoffs are usually in 
the form of material benefits that may but will not necessarily increase the 
spread of the organism's genes in future generations. In economic models 
motives may matter in determining whether an action will be characterized 
as altruistic. And assumptions that agents act in ways contrary to their 
individual interest will often be attacked ab initio on the grounds that such 
behavior is not consistent with rationality. Thus the model builder may be 
discouraged from positing such behavior. 
Within an evolutionary framework there are no implicit restrictions 
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on what behavioral predispositions may be posited. Rather, the intellec-
tual discipline comes in requiring that one develop a plausible model of 
how a particular trait, and the gene(s) that may predispose to it, survives 
the forces of selection operating on it upon first appearance at low fre-
quencies in a population. In practice, in recent years, evolutionary analy-
sis has focused almost exclusively on individual level selection and on the 
maintenance of equilibria. Evolutionary mechanisms have therefore often 
been appealed to as reinforcement for the assumption of strict egoism in 
economics. But the Darwinian framework provides space for the opera-
tion of natural selection at more than one level and consequently for the 
survival of a range of essential human predispositions broader than those 
upon which the standard economic model is premised. 
From the standpoint of evolutionary biology, the forces of natural 
selection may be indifferent between behaviors that enable an organism to 
survive and continue to procreate and behaviors that prevent that out-
come but permit survival of and procreation by two children. The impor-
tant distinctions between economic and evolutionary models have, how-
ever, often been blurred by the use of a restricted set of the latter to justify 
the standard version of the former. Such a rhetorical strategy has elided 
important differences in their structure. In particular, evolutionary theory 
is concerned with genotypical influence on phenotype and the feedback 
through natural selection on gene frequencies in the future. Economic the-
ory, however, is concerned with decision making by the organism as an 
entity and, in its standard or canonical form, rules out behavior that might 
benefit genes predisposing to it, if such behavior is not in the material 
interest of the organism. 
Restricting the operation of natural selection to the individual level 
closely aligns the results of evolutionary models with those of the standard 
economic model, since organisms that efficiently pursue their material wel-
fare, choose life over death, and, ceteris paribus, choose more wealth over 
less, will find their relative fitness increased by individual level selection. In 
particular, neither approach is consistent with or is likely to predict bio-
logically altruistic behavior. But the range of mechanisms through which 
natural selection can operate is broader than that so allowed. 
The majority of humans end up fathering or mothering children and 
sacrifice enormously for their well-being. Since what is here selfish from 
the standpoint of the gene is altruistic from the standpoint of the acting 
organism, and thus altruistic from the standpoint of the rational actor, we 
must conclude that the majority of humans at least sometime during their 
life cycle practice altruistic behavior toward others and have the emotional 
experience of so doing. It cannot, then, be an emotionally alien experience 
to humans or an inessential component of their behavioral makeup for 
Reciprocal Altruism, Norms, and Evolutionary Game Theory 153 
them to be empathetic, Indeed, growing evidence indicates that children as 
young as a few days old cry when they hear other infants crying but not 
when they hear other noise or a tape recording of their own distress (Hoff-
man 1981, 129-30). Most rational choice theorists do not argue the point, 
making an exception with respect to behavior toward kin in their assump-
tion that humans act in all domains so as efficiently to maximize their 
material welfare. But the line tends to be drawn, in one way or another, 
with respect to relations among non-kin. 
For biologists, explanation of altruism toward kin is a central and 
largely resolved issue. As in the social sciences, controversies have sur-
rounded the understanding of behavior among non-kin, mirroring the 
denial of the relevance of altruistic inclinations in understanding such 
behavior implicit in the standard economic model. The predictive/ 
explanatory difficulties this entails can be appreciated, simply, as a chain 
of reasoning that leads to a conclusion at variance with observational and 
experimental evidence. 
1. Behavioral Assumption: Individuals efficiently maXImIze their 
material self-interest. This reflects the essential feature of the stan-
dard economic model and specifies an externally observable 
goal-maximize material self-interest-and assumptions about 
how this goal is pursued-efficiently, that is, making decisions 
based on all available information using rational rules. 
2. Scientific Justification: Argument from natural selection. Those 
humans who in the past did not have such predispositions were 
culled out; therefore this model accurately characterizes essential 
human behavioral predispositions. The argument from natural 
selection is used to endow proposition 1 with the quality of an 
axiom: an accepted fact so unquestioned that it may serve as a 
foundation for proof of more fundamental claims. 
3. Normative Conclusion/Descriptive Prediction: Mutual defection in 
single play PD games; continuous defection in Prisoner's Dilemma 
games of fixed and known duration. Many implications for social 
organization, or the lack thereof, may be derived from this predic-
tion. 
4. Inconsistency between Theory Prediction and Data: Prediction is 
inconsistent, and not in minor ways, with experimental and obser-
vational data. 
Something is wrong. But if the justification 2 for the behavioral 
assumption 1 is correct, the reasoning seems airtight. The proposed solu-
tion involves recognizing that the justification (step 2) is invalid. Evolu-
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tionary theory and evidence do not, in and of themselves, exclude the pos-
sibility of selection for some traits at levels other than that of the organism. 
If this possibility is recognized, then 2 is no longer an automatic 
justification for 1. And if 1 is modified to allow the possibility that humans 
are born with predispositions to practice first move(r) altruism, a trait 
favored at least initially at the group but not the organismic level, a trait 
that can be weakened, strengthened, or modified by environmental experi-
ences but one that nevertheless defines baseline practice and expectations, 
then predictions of theory are no longer necessarily at odds with experi-
mental and observational data. This modification is the essential first step 
in laying the foundations for a behavioral science with improved predicted 
power. 
This view is controversial, and a natural question is to ask whether 
there are other options. These options have been explored exhaustively. 
The Trivers approach, as we have seen, does not solve the problem of 
altruistic behavior directed at non-kin but merely extends a long tradition 
of identifying conditions that may sustain reciprocity once established. 
Axelrod's tournaments begin with an environment of iterated games, 
which assumes one of the biggest hurdles on the way to complex organiza-
tion has already been overcome. As Maynard-Smith himself observes, the 
concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) addresses issues of sta-
bility, not origin. Appeal to norms does not solve the problem because 
adherence to them, at least initially, faces the same negative individual 
level selection as the underlying behavior. 
The widely disseminated view that the problem of altruism toward non-
kin has been solved without the necessity of appealing to evolutionary tra-
jectories involving group level selection represents a misconception. It has 
been "solved" by focusing on end state equilibria in which the behavior 
has become mutualistic. 
Much as we might like to insist on a strict separation of science and 
politics, the two in practice are interrelated. 18 But as scientists, social or 
natural, we should do our best in reaching conclusions to leave the possi-
ble political implications of our findings behind. The alternative of ruling 
multilevel selection out of order leaves the reasoning sequence 1-4 intact, 
along with its unfortunate outcome: a contradiction between theory pre-
diction and experimental/observational data. That is, failure to move in 
18. Views about the Prisoner's Dilemma are sometimes mapped onto political ideolo-
gies, with "belief' in cooperation being a "liberal" position and "belief' in deception a con-
servative position (Poundstone 1992). But it is hard to see the logical necessity of this corre-
lation. The question is one of coherence and consistency with data, and the conclusions with 
regard to essential human behavioral propensities in this book could provide foundation for 
"classical liberal" views of the natural order and the limited role of government. 
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this direction leaves in place, particularly in economics and political sci-
ence, an empirically invalidated model. 19 
Evolutionary biologists' treatment of the empirical importance of 
group level selection may have been misleading and unfair, but it has never 
involved the denial of the possibility of multilevel selection. On the other 
hand, the standard economic model, which reflects an organism level per-
spective, is inconsistent both with a gene's eye view of the world and with 
the possibility that natural selection may operate on different levels to 
increase gene frequency in subsequent generations. 
Resistance to entertaining the possibility of group selection seems to 
stem partly from fear that to open the floodgates even a crack will unleash 
a torrent of romantic, naive, and empirically unjustified models of human 
nature that, if allowed to influence political discourse, will have devastat-
ing consequences. In some instances this appears to be wound up in a 
belief that opposition to group selection models indirectly defends the 
standard economic model and whatever political implications are seen 
flowing from it. Whatever the merits of this type of reasoning, this view 
fails to appreciate that support for the economic approach does not flow 
automatically from success of the gene's eye view. Consider this passage 
from Ridley's The Red Queen. 
Within a few years of [George] Williams' book, Wynne-Edwards was 
effectively defeated, and almost all biologists agreed that no creature 
could ever evolve the ability to help its species at the expense of itself .... 
Williams knew full well that individual animals often cooperate and that 
human society is not a ruthless free-for-all. But he also saw that cooper-
ation is almost always between close relatives ... or that it is practiced 
where it directly or eventually benefits the individual. (Ridley 1993, 36) 
Note the familiar problem with the final part of the passage. Once estab-
lished, a group of contingently cooperative players prepared to punish viola-
tions, including those against third parties, and punish those who fail to pun-
ish those who fail to punish, and so on, can be evolutionarily stable: the 
meanest, most selfish agent invading that population will find it strictly 
rational to behave in a manner indistinguishable from the other members of 
the population. In the limit, such behavior can be viewed as completely con-
sistent with self-interest: it has been drained of altruistic content by the 
19. Surely Kuhn and Lakatos never intended to suggest that empirical tests of scientific 
theories were without relevance. Lakatos objected to Popper's notion of the crucial or deci-
sive experiment. He argued that theories are not in fact rejected based on limited failures of 
prediction: they are rejected only when something better comes along (Lakatos 1970, 101). 
My argument is (a) the failures of prediction are not isolated and (b) there is an alternative, 
whose elements this book spells out. 
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increase in frequency of similarly inclined individuals. But the observation 
that cooperation tends to be practiced where it directly or indirectly benefits 
the individual tells us nothing about the origin of such behavior or about how 
predispositions to play cooperate could survive the individual level forces of 
selection arrayed against them upon first appearance in a population. 
Genes are the ultimate repository and locus of the raw material upon 
which selection operates, and there is nothing in evolutionary theory or 
practice that prevents a gene pursuing a particularly "devious" strategy 
whereby it predisposes an individual to jeopardize its own survival in a 
way that benefits other individual organisms in the actor's group, so long 
as that strategy results in an increase in that gene's frequency in subse-
quent generations. When reproduction (passing on genes) and an organ-
ism's survival are in conflict, reproduction wins, and when a behavioral 
trait puts an individual at risk but benefits its group in a way that increases 
the inclusive fitness of the gene so predisposing, the organism bears the 
risk and the gene reaps the benefit. Organisms are not selected for; designs 
are (Tooby and Cosmides 1990, 394). Selection at the group level may be 
less important today than it was in the evolutionary past, but there is noth-
ing in the gene's eye view that precludes such "strategies." 
Some sociobiologists and evolutionary psychologists continue to insist 
on denying at the outset, almost on a priori grounds, the possibility that 
group level selection operates or has ever operated in an empirically 
significant fashion in evolutionary history. In certain areas of inquiry, the 
study of vision, for example, such a restriction has little effect, but in others 
it is crippling-like trying to walk across a tightrope having first shot one-
self in the foot. If persisted in it will likely generate a series of pathologies, 
different from but no less deleterious than those that have beset rational 
choice theory in economics and political science. It is an uphill battle in 
many cases to persuade social scientists to consider biological influences on 
behavior. The logic and evidence are such that those of us interested in such 
persuasion should abandon knee-jerk opposition to the possibility of group 
level selection. Failing to do so will just make the climb harder, aside from 
leading to repeated contradictions. 
Skeptics typically conflate sociobiology with rational choice models 
with a gene's eye perspective. This is too broad brush. It is not the gene's 
eye view of the world that is especially wanting.2o Nor is it sociobiology or 
20. Sober has argued that selection operates on organism traits and that there is rarely 
a one to one relationship between particular genes and traits. Moreover, he points to the case 
of heterozygous superiority as a counterexample to a gene's eye view. Genes for sickle cell 
anemia are fatal in homozygous form, but in malarial environments, the heterozygous form 
has fitness superiority compared to normal homozygotes (Sober 1984). See Sterelny and 
Griffiths 1999 (61-70) for responses to Sober's criticisms and an attempt to chart a middle 
ground (1999, chap. 5). 
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evolutionary psychology per se, provided we are less dogmatic about the 
possibility of group selection and open to the possibility of persisting mal-
adaptive behavior. Rather it is the standard economic model, which is 
based on the assumptions that people are rational and that rationality 
means the efficient pursuit of the actor's material self-interest and the belief 
that these assumptions are equally applicable across all domains. It claims 
too much, a charge that has been levied at all three of these approaches but 
is particularly relevant here. We need an empirical and evolutionarily 
informed program for identifying essential human behavioral propensities 
beyond those emphasized by the standard model and the domains in which 
they are most likely to manifest themselves. We need these baseline or base 
rate data, and we need to agree on their relevance, in order to construct a 
behavioral science with improved predictive capabilities. 
To sum up thus far, I am making four claims. First, that the behav-
ioral propensities that manifest themselves in altruistic behavior are 
empirically relevant, extend to behavior toward non-kin, and should be 
understood to include the passive altruism reflected in failure to harm. 
Second, that an evolutionary approach emphasizing group or multilevel 
selection provides a coherent framework for understanding how such 
traits might have become established in populations and that existing 
"explanations" for such behavior do not. Third, that economic models are 
not necessarily the same as evolutionary models in their implications. In 
particular, the justification by appeal to evolutionary theory for the stan-
dard economic behavioral assumptions is invalid. Finally, that attempts to 
account for the origin of altruistic behavioral propensities toward non-kin 
through evolutionary models restricted to individual level selection or, 
what turns out to be the equivalent, economic models where agents 
efficiently pursue their own individual self-interest represent journeys 
down similar intellectual culs-de-sac. This last point is illustrated and 




Robert Frank's widely cited 1988 book Passions within Reason represents 
a heartfelt plea, particularly to social scientists, to recognize the category 
of altruistic behavior as empirically relevant. For skeptics, it provides an 
accessible summary of evidence of such behavior. What follows, however, 
is critical of Frank's second key objective-his attempted explanation of 
this phenomenon-and is designed to illustrate further the limitations of 
an economic/evolutionary approach that, from the outset, limits selection 
to the level of the individual organism. 
We should applaud Frank's attempt to understand a range ofbehav-
ior that many economists have downplayed, ignored, or even suggested 
does not exist. He has taken seriously the problem of altruism in a way 
some more ideologically committed have not. To read this work critically 
is to take it seriously.! Nevertheless, his analysis is riddled with inconsis-
tencies and contradictions. Not acknowledging in a consistent fashion the 
limitations of a strictly economic approach, or an evolutionary approach 
limiting selection to the level of the individual organism, vitiates an analy-
sis that tries to integrate the two approaches. 
By deconstructing the analysis we can illustrate the pitfalls of trying 
to explain the origin of altruistic behavior within a model that focuses, 
from an evolutionary standpoint, on the forces of individual level selection 
alone. Not bringing this issue to the surface leaves one group of scholars 
secure in knowledge of "flaws" in argument such as this, unable quite to 
specify them, yet confident, because there is so little "theoretical" founda-
tion for the persistence of altruism, that in fact it does not persist. This is 
an untenable position because, as Frank and others show, and as is self-
evident to many nonacademics, there is a substantial body of experimen-
1. Although often referenced, the book has received remarkably little critical attention. 
A recent exception is Reder 1999 (326-30). For an example of continued uncritical accep-
tance, see Sterelny and Griffiths 1999. These authors, astute critics and expositors of the bio-
logical literatures, describe Passions within Reason as "probably the best book yet on the pos-
sible evolutionary significance of a wider range of emotions" (304). Ignored by those 
convinced altruism is empirically unimportant, Frank's book has been embraced by those 
who see it as reconciling the standard economic model with other-regarding behavior. 
159 
160 Altruistically Inclined? 
tal and observational evidence for such behavior. Of perhaps equal con-
cern, not undertaking this critique leaves another group confident that 
there are available good individual selectionist explanations of such 
behavior. 
Frank implicitly criticizes economists for their skepticism about the 
empirical relevance of altruistic behavior. He is right to do so. The prob-
lem, as in the Trivers model, is the commitment to explain it within an evo-
lutionary framework that precludes the operation of natural selection 
above the level of the individual organism. Because Frank restricts himself 
to an evolutionary past in which only individual level selection can have 
occurred, he must ultimately accept the logic of the pop Darwinism view 
of evolution: natural selection has necessarily eliminated any other-
regarding behavioral predispositions. To account for the emergence of the 
behavior he wishes to explain, he finds himself forced, as was Trivers, to 
develop his theory based on rational calculation by self-interested agents. 
The recurring problem is that, for such an agent, altruistic behavior, were 
it to be practiced in a population where it manifests itself initially at low 
frequencies, would be fitness reducing for an individual organism and 
thus, according to the definition used in this book, irrational. 
In spite of its evolutionary trappings, Frank's account is at its core 
narrowly economic and consistent with the assumptions of the standard 
economic model. Behavior results from constrained maximization of util-
ity functions devoid of arguments reflecting the utility of others. But the 
issue goes beyond the possible need to add additional arguments to utility 
functions or modify the way they may enter. There may be limits within 
which the metaphor of constrained maximization itself is useful in model-
ing human behavior. A fully evolutionary framework can help us under-
stand these bounds. Passions within Reason goes half the distance, but the 
effort produces an analysis that is muddled and contradictory. 
The centerpiece of the theory is a treatment of the strategic role of 
emotions. By permitting us credibly to commit to threats or promises it 
might not in the future be in our interest to deliver on, Frank argues, pas-
sionate behavior allows us to "solve" problems, like nuclear deterrence, 
that would otherwise be insoluble. But he never satisfactorily explains 
whether emotional behavior is ultimately under the control of reason, and 
thus can be considered truly strategic, or whether it is not. If emotions are 
truly under the control of reason, then a tendency to exhibit emotional 
behavior cannot serve its appointed role of giving credibility to commit-
ments or threats. Normative game theory is premised on the proposition 
that one's counterparty is also rational, in the sense that Nash understood 
the term. If reason controls the passions, a rational player would see 
through emotional display as a ruse and would, anticipating similar rea-
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soning on the part of the counterparty, not bother to use it in the first 
place. 
If emotions are not under the control of reason, on the other hand, 
one has difficulty explaining how passionate people would continue to 
experience positive selection pressure once repeated interaction had been 
established and reason (and individual level selection) alone was sufficient 
to maintain a cooperative equilibrium. Rational actors would, one can 
argue, shun potential counterparties prone to exhibit such behavior in 
favor of those whose behavior was viewed as less volatile and more pre-
dictable. Passionate individuals would have a hard time surviving, unless 
we were to posit a species typical preference for dealing with passionate as 
opposed to purely reasonable people. Perhaps we are indeed so predis-
posed. But then we are back to the problem of origin. The analysis does 
not explain how such a self-harming and thus irrational tendency could 
have survived upon first appearance if selection occurs only at the individ-
uallevel. Frank's treatment of the role of a reputation for displaying emo-
tional behavior as a guarantor of threats or commitments is inadequately 
developed. 
Ifwe understand emotional behavior to reflect behavioral predisposi-
tions contrary to what would be counseled by reason narrowly and pre-
cisely defined, an expression of cognitive modularity (see chap. 5), then 
Frank's intuition that such tendencies are relevant to developing a more 
comprehensive empirically based social science is probably correct. But his 
analysis does not get below the surface of the issues raised by this intuition. 
The cover copy for the book includes these observations. 
In thousands of studies of family, school, business and politics, 
behavioral scientists have claimed that altruism is irrelevant, and that 
"passion," our feeling for our families, lovers, friends, even our good 
will for the world in general, is illogical. It seems a simple matter of 
time before social commitment disappears in the wake of personal 
gain .... this book shows why passionate behavior may be reason-
able. 
The first sentence is an accurate characterization of trends in late 
twentieth century social science. While increasing numbers of economists, 
like Frank, have tried to wander away from Stigler's palace, their outflow 
has been matched by new recruits from political science, sociology, and 
anthropology, dazzled by the magnificence of the structure and its "gran-
ite" foundations. So the problem of the dismissal of altruism is real. 
What of the second sentence? Throughout the book Frank uses a 
number of synonyms for rational. such as reasonable or prudent, in appar-
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ent hope of avoiding the criticism that he is characterizing behavior as at 
the same time both rational and irrational. Is Frank arguing that reason-
able behavior is necessarily rational?2 If apparently irrational actions-the 
play of conditional cooperation in a fixed and known duration PD game-
end up serving my material interest, is he suggesting that we call such 
behavior reasonable but not rational? In discussing a rational man, does 
he mean to appeal to the individualistic approach of the eighteenth cen-
tury homme eclaire-we might call him enlightenment man-or that of 
twentieth century economic man, Homo economicus? If the former, is 
Frank arguing that since passionate behavior may be "reasonable," it is 
therefore rational? But if that is true, how can we define passionate behav-
ior as the negation of the counsel of reason? 
The introduction of Passions within Reason begins to explain what the 
author intends: "In this book, I make use of an idea from economics to 
suggest how noble human tendencies might not only have survived the 
ruthless pressures of the material world, but actually have been nurtured 
by them" (Frank 1988, ix). To achieve this goal, Frank must somehow 
explain the withstanding by altruistic behavioral propensities of the forces 
of individual level selection at the point where they first emerge at low fre-
quencies. He understands well the obstacle: "Biologists tell us that behav-
ior is shaped ultimately by material rewards, that the relentless pressures 
of natural selection will cull out any organism that foregoes opportunities 
for personal gain" (ix). 
Frank appears here to distance himself from this pop Darwinist view, 
but in limiting himself to an individual selectionist framework, he must 
ultimately accept it. He mischaracterizes Darwin, however, and biologists 
in general, as counseling a framework in which selection can take place 
only at the individual level. Darwin recognized the possibility of selection 
at the group level. He appealed to it parsimoniously, and so should we. 
But when an account of the origin of well-documented and widespread 
behavioral predispositions stubbornly refuses to yield to models based on 
individual level selection alone, group selection models offer a viable alter-
native. 
By choosing to operate within a framework that explicitly precludes 
selection above the level of the individual, Frank stacks the cards against 
himself and lays the groundwork for the difficulties that follow. He finds 
himself over and over again trying to conclude that behavior he defines as 
irrational is in fact rational. According to the law of contradiction in logic, 
a reasoning process that, based on the same evidence, leads to contradic-
2. The first definition given for reasonable in some dictionaries is rational; in most they 
are listed as synonyms. 
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tory conclusions is flawed, because a statement about the world cannot be 
both true and false (Dawes 1988, 9). The quagmires into which Frank 
descends might have been avoided had he abandoned the concern with 
whether or not behavior is rational and instead worked within an evolu-
tionary framework allowing group as well as individual level selection. 
Frank argues in the introduction (he is not the first; the idea goes back 
at least to Schelling 1960 and can be found also in Hirshleifer 1987) that it 
is rational to threaten to behave irrationally in order to deter theft or 
aggression, because such threats may deter such harm, thus benefiting the 
actor materially: "Being predisposed to respond irrationally serves much 
better here than being guided only by material self interest" (Frank 1988, 
x). The underpinnings of this critical argument are not, however, fully 
explored. Did natural selection favor propensities to practice "irrational" 
behavior at the point where they first emerged at low frequencies? If so, 
how can this have been if selection operated only at the level of the indi-
vidual organism? Or is this a statement about what works well for an ego-
istic "invader" confronting baseline human behavioral propensities whose 
origin is simply assumed? This latter claim is sustainable, since frequency 
dependent selection can, under such conditions, favor the behavior, which 
can then also be viewed as rational. 
We are led inexorably to the following contradiction. If being predis-
posed to respond irrationally serves "much better," then does that not, by 
definition, make such behavior rational (rational behavior is that which 
efficiently advances the material welfare of the agent)? Yet one cannot 
claim that a behavior is both irrational and rational and still have the 
terms retain meaning. Sooner or later, for example, threats to retaliate 
may have to be exercised, even when doing so can be stigmatized and will 
be stigmatized by Frank as irrational because the harm has already been 
incurred (costs are sunk) and retaliation invites an additional round of 
retaliation. 
This is precisely the issue that concerned the game theorist Reinhard 
Selten in 1965 when he developed the idea of subgame perfect rationality 
and its associated equilibrium concept. Selten rejected the idea, implicit in 
Schelling and Frank, that one could consider rational a strategy involving 
a threat to behave irrationally if a certain outcome was reached at a yet to 
be played stage of a multistage game. For a strategy to be considered ratio-
nal, Selten suggested, it must be rational for each of the component sub-
games. Since a commitment to retaliation after failed deterrence is not 
rational, neither is the entire strategy of which it forms part. Selten, how-
ever, was not concerned with whether, descriptively, such an announced 
strategy actually worked to deter aggression; his interest was whether one 
could term it rational. 
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Rather than continuing down a road that leads ultimately to unre-
solvable semantic and philosophic controversy, it is far better in my view 
to recast the entire argument-not just part of it-in evolutionary lan-
guage. One can then explore whether, or under what conditions, a behav-
ioral propensity to retaliate against cheaters or those who appear untrust-
worthy even where this is contrary to one's material interest serves to 
increase inclusive fitness. Whether such behavior satisfies Selten's or any-
one else's definition of individual rationality is beside the point in such 
analyses. 
As has been pointed out, one must guard against concluding that 
because a behavior can be viewed as rational for a strictly egotistical 
invader of a population of conditionally cooperative players, and no other 
invading strategy can do better, it therefore follows that the resulting 
cooperation has been explained as the consequence of egoistic rational 
choice or selection only at the individual level. One has accounted for the 
maintenance of an equilibrium-in particular its resistance to invasion by 
those who might essay defection-but one has not accounted for its origin. 
In such circumstances, there will be more than one equilibrium that can be 
sustained by frequency dependent selection. Others will not necessarily 
involve the cooperative outcomes just described. Through what dynamic 
evolutionary process has this particular equilibrium been "selected"? 
In any event, before trying to model cheating and the problem of 
detecting it, one must address an "irrational" behavioral predisposition 
that is logically prior: the practice of first move(r) altruism. The willing-
ness to refrain from cheating (or killing) those who have not previously 
violated one's trust, even when doing so may be contrary to one's material 
interest, is a manifestation of first move(r) altruism. Combining this pre-
disposition with the one Frank explicitly recognizes, a willingness to retal-
iate in response to defection (including defection against third parties), one 
has, essentially, an organism that practices Tit-for-Tat. 
A rational agent-one interested in efficiently advancing its material 
welfare-would not adopt cooperative or conditionally cooperative strate-
gies except under certain conditions. Conditionally cooperative strategies 
presuppose that one has already transitioned from single play, in which 
cooperation is unambiguously altruistic and irrational, to repeated play. In 
a two player fixed and known duration PD, one has to believe one's coun-
terparty irrational to do other than defect continuously. In two player PDs 
of indefinite duration, TFT can be defended, assuming others rationally 
play it as well. It leads to a Nash equilibrium, although not one that is 
unique. Similarly, in the multiplayer context of the first Axelrod tourna-
ment, one would have to have some reason for believing that the frequency 
of such strategies in the rest of the population would be high in order to 
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rationalize abandoning ALLD. Binmore argues that "no compelling rea-
sons exist for supposing that Nature will necessarily select a neighborly 
strategy like Tit-for-Tat. Nasty strategies that begin by playing hawk have 
at least as much right to a place on Nature's agenda" (1994, 175). 
But perhaps Binmore is wrong. Like Trivers and Frank, he is com-
mitted to an individual selectionist framework, and he finesses the transi-
tion from an environment of single play PD games to one in which 
indefinite repetition can be assumed or expected. If, as I am arguing, pre-
dispositions to practice first move(r) altruism, favored by selection above 
the level of the individual organism, are essential in providing a coherent 
evolutionary account of that transition, then, upon "arrival" in an envi-
ronment of indefinite repetition, one can interpret these predispositions as 
facilitating coordination on a conditionally cooperative strategy. Hard-
wired biases, a legacy of the transition, may, along with historical patterns 
of interaction, serve the function of a focal point in coordinating on one of 
a number of possible Nash equilibria (Schelling 1960, 54--58). In such an 
equilibrium, the guidance of "reason" and a nonrational PD solution 
module are no longer in conflict. The resulting equilibrium, but not the 
evolutionary trajectory that led to it, can then be viewed as undergirded by 
rational choice. 
Frank continues: "We will see that the modern presumption of a 
severe penalty for behaving morally is utterly without foundation" (Frank 
1988, xi). This confuses the observation that there is often little penalty for 
and in fact there may be benefits from operating "morally" within an estab-
lished social grouping with the problem of origination: how such behavior 
could have survived upon initial appearance at low frequencies. If one 
assumes, as does Frank, an evolutionary environment in which selection 
operates only at the individual level, predispositions to behave "morally" 
can never establish themselves. If groups with a higher frequency of 
"moral" actors grow more rapidly, and if these groups periodically disperse 
and re-form, then it is possible for predispositions to "moral" behavior, 
such as the practice of first move(r) altruism, to survive the penalty they 
experience at the individual level. And once organisms with such predispo-
sitions come to predominate, once P > e within a group, to use the language 
of chapter 2, it may be strictly "rational" for the meanest and most 
unscrupulous invader to behave as ifhe or she were strictly moral. 
But this is not Frank's argument. If the presumption of a "severe" 
penalty is "utterly without foundation," does the same hold for a "mild" 
penalty? He continues: "We have always known that society as a whole is 
better off when people respect the legitimate interests of others. What has 
not been clear, least of all to modern behavioral scientists, is that moral 
behavior often confers material benefits on the very individuals who prac-
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tice it." True enough. Students of the one-shot PD have long understood 
that cooperate-cooperate is the most jointly desirable of the three Pareto 
efficient outcomes; that egoism militates against the achievement of this 
outcome has always been the central core of the dilemma. We also know 
that, having invaded a population of conditionally cooperative players, 
practicing cooperation (behaving morally) confers material benefits on the 
invader, although there is no longer much that is "moral" about such 
behavior. 
Frank's problem, like that of Trivers, is that he believes that in eluci-
dating mechanisms of maintenance, he has shed light on origin. Upon first 
appearance, moral or cooperative behavior cannot easily survive the 
forces of individual level selection arrayed against it, if it is practiced in the 
presence of other rational actors interested in efficiently advancing their 
material welfare. At the point of first appearance, the issue is whether 
amoral behavior confers larger benefits, so that those operating morally 
suffer a reduction in relative fitness at the individual level. 
What we call moral behavior is likely to be altruistic at low frequen-
cies but mutualistic at high. The nub of the problem is transition. In evo-
lutionary biology, altruism is defined as behavior that increases the indi-
vidual level fitness of other organisms at the expense of the acting 
organism. Thus what Frank says cannot be true if he is addressing the 
problem of origin. Frank combines the correct empirical observation that 
altruistic behavior persists with the incorrect belief that only behavior that 
increases fitness at the level of the individual organism can persist to con-
clude,3 by implication, that altruistic behavior must have increased fitness 
at the individual level if and when it appeared initially at low frequencies 
in a population. 
Hatfields, McCoys, and Margaret Thatcher 
The main text of Frank's book (chap. 1) begins with a description of the 
feud between the Hatfields and McCoys, a classic conflict involving a 
bloody thirty-six-year-long cycle of vengeance and retribution. A striking 
empirical claim is immediately advanced: "The McCoys, or the Hatfields, 
could have ended the violence at any moment by not retaliating for the 
most recent attack. At each juncture it was clear that to retaliate would 
produce still another round of bloodshed" (Frank 1988, 2). The conclu-
sion, although intuitively plausible, is neither self-evident nor deducible 
3. The assumption is incorrect because behavioral tendencies that disadvantage an 
organism exhibiting them may persist and grow in population frequency if they benefit genes 
predisposing to them. 
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using the standard a priori assumptions of economic analysis and game 
theory. 
Frank has just described an episode in which Hatfields attempted to 
end the dispute once and for all by killing all the remaining members of the 
main McCoy family. The raid was not entirely successful. How can one 
conclude normatively, given the apparent intent of this raid, that failure to 
retaliate would have caused the bloodshed to end? Could one not equally 
well have argued that failure to retaliate would only have encouraged fur-
ther aggression and persuaded the Hatfields that the likely costs of com-
pleting their agenda were likely to be lower rather than higher? 
When one individual, or one group, is intent on destroying another, 
as was true with the German attempt to annihilate the Jewish people, or 
the Palestinian commitment to destroy the state of Israel, or the Serbian 
drive to extirpate Moslems in the Balkans in the 1990s,4 it is not at all clear 
that failure to retaliate even when such action involves costs both now and 
in the future is the key to cessation of violence. The argument that this is 
the key forms the centerpiece of pacifist philosophy, and within the logic 
of a strictly economic/game theoretic framework, there is a powerful ker-
nel of truth here. Pacifism stresses the irrationality of responding to vio-
lence with violence. Opponents of pacifism stress the irrationality of failing 
to follow through on a policy of deterrence, since absent a willingness and 
credible commitment to follow through, deterrence is worthless. How else 
to deter future attacks than to indicate to the attackers what will be the 
cost of such adventurism? Certainly, such arguments must have prevailed 
among both the McCoys and the Hatfields, just as they have prevailed 
among the Palestinians and the Israelis and, until very recently, among 
Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland. 
But can a priori economic theory, unnourished by empirical data on 
human behavioral propensities, support at one and the same time both 
pacifism and the theory of deterrence? The answer is that it cannot. Allow-
ing a role for such data, and partially converting a strictly game theoretic 
issue into a decision theoretic problem, is a step toward making progress 
beyond this apparent impasse. It can help, for example, explain coordina-
tion on a cooperative equilibrium in an indefinitely repeated game. But it 
is only a step, because in some contexts, such as the fixed and known dura-
tion PD game, or the problem faced by the proposer in a one shot ultima-
tum game, treating the problem as decision theoretic requires an asymme-
try in the degree of rationality attributed to each of the two players. 
Economic rationality as Nash understood it, or evolutionary 
4. I do not necessarily mean to equate the severity or moral status of the intentions of 
actors in each of these instances. 
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processes in a model where selection is restricted to the individual level, 
can no more explain the origin of the second pillar of Tit-for-Tat, a 
propensity to retaliate in response to defection, than it can the first: 
refraining from aggression until attacked. Indeed, a rational choice model 
reflecting psychological egoism, which assumes that agents will and should 
act efficiently to advance their material welfare, suggests that if it is in 
one's interest to attack another, one should do so right away, irrespective 
of past or present behavior of the target of one's attack. Thus one of the 
most famous pacifists of the twentieth century, the philosopher Bertrand 
Russell, as well as one of the originators of game theory, John von Neu-
mann, both advocated first strike against the Soviets in the early 1950s. "If 
you say why not bomb them tomorrow, I say why not today? If you say 
today at five o'clock, I say why not one o'clock?" The quote is attributed 
to von Neumann in an obituary published in 1957 (Blair 1957, cited in 
Poundstone 1992,143). 
Did advocates of first strike consider superpower relations a Pris-
oner's Dilemma, or did they actually think of themselves as playing the 
related game of chicken? The question has broader implications. Evolu-
tionary game theorists such as Maynard-Smith have analyzed frequency 
dependent selection in environments in which organisms interact accord-
ing to the payoffs of the game of chicken, a variant of which Maynard-
Smith called hawk-dove. Some seem to have seen in these analyses an 
account of the origin of complex social organization. 
Chicken is commonly illustrated by the scene in the James Dean film 
Rebel without a Cause, in which two adolescents drive cars as fast as they 
can toward a cliff (one could also imagine them being driven straight 
toward each other). The first to swerve loses. A game of chicken is not, 
however, a Prisoner's Dilemma. In particular, it has two (not one) pure 
strategy equilibria, and consequently does not share with the PD the fea-
ture that defect (don't swerve) is a dominant strategy. If both parties 
choose not to swerve, the very worst outcome for each results (death). If 
one knows for certain one's counterparty won't swerve, the rational choice 
is to swerve. The assumption reflected in the assumed payoffs in the game 
is that both parties prefer living to dying-to swerve if the other guy does-
n't-although they much prefer the outcome where the other guy blinks. 
My emphasis in this work-shared by Axelrod, Kavka (1986, 
110-11), and many others, including, implicitly, Hobbes-is that PD, not 
chicken, is the appropriate metaphor for the asocial state. It is the relevant 
vehicle for thinking about whether altruism, including the altruism 
reflected in restraint on first strike, can survive a world in which natural 
selection operates only at the individual level. 
One can argue that superpower relations, even though they take place 
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in the absence of an overarching Leviathan, do not reflect the conditions 
of the original state because such relations are already embedded in a pat-
tern of continuing interaction, making possible self-enforcing cooperative 
equilibria. Nevertheless, nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass 
destruction, which raise the possibility of total annihilation of a foe, 
severely call into question the necessary applicability of the assumption of 
continued interaction. 
Was von Neumann thinking PD when he thought about superpower 
relations, or was he thinking chicken? William Poundstone, von Neu-
mann's biographer, clearly thought the former descriptor appropriate, 
inasmuch as he titled his book after the game. To see superpower relations 
as a PD is to see first strike (defect) as the dominant strategy for both par-
ties: preferable irrespective of the action of the other party. 
There may be merit in thinking about superpower relations as a 
sequential rather than a simultaneous move PD. Either player has the 
option of moving first, but once the move has occurred, the counterparty 
has an opportunity to respond. To attack first and achieve domination 
without retaliation is most preferred. But least preferred is the reverse sce-
nario, with mutual incineration preferred to that possibility. Is there any 
evidence that advocates of first strike had such preferences? Did they really 
prefer an exchange of nuclear attacks in which they and/or their families 
were no longer living to being overrun but perhaps ending up alive under 
communism? Apparently so. A common refrain of first strike advocates in 
the 1950s was "Better dead than red." These words imply a very precise 
preference ordering. 
If that sentiment is taken seriously, nuclear conflagration (the defect-
defect outcome) was preferred to the cooperate-defect outcome (our 
behavior listed first), although the most preferred outcome was of course 
defect-cooperate. The worst case imaginable was for us to fail to attack, 
give up the advantage of the offense, and be attacked and overrun by the 
enemy (cooperate-defect). Most preferred was the plan of action recom-
mended by von Neumann and Russell: we attack at one o'clock (it is now 
12:59), and the enemy is either too devastated, too demoralized, or too 
rational to strike back (defect-cooperate). But if for whatever reason these 
calculations turn out to be wrong, and attack does provoke retaliation, 
nuclear exchange (defect-defect) is still preferable to the prospect of being 
on the receiving end of an unprovoked attack (cooperate-defect). Finally, 
since the Nash algorithm assumes one's counterparty is also reasoning in 
a similar rational manner, one must conclude that a Soviet attack is immi-
nent. Prudence, therefore, along with less noble sentiments, reinforces this 
conclusion: push the button now. 
If the alternative of rolling over and surrendering after a first strike 
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(cooperate-defect) is in fact preferred by policymakers to the defect-defect 
outcome, even though defect-cooperate is preferred to both, then we 
should characterize superpower relations as a game of chicken. Some pol-
icymakers may have so preferred. It is likely that both Kennedy and 
Khrushchev did so in the Cuban missile crisis. But not advocates of first 
strike. In October 1962 von Neumann had been dead for five years. But 
we can speculate what his advice would have been. We know that he 
advocated first strike in 1950. Before he died in 1957 he told the Harvard 
philosopher Hilary Putnam he was "absolutely certain 1) that there 
would be a nuclear war and 2) that everyone would die from it" (Putnam 
1979, 114). 
Where could that absolute certainty have come from? I speculate that 
it was from the mathematical certainty that defect was a dominant strat-
egy in a one-shot PD, an analysis related to von Neumann's advocacy of 
first strike. If the question was only when, he wanted to get in the first lick. 
The idea that hardwired restraints on intraspecific harm stood in the way 
of nuclear holocaust would have been dismissed by von Neumann as 
laughable-and perhaps also by many social and behavioral scientists 
today. But if such a position is laughable, you must ask yourself this: 
would you have been with von Neumann and Russell in advocating first 
strike against the Soviets in 1950? Would you, in 1962, have been with 
Curtis LeMay in criticizing Kennedy's blockade strategy as analogous to 
Chamberlain's actions at Munich in 1938? And if not, why not? 
Neither the Soviets nor the Americans ended up pursuing the course of 
action recommended by von Neumann. Instead, a policy of mutual assured 
destruction (MAD) emerged on both sides. At the end of his book Frank 
discusses the logic of this strategy, which is based on the premise that nei-
ther party will attack because the other side will retain sufficient force to 
launch a devastating reprisal. The apparently straightforward argument 
here is that while first strike might be rational if the counterparty lacked the 
capability to retaliate, the situation changes if that condition no longer 
obtains. But this interpretation misses a subtlety of the von Neumann 
analysis. His reasoning did not so much count on the absence of a Soviet 
ability to retaliate to our first strike as on the absence of a will to do so. 
If we follow Selten we are led to conclude that to deter by threat of 
retaliation and to be deterred from launching a first strike by threat of 
retaliation are both irrational stances, because once a first strike has been 
launched by one's counterparty there is nothing left to deter, and retalia-
tion invites yet another round of attacks, with devastation to both sides 
(Frank 1988, 243). Following through this chain of reasoning regarding 
the implications of a noncredible threat of retaliation, one can, by assum-
ing one's counterparty is rational, forecast no retaliation and therefore 
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conclude that it is rational to launch a first strike! A key question in 
nuclear strategy is therefore whether we rely on the Nash algorithm, 
refined by Seiten, for forecasting counterparty behavior or also allow some 
input from an inductive/empirical methodology for which there is little or 
no room within the Nash framework. 5 Why? Because as an empirical mat-
ter an actor might be willing irrationally to forego first strike if he or she 
had some grounds for believing the counterparty would irrationally do the 
same and in particular if the actor believed the counterparty might irra-
tionally retaliate if attacked. 
I don't mean to suggest that von Neumann discounted entirely the 
possibility of retaliation. However, he did not, as did others, view his pro-
posed course of action as recklessly endangering the security of the United 
States (in fact he believed failure to follow his counsel would have that 
effect). I do mean to argue that his chain of reasoning was partially 
premised on the likelihood that the Soviets, if perhaps foolish in delaying 
their own strike, would nevertheless be rational in the Nash/Selten sense 
following our attack on them. 
The unsettling implications of this logic underlay the Doomsday 
machine in the film Dr. Strangelove and concerns on the part of both U.S. 
and Soviet nuclear strategists that military personnel might not be capable 
"irrationally" of pulling the nuclear retaliatory trigger after an initial strike. 
Repeated publicized drills among silo crews in which personnel never knew 
whether they were dealing with a drill or the real thing were, and are, essen-
tial in creating the equivalent of human/mechanical Doomsday machines 
and making sure their existence was, and is, known to adversaries.6 
5. Dixit and Skeath's analytic narrative of the Cuban missile crisis fudges a bit in sug-
gesting that there was, from the standpoint of subgame perfect rational choice theory, no 
difficulty in assuming that the United States would carry through on its implied threat of 
nuclear war if the Soviets had not backed down (Dixit and Skeath 1999, chap. 13). Accord-
ing to the logic of backward induction, the United States would not have done so, and the 
Soviets, realizing this, should have faced no incentive to agree to withdraw the missiles. Dixit 
and Skeath speak of making incredible threats credible by creating a situation characterized 
by "controlled lack of control" (451), and they integrate Graham Allison's emphasis on how 
bureaucratic politics created an environment where neither leader completely controlled the 
situation (Allison 1971). It was the Soviet knowledge that this might be so that made the U.S. 
threat credible. This logic is similar to that used by Richard Nixon when he argued that he 
wanted his counterparties to think he was a little bit crazy. Thus he wanted to be rationally 
irrational. But if our thinking is to be precise, and we wish to use the term rational in a con-
sistent fashion, we must reject this kind of argument as embodying a contradiction. 
6. The Doomsday machine was wired to launch a devastating reprisal if the Soviet 
Union was attacked. It could not be countermanded. A key element of the script emphasized 
the Soviets' error in keeping their machine secret. In the real world, the design of both U.S. 
and Soviet (now Russian) launch sites has been driven by two powerful and to some degree 
opposed imperatives. First, make it impossible for "Lone Rangers" to go ahead and imple-
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Frank seems at the same time to say that MAD made and makes 
sense even though it is not based on assuming strict rationality among 
players (it does not satisfy the criteria for subgame perfect rationality),7 
whereas the conflict between the Hatfields and the McCoys did not make 
sense, because actors failed to operate according to the counsel of strict 
rationality. He can't have it both ways. He cannot dignify pacifism in 
response to aggression as rational, stigmatizing retaliation as irrational, 
while at the same time appearing to dignify MAD as rational and opposi-
tion to it as irrational. With no more and no less legitimacy, the labels in 
each of these cases can be reversed. In the absence of additional assump-
tions about, or empirical evidence pertaining to, human behavioral 
propensities, rational choice models, by themselves, provide a poor means 
of predicting outcomes in these cases or, for that matter, of providing use-
ful normative guidance. As Rapaport and Chammah observed, "Once the 
limits of two-person zero-sum games are transcended, game theory, while 
remaining a powerful tool for analyzing the logical structure of conflicts of 
interest, loses its prescriptive power. In this realm, strategically rationaliz-
able courses of action are frequently intuitively unacceptable and vice 
versa" (1965,23). 
One can as easily use such models to justify a unilateral cease-fire, 
what Frank seems retrospectively to counsel for the Hatfield-McCoy 
conflict, or even unilateral disarmament, as to argue the contrary position. 
Rational choice models unenriched by data on human behavioral propen-
sities are unable to provide guidance as to which type of action is more 
likely to reduce violence as opposed to encouraging more of it. 
I belabor this point because it is the first major proposition advanced 
by Frank and because the problems with it illustrate the incomplete and 
contradictory nature of his analysis. The subtitle of Passions within Reason 
is The Strategic Use of Emotions. It is indeed common for evolutionary 
ment the von NeumannlNash/Russell strategy. This is done through dual key systems with 
locks positioned at sufficient distance (beyond arms' reach) so that one person cannot turn 
them both simultaneously. At least two authorized individuals must agree that codes received 
represent a valid launch order. The second imperative is to train personnel so that, upon 
receipt of such orders, they will have no more hesitation in turning their key than does a 
Secret Service agent in interposing her body between a bullet and the president, in spite of the 
fact that reflection might suggest the irrationality of the action of the Secret Service agent, or 
that of the missile technician who obliterates multiple enemy cities, given that deterrence has 
evidently failed. The compromises involved in trying to reconcile these conflicting impera-
tives do not make for pretty reading or encourage sound sleep. See Leslie 1996 (chap. I). 
7. Again, this is Selten's (1965) language. So long as there is a decision point after the 
aggressive attack, the threat of retaliation is not credible if each player believes the other to 
be rational, since at that point deterrence has failed and mutual assured destruction is disas-
trous for both parties. 
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biologists to talk about strategies adopted by organisms, even those lack-
ing consciousness or intentionality. Economic (normative) game theory 
models, however, involve conscious choice informed by reason. But the 
essence of truly emotional behavior is that it represents a short-circuiting 
of the behavioral guide provided by reason, narrowly and precisely 
defined. Thus it is a contradiction to interpret the use of emotions as 
strategic, if that implies that they are chosen rationally. One can, within an 
evolutionary framework, explore whether organisms with emotional 
repertoires end up with fitness advantages, but this brings us to the ques-
tion of whether, within such a framework, selection is operating only at 
the level of the individual organism. 
If one has been attacked and is told by the attacker to surrender at the 
risk of further attack, why, from the standpoint of the Nash reasoning 
algorithms, should the damage one has just incurred, assuming it has not 
damaged retaliatory capabilities, affect the decision on whether or not to 
initiate military operations against the other actor? After all, bygones are 
bygones: the costs are already sunk, and no action can restore the damage. 
What is the point of sending millions more to their death? On the other 
hand, if one concludes that it is rational now to harm the attacker, because 
one had previously threatened to do so under these conditions, why was it 
not rational to do so before the attack, when one would have had the 
advantage of the offense? 
The entire theory of deterrence is based on the proposition that we 
will irrationally forgo the offensive advantage of first strike, that we will 
irrationally retaliate if we are hit by such a strike, and that we can expect 
our counterparty irrationally to act according to the same logic. Mutual 
assured destruction, a version of Tit-for-Tat, albeit with very large stakes, 
is premised on the idea that humans possess some sort of specialized neu-
robiological subsystems that will predispose us to overrule the counsels of 
pure reason when confronted with problems of this sort. More concretely, 
it is premised on the proposition that policymakers will overrule the coun-
sel of John von Neumann and Bertrand Russell. 
Either there is a separate category of behavior that is not driven by 
the dictates of reason (emotional behavior), or there is not. If there is a 
separate category, then emotional behavior is not rational, and rational 
behavior is not emotional. If there is not a separate category, then Frank's 
entire discussion of the problem of mimicry (people pretending to be emo-
tional when they are not) is irrelevant. Mimicry would be of no value 
because those attempting it would be perceived to be pretending to be will-
ing to act in ways that no one would find credible. If emotional behavior is 
actually under the control of reason, then it cannot serve to make other-
wise noncredible commitments or threats credible. 
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Whether or not MAD (or, for that matter, Tit-for-Tat) is truly mad (if 
madness be the absence of rationality) is, from an evolutionary stand-
point, beside the point. Genetic factors that predispose toward certain 
types of behavior, including emotional behavior, may have engendered 
feedback loops that caused action inclinations underlying them to spread 
and persist. If they have spread and persisted, and if we understand how 
that could have occurred, that is all we need to reconcile natural selection 
and the theory of evolution with a positive, empirically based description 
of essential human behavioral tendencies. 
The theory and practice of deterrence make no sense unless one 
assumes that humans possess baseline predispositions to behave in funda-
mentally irrational ways. Ifwe assume all actors are "rational" (concerned 
only about their own material welfare), each should feel free to launch a 
first strike without fear of retaliation, secure in the knowledge that an 
attacked counterparty would realize the irrationality of striking back. 
Since attack could permit territorial aggrandizement or other political 
gains, each should attack right away: failure to move first, with its atten-
dant advantages, will be irrational when there is no threat of retaliation. It 
is in part because an actor assumes his counterparty is not rational and will 
not accept the argument that bygones are bygones, costs are sunk, and so 
on, that he does not launch a first strike. Of course the counterparty 
refrains from first strike because she makes the same calculation. Such 
behavior may appear intuitively to be in some sense reasonable, but from 
within the framework of game theoretical analysis, we cannot avoid the 
conclusion that deterrence works only because each party assumes the 
other is fundamentally irrational and is prepared to act in a similarly irra-
tional fashion. 
In addition to John von Neumann and Bertrand Russell, a number of 
other military and civilian opinion leaders in both Britain and the United 
States argued for a first strike against the Soviet Union shortly after its 
acquisition of the atomic bomb. Those arguing for obliteration of the 
country President Reagan would subsequently stigmatize as the "evil 
empire" included Winston Churchill, Douglas MacArthur, and Francis P. 
Matthews, secretary of the Navy under Truman. Matthews's language was 
the most florid. He argued that the United States had to overcome what-
ever unease its democratic heritage might induce and get comfortable with 
the idea of being "aggressors for peace." 
But Russell's stance is the most surprising. Known as a lifelong 
pacifist and for his work as the first leader of the Campaign for Nuclear 
Disarmament, throughout the middle 1950s Russell denied his early sup-
port for a "preventive war" against the Soviet Union. In a 1959 BBC inter-
view he was confronted with evidence of his earlier advocacy and forced to 
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acknowledge it. When pressed as to why he had so long denied this advo-
cacy, he claimed he had "completely forgotten" his earlier position 
(Poundstone 1992,4, 141-64, 195-96).8 
It is not clear how close the United States came to becoming an 
"aggressor for peace." Curtis LeMay, commander of the air squadron that 
delivered nuclear bombs to Hiroshima and Nagasaki and subsequently 
director of the U.S. Strategic Air Command and an influential military 
leader throughout the 1950s and into the early 1960s, was widely viewed as 
favoring such action.9 Undoubtedly there were similar discussions about 
the desirability of first strikes on the Soviet side. In the event, cooler, pre-
sumably less rational (!) minds prevailed, and the formally irrational 
MAD strategy took hold on both sides. But why? Why did the latter strat-
egy, which involved mutual grants of first move(r) altruism, prevail, 
whereas von Neumann's and Russell's quintessentially rational approach 
did not? 
One consideration commonly adduced to explain U.S. hesitation 
involves the question of whether we came close to having the technical 
capacity for a first strike that would effectively have obliterated the Soviet 
Union's ability to inflict damaging retaliation. Advocacy of first strike is 
sometimes defended on the grounds that there was a brief window in the 
early 1950s, after the Soviets had the atomic bomb but before they had the 
hydrogen bomb, during which the United States had that capability. 
There are historical grounds for questioning whether this was true: the 
number of operational warheads during this period on either side was 
small and, to each party, uncertain. If it in fact was true that we had this 
8. It is an interesting footnote in intellectual history that Russell, at the turn of the cen-
tury, declared that the theory of evolution, in contrast with mathematical logic, had no 
significant implications for philosophy (Sterelny and Griffiths 1999, 3). Consistent with his 
strong support for the centrality of mathematical logic, he questioned the indispensability of 
causal reasoning, necessary if we are going to allow data on past or baseline behavior to be 
used in forecasting how humans will act. He compared the law of causality to the British 
monarchy, both surviving because they are "erroneously supposed to do no harm" (Russell 
1918,180; cited in Sperber 1995, xvi). Consideration of first strike has periodically resurfaced 
in discussions of U.S. military strategy. Kennedy's secretary of defense, Robert McNamara, 
examined the option briefly before rejecting it as infeasible, and during the first Reagan 
administration there was much talk that nuclear war was winnable (Fitzgerald 2000, 92, 150). 
9. At a meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council during 
the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, LeMay basically accused Kennedy of cowardice for his fail-
ure to accept plans for aerial bombardment followed by full scale invasion of Cuba: "This 
blockade and political action, I see leading right into war. ... I don't see any other solution 
... This is almost as bad as the appeasement at Munich." Kennedy responded, "I appreciate 
your views. These are unsatisfactory alternatives. The obvious argument for the blockade 
was [that] what we want to do is to avoid, if we can, nuclear war by escalation or imbalance" 
(May and Zelikow 1997,178,186). 
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capability, so that we can completely discount the risk that a retaliatory 
capability would have survived our first strike, we need to ask why the 
United States did not overcome its scruples as a democratic state and 
embark on this course of action. 
Actually, we need to ask this question even if one makes the contrary 
assumption, that the limited number of warheads made the United States 
unable to neutralize the counterparty's retaliatory capability. It was still 
arguably "rational" to strike first, since the Nash/Selten solution concept 
counsels assuming one's counterparty is rational and a rational opponent 
would, having experienced a first strike, have no interest in retaliating 
(damage has already been done, deterrence failed, what is the point of 
killing ten million of the enemy just to show you were not bluffing?). An 
equally powerful line of reasoning reinforces the argument for first strike: 
whether or not one's counterparty is evil incarnate, it will perform the same 
reasoning, and conclude it should attackfirst. There will be von Neumanns 
and Russells on the other side. Therefore, both parties, concluding ratio-
nally that attack is imminent, or hoping to get the jump on a less timely 
(and more foolish) counterparty, launch aggressive war that they may 
"rationalize" as defensive. 10 The Nash equilibrium is reached in a no regret 
conflagration, whose logic is captured beautifully by Stanley Kubrick and 
screenwriter Terry Southern in the closing images of Dr. Strangelove, as a 
wildly happy, indeed ecstatic, U.S. Air Force pilot sits astride a U.S. 
bomb, waving his cowboy hat as he and his payload fall away from a B-52. 
One of the central characters in the screenplay, Jack D. Ripper, is 
widely believed to have been modeled on Curtis LeMay. The film has been 
interpreted as reflecting the monumental irrationality, indeed madness, of 
certain types of strategic thinking, but as I have tried to indicate, a differ-
ent perspective can. suggest the contrary, if one defines madness as the 
absence of rationality, narrowly and precisely defined. 
The same kind of logic that could lead one to conclude that a first 
strike entailed no risk of retaliation led Yale Brazen, a student of indus-
trial organization, to conclude that one need not worry about the threat of 
retaliation (for cheating) as a mechanism that might maintain price cartels: 
"such action would be as irrational and as unlikely as predatory pricing" 
(Brozen 1982, 136). This type of reasoning, which involves denying the 
existence or likelihood of a phenomenon for which there is substantial 
empirical evidence, based on the predictions of a model whose behavioral 
10. There is, of course, no need truly to "rationalize" first strike: within a Nash universe 
it is, as von Neumann saw, the epitome of rationality. The fact that even Hitler felt compelled 
to rationalize his aggressive actions as defensive is testimony to a widely shared human pre-
disposition not to accept the von Neumann conclusions. 
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assumptions are supported by an incomplete understanding of evolution-
ary theory, is paradigmatic of a style of economic argument one finds 
difficult, sometimes, to credit as scientific. In terms of the decision theo-
retic character of the problem, the issue in many instances again comes 
down to whether the theoretical algorithm or an alternate empiricaVinduc-
tive methodology gives the better forecasts of counterparty behavior. 
Reliance on models premised on the Nash algorithm (enriched by the Sel-
ten equilibrium "refinement") leaves unanswered the puzzling empirical 
questions of why we do not live in a war of all against all and how it is that 
complex social organization, including felonious behavior like cartel for-
mation in the United States (Wiley 1988), as well as that we may value 
more positively, ever arises and persists. 
Frank continues his discussion of the Hatfield-McCoy conflict by 
asking, "What prompts such behavior? Surely not a clear-headed assess-
ment of self-interest. If a rational action is one that promotes the actor's 
interest, it is manifestly irrational to retaliate in the face of such devastat-
ing costs" (Frank 1988, 2). Here Frank unequivocally embraces the irra-
tionality of following through on threats central to a deterrence strategy, 
an endorsement that some, indeed Frank himselflater in the book, are less 
willing to accept. Obviously, many European Jews, using Frank's 
Hatfield-McCoy prescription and having witnessed wanton violence such 
as occurred on Kristallnacht, made these calculations as they were shipped 
by Germans to concentration camps where they met their demise. Those 
who participated in the Warsaw uprising reasoned differently. The judg-
ment of whether or not their actions were rational is a philosophical one 
that the tools of economics cannot and have not answered. What Frank 
takes as obvious is not at all obvious. 
We know from historical (nonexperimental) evidence that sometimes 
people retaliate even though the costs are high and the chances of their sur-
vival almost nil. We know from such evidence that countries often refrain 
from attacking their neighbors, even when their neighbors are weak and 
there might be gains from so doing. The apparently inconceivable idea 
that the United States might engage in hostilities with Canada has figured 
as a comic theme in a number of recent films such as the scatalogical but 
intermittently funny South Park: Bigger, Longer, and Uncut (1999). (Of 
course armed forces of the United States have invaded Canada twice, most 
recently during the War of 1812.) We know from the evidence of history 
that strategic bombing rarely weakens the willingness of enemies to resist. 
We know from the evidence of history that people will sometimes fight and 
die to defend their country. 
We also know from the evidence of history that people will sometimes 
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vote (see chap. l).ll We know that people will sometimes make anony-
mous donations to charity, or leave tips at restaurants they will never 
revisit, or donate blood for the benefit of others they will never meet (more 
than nine million people in the United States do so annually) (Hunt 1990, 
13; data are from the American Red Cross). We know from experimental 
evidence that people will sometimes return wallets full of money that they 
find in the street, or play cooperate in single play PD games, or retaliate at 
cost to themselves against third party rule violators. Perhaps most impor-
tant, we know that people and states will often refrain from first strike, 
even when doing so exposes them to risk. None of these behaviors can, con-
sidered in isolation, be defended as rational according to the strong definition 
set forth in the prologue. 
Frank effectively makes the case that people engage in irrational 
behavior that can be beneficial to a group. But he also argues correctly 
that such behavior may, if it is sufficiently widely practiced, also be 
beneficial to the individuals who make up the group. If the behavior is 
beneficial to the individual, though, how can it be characterized as irra-
tional? I suggested a resolution of this conundrum in chapter 2 by propos-
ing that the altruistic character of an action can be frequency dependent 
and that by appealing to group selection we can explain how a behavior, 
altruistic at low frequency, may increase in frequency to the point that it 
becomes mutualistic. This is a solution, however, that Frank rules out of 
bounds ab initio. 
Frank's first chapter continues by noting that social and natural sci-
entists have invested a great deal of time and resources in attempting to 
account for seemingly irrational behavior, usually by trying to identify 
some overlooked source of gain to the agent, certainly a true statement. 
He mentions two examples of such arguments and his tone implies skepti-
cism about each. The first is the treatment of kin selection by evolutionary 
biologists. His reservations are based not on an objection to its logic but 
rather on doubts as to whether the evidence for altruism can all be slotted 
into this category. This is an entirely reasonable concern, since a great deal 
of altruistic behavior is not directed toward close kin. 
The second reference is to IRS tax compliance philosophy: "Or, econ-
omists will explain that it makes sense for the Internal Revenue Service to 
spend $10,000 to prosecute someone who owes $100 in taxes, because it 
therefore encourages broader compliance with the tax laws." The tone 
II. As Morris Fiorina puts it, "There have been any number of minor debates-is the 
probability of a tied election 10 -15 or 10-12 and so forth-but the bottom line remains: no 
individual's impact on the election outcome is sufficiently great that his or her expected 
benefit from voting exceeds his or her cost" (Fiorina 1990, 334). Note that the existence of an 
informed electorate is as much of a paradox for a rational choice theorist. 
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suggests that Frank views this as obviously silly. But if he thinks MAD is 
a defensible strategy for a rational actor to pursue, he should certainly 
approve of what the IRS does. The IRS is behaving irrationally to make its 
threats credible and increase compliance rates, which helps it achieve its 
mission. This is another case of behavior that can be rejected as irrational 
on narrow cost-benefit terms (why should we spend $10,000 of taxpayer 
money to recover $100?) or defended for its deterrence effect, just as the 
Israelis defended retaliatory raids for Palestinian rocket attacks. If, on the 
other hand, Frank is skeptical of the rational foundation of deterrence the-
ory, does he believe that economic theory implies that pacifism is an 
appropriate policy? Or does his skepticism drive him to advocate first 
strikes? 
The text proceeds to discuss conflicts, such as the Falkland Islands 
war between Argentina and England. 
Both sides knew perfectly well that the windswept, desolate islands 
were of virtually no economic or strategic significance. At one point 
in history it might have made sense for the British to defend them 
anyway, as means of deterring aggression against other more valu-
able parts of a far-flung empire. But today, of course, there is no 
empire to protect. For much less than the British spent in the conflict, 
they could have given each Falklander a Scottish castle and a gener-
ous pension. (Frank 1988, 3) 
One can add that for the combined Union and Confederate costs of 
the Civil War, all slaves could have been purchased at market prices and 
provided with forty acres and a mule. In fact, in the 1830s in the British 
Caribbean, government revenues were pledged to service bonds issued to 
free slaves by buying them from their owners at market prices. So what is 
the point? Is Frank saying that Margaret Thatcher was irrational to pur-
sue this conflict? He clearly implies that deterrence might have been ratio-
nal if Britain had still controlled Canada. But earlier he has argued, in dis-
cussing the Hatfields and McCoys, that retaliation to aggression is never 
rational, since the costs have already been incurred (bygones are bygones) 
and retaliation just invites more death and destruction. 
Apparently Thatcher's actions were not motivated by reason, because 
the beginning sentence of the next paragraph reads as follows: "Many 
actions, purposely taken with full knowledge of their consequences, are 
irrational." Frank notes that such behavior is often attributed to passions 
overcoming reasoned pursuit of self interest and that normatively, it is 
often claimed, one of our main challenges as humans is to control our pas-
sions to avoid such outcomes. He then says, "My claim, on the contrary, is 
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that passions often serve our needs very well" (Frank 1988,4). But if pas-
sionate behavior is truly perceived as purposive, it cannot have the effects 
Frank claims for it, for it cannot increase a counterparty's subjective belief 
that you may, in the future, irrationally retaliate for attack. If such behav-
ior serves our needs "very well," it surely does so better than other strate-
gies and therefore must be rational. Yet Frank has just characterized such 
behavior as irrational. He goes on to talk about how "The apparent con-
tradiction arises ... because we face important problems that simply can-
not be solved by rational action. The common feature of these problems is 
that to solve them we must commit ourselves to behave in ways that may 
later prove contrary to our interests." 
Thus nuclear antagonists feel compelled to build Doomsday 
machines or their equivalent, and humans feel compelled to threaten to 
behave emotionally if challenged or attacked. The "important problems" 
with which Frank is concerned are strategic: they involve interactions with 
other parties with decision-making capability. What exactly, however, 
does it mean for one party to "solve" a problem? Does it mean to act in a 
fashion that Frank views as socially desirable? Does it mean, precisely, to 
arrive at a Pareto efficient outcome of a game? Not all of the efficient out-
comes are as jointly desirable as others. In 1938 Hitler solved his problem 
by seizing Czechoslovakia. Neville Chamberlain "solved" his problem by 
not retaliating. Pareto efficient outcome: within the scope of available pos-
sibilities, neither party could be made better off without making the other 
worse off. It was, however, a better "solution" for Hitler than it was for 
Chamberlain or the Czechs. During the Cold War, on the other hand, the 
United States and the Soviet Union "solved" their problem by spending 
hundreds of billions of dollars on arms that most military personnel had 
no intention of ever using, because they expected deterrence to work. 
Pareto inefficient outcome. Nevertheless personnel were "fully prepared" 
to use them had deterrence failed, even though they knew that to do so 
would be irrational. 
Committing to be irrational cannot serve one's interest if one has no 
intention of retaliating if first attacked and if this is so perceived. But if one 
intends to retaliate after attack, then the overall strategy cannot be sub-
game perfect rational. How then can such behavior be truly purposive? If 
the terms rational and irrational are to have meaning, we cannot simulta-
neously characterize behaviors as, at one and the same time, both (this was 
the essence of the issue that bothered Selten). Again, the advantage of an 
evolutionary approach is evident. If one allows multilevel selection, one 
can argue that behavior that reduces the fitness of an individual organism 
may nevertheless increase in populations if it increases the inclusive fitness 
of the genes that predispose toward it. 
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Frank goes on to analyze deterrence explicitly. An individual who has 
a reputation for striking back, even at great cost, may not be tested 
because of the fear of such retaliation. It is, of course, this logic that under-
lies the argument that a large standing army, along with air and naval 
forces, is the surest way to prevent these military capabilities from being 
used. The strategy of Mutual Assured Deterrence (MAD) was associated 
with the absence of nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet 
Union during the four decades of the Cold War. One can argue that by 
spending so much for arms, both the United States and the Soviet Union 
signaled their willingness to behave irrationally-reducing consumption 
levels to build more and more bombs and delivery systems. Thus, accord-
ing to this logic, the other side had fewer doubts that their opponent would 
respond to a first strike with devastating retaliation, even though the 
injury of a first strike could not be undone and even though retaliation 
would result in tens of millions of additional deaths. Of course, one can 
ask, from a strictly decision theoretic standpoint, why evidence that one's 
counterparty is behaving irrationally should increase the precision of one's 
estimate of his or her future behavior. 
Large military forces can be accumulated not only by those who wish 
to deter aggression but also by those who see war, as did Carl von Clause-
witz, as a continuation of political intercourse by other means (Clausewitz 
1873, chap. 1). There were those on both sides of the Cold War who 
believed that their counterparty intended to acquire a first strike capability 
and use its threat or actuality as a vehicle for territorial aggrandizement or 
world domination. This fear led to arguments on both sides in favor of 
preemptive attacks to remove options from the accumulator, arguments 
that dovetailed with perhaps less morally defensible aspirations for domi-
nation or territorial gain. These mutually reinforcing arguments remind us 
that in Prisoner's Dilemmas, both prudence-action designed to protect 
against catastrophic loss-and avarice-action intended to reap the 
largest possible gain-counsel defection. 
MAD may have prevented the defect-defect outcome, but in doing so 
it established a hair trigger, and hair raising, international environment, in 
which the slightest miscalculation, data processing error, or failure in the 
chain of command could have unleashed untold destruction. Why did 
MAD, this formally irrational strategy, succeed in preventing mutual 
destruction? Perhaps we were lucky. But a contributing factor was 
assuredly that the game of deterrence played itself out within the context of 
a configuration of human reasoning and behavioral propensities that 
implicitly guided the choices of key players. That configuration is not ade-
quately reflected in the typical assumptions of normative game theory or in 
the standard economic model embodying a strong version of rationality. 
182 Altruistically Inclined? 
There are other historical examples: certainly mid-twentieth century 
Germany, where deterrence failed, or perhaps was not seriously 
attempted, and the obvious attractiveness and rationality of aggressive 
war prevailed. Taking a broad view, however, what is puzzling from the 
standpoint of a strictly rational approach is not how much war there is but 
how little. Again, without introducing empirical evidence on human 
behavioral propensities and, ideally, accounting for these propensities 
within a consistent evolutionary framework, rational choice models in and 
of themselves cannot take us very far in helping us deal with the vexing 
problems of deterrence, armament, and disarmament. 12 Nor can they take 
us very far in understanding the origin of complex social organization, 
with which these issues are formally analogous. 
Unfairness, Ultimatums, and Bargaining Games 
From the standpoint of a nation or ruler, the most effective deployment of 
military power may well be where it can be used as a tool for intimidation, 
and military and political objectives can be obtained with little or no dam-
age to one's forces. There is an old Jack Benny joke in which the comedian 
describes being held up by a mugger who announces, "Your money or 
your life!" Benny replies, very slowly, "I'm thinking." The humor arises 
because we see the conflict between the apparently rational response (hand 
over the money) and our knowledge that some people will, as does Benny, 
hesitate or, in the extreme, infuriated by this demand, fight or throw the 
money into the river. 
Such "irrational" behavior is highlighted in ultimatum game experi-
ments involving a slightly less extreme story line. In these games, a "pro-
poser" offers a division of a fixed sum. If the counterparty accepts the divi-
sion, the money is split as proposed. Otherwise, neither gets anything. The 
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for a game involving $10, with a mini-
mum denomination offer of $ 0.01, is for the proposer to demand $9.99 
and the counterparty to accept $ 0.01. Most experimental subjects, how-
ever, reject such demands, and therefore most who demand $9.99 end up 
with nothing. 
Earlier, with regard to the Falklands war, Frank argued, "Many 
actions, purposely taken with full knowledge of their consequences, are 
irrational." Is rejecting a positive offer in an ultimatum game an example 
of such action? Frank seems ambivalent. On the one hand, those who 
12. As Rapaport and Chammah concluded in 1965, "it is typical of arguments in sup-
port of a particular style of play in Prisoner's Dilemma that the features of the game which 
support the argument can be turned around to support the opposing argument" (212). 
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reject such offers seem clearly to prefer nothing to something-a clear vio-
lation of a strong version of rationality. On the other hand, Frank repeat-
edly emphasizes the individual benefits (consequences) that may result 
from walking away. He argues that a person known to "dislike" an unfair 
bargain can "Credibly threaten to walk away from one, even when it is in 
her narrow interest to accept it. By virtue of being known to have this pref-
erence she becomes a more effective negotiator." The individual interest 
argument is valid, however, only if negotiation or play of the game con-
tinues, that is, if the interaction is repeated. Yet rejection is observed 
experimentally in single play games where anonymity is assured. Some indi-
viduals, finding themselves in Mr. Benny's situation, instead of handing 
over the money, will make unprintable suggestions to the mugger, possibly 
contributing to the loss of their life. The behavior observed in ultimatum 
games cannot simply be a result of rational calculation based on the expec-
tation of repeated interaction. 
Those who believe that these results are the consequence of measure-
ment errors or peculiarities of the experimental design pursue two lines of 
argument. The first is to argue that the stakes are too small to get people's 
attention. The repetition of the experiments in third world countries such 
as Indonesia casts doubt on this view (Cameron 1999). It is possible that 
the minimum offer (but not dollar amount) typically necessary to elicit 
assent might fall as a percentage of the stake as the stakes increased. On 
the other hand, a risk averse proposer may be inclined to offer a more even 
split to reduce the probability of ending up with nothing. Does anyone 
really believe that if $10 million were involved, the Nash/Selten prediction 
would be realized? The sub game perfect equilibrium offer is still $0.01 for 
you (and $9,999,999.99 for me). Would you accept such an offer? And 
supposing you were offered $2 million knowing that your proposer would, 
if you accepted, get $8 million, would you accept, or would the prospect of 
envy lead you to reject it? Or is your rejection based on a more simplistic 
distaste for unequal division? How much difference would anonymity 
make, and if it makes a difference, why should it make a difference? How 
drastically would your behavior change if you were told you were playing 
against a computer, and again, why should it matter at all? It is unlikely 
that raising the stakes by several orders of magnitude would eliminate the 
anomaly in games played with other humans. 
The second route is to say that the experimental environment is unfa-
miliar and people need time to learn how to play the game. The ultimatum 
game is so transparent this seems on the face of it unlikely. What is there 
to learn? There is some evidence that repetition may cause a drift in the 
direction of the theoretical prediction. But although the anomaly may be 
reduced, it is not eliminated. 
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Other parts of Frank's analysis suggest that rejecting a positive offer 
is one of those "irrational" actions, taken with full knowledge oftheir con-
sequences. At times, he appears to second the view, advanced by behav-
ioral economists such as Thaler, that such behavior is the result of a taste 
for "fairness" that is widespread in human populations. The fairness 
approach presumably implies that this taste is so powerful that it can over-
ride a desire for individual gain. But Frank does not abandon the instru-
mental argument that cultivating a reputation for fairness is helpful in 
achieving ends: in fact, as we have seen, it is central. Ifthe latter position is 
advanced, then there is no other-regarding aspect to these actions. Talk 
about fairness is a sham: rejections of offers are simply strategic choices 
made in games known to be iterated. 
From a game theoretic standpoint, there are indeed several problems 
with the fairness as instrument argument. If actors are rational, why would 
they even bother to talk about, or listen to talk about, fairness? If on the 
other hand subjects are bringing to these games heuristics that work well in 
day-to-day life, not fully absorbing the fact that the games are one shot, one 
has a related problem. Bargaining advantage through reputation cultivation 
comes from a credible willingness to walk away, irrespective of the character 
of the offer. One could equally well argue that being known as someone who 
loves unfair bargains, particularly where they benefit that person, and is pre-
pared to walk away unless the deal provides disproportionate benefits to her 
will be at a great advantage in negotiating, provided of course that repeated 
interactions are expected and people keep track of reputations. 
The purpose of running single play games with anonymity is to con-
trol experimentally for iteration and reputation effects. If that control has 
been successful, then we are picking up the consequences of predisposi-
tions that are hardwired and/or the effect of socializationlenculturation. I 
am inclined to think that the hardwired component is more important 
than those who advance the fairness interpretation suggest. A taste for 
fairness paints a very positive face on the rejection behavior, but it seems 
clear that knee-jerk reactions of anger and the prospect of envy-two 
emotions not thought to be reinforced by socialization/enculturation-are 
intimately entwined in these results. A more plausible view is that we are 
hardwired with biological Doomsday machines, machines that can be trig-
gered if we are offered what we view as an insultingly small share of a 
resource to be divided. Positing an innate and-by Nash's definition-
irrational concern with fairness is consistent with this behavior but may 
not be the best characterization of it. 
We know from experimental evidence that people will walk away 
from deals that provide them some benefit but not as much as the offerer. 
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We do not know, however, if people will also walk away from deals in 
which they are offered disproportionate benefits. Since proposers do not 
normally propose to take less than a 50 percent share in ultimatum gains, 
one would need to use confederates posing as experimental subjects to 
explore this possibility, or else query subjects as to how they would act 
were such an offer to be made. Would most subjects simply take the 
money and run? Finding that a significant fraction would also walk away 
from such offers would strengthen the fairness argument. Finding that 
they do not would support the Doomsday machine interpretation. 
It might appear that in interpreting rejections in terms of hardwired 
Doomsday machines, I am embracing the Frank/Hirshleifer view of the 
strategic role of emotions. The critical difference in our views concerns the 
understanding of the term strategic. If the term characterizes conscious, 
deliberate choice in situations involving human interaction, then their 
analysis appears to involve a contradiction. My objection is that if the 
emotions are truly strategic in the sense that they are consciously chosen, 
they cannot fulfill their assigned role of making commitments credible or 
guaranteeing threats. Frank states clearly at several points that such 
actions are irrational, but then repeatedly backtracks, suggesting that they 
are sort of rational. 
On the other hand, if emotional responses are human Doomsday 
machines, they can unambiguously be viewed as irrational from a 
Nash/Selten standpoint. If they reflect hardwired "knee-jerk" reactions 
(they are often characterized as such), then they are not undertaken as the 
result of calculation and with an orientation to the possibility of future 
benefit. They are not usefully interpreted as the consequence of con-
strained maximization of a utility function. They cannot then be viewed as 
strategic in the sense in which economists typically use the term. 
If a propensity to undertake such action imposes a fitness cost on the 
individual, which it clearly does in an asocial state, since something is bet-
ter than nothing, then the predispositions underlying such behavior can-
not have been favored by individual level selection upon initial appearance 
at low frequencies in a population. Thus, if these predispositions are real 
and important, as the experimental and observational data suggest they 
are, I conclude that they must have been favored at some point by selec-
tion at a higher level. 
The Symmetric Bargaining Problem 
The (asymmetric) ultimatum game needs to be carefully distinguished 
from the symmetric bargaining problem, in which two individuals must 
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independently propose the share they will take of a fixed resource, with the 
knowledge that if the shares exceed 100 percent, neither will get anything. 
Brian Skyrms has developed an intriguing argument that a propensity to 
propose a 50 percent share for self is likely to emerge as the result of fre-
quency dependent but individual level selection in human populations. 
Such a process will lead to outcomes of equal division, seeming to reflect a 
taste for fairness but actually the result of the simple fact that organisms 
that take 50 percent are likely to do better over the long run and come to 
exhibit high frequencies within populations. The behavior that gives rise to 
these results is not altruistic or other regarding, although it has been inter-
preted as such. Thus equal division in these problems, commonly under-
stood as the consequence of a cultural focal point (Dixit and Skeath 1999, 
212), may actually have an underlying biological foundation, but not one 
that required group selection to evolve. 
Here is Skyrms's argument. In the symmetrical bargaining problem 
there exists a multiplicity of informed rational choice Nash equilibria, 
ranging from a 50/50 split to a 9911 split and including all possible combi-
nations of divisions that sum to 100 percent. Each is a Nash equilibrium 
because, conditional on the other's demand, neither player could have 
done better by making a different demand and in fact would have done 
worse. For example, consider a 90110 split. As the second party, I examine 
retrospectively the advantages of having asked for 11 percent and realize 
under that scenario I would have gotten nothing. If I consider having 
asked for 9 percent, I realize I would have gotten less than the 10 percent I 
did. Using similar logic, the first individual has no regrets about not hav-
ing demanded 91 percent, because she realizes she would then have 
received nothing. She also has no regrets about not having asked for 89 
percent, since 90 is preferable to 89. 
Skyrms's insight is that a genetic predisposition to demand 50 per-
cent in such circumstances can evolve as a consequence of the same type 
of frequency dependent selection whereby Fisher explained the rough 
constancy of mammalian sex ratios (see chap. 2). Begin, for example, with 
a society in which everyone demanded 70 percent, in which no one would 
get anything. A mutant invader that demanded 30 percent or less would 
do better than the group average and would begin to spread. As the num-
bers of such individuals increased, mutants who demanded 35 percent 
could begin to establish a foothold, and so forth, until, through a contin-
uing process of frequency dependent selection, the population would sta-
bilize, composed of those who demanded 50 percent. Demanding 50 per-
cent, therefore, is an evolutionarily stable strategy, in the sense in which 
Maynard-Smith and Price (1973) first intended it. Indeed, as Skyrms 
(1996) notes, it is the unique ESS of the symmetric bargaining game, even 
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though it is only one of an infinite number of Nash equilibria in the two 
person game (11).13 
In this instance, evolutionary game theory permits us to select, from 
among a multiplicity of informed rational choice Nash equilibria, the one 
such equilibrium that is evolutionarily stable. The replica tor dynamic is 
such that one will reach this equilibrium irrespective of the starting point. 
A notable aspect of Skyrms's analysis is that the explanation of the emer-
gence of equal division in the symmetric bargaining problem need not 
involve other-regarding behavior and need not appeal to selection above 
the level of the individual. 
The behavior observed in asymmetric bargaining (ultimatum) games, 
however, is different: something else is involved. The interplay between 
this "something else" and a concern for individual wealth maximization is, 
to be sure, subtle and complex. 14 The ultimatum (and the dictator) game 
results reflect behavior that, unlike that in the symmetric bargaining game, 
cannot, upon initial appearance at low frequency, have been favored by 
the forces of individual level selection. Most people, asked if they want $2, 
will accept. Offered $2 but told that if they accept, the offerer will get $8, 
and if they reject, neither will get anything, many people reject. In eco-
nomic terms, such behavior cannot be viewed as rational. 
Irrational Play in PD and 
Ultimatum Games: Implications 
The evidence from single play PD games reveals a normatively irrational 
behavioral propensity to play cooperate. This corresponds in nonexperi-
mental situations to giving up the advantage of the first move in what 
might or might not end up as a game with more than one stage. The ulti-
matum game results reveal a normatively irrational willingness to retaliate 
against those who have not made such grants (offering an "unfair" bar-
gain is interpreted here as an aggressive move, analogous to a failure to 
make a grant of first move(r) altruism). The Fehr and Gachter results 
show that people are prepared, irrationally, to retaliate against those who 
violate social rules, a propensity that can be interpreted itself as a social 
13. There are a number of complications, including the possibility of polymorphous 
equilibria that are inefficient in the sense that they involve a lower average payoff than does 
equal division but that, once established, are strictly stable. The seriousness of the problem 
depends in part on how divisible the good is, that is, the "granularity" of the problem. 
14. Were that not the case, one would see no differences in the results of ultimatum and 
dictator games (where the proposer simply offers a division, keeping his or her share in any 
case, while the acceptor has the choice of taking or not taking what is offered) (Roth 1995b, 
328). In fact, the average demand by the proposer in dictator games is larger, although it is 
still well below 100 percent. 
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rule. In order to explain the origin and development of complex social 
organization, we need these predispositions. 
Once a network of complex and multiple relations of reciprocity 
among non-kin has been established in a manner that participants view as 
reliably predictable, these practices become, for the marginal invader 
interested in efficiently advancing her material welfare, increasingly ratio-
nal, provided we accept as rational the use of empirical algorithms for pre-
dicting the behavior of counterparties. Retaliation for defection becomes 
increasingly unnecessary, and as this happens, cooperation becomes 
increasingly drained of its altruistic content. The devotion of constant vig-
ilance to monitoring those around one for signs of hostile intent (defec-
tion) can begin to take on the appearance of irrationality, earning its devo-
tees such labels as paranoid. Paranoid behavior can be and generally is 
viewed as irrational because once we accept an empirical (inductive) 
methodology for forecasting counterparty behavior, the expected benefits 
of detecting the rare defection are more than outweighed by the costs of 
constant vigilance. Yet from the standpoint of the Nash algorithm, tightly 
embedded in most normative game theory, one can ask why the "paranoid 
personality" is not exhibiting rationality in its highest order, refusing to 
fall for the scandal of induction in making predictions about what others 
intend for him or her. Is not eternal vigilance the price of freedom?15 
Although in many instances a statistical methodology offers help in 
determining, for practical purposes, a normatively rational action, it does 
not do so in all. Just as insurance companies are unwilling to insure against 
hazards unless they have a broad and relevant statistical basis upon which 
to base actuarial prediction, humans are sometimes faced with circum-
stances for which experience has not prepared them and in which they lack 
a database from which reliably predictive forecasts of counterparty behav-
ior may be made. From the standpoint of the empirical algorithm, the least 
predictable and for that matter perhaps most interesting human behavior 
occurs at the point where it is no longer clear, or has not become clear, 
whether or not one is in a relationship whose continuance is reliably pre-
dictable. At such points one enters a twilight zone where the character of 
15. Paranoids cannot always be described as irrational, even using this empirical argu-
ment. The first U.S. secretary of defense, James Forrestal, was hospitalized at Walter Reed 
after his doctors diagnosed him as delusional: he was persuaded he was being followed every-
where by Israeli secret agents. It turned out subsequently that he was being followed every-
where by Israeli secret agents, who were concerned about his possible pro-Palestinian lean-
ings. Forrestal, who subsequently jumped to his death from a window of the hospital, was 
clearly disturbed, but his mental state was most likely not improved by the fact that no one 
would believe him (Sagan 1977,181). 
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certain behaviors wavers uncertainly from being rational to being irra-
tional or vice versa. Cooperative acts regain some of their original altruis-
tic character, because they now, again, expose the practitioner to real risk 
of harm. Attention to the behavior of others that might normally be 
viewed as excessive becomes prudent. In this crepuscular zone, one may 
feel compelled to make good on threats to retaliate, damaging the retalia-
tor without garnering obvious benefits. But of what good is preserving a 
reputation for being tough if your counterparty has signaled that the rela-
tionship is over? Or is it? These moments, fraught with ambiguity and rel-
atively rare in an individual's lifetime, provide glimpses into the evolu-
tionary challenges of explaining the origin of the behavior that underlies 
complex social organization. 
The single play ultimatum game, like the single play PD game, is par-
ticularly important in understanding essential human tendencies because 
it illuminates in harsh relief predispositions that are strictly irrational, 
according to the Nash algorithm, simply because the experimental design 
has eliminated any possible role for reputation or calculations based on a 
presumption that the relation will continue. If situations are in flux, of 
course, as they are in most psychological thrillers, then all bets are off as to 
what is normatively correct. The empirical forecasting methodology is 
most likely highly inaccurate, because of lack of adequate historical data 
for the particular individuals involved, and Nash algorithm predictions 
based on deduction may not be any better. The ability to fall back on 
knowledge of essential human tendencies, knowledge that from a decision 
theoretic standpoint can be viewed as base rate data, may be all one has to 
rely on. At this point, since defection is strictly dominant in a one-shot PD, 
the relevant question becomes whether that empirical methodology turns 
out to be relevant in forecasting one's own behavior. 
What, then, should we tell our students (or our children)? That in a 
great many (but not all) environments they are likely to encounter, virtue 
will indeed be rewarded and one will lose by being unvirtuous. On the 
other hand, in single play interactions, where social structures are fluid, 
breaking down, or not yet established; where continuing interactions can-
not be, or can no longer be, reliably predicted; where past behavior 
embodied in reputations is no guide to the future; and where considera-
tions about the value of investing in reputation may be nugatory, no such 
guarantee applies, and the normatively "correct" play is to defect. Never-
theless, even in such fluid circumstances, a great many humans will coop-
erate (this is a descriptive statement), and because they do, being virtuous 
may turn out to be less damaging to one's health and wealth than might 
otherwise be predicted. Children (and adults) must be prepared to under-
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stand the implications of the regularity and predictability of routine social 
existence, at the same time they are prepared, if necessary, to confront true 
social dilemmas in situations of great fluidity. 
If the decision is a matter of life and death, it is not surprising that 
some prudent individuals may feel drawn to a solution that exposes them 
to least risk; it is indeed a behavior that would be favored by the forces of 
individual level selection. What is surprising is that so many people are 
not. Nonconsequentialist ethical systems-those that, unlike utilitarian-
ism, sever a link between an action's rightness and its consequences----<:od-
ify norms that reinforce playing cooperate in such circumstances. But they 
do not explain the origin of the underlying behavioral propensity that, 
since it cannot have been favored by individual level selection, must have 
been favored by selection at a higher level. That behavioral propensity, in 
turn, helps account for why organized and predictable social structures are 
the empirically dominant environment for humans. They help explain 
why, above and beyond our interactions within a kin group, we do not live 
in a continual war of all against all and, perhaps, why the Cold War did 
not turn hot. 
Making grants of first move(r) altruism is, as is reflected in the terms 
used, altruistic from an evolutionary standpoint and not likely to be 
encouraged by selection at the individual level alone. It is harder at first to 
interpret the act of retaliation as altruistic: it will almost surely reduce the 
fitness of the practitioner from the standpoint of individual level selection, 
but it is hard to see how it increases the fitness of the person on the receiv-
ing end. The solution is to understand that the true beneficiary of the 
action is not necessarily the individual(s) at whom the action is directed 
but rather all other members of one's group, who, because of one's will-
ingness, and that of others, to punish defectors, find themselves less at risk 
from deviant behavior. 
Emotional Lability as a Doomsday Machine 
We now come back to the core of Frank's argument: "Being known to 
experience certain emotions enables us to make commitments that would 
otherwise not be credible. The clear irony here is that this ability, which 
springs from a failure to pursue self-interest, confers genuine advantages. 
Granted, following through on these commitments will always involve 
avoidable losses .... The problem, however, is that being unable to make 
credible commitments will often be even more costly. Confronted with the 
commitment problem, an opportunistic person fares poorly" (1988, 5). 
Thus Frank appears to embrace the interpretation of a publicly known 
susceptibility to emotional display as a human Doomsday machine, 
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resolving the problem of subgame imperfection associated with noncredi-
ble threats or commitments. The ability to make credible commitments 
means the ability to telegraph likelihood that in the future one may behave 
irrationally, for example, by refusing to walk out on a commitment even 
when it subsequently becomes advantageous to do so. 
The subtitle of the book, The Strategic Use of Emotions, is an indica-
tion of how central to it is the idea that the display of emotional lability 
(changeableness or unpredictability) is as important for individuals as 
were publicized attack drills for u.s. and Soviet nuclear missile crews. 
This idea is key to Frank's understanding of how other-regarding behav-
ior originates and is sustained, and it seems to betoken a catholic approach 
to human cognition and choice, one open to the implications of modular-
ity. On page 6, for example, he states that we are born with certain tastes 
and drives and that "rational assessment is only one of many forces that 
can arouse the feelings that govern behavior directly." This position raises 
the possibility that functionally specialized neurobiological subsystems 
might, in certain cases, overrule the counsel of our general reasoning abil-
ity. Frank suggests that emotions and feelings reflect the operation of such 
variegated behavioral impellers, apparently reflecting a willingness to 
abandon the restriction that the only behavioral predispositions that may 
be presumed are those reflecting the operation of rational choice directed 
at efficiently serving material self-interest. 
He goes on to quote Jerome Kagan: "Construction of a persuasive 
rational basis for behaving morally has been the problem on which most 
moral philosophers have stubbed their toes. I believe they will continue to 
do so until they recognize what Chinese philosophers have known for a 
long time: namely feeling, not logic, sustains the superego" (Kagan 1984, 
xiv, cited in Frank 1988, 12). But no sooner has Frank laid the ground-
work for an acceptance of views such as Kagan's than he backpedals: "The 
emotions may indeed sustain the superego. But as the commitment model 
will make clear, it may well be the logic of self interest that ultimately sus-
tains these emotions." Here Frank recommits himself to the rational 
choice framework in general and that of normative game theory in partic-
ular and, at the same time, signals his intention to integrate traditional 
economic analysis with an evolutionary approach. This will lead him again 
and again to argue, untenably, that one and the same behavior is at the 
same time irrational and rational. He underlies his intent several pages 
later in writing that "what I hope to show here is that [the presence of emo-
tions] is in perfect harmony with the underlying requirements of a coher-
ent theory of rational behavior" (16). 
We are back at square one in terms of method. The attempted marriage 
of economic and evolutionary approaches underestimates the differences 
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between them and assumes that they are necessarily of the same species and 
thus likely to produce viable offspring. This is a misconception! To the 
degree that standard rational choice models, which emphasize individuals 
acting efficiently to improve their own material welfare, are translated into 
evolutionary language, by definition they must involve models in which 
selection operates only at the level of the individual organism. This restric-
tion makes such models incapable of accounting for the origin and persis-
tence of altruistic behavioral predispositions toward those other than kin. 
Again, all concern with the issue of credibility presupposes a solution 
to the more fundamental problems of social organization, so that there is 
a reliably predictable likelihood of repeat interactions. Emotions as signals 
of credible commitment cannot be the explanation for the origin of coop-
eration because origination involves moving from an absence of social 
organization, in which structures of interaction cannot reliably be pre-
dicted to persist, to a situation where they can. Credibility or reputation 
can only be an asset within the subsequent state: within the context of rel-
atively established social structures. Trivers's initial rescuer must act 
because of some innate predisposition, not out of any necessary expecta-
tion of future gains from interaction based on prior learning. 
Frank's Treatment of Evolutionary Theory 
In chapter 2 of Passions within Reason Frank attributes the strongest foun-
dation for the self-interest model to Darwin, whom he incorrectly 
identifies as emphasizing individual level selection alone. As Frank notes, 
"If human nature, too, was shaped by the forces of natural selection, the 
apparently inescapable conclusion is that people's behavior must be fun-
damentally selfish" (1988, 24). It is never clear, however, whether Frank 
means that this conclusion is only "apparently" inescapable or that it is in 
fact inescapable. If natural selection is indeed allowed to operate only at 
the level of the individual organism, then the latter conclusion obtains, 
which would appear to contradict Frank's view that other-regarding 
behavior is an empirically important behavioral category. Although famil-
iar with work in evolutionary biology, Frank does not proceed along the 
one route that would permit him to avoid this contradiction. That route is 
the one Darwin himself suggested, a route that involves the possibility of 
natural selection operating at multiple levels. 
Frank goes on to discuss Hamilton's concept of inclusive fitness, 
pointing out that its limitation (as generally implemented) is a failure to 
account for altruistic behavior toward non-kin. Even if hunter-gatherer 
societies were closely related, one still should not expect to see group pos-
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itive behavior based on such models. Second cousins share only 1/32 of 
their genes; they are on this basis close to indistinguishable from total 
strangers (1988, 27). This is an important point for those who believe that 
kin selection alone solves the problem of explaining human altruism in rel-
atively small groups. 
Frank continues by discussing Trivers's theory of reciprocal altruism 
in which A scratches B's back in the hope and expectation that B will 
scratch A's back. That this often happens is beside the point. It does not 
explain why those who accept grooming but do not reciprocate do not 
come to dominate a group: they will clearly be favored by individual level 
selection (Hamilton 1975, 150). Frank argues that Trivers's model cannot 
explain "hard core altruism," and Frank is right. He goes on to discuss Tit-
for-Tat and the PD problem and is perceptive in understanding some of 
the limitations of Axelrod's work, in particular the implicit assumption 
that counterparties have no choice but to interact with each other repeat-
edly (Frank 1988, 32). 
Frank indicates awareness of the possibility of group selection (Frank 
1988, 37-39) but rejects its likelihood, apparently because he views these 
ideas as out of favor within the evolutionary biology community. His posi-
tion on this issue is strictly conventional, and one can find innumerable 
examples of similar argument elsewhere. He does not discuss the import of 
biological evidence on female-male sex ratios in arthropods; or the evolu-
tion of virulence in microorganisms; or the work of Price, Steven Frank, 
Wade, Sober and Wilson, and others who have effected a theoretical and 
empirical defense of its possibility. Much of this work was available when 
Passions within Reason was published, although its implications had not 
been as forcefully and widely articulated as is true today. 
As scholars we are only human, and it is perhaps understandable 
when we are loathe to challenge majority opinion, particularly in an area 
outside of our area of training. But respect for intellectual authority has 
the potential to get us into serious trouble. The problem with rejecting out 
of hand the multilevel selection route, aside from the fact that the reasons 
given for so doing are weak (logic and evidence are generally sounder than 
argument from authority), is that doing so gives rise to analysis that is 
internally contradictory. In any event, although Frank quotes E. O. Wil-
son in support of the anti group selectionist consensus, Wilson is now more 
equivocal, describing the 1998 Sober and D. S. Wilson book as "important 
and original," containing "the definitive contemporary statement on 
higher level selection and the emergence of cooperation" (quoted on 
cover). And although economists are fond of quoting E. O. Wilson in 
defense of their "hard-headed" approach, he does not return the compli-
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ment. Indeed, in his 1998 book, Consilience, he is openly disdainful of 
what economists have contributed to our understanding of evolution. 16 
Finally, Frank considers whether "Cultural Conditioning"-social-
ization or the inculcation of norms---can account for self-sacrificing 
behavior. His most important observation is that adherence to norms is 
not advantaged by the forces of individual selection (1988, 40). Thus the 
problem posed by adherence to norms is the same as the problem posed by 
any form of altruistic behavior (as I have noted in chap. 3, adherence to 
norms is altruism writ small). 
Frank observes that norms may "restrict our baser impulses as well as 
encourage those considered more noble." For example, he indicates that 
norms may restrain the "irrational" pursuit of vengeance, noting that the 
maxim an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth was intended to restrain rather 
than encourage the pursuit of vengeance (Tit-for-Tat requires matching 
injury for injury, not exceeding it) (39). But Frank needs to be careful. By 
suggesting that "excessive" vengeance is irrational, he implies that retalia-
tion calibrated to the dimensions of the injury is rational. Proportionality 
(let the punishment fit the crime)-a key consideration in calibrating U.S. 
retaliation against terrorist attacks-may work best empirically, but 
defending the policy as more "rational" than a policy of no retaliation or 
one embodying tenfold escalation is fraught with difficulty. 
If the purpose of threatened retaliation is deterrence, any level of ex 
post retaliation once deterrence has failed is not rational, according to the 
narrow and precise definition implicit in the Nash/Selten method for ana-
lyzing situations of strategic interaction. Frank intermittently embraces 
this position, most obviously in his opening castigation of the folly of the 
behavior of the Hatfields and McCoys. So which is it? Is retaliation 
according to the lex talionis-an eye for an eye-rational, or is it not? In 
order to push our understanding forward, we must adopt a clear definition 
and adhere to it consistently. This Frank does not do. 
Chapter 2 provides an intelligent overview of explanations of altruis-
tic behavior other than his own. Most of his positions here are similar to 
mine, with the important exception of his summary rejection of the mul-
tiselection route. In chapter 3, Frank reaffirms his objective: "My task 
... is to make use of a simple idea from economics to sketch an altern a-
16. "The enterprise within the social sciences best poised to bridge the gap with the nat-
ural sciences, the one that most resembles them in style and self confidence, is economics. The 
discipline, fortified with mathematical models, garlanded annually by its own Nobel Memo-
rial Prize in Economic Science, and rewarded with power in business and government, 
deserves the title often given to it, Queen of the Social Sciences. But its similarity to 'real' sci-
ence is often superficial and has been purchased at a steep intellectual price" (E. O. Wilson 
1998,212-13). 
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tive individual selectionist avenue along which altruism and other forms 
of apparently self-serving behavior might have emerged" (Frank 1988, 
45). As we have seen, this simple idea is not so simple after all, and his 
quest is quixotic, for the simple reason that behavioral propensities can-
not simultaneously reduce individual level fitness and increase it. Once 
contingent cooperators have become established in a population, and 
repeated interactions can be assumed, cooperation by an invader is no 
longer altruistic but becomes, if we resolve the issue of how we know, or 
how we forecast, the strategies of counterparties, self-serving. But that 
does not mean that a population-wide pattern of cooperation has 
emerged out of the behavior of egoists. These confusions are reaffirmed at 
the end of chapter 3, when Frank talks about how "the fact that trust-
worthy persons do receive a material payoff is of course what sustains the 
trait within the individual selectionist framework" (69). True enough, but 
demonstrating what sustains group cooperation is not the same as 
explaining its origin. 
Reputations and Induction 
Frank goes on to explain how considerations of reputation may make it 
rational for people to be moral. For example: "Someone who is caught 
cheating on one occasion creates the presumption he may do so again" 
(Frank 1988, 71). Descriptively, it is clear that the ability of individuals to 
keep track of others' reputations, and to update these reputations induc-
tively based on repeat performance, helps sustain social relations in estab-
lished settings. From a game theoretic perspective it may also be viewed as 
facilitating coordination on a particular rational choice equilibrium when 
there may be others (Greif 1989; Klein 1997). But there are two difficulties 
in appealing to this mechanism as explanation for the origin of coopera-
tion among non-kin. First, for obvious reasons, it cannot be used in 
accounting for transition from one-shot to repeated interaction. Second, 
we have introduced a role for an empirical/inductive methodology for 
forecasting counterparty behavior. This runs contrary to an important 
methodological principle in canonical game theory. 
David Hume argued in An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding 
(1741) that induction was deductively invalid, and his arguments have 
never been effectively refuted. In exploring a deductive rather than an 
inductive methodology for forecasting behavior, Nash in a sense followed 
Hume's logic. Although I believe there is good reason to study reputa-
tional mechanisms from a descriptive standpoint, and that there are prac-
tical reasons to make use of them in many instances of day-to-day life, one 
can argue, as implicitly did Nash and other economists who follow him, 
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that it is normatively irrational to base decisions on them in a world whose 
structure may be changing and, more fundamentally, that inductive infer-
ences are at best speculations. This is a prospect that keeps actuaries and 
insurance company executives, as well as philosophers, up at night (Pinker 
1997,351). 
But if we stick with the Nash algorithm, our practical problems are 
more severe and our forecasts of behavior much worse. Reputational data 
must now be deemed of no value for this purpose. Using the Nash algo-
rithm, which implies that dispositions, as opposed to situations, have no 
influence on human behavior, one has no way of rejecting the possibility 
that the counterparty who has never cheated is simply trying to build up a 
stock of reputational capital, with the anticipation of cashing in at some 
future date. And that date is not predictable, based on logic alone. 
Such strategies may be low frequency, but they are not zero fre-
quency. Exactly this type of behavior has recently been observed on eBay, 
the Internet based electronic trading system. Transactors are requested to 
post their evaluations of buyers or sellers after a deal is consummated. 
Anyone with more than four negative postings is denied access to the sys-
tem. But some cases of fraud have involved individuals who conducted an 
initial series of transactions, earning exemplary reviews, and then went in 
for the big score, stiffing a number of counterparties who had relied on the 
previous unsullied reputation of the seller before sending off their certified 
checks for merchandise that was never delivered. 
Empirically, of course, many people do refrain from cheating when 
they could get away with it and try to associate with those who behave in 
a similar fashion. The overall success of eBay and its policies confirms this 
view. So we come back to the decision theoretic question. Should we or 
should we not make any use of data on reputation in deciding with whom 
we should transact? Should we dismiss the possibility that the concept of 
disposition or personality is predictively relevant and reason deductively 
that anyone building up a favorable reputation is simply doing so with an 
eye to exploiting those who might be foolish enough to base their decisions 
on it? 
I have suggested earlier that an action may fail the criterion of ratio-
nality either because it is premised on beliefs not arrived at rationally or 
because, conditional on these beliefs, it does not "best" serve the desires or 
preferences of the actor. Questions surrounding the rationality of basing 
decisions on a reputational mechanism concern the appropriateness of dif-
ferent algorithms in forming expectations of human behavior, in particu-
lar, whether or not the use of statistical algorithms involving prior behav-
ioral data leads to an expectation that is rational in the Muth sense. 
Lester Telser follows in the Nash tradition, arguing that it is not. 
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"Reliability is not an inherent personality trait. A person is reliable if and 
only if it is more advantageous to him than being unreliable .... Someone 
is honest only if honesty, or the appearance of honesty, pays more than 
dishonesty" (Telser 1980, 28-29). Telser is simply reaffirming Hume's 
proposition that all induction is speculative, particularly where it is 
applied to human relations. At a more down to earth level, he is trying 
once again to draw a clear line of demarcation between games against 
nature, for which most recognize data tabulation and collection and algo-
rithms for statistical inference as relevant and useful, and games against 
humans, where only mathematics and logic (not statistics) are deemed rel-
evant and useful (Williams 1954,207). In terms of the "fundamental attri-
bution error," he is denying the relevance of "disposition": situation is all 
that is relevant for predicting behavior. And he is endorsing the basic 
behaviorist position reflected in social learning theory: individuals do not 
have general personality traits but react as they do because of the specifics 
of a particular situation in a way that does not carryover to other situa-
tions. I7 
Telser would probably not take the same position were he trying to 
forecast whether or not a particular aircraft engine will break down over 
the next week. He would not say, "Reliability is not an inherent engine 
trait. An engine is reliable if and only if it is more advantageous to it than 
being unreliable." Telser would agree that we would then be faced with a 
decision theoretic problem and presumably would agree that prior break-
down records for different individual engines are relevant, as well as over-
all base rate data on frequency of breakdowns for engines of this design 
and this vintage. Now imagine he is trying to decide which horse is likely 
reliably to perform over a long trek. Would he use the same methodology? 
Now he wishes to forecast the behavior of several chimpanzees. Would he 
argue, "Reliability is not a trait inherent in an individual chimpanzee. A 
chimpanzee is reliable if and only if it is more advantageous to it than 
being unreliable"? Finally, he is dealing with a group of humans. For 
Telser, by the time we get to humans, decision theory, which relies on an 
empirical/statistical methodology, is now without relevance; only game 
theory along the lines Nash laid down is appropriate. 
As we saw in chapter 1, in a one-shot PD, forecasts of counterparty 
17. Because my argument is principally concerned with species typical predispositions, 
I have generally not addressed issues surrounding the heritability of individual differences. 
Since my argument involves selection, however, there would have to be a heritable compo-
nent of such inclinations. Studies of identical and fraternal twins suggest that approximately 
50 percent of the variance in altruistic inclinations can be attributed to genetic differences 
among individuals. The same is true for a number of other personality traits (see Hunt 1990, 
54--56; Hauser 2000, 110-11). 
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play are simply irrelevant in choosing rationally one's best strategy, 
although practically speaking, one could imagine that such a forecast 
might influence one's willingness to play irrationally. In a two player fixed 
and known duration game, a forecast that the counterparty would play 
irrationally could lead one rationally to alter one's strategy. In games of 
indefinite duration, where cooperative play can possibly be justified as 
rational but where there are multiple equilibria, such estimates are also 
critical in estimating whether or not one is likely to be able to coordinate 
on a cooperative equilibrium. 
Even though game theory is predisposed against admitting the value 
of empirically based forecasts of human behavior for normative theory, we 
can see how it begins to creep in in some of the more complex analyses. 
Admitting data on base rates and individual reliability is equivalent to 
acknowledging that the distinction between games played against nature 
and games against humans is not hard and fast. Games against humans 
are, after all, to some degree games against nature, because humans are 
biological organisms designed and structured as the result of natural selec-
tion operating over a long evolutionary history. To that degree, tools of 
decision theory can be relevant in making decisions involving strategic 
interaction among humans or, for an external observer, in simply trying to 
predict behavior. 
Ifwe accept the Telser/Nash view, we must conclude that it is impos-
sible to extract any predictively relevant information from human past 
behavior, either individually or in the aggregate. Econometrically, we are 
saying that lagged values of past behavior add no additional power in 
forecasting behavior, when they are included along with right hand vari-
ables measuring current conditions. In fact we do base our predictions of 
counterparty behavior in part on base rate data and individual past reli-
ability, and we generally find it worth doing so. Indeed, one of the few 
robust findings from the field of clinical psychology is that past overt 
behavior is one of the best predictors of future behavior-far superior to 
clinicians' "trained intuition," which adds almost no value (Dawes 1994, 
5, 26). Is it or is it not silly to give prisoners time off for good behavior? 
To argue that considerations of reputation-our own and others-are 
relevant in making strategic decisions is to admit a role for empirical data 
on human behavior game theorists are generally reluctant to consider, 
for it casts doubt on the predictive power of the purely analytic methods 
offered. 
With respect to predictions involving groups of humans, I am arguing 
that base rate data are relevant and are in part what we are attempting to 
extract in the search for essential human predispositions. The incorpora-
tion of reputation, or the use of data on frequency of past behavior in fore-
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casting future behavior, is a species of causal inference based on the obser-
vation of contiguity and succession (correlation). We observe that past 
overt behavior is one of the best predictors of future behavior and infer a 
causal mechanism based on personality structure, or "inherent personality 
traits," or species typical predispositions to explain these regularities. We 
have no logical basis for doing so, but we end up with better forecasts if we 
admit such data. As Daniel Sperber nicely puts it, "Causal beliefs are both 
indispensable to human understanding and unfounded" (1995, xvi). The 
canonical game theoretic approach, with its emphasis on deductive logic, 
can pride itself on its cleanness, on its avoidance of logically unfounded 
reasoning. But to paraphrase E. O. Wilson, this elegance is purchased at a 
high price when the tools are applied to domains of strategic interaction, 
to which they are thought to be particularly appropriate. That price is the 
quality of forecasts of counterparty behavior. And, in many instances, the 
quality of forecasts of our own. 
Even admitting an empirical/inductive methodology, there may be, as 
noted, some circumstances where it will perform less well. Decision theory 
emphasizes that one should place different weights on base rate data under 
different circumstances (Koehler 1996). Perhaps exceptional cases sur-
rounded the observed past behavior and it will not be repeated. Perhaps 
the circumstances now are exceptional. Where data on past behavior exist, 
and I would argue that such data are always going to be of some use, it is 
still a leap offaith for us to reason that the future will display the same reg-
ularities as the past, that the characteristics of a population will roughly 
reflect those of a sample, that our prior observation of similar circum-
stances gives us grounds for forecasting behaviors that have not yet 
occurred. But it is a useful leap. 
Presentist Bias and the Function of Anger 
Frank goes on to discuss experimental research that shows that we have a 
preference for immediate rewards that goes beyond what traditional dis-
counting can account for (this is sometimes referred to as hyperbolic dis-
counting). Faced with a choice of $100 twenty-eight days from now and 
$120 thirty-one days from now, most subjects will choose the latter. But 
faced with a choice of$100 now or $120 in three days, most will choose the 
$100 (Frank 1988, 77). This behavior is not rational from a decision theo-
retic standpoint and represents a behavioral predisposition driven by some 
neurobiological subsystem that short-circuits the counsel oflogic. The pre-
disposition is interesting, may have been favored by individual level selec-
tion, and may have a role in understanding the ability of altruism to estab-
lish itself. But if so, Frank has not put his finger on it. 
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He uses these results to provide an explanation for why "merely pru-
dent" people may cheat, even when they have a strong probability of being 
caught. Such an individual has difficulty in adequately crediting the great 
gains from not cheating (which will come in the future) and balancing 
them against the immediate benefits. Whether or not this argument has 
psychological merit, it has little relevance to the question of the emergence 
of altruism. Decisions about whether or not to cheat are relevant only 
after fundamental social problems have been solved and the agent is oper-
ating in an environment predominated by noncheaters playing Tit-for-Tat 
where repeated interaction can be assumed. The more basic evolutionary 
question is how the environment became populated in the first place by 
those who will not cheat unless first cheated. If one has not satisfactorily 
explained why people refrain from cheating when it would pay them to 
cheat, does it make a great deal of sense to try to explain, as does Frank 
here, why people may cheat when it doesn't pay them to? 
Frank also suggests that this presentist bias may cause us to refrain 
from getting angry when we are wronged because the costs are now and 
the reputational rewards are in the future, whereas a propensity to anger 
helps us avoid this pitfall. "Anger helps shift the relevant future payoffs 
into the present" (Frank 1988, 83). But Nash/Selten rationality tells us it is 
perfectly rational not to get angry, because retaliation once deterrence has 
failed is irrational! Frank is arguing that a tendency to anger will trump 
the rational behavior (let bygones be bygones) that fails to deter aggres-
sion. Instead, anger produces an irrational propensity toward retaliation 
that may deter it. Perhaps so, but one cannot then turn around and argue 
that getting angry is in fact rational. 
Frank spends considerable time earlier in the book discussing the ulti-
matum games and the evidence that people will refuse "unfair" bargains. 
Now he has reversed course entirely. Our willingness to place dispropor-
tionate weight on gains that will occur in the very near future helps us 
understand why some people will accept unfair bargains. But from the 
standpoint of rational choice theory we have no need of behavioral data to 
explain why people accept these bargains. It is strictly rational to do so, 
because something is always better than nothing. 
The discussion of the role of hyperbolic discounting is regrettably 
emblematic of the type of armchair theorizing that is commonplace within 
the rational choice tradition. And it bears some of the hallmarks of the 
heuristics and biases research program discussed in greater detail in chap-
ter 6, in particular a willingness to "explain" an apparent deviation from 
normatively counseled behavior with reference to a menu of heuristics 
without developing a coherent predictive framework explaining when 
some rather than others will apply. Thus it becomes sometimes difficult to 
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know whether we are dealing with an essential human predisposition or 
one that is introduced adventitiously in an ex post fashion to account for 
troublesome behavior. In Frank's book it is impossible sometimes even to 
figure out what is the "troublesome" behavior. Is it a propensity to accept 
"unfair" bargains or a propensity to refuse them? 
There are clearly important questions about the evolutionary role 
played by a propensity to anger. Successful implementation of Tit-for-Tat 
involves a number of different types of self-control problems. I understand 
a self-control problem to be one where, through an effort of will, we must 
consciously override the counsel of one behavioral impeller and accept 
that of another. In some cases such problems involve directing behavior 
toward that counseled by one's faculties for making rational choices; in 
other cases they involve directing behavior away from such behavior. 
If one is playing Tit-for-Tat one should get angry only after one has 
been wronged and then only for a limited duration, particularly when the 
counterparty then plays cooperate (apologizes, makes amends, etc.). One 
type of control problem involves that identified by Frank: forcing oneself 
to respond to a slight with anger, even though this imposes costs now and 
even though Nash/Selten rationality counsels that bygones are bygones, 
retaliation won't undo the slight, and so on. Another type of control issue 
involves refraining from becoming angry when one has not been wronged, 
even though doing so might permit an immediate advantage or provide 
defense against another acting in this fashion. Controlling anger is critical 
to the practice of first move(r) altruism. Someone who attacks another 
who has just entered the room because she does not like his looks is not 
practicing first move(r) altruism and is not laying the foundation for a 
cooperative relationship. Finally, there is a control problem in limiting the 
anger to a period of "one play": achieving proportionality in the response 
and not permitting the emotion to fester and feed on itself after amends 
have been made, thus forestalling the possibility of reestablishing cooper-
ation. Frank's exploration of the role of anger in implementing a Tit-for-
Tat strategy and the several control problems that present themselves, sit-
uations where different behavioral impellers are providing sharply 
contradictory advice, only scratches the surface of this complex emotion 
and the challenges posed by its function, possible use, and control. 
In exploring the high human preference for short term rewards Frank 
has identified an interesting human behavioral predisposition, one at vari-
ance with the predictions of decision theoretic models based on rational 
choice. But he has not shown why it is relevant to the emergence of coop-
eration. He concludes this section with this observation: "In cases where 
reputational considerations weigh in favor of action, the angry person will 
be more likely to behave prudently than the merely prudent person who 
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feels no anger." Frank, I believe, is sensitive to the charge that he is in sev-
eral places describing the same behavior as both rational and not rational. 
He tries here to avoid the criticism by substituting the word prudent for 
rational. The problem is not finessed. Does he mean to suggest that it is 
possible for a prudent action not to be rational? Or for a rational action 
not to be prudent? 
One can equally well argue that the "merely prudent person who feels 
no anger" may behave more prudently than the congenitally angry person 
who flies off the handle when one comes in wearing a red shirt. As indi-
cated previously, the analysis of the role of anger in implementing a Tit-
for-Tat strategy poses real challenges, only some of which does Frank 
address. Anger is a volatile emotion, difficult to trigger in some, difficult to 
bring under control in others, sometimes both. Acting under the influence 
of anger is not acting prudently, ifby prudently we mean engaged in behav-
ior consistent with the counsel of reason. Anger almost certainly plays a role 
in a complex of behaviors that together have been evolutionarily adaptive. 
But the evolutionary advantage of a propensity to anger cannot be con-
sidered out of context. In certain contexts, anger may be group positive 
and individual level negative, in others the reverse. 
If anger is not simply dissembling, it is by definition not prudent. 
Aristotle did not counsel against ever being angry. In the Nichomachean 
Ethics he argued that the key was to be angry with the right person, to the 
right degree, at the right time, for the right purpose, and in the right way 
(1959, 96-97). What one does with anger-how much one yields to its 
siren song-may be strategic, but its reality as a behavioral impeller is not. 
Does prudently mean rationally? If so, we are back to describing behavior 
as at one and the same time rational and irrational. 
Frank summarizes (chap. 6) a variety of psychological and physio-
logical research making a convincing case that many visible signs of emo-
tions are linked involuntarily to the emotions themselves. But again, what 
he does with this evidence is problematic. "If for example, trustworthiness 
and a tendency to blush go together, and if being known to be trustworthy 
is advantageous, selection pressures can clearly affect both the tendency to 
blush and the emotion that triggers it" (Frank 1988, 133). True enough, 
but if selection occurs only at the level of the individual organism, it will 
operate against both tendencies. A signal that one is trusting and trust-
worthy makes one an ideal mark for a deceiver. If group selection is 
allowed, on the other hand, matters are different. If groups high in those 
inclined to trust (or to trust once) grow more rapidly and periodically 
recombine in the general population, and particularly if this tendency is 
reinforced by assortative "mating," then forces of natural selection, under-
stood to mean those operating both at the individual and at the group 
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level, can favor the spread of such propensities. The effect of both tenden-
cies on inclusive fitness will be positive, even though the within group 
effect is negative. 
Those of us who are trustworthy-who carry out our commitments 
even when it would be to our immediate advantage to do otherwise-may 
like to think that it incidentally provides us material benefit. In an envi-
ronment with sufficient structure-reliably predictive information on 
behavioral propensities of others, required repeated interaction-being 
trustworthy or speaking honestly may be defended as a rational choice. 
But at that point an individual choice (e.g., by an invader) to be trustwor-
thy no longer has much altruistic character. 
In a less predictable environment, or one characterized by lower fre-
quencies of cooperators or conditional cooperators, no such conclusion 
follows. In such circumstances, those of us who are trustworthy when we 
could cease to be and benefit ourselves must remain content with the oft-
stated observation that virtue is its own reward. The healthy young man 
who stands by his dying spouse for seven long years as she withers away as 
the result of an incurable illness has honored his marital vows to stick by a 
spouse in sickness and in health but has passed up opportunities to 
remarry and father offspring. A society with a high percentage of trust-
worthy people of this type may grow stronger and larger, but it is not 
because the behavior increases the relative fitness of trustworthy individu-
als, taking into consideration the forces of individual level selection alone. 
Frank's book is written, as is Sober and Wilson's, very much from the 
standpoint of the "good" people of society. But unlike Sober and Wilson, 
who confront the advantages enjoyed by "cheaters" head-on, Frank's 
treatment is often asymmetrical. Anger, he argues, helps us overcome the 
presentist bias that would otherwise cause us rationally to accept positive 
(but "unfair") offers in ultimatum games. But why shouldn't a bias toward 
the present also prevent "bad" people, who care nothing for fairness, from 
rejecting somewhat profitable deals in order to establish reputations as tough 
bargainers? If the use of emotions is strategic, Why can't "bad" people also 
use them to overcome this bias? And if they can, why should the net effect 
of these behavioral predispositions be to make a society fairer? 
We also see an asymmetrical treatment in Frank's comments on the 
role of love in marriage: "The worry that people will leave relationships 
because it may later become rational for them to do so is largely erased if 
it is not rational assessment that binds them in the first place" (Frank 
1988, 196). Why should this be so? Take the case of a young, wealthy, 
handsome man who proposes to a poor, rather plain looking woman past 
the age of childbearing. Surely the woman, even if she goes through with 
the marriage, must worry that, since the behavior of her spouse in the first 
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place has been so flaky by evolutionary standards, he will be more likely to 
stray or leave, even if she manages to create a warm home environment for 
him. I come back to a point made earlier with regard to nuclear strategy: 
why should evidence that one's counterparty has behaved irrationally in 
the past increase the precision of one's estimate of his or her behavior in 
the future? 
Frank is certainly right that some elements of marital relationships 
defy calculation just as many do not, and that people can look for ratio-
nalizations for what they have done. But if the emotions are strategic, as 
the title of the book suggests, then they involve following the dictates of 
reason. Ifwe are to use them to account for behavior that cannot be ratio-
nalized then we must give up the effort to interpret true emotions in strate-
gic terms. 
Frank's confusion is vividly illustrated in his comment that "again 
and again ... we have seen that the most adaptive behaviors will not 
spring directly from the quest for material advantage." He insists, cor-
rectly, in calling our attention to altruistic behavior toward non-kin. Since 
the forces of natural selection have not eliminated such behavior, he 
implicitly reasons (correctly) that it has been adaptive. Critics will point 
out (as I have) that such behavior imposes an (individual level) evolution-
ary disadvantage on those who practice it, at least upon first appearance. 
Frank attempts to work his way out of this box by persuading us that 
behavior that by definition cannot be favored by the forces of individual 
selection somehow is. It is an intellectual cul-de-sac that cannot be exited 
until one begins seriously to consider the interaction of group level and 
individual level selection. 
Frank's argument, again, is akin to the main Dr. Strangelove theme, 
with human emotions playing the role of the Doomsday machine. Being 
known as someone often under the sway of emotions, making one prone 
to behavior apparently not under the control of reason, enables commit-
ments or threats that would otherwise lack credibility to possess it. But if 
emotions are truly not under the control of reason then they belong 
nowhere within a discussion of strategy, which presumes conscious calcu-
lation of choice based on the existing situation and the likely behavior of 
one's counterparty(ies). Evolutionary game theorists sometimes talk 
about the "strategies" of lower animals or plants that clearly lack con-
sciousness: it's an "as if' kind of usage designed to characterize the out-
come of natural selection. But there is little in Frank's book to suggest that 
this is what he has in mind with respect to humans: the discussion is at its 
heart choice theoretic. Frank describes behavior as "seemingly" irrational. 
If the terms rational and irrational are to have any meaning, one must be 
the negation of the other. They cannot overlap. 
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If a reputation for emotional behavior is cultivated, and known to be 
so, it ceases to guarantee commitments and threats, because counterpar-
ties understand that such behavior can, ultimately, be turned on or off at 
will. If people know the Doomsday machine can be turned on or off, it 
serves no purpose. On the other hand, if people know that the emotional 
side of a person is truly beyond the control of reason, then they may be 
reluctant to enter into relationships with this individual in the first place, 
viewing the individual's behavior as too unstable and consequently too 
unpredictable. Frank's analysis of the role of emotions in human interac-
tions is therefore at best incomplete. 
The Formal Model 
Let us conclude by examining the formal model appearing in an appendix 
that apparently underlies Passions within Reason. Frank first analyzes a 
large population playing one-shot PDs in random pairings with each 
other. Hypothetically varying the frequency of cooperators from 0 to 100 
percent, he shows that the fitness of both defectors and cooperators rises 
the more cooperators there are in the population (see chap. 2 in this vol-
ume, fig. 1). Unfortunately, the fitness of defectors will be higher than that 
of cooperators at any frequency, so the dynamics are such that coopera-
tors will go extinct regardless of starting frequency. They cannot invade a 
population of defectors and cannot survive at first appearance at low fre-
quency. 
Frank then considers what would happen if cooperators were able 
costlessly to emit a signal identifying themselves as cooperators and also to 
detect such signals with unfailing accuracy. By choosing selectively, coop-
erators can now interact only with other cooperators, leaving defectors to 
interact only with other defectors. Under these circumstances, cooperators 
will have higher fitness at any frequency, and cooperators will therefore 
evolve to fixation within the population. 
Frank does not appreciate that, having explicitly eschewed any role 
for group selection, he has nevertheless posited a set of assumptions that 
creates an environment, indeed the most favorable sort of environment, 
for its operation. In this case the groups are none other than the cooperat-
ing dyads. Frank's assumptions make them like the demes in Sewall 
Wright's analysis, in this case completely immune from invasion. 
What is required, however, to move from the first set of assumptions 
to the second? The evolution of such a system in the absence of any group 
selection would require a most improbable set of coincidences: first, the 
simultaneous appearance of at least two conspecifics predisposed to coop-
eration; second, the simultaneous appearance in both of them of an ability 
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to emit a nonfalsifiable signal of sympathy; and third, a foolproof ability 
in both of these conspecifics to detect such a signal. If one of the abilities 
appeared in a defector and the other in a cooperator, cooperation would 
be dead on arrival. These individuals would, moreover, in a large popula-
tion, have to locate each other immediately, avoiding costly interactions 
with other (defection prone) conspecifics. In comparison, the assumptions 
Sober and Wilson require to enable some kind of evolution by group selec-
tion seem modest. 
The existence of signal emission and detection equipment, once in 
place, could help explain how cooperative outcomes are sustained, and 
Frank's experimental work has provided important evidence of their oper-
ation. Frank spends considerable time exploring the "rationale" of turning 
off the signal detection equipment (if it is costly) if the frequency of coop-
erators rises above a certain level, creating a fitness chart with discontinu-
ities at one end of the frequency range, and the likelihood that cooperators 
will not evolve to fixation but will attain a polymorphous equilibrium, 
turning on signal detection only if frequency drops below a certain level. 
But the fundamental evolutionary problem, unaddressed, is the origin of 
this apparatus in the first place. 
Nothing in Passions within Reason overcomes the fact that in the 
absence of an established social structure of repeated interactions, or in 
the absence of this signal emission and detection equipment, or in the 
absence of a population with a high frequency of individuals similarly pre-
disposed, behaving "nicely" puts one at a disadvantage from the stand-
point of the forces of individual selection. In interactions among humans, 
"nice" people bear potential handicaps. If the dominance of nice people is 
so great in an established group that these handicaps vanish, then the 
behavior in question is no longer nice, merely prudent. Groups that have 
large numbers of trustworthy individuals, on the other hand, may grow 
faster or stronger, and consequently, assuming periodic group mixing, 
cooperative or conditionally cooperative inclinations may grow or become 
stabilized in a larger population. In evolutionary terms, one cannot 
account for the phenomena that interest and concern Frank without 
allowing a role for group level selection. 
Frank has summarized a great deal of experimental evidence showing 
the many failures of the rational actor model accurately to predict behav-
ior. He criticizes the rational choice model in saying that "Its hard-nosed 
if unhappy conclusion is that over the millennia, selfish people have grad-
ually driven out all others" (Frank 1988,257). Frank states that this logic 
is wrong but does not successfully explain why, because he has restricted 
his evolutionary framework to one that accommodates individual level 
selection alone. How did all those unselfish people who, in the past millen-
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nia, have been driven out, ever get established in empirically important 
numbers in the first place? Frank sees the problem, but his solution will 
not persuade those skeptical of his views because it leads to so many inter-
nal contradictions. 
To his great credit, six years after the publication of Passions within 
Reason, Frank acknowledged in print the relevance of the group selection 
mechanism. Here is what he said in commenting on a 1994 target article by 
Wilson and Sober in Behavioral and Brain Sciences. 18 
[They] have persuaded me not only that [my mechanism whereby 
"genuine" altruism toward non-kin might evolve by natural selection] 
can be viewed equally as group-selectionist in their terms, but also 
that there is an advantage in doing so. As a committed individual 
selectionist, I confess that I was very reluctant to reach this conclu-
sion. I hope that my attempt to explain my change of heart will cau-
tion other individual selectionists against dismissing [their] argument 
prematurely. (Frank 1994,620) 
This acknowledgment is, regrettably, little known, and its implications are 
not widely appreciated. Passions within Reason, along with work by 
Trivers and Axelrod, continues to be cited by many as evidence that one 
can account for altruistic behavior and the origin of complex social orga-
nization using a strictly individual level selectionist approach or, from a 
social science perspective, as reflecting the outcome of rational choice. 19 
18. This format of intellectual exchange is one that economics and other social sciences 
might well consider emulating. A "target" article is made available on-line. A prequalified set 
of scholars then has the option of sending in commentary. All of this is published along with 
a combined bibliography. Since most of the players in a field contribute, one can easily get a 
good overview of new and breaking developments and how they are received. In the social sci-
ences, in contrast, when a controversial work appears, one can often only ascertain its initial 
reception through a series of conversations in which scholars sometimes tell you what they 
think of a work but often preface these comments by noting that, of course, they would not 
say this in print. The Behavioral and Brain Sciences format evidently does not limit critical 
commentary but does discipline its quality. No one wishes to appear a fool in print, for exam-
ple, by commenting on work not actually read. Yet the norms are such that most of the major 
contributors in a field apparently feel a responsibility to make their views known, rather than 
allow the absence of a commentary to be interpreted itself in a way they do not wish. 
19. See Green and Shapiro 1994 (chap. 4) for a thorough and effective critique of 
attempts to square the empirical reality of positive voter turnout with the predictions of ratio-
nal choice theory. In An Economic Theory of Democracy (1957), Downs predicted very low 
turnouts except in "close" elections where voters might believe they could influence the out-
come. But although "low" turnout in the 30-40 percent range in elections considered not to 
be close is of concern to some political scientists, the numbers remain far too high to be con-
sistent with Downs's analysis. Riker and Ordeshock in 1968 tried to square theory with evi-
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The foraging algorithms at the heart of what we study in economics 
are powerful indeed. But in situations of social or strategic interaction, 
their guidance can be short-circuited or blocked by the operation of others. 
We need to recognize the implications of the modular structure of our men-
tal organs, evidence for which is detailed in chapter 5. Trying to construct a 
foundation for altruistic or cooperative behaviors on the basis of rational 
choice mechanisms alone leads us not to a Stiglerian palace underpinned by 
granite. Rather, it is like trying to build a house on quicksand. 
dence by adding a sense of civic duty to utility functions. But this is just the sort of ex post 
emendation that leads to criticism from purists as ad hoc. Again, we can use the word ratio-
nal to mean what we want, but proceeding down this route rapidly leads to models that lack 
out-of-sample predictive capability and are therefore difficult to refute. 
CHAPTER 5 
Altruism, Rule Violators, and the Case 
for Modularity 
Pioneering social theorists such as Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau explored the emergence of complex social organi-
zation in ways that left little place for knowledge known or discoverable 
about human prehistory that might contribute to evolutionarily informed 
expectations about fundamental behavioral propensities. Hobbes, Locke, 
and Rousseau, in spite of their empiricist contributions, made assumptions 
about these base rates~in some cases quite different ones. But the validity 
of what was assumed was taken, particularly by Hobbes and Locke, as 
largely self-evident. These philosophers contributed to establishing a tra-
dition of social contract theorizing that is to this day largely a prioristic. 
Rousseau, to his credit, did try to exploit medical knowledge, data on 
comparative anatomy, early anthropological studies of primitive people, 
and observations on animal behavior in developing his theory (see Wrong 
1994, 17). Our base of scientific knowledge is now, however, much im-
proved compared to what existed in the seventeenth and eighteenth cen-
turies, and our assumptions about human prehistory need no longer be 
premised almost entirely on speculation. Advances in ethology, paleontol-
ogy, and molecular biology today permit a range of reasonably definite 
inferences about our origins and development in the millions of years prior 
to the Neolithic revolution. First, the overwhelming weight of paleonto-
logical evidence, genetic analyses, and behavioral studies of our closest 
animal relatives, in particular chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and bonobos 
(Pan paniscus), is that we are descended from animals "that had lived for 
millions of years in hierarchically structured communities with strong 
mutual attachments" that extended beyond kin (de Waa11996, 167). 
Many scholars have been and remain ambivalent about the core pre-
sumption of ethology: that we can learn something useful about human 
cognition and behavior through the study of other animals. l Skepticism 
I. Leslie White commented a half century ago: "Because human behavior is symbolic 
behavior and since the behavior of infra-human species is non symbolic, it follows that we can 
learn nothing about human behavior from observations upon or experiments with lower ani-
mals" (White 1949). 
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derives in part from a hard won twentieth century consensus that vari-
ance in capabilities within human "races" dwarfs any that may exist 
among them and that it is scientifically indefensible to rank human 
groups on any sort of evolutionary continuum (e.g., Montagu 1956). This 
important consensus has had the side effect, however, of widening the 
gulf between what are typically viewed as essential human characteristics 
and those possessed by animals, further than can be justified by the evi-
dence. In a desire to inter irrevocably views that African pygmies or Aus-
tralian aborigines were somehow closer to animal forebears than were 
other humans, scientific evidence on human-animal continuity has been 
downplayed. There is no reason in principle, however, why a nonracist 
anthropology cannot be consistent with a more balanced recognition of 
the facts of human evolution. 
The central fact is, as Darwin gingerly suggested in The Origin of 
Species (1859) and finally explored more exhaustively in The Descent of 
Man (1871), that we are descended from animals. Today, in contrast with 
the nineteenth century, or even the mid-twentieth century, we can be quite 
explicit about the line of descent. The accumulating evidence is over-
whelming that we are one of three surviving chimpanzee species who share 
over 98 percent of our DNA, should probably be classified in the same 
genus, and are descended from a common ancestor who lived roughly six 
million years ago. The study of our closest relatives can, as can the study 
of our own behavior, tell us something about the morphological and 
behavioral characteristics of that ancestor, although we must, as Darwin 
himself warned, be careful about assuming the common ancestor was like 
any particular extant species (1871, 199). 
Nevertheless, fossil evidence going back to Australopithecus shows 
apelike features in known hominid ancestors, suggesting that existing 
chimpanzee species, assuming they have not evolved as rapidly as humans, 
may bear important similarities to that ancestor. In an influential paper in 
1978, Adrienne Zihlman and her colleagues concluded that the bonobo, or 
pygmy chimpanzee (Pan paniscus), is probably morphologically and per-
haps behaviorally closest. In any event, traits common to two or more of 
the surviving species have a strong claim to having been characteristic of 
the common ancestor, although we can never entirely reject the possibility 
of different evolutionary paths subsequent to branching leading to similar 
outcomes. Ifwe are interested in identifying essential behavioral predispo-
sitions in humans-those that have been evolutionarily selected for over a 
long history-evidence on animal behavior and cognition is, subject to 
these caveats, relevant. 
If it is true that as humans we possess behavioral impellers that, 
within certain domains, override the counsel of logic and mathematical 
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reasoning as interpreted by normative game theory, predisposing us, for 
example, to play cooperate in one-shot PDs, the hardwiring that induces 
them has almost certainly been in our genetic heritage for a long time. 
Chimpanzees and bonobos as well as humans all exhibit social organiza-
tion that would be impossible without such predispositions, and there is a 
strong likelihood this was also true of our common ancestor. 
In considering first move(r) altruism or restraint on first strike, there-
fore, we should focus on an evolutionary period extending over millions of 
years, not on some relatively recent period in which fully modern humans 
assembled to agree on a social contract, before which time life was demon-
strably more solitary, poorer, nastier, more brutish, and shorter. For first 
move(r) altruism, at least in the form of failure to harm, we are dealing 
with an environment of evolutionary adaptation that extends back not 500 
or 50,000 generations but 150,000 or 200,000, most likely more. 
Lorenz's Account of the Control of Intraspecific Violence 
Such restraints, particularly toward members of the same species, are, 
after all, common among animals, many of which are believed, based on 
fossil records, to have changed much less than have we since the time of a 
shared ancestor. In On Aggression, Konrad Lorenz observed that even 
"full time" predators like lions and wolves had evolved powerful behav-
ioral inhibitors that restricted intraspecific violence (Lorenz 1966, 129-30, 
241). How did Lorenz account for these inhibitors? Through appeal to 
group selection, a mechanism he adduced frequently and with abandon, 
one of the reasons he, along with Wynne-Edwards, was one of the targets 
of the individual selectionist revolution. Although I take issue with much 
of the thrust of Lorenz's analysis of restraint in humans (see the discussion 
that follows) it is hard to see how he could not have been correct with 
respect to the role of group selection in the evolution of those behavioral 
inhibitors among animals. 
Absent a satisfactory explanation of hardwired restraints on intra-
specific violence, we cannot move to game theoretic environments in 
which indefinitely repeated interactions are assumed. Wolves are heavily 
armed predators who earn their calories by killing other animals. Con-
specifics are potential sources of protein. Failure to attack members of 
one's own species cannot be explained as the consequence of the possibil-
ity they might fight back, since that expectation does not inhibit attacks 
on non-conspecifics, particularly where they may be smaller and weaker. 
And yet wolves generally refrain from attacking other wolves, regardless 
of size. 
Among predator species, smaller and weaker members of the same 
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species represent a potentially lucrative source of calories as well as poten-
tial competitors for other forms offood, both plant and animal. So why do 
animals not avail themselves more frequently of these opportunities for 
self-advancement? Much of the explanation can be found through consid-
eration of the Hamilton kin selection mechanism. Sexually reproducing 
organisms with a high propensity to attack and/or eat reproductively 
mature members of the opposite sex of their own species might live long 
and well fed lives, compared with those that did not. But for obvious rea-
sons they would be unlikely to pass on their genes. Thus a propensity to 
refrain from attacks on opposite sex conspecifics would, overall, face pos-
itive selection: such propensities would increase inclusive fitness. Note that 
this is a consequence of a group level selection factor that overwhelms the 
(negative) individual level selection factor, with the group here identified 
as a male-female dyad. -A case can be made that group level selection 
played a role in the evolution of the system of sexual reproduction itself 
(see chap. 2), and the evolution of hardwired restraints on attacks on 
opposite sex conspecifics was likely part of this package. 
The second important question is why, once we have propensities facilitat-
ing fertilization and gestation, parents do not more frequently attack 
and/or consume their offspring, who represent, again, ready stores of calo-
ries as well as potential competitors for other food sources. This is not a 
trivial issue, given the rates of infanticide and sometimes cannibalism 
reported for many species relatively close to us evolutionarily (de Waal 
and Lanting 1997, 118). Again, the answer is straightforward: animals 
averse to consuming their young would be more likely to pass on genes 
predisposing to such behavior simply because their offspring would be 
more likely to reach maturity and procreate, thus resulting in the spread of 
such dispositions in subsequent generations. An exception, which 
accounts for much of the preceding data, is the tendency observed in some 
animals for males to kill offspring not their own when they mate with a 
new female (Hrdy 1979). In general, however, restraint on the killing 
and/or consumption of young is favored by group level selection, with the 
group now including parents and offspring. 
Restraint on attacking members of the opposite sex and restraint on 
consuming one's offspring are both explicable in terms of the Hamilton 
kin selection mechanism. They involve behavior that disadvantages the 
organism practicing it but benefits the group, in this case the kin group. As 
has been imperfectly acknowledged, the Hamilton mechanism operates as 
a variant of group selection favoring altruism within a trait group here 
defined as the family. 
But this leaves unresolved the question of restraint on attacks on non-
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kin conspecifics. The metaphors we use to characterize the competitive 
marketplace and the real world are often influenced by an unsophisticated 
pop Darwinism, suggesting far higher rates of such activity than in fact 
obtain. Witness: It's a dog-eat-dog world or, with respect to a business 
competitor, not just We're going to eat their lunch (deprive them of caloric 
sustenance) but also We're going to eat them for lunch (deprive them of 
caloric sustenance, provide us with caloric sustenance, and remove a 
potential competitor for calories in the future). But it is not literally a dog-
eat-dog world, and same species competitors only rarely eat each other for 
lunch. Why not? Why wasn't it, to extend the argument backward to 
canine ancestors, a wolf-eat-wolfworld? 
One cannot start, in explaining restraint on intraspecific violence, by 
assuming an environment of indefinitely repeated interaction. If the out-
come of not defecting in the face of defection at first meeting is that one is 
dead, and the defect-defect outcome is only marginally superior for the 
players, restraint on intraspecific violence simply cannot evolve if selection 
operates only at the individual level. The replicator dynamics point in only 
one direction: to a Hobbesian world that is nasty, short, and brutish, leav-
ened only by a modicum of restraint in relations with mates and children. 
This is why Ken Binmore refuses to be drawn into a discussion of how 
such restraint might evolve as a result of rational choice, or individual level 
selection, in an original state characterized as a series of one-shot Pris-
oner's Dilemmas. Having concluded with justification that it cannot, he is 
determinedly critical of those who argue otherwise. He is more or less wed-
ded, as are most practicing game theorists, to an individual level view of 
natural selection, consistent with his emphasis on rationality narrowly and 
precisely defined. Thus, in order to account for restraint on intraspecific 
violence and other forms of cooperation, he must begin his analysis by 
positing an environment of indefinitely repeated interaction. Having made 
this common assumption, he has established necessary although not 
sufficient conditions for the maintenance of cooperative behavior. The 
assumption is only necessary because a variety of equilibria including 
those involving continuous defection can sustain themselves through the 
operation of rational choice, giving rise to a large academic enterprise in 
explaining through simulation or a priori restriction the determination 
("selection") of which one of the possible equilibria prevails. 
Admitting group level selection in favor of some altruistic tendencies, 
the most important of which is the negative altruism offailure to harm, is, 
on the other hand, a plausible vehicle for explaining the transformation of 
one-shot into iterated games. But it is also the camel's nose under the tent 
in terms of admitting the possibility that human behavior may be driven 
by other than self-regarding preferences or that different cognitive mod-
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ules may drive behavior, possibilities resisted tenaciously by many game 
theorists for reasons both historical and ideological. 
Offspring of both sexes develop into adolescents and eventually into 
mature adults. What protects them from attacks on other conspecifics? 
Trivers's theory of reciprocal altruism is of no help in accounting for the 
origin of such restraint. Without group level selection, the first wolf who 
fails to attack a ravenous conspecific, giving up the advantage of the 
offense, is most likely dead meat (see chap. 4). Wolves are collectively bet-
ter off if they "agree" not to attack each other-that is a Pareto efficient 
solution-but that is precisely the dilemma reflected in a one-shot or fixed 
and known duration PD. And we cannot simply dismiss the difficulty on 
the grounds that a species killing and/or eating one of its own is completely 
unthinkable. 2 
Lorenz was ultimately concerned with human aggressive impulses 
and went on to argue that Homo sapiens (unlike lions and wolves) had not 
had enough evolutionary time to develop hardwired restraints on such 
behavior. Rather than evolving weapons physically integral to our organ-
ism, we had "suddenly" discovered the use of tools for hunting. 
"Overnight" we became very dangerous to each other as well as other ani-
mals, lacking the restraints that would have evolved through group selec-
tion, he claimed, had those weapons been physically integral. The fact that 
our weapons were abruptly invented rather than slowly evolved meant, 
according to Lorenz, that today only a thin veneer of civilization keeps us 
from tearing each other to shreds. This view was consonant with a wide 
variety of postwar literature, including Freudian psychology and fictional 
works such as William Golding's novel Lord of the Flies ([1962] 1983). 
But Lorenz's analysis is far too broad stroke, and his reliance on "cul-
ture" to explain our persistence is unpersuasive. Much as we may credit 
our efforts as parents, and acknowledge the impact of institutions of 
socialization (family, church, school), do we really believe that the absence 
of murderous behavior on the part of the predominant portion of the pop-
ulation is entirely attributable to these efforts? Lorenz mistakes the success 
of "civilization" in tamping down the practice of "blood vengeance" (as 
manifested in the Hatfield-McCoy feud referenced by Frank) and insisting 
that retribution be public for the ultimate cause of restraint on intra-
specific murder per se. 
2. Restraints on intraspecific violence do not preclude murder of adult conspecifics and 
do not necessarily preclude infanticide, even among some of our close relatives. Some current 
estimates of infant mortality due to this cause are 37 percent in mountain gorillas, 35 percent 
in gray langurs, 43 percent in red howler monkeys, and 29 percent in blue monkeys (de Waal 
and Lanting 1997,118). For an evolutionary explanation based on sexual selection, see Hrdy 
1979. 
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The practice of blood vengeance in situations lacking strong state 
power, still evident in some environs today, does not imply a widespread 
human predisposition to launch unprovoked first strikes against unrelated 
conspecifics but rather a predisposition to respond to such attacks with 
self-righteous wrath. Such responses are sometimes wildly disproportional 
to the insult, leading to escalating cycles of violence, and I do not mean to 
suggest that the norms that sustain this behavior are necessarily adaptive. 
But from a broader perspective, a secondary and often neglected puzzle is 
why retaliation is so often restrained. While cycles of violence and retalia-
tion do break out from time to time, and receive extensive media and his-
torical attention, they represent the exception rather than the rule. Absent 
such restraint, humans would long since have destroyed themselves 
through undamped volleys of strike and counterstrike. Once started by 
even a small probability spark, the fires would burn ever more ferociously, 
consuming everything in their midst. 
The successful promulgation of the norm of measured response 
reflected in the lex talionis is likely partly attributable to hardwired predis-
positions to restrain secondary retaliation, in this case to that which is pro-
portional. The promulgation of such norms by lawgivers can influence 
behavior, by altering expectations of what others expect, but such cultural 
developments cannot be the entire explanation of restraint on intraspecific 
violence. 
Lorenz's analysis presupposes an implausible sequence of events. The 
discovery of the use of tools as weapons, which turned us into such pow-
erful threats not only to other animals but also to each other, would have 
had to have been followed almost immediately by the "invention" of cul-
ture, just in time to keep us from hacking ourselves to death. And how did 
culture control the expression of these vicious tendencies? Through the 
articulation and promulgation of social norms restraining individually 
rational but group damaging behavioral tendencies. 
But why were these norms initially accepted when first articulated, 
and why would they have influenced behavior? As we have seen in chapter 
3, adherence to norms requires the same short-circuiting of self-interested 
calculation as would be required to explain any kind of restraint in the first 
place. Thus, if one is assuming a world in which only individual level selec-
tion can occur there is a real problem in accepting his explanation. 
I suggest here a more plausible hypothesis that accepts Lorenz's 
admission of the possibility of selection above the level of the individual in 
the evolution of restraint among animals, but not his account of the con-
trol of intraspecific violence among humans. Like lions and wolves, we 
possess hardwired inhibitions that powerfully restrain intraspecific vio-
lence, predisposing us to retaliation when it occurs but also restraining 
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that retaliation to some degree. These predispositions have an extensive 
evolutionary lineage, and we and our ancestors have had them for a long 
time. Cultural restraints on intragroup violence represent a codification-
to which we may be particularly receptive-of predispositions that made 
groups possible, not an entirely independent cause of social organization 
in the first place. 
All of these predispositions are subject to the qualification noted in 
chapter 1: growing within group solidarity, made possible by these incli-
nations, may reduce the likelihood that restraint is manifested toward 
members of "other" groups. Group solidarity requires an aggressive will-
ingness irrationally to retaliate and punish violators of group norms. The 
growth of solidarity may encourage this biologically favored predisposi-
tion to be directed outward. Chimpanzees, for example, will attack and 
kill unaccompanied members of out-groups-but only if three or more 
adult males in a group are present (Hauser 2000, 46). 
Nevertheless, I view these restraints-on the propensity to strike first 
and on the possibility of massive, disproportional retaliation-as the most 
empirically important form of human altruism, the fundamental enablers 
of complex social organization. The affirmative assistance stressed by the 
Russian anarchist Peter Kropotkin in Mutual Aid (1910) is a weaker 
impulse, one whose scope is more culturally variable. Yet most discussions 
of human altruism focus exclusively on affirmative aid, a practice that has 
obscured the importance in humans of hardwired restraints on first strike, 
altruistic in an evolutionary sense as much as the actions we celebrate (in 
their purest form) when we honor heroic behavior. 
The progress of civilization has clamped down on blood vengeance 
within states and reinforced the principle of lex talionis in armed conflict 
among nations. Successful socialization, as proponents of schooling in 
Massachusetts in the mid-nineteenth century argued, can dramatically 
reduce the number of police officers per capita needed to maintain social 
order (Field 1974, 1976a, b). Within the limits posed by hardwired 
restraints, political culture and institutions have important independent 
effects on outcomes. Neither control of primary aggression nor that on the 
proportionality of retaliation is ever complete, although sometimes the 
"advance" of civilization only displaces a "problem" to a different level. 
For example, in the Middle Ages, suppression of private justice elevated 
excesses of retaliation to the public arena, with horrible retribution often 
meted out by states for trivial violations. That historical reality, in the con-
text of Enlightenment thought, was responsible for the prohibition of cruel 
and unusual punishments reflected in the Eighth Amendment to the u.S. 
Constitution. 
The basic flavor of blood vengeance can still be observed in the death 
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penalty meted out by states for the crime of murder and in the practice of 
war by organized states, particularly those that are not democratic, and in 
locales where organized state power is weak. If blood vengeance was the 
"way of the jungle," the prehistorical modality, we can infer that in the 
worst cases it led to an environment of endemic intraspecific violence. But 
such violence has evidently not been sufficiently severe or widespread to 
lead to the extinction of the species (for a view suggesting that so far we 
have just been lucky, see Leslie 1996). Indeed, humans have spread to 
occupy all continents of the world and to grow in numbers to the point 
that there are now more than six billion of us. Surely this is not the record 
of a species lacking hardwired restraints on intraspecific violence or rely-
ing entirely on cultural forces for its suppression. 
Much as we may be depressed and revolted by the carnage of twenti-
eth century wars and genocide, it must be kept in perspective. Violence, 
murder, and war fascinate us, in part because of their abnormality, and 
lead us to overlook the complementary propensities to restrain the exercise 
of first strike, to limit retaliation, and to make peace after conflict. We are 
fascinated by the Middle East, or Northern Ireland, or the Hatfields and 
the McCoys, which feature apparently endless cycles of strike and coun-
terstrike. We overlook the facts that these represent one tail of a statistical 
distribution, that the vast majority of episodes of intraspecific violence end 
after one or two cycles. It follows that humans, like primates (de Waal 
1989), possess abilities, to some degree hardwired, to limit these escala-
tions and make peace (for a description of conflict resolution still worth 
reading see also Kropotkin 1910, 134). 
The pessimistic views of George Orwell about the future of the human 
race have not yet been borne out. John von Neumann's, Bertrand Rus-
sell's, and Curtis LeMay's advocacy of first strike against the Soviets, and 
that of their counterparts in Moscow, did not, in the event, plunge us into 
a nuclear holocaust. The world, it is true, is a dangerous place, but it is also 
true that no other species is as prone to altruistic behavior toward non-kin, 
not only the extraordinary altruism of Yad Vashem award winners but 
also the more mundane and more empirically important altruism reflected 
in the restraint from first strike that preserved the peace in the Cold War 
and prevented our ancestors from annihilating each other. 
The interpretation of our progenitors as killer apes, popularized by 
writers such as Robert Ardrey in the 1960s and 1970s, is widely rejected 
today, in part on the basis of analysis indicating that Raymond Dart seri-
ously misinterpreted the original fossil evidence associated with his dis-
covery of Australopithecus in 1924 (Cartmill 1993, chap. 1). A dent in the 
child's skull quickly interpreted as consequent upon a blow from another 
con specific has been shown to fit very well with the jaw of a saber-toothed 
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tiger found in the same cave. The evidence now seems much stronger that 
the southern ape was hunted by and at great risk from large carnivores, 
particularly at night. The hypothesis that intelligence, tool use, language, 
and human cooperation all flowed from the imperatives, once we had 
descended from the trees, of seeking out and killing large carnivores, a sta-
ple of anthropological texts and museum dioramas through the 1970s, is 
today almost universally discredited. As the work of ethologists has 
shown, chimpanzees also have a taste for flesh, yet they have not evolved 
our higher intelligence. Moreover, as regards the putative link between 
social hunting and superior intelligence, lions developed complex cooper-
ative hunting skills but evolved neither language nor the ability to do dif-
ferential equations. 
The rise to prominence of the hunter hypothesis that, as Mark Cart-
mill (1993) has shown, had political appeal on both the left and the right, 
was certainly influenced by ideological factors. The same can be said for its 
retreat, but reinterpretation of evidence and the development of compet-
ing hypotheses have ultimately been more decisive. One can say this pre-
cisely because the hypothesis had such appeal across the political spec-
trum. 
Steven Stanley (1996), for example, has fashioned an argument for 
the origin of human intelligence emphasizing the challenges of overcoming 
vulnerability to large carnivores. He maintains that climatic changes (trig-
gered by the uplift of the Isthmus of Panama) resulted in a cooling oftem-
peratures in Africa and a shrinkage of the transitional woodlands between 
savanna and rain forest, the traditional habitat of Australopithecus. As the 
southern apes were forced to the ground in search of food, they became 
much more vulnerable to predators. Most of them died out, Stanley sug-
gests, but one group began evolving toward Homo, acquiring the higher 
intelligence associated with tool use; the discovery of fire; language capa-
bility; the growth in brain size of the human embryo; and, because of lim-
its on the extent to which the width of the female pelvis could expand while 
still allowing bipedal locomotion, the birth of babies born more helpless 
and dependent than those of other species. 
The latter was both necessitated and made possible by the final aban-
donment of trees. The imperatives oflearning to avoid being eaten by car-
nivores, rather than our discovery of how to hunt them with weapons, cre-
ated the evolutionary advantage for higher intelligence, leading to larger 
brained infants, whose skulls could squeeze through birth canals only if 
they were born at an earlier stage of fetal development. Tree climbing by 
mothers was then impossible, since such helpless infants could not be 
expected to cling to arboreal caregivers (Stanley 1996). 
Whether Stanley's views ultimately gain widespread acceptance 
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remains to be seen. I mention them to indicate the availability of evolu-
tionary scenarios different from those suggested by the hunting hypothe-
sis. Australopithecus may have caught and eaten small game and might 
have engaged in violent internecine conflict, although it seems increasingly 
unlikely, if we accept the interpretation that he lived in constant fear of 
predators, retreating to the trees each evening. And it remains possible, 
although uncertain, that Homo sapiens exterminated Homo neanderthal-
ensis thirty-five thousand years ago (Trinkaus and Shipman 1993). My 
argument extends only to a claim about hardwired restraints on intra-
specific violence and is subject, as noted, to the important qualification, 
addressed in chapter 1, that increasing within group solidarity (made pos-
sible by this propensity in the first place) may weaken its manifestation 
toward out-group members. 
Focusing our attention on our two closest living relatives, we get a 
mixed report. The warlike and aggressive behavior of common chim-
panzees can be contrasted with the more peaceable mechanisms for dis-
pute settlement observable in bonobos; either set of predispositions may 
have predominated in our common ancestor. In any event, humans, 
chimps, and bonobos do not live in a war of all against all;3 nor is there 
reason to believe that they or any of their ancestors, including their and 
our shared ancestor, ever did. de Waal argues, based on comparative study 
of the previously mentioned three ape species as well as rhesus monkeys 
and stump-tailed macaques, that inborn predispositions facilitating recon-
ciliation after conflict predate not only the common ancestor of the three 
chimpanzees but also the common ancestor of monkeys and apes, refer-
ring to a branching of the lineage that occurred at least thirty million, 
rather than just six million, years ago (de Waal 1989, 270). Such mecha-
nisms must be prevalent in humans as well. 
Of course there is evidence of violent behavioral tendencies along 
many branches of our family tree. Such behavior has great salience, but it 
must be kept in perspective. We can choose to focus on the predatory 
behavior of wolves and lions to confirm Tennyson's view of nature as red 
in tooth and claw, but in doing so we risk ignoring the inhibitions these 
animals exhibit toward intraspecific violence. We can choose to focus on 
chimpanzees' brutal aggression toward members of other chimpanzee 
groups, but in doing so we ignore the predispositions that enable their 
intragroup cohesion, cohesion that extends beyond what can be accounted 
for by kin selection. 
Lorenz's analysis complemented other strands of thinking popular at 
3. In this context I define a war of all against all as an environment in which there are 
no restraints on intraspecific violence save those predicted by the Hamilton kin selection 
mechanism. 
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the time he wrote, including Sigmund Freud's analysis in Civilization and 
Its Discontents (1962). The basic thrust of this view was that humans were 
essentially violent and murderous toward each other and only a thin 
veneer of civilization reined in these impulses and kept them from mani-
festing themselves in disastrous fashion. There is no point in whitewashing 
the ethogram either of humans or other animals. But from a historical 
standpoint, this view begged and begs the question of how "civilization," 
presumably a relatively recent development, ever had a chance to restrain 
the behavior of a species, if the analysis were to be fully accepted, that 
would in an "uncivilized" state surely have torn itself to shreds eons ago. 
It ignores the fact that advanced and culturally refined groups of humans 
have often proved the most murderous (some of the most notorious Nazis 
prided themselves on their love of great opera and fine art).4 Attributing to 
"civilization" in the large the restraint of murderous "basic instincts" runs 
into the same explanatory problems faced by those who appeal, less glob-
ally, to "norms" to account for other-regarding behavior among humans 
(see chap. 3). 
Lorenz's comments actually reinforce the likelihood that ancestral 
progenitors common to humans, apes, and other mammals possessed 
hardwired inhibitions against intraspecific violence. In some cases the inhi-
bitions he described extended only as far as the individual's group, pack, 
or pride. But the cohesion and social interaction in these groups are more 
than can be accounted for by the Hamilton kin selection model. Predispo-
sitions toward playing cooperate in one-shot PDs, at least toward mem-
bers of the same species, must have been part of the genetic endowment of 
hominid ancestors long before the two-million-year Pleistocene empha-
sized by Cosmides and Tooby. Other "cognitive adaptations for social 
exchange," to use their language, may have developed and strengthened 
during this more recent period, but they did so on foundations already 
present. For example, their "cheater detection" module was almost cer-
tainly characteristic of our primate forebears, at least in rudimentary 
form, given the sophisticated political life observable today among chim-
panzees (de WaaI1982). 
Pleistocene adaptations for social exchange developed alongside the 
explosion of hominid cranial capacity, but they did so on a foundation of 
other "adaptations for social exchange" already well established, in par-
ticular a PD solution module. It is unlikely that that module can be attrib-
uted to the development of increased cranial capacity. After all, the 
smarter hominids became the more "obvious" it should have been that the 
4. Lorenz argued, unpersuasively, that in the modern world, humans "succumb to bar-
barism because they have no more time for cultural interests" (1966, 41). 
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"best" strategy in a one-shot PD game was to defect, So something else 
must lie behind observed play in this game. As the example of a highly 
intelligent serial murderer indicates, there is no necessary correlation 
between cranial capacity and its presumed correlatesS and restraint on first 
strike. If increased intelligence was associated with improved abilities to 
forecast counterparty behavior, we have seen that such abilities become 
formally relevant only after an environment of repeated interaction has 
been established. 
Because humans exhibit far more reciprocity than chimpanzees or 
bonobos and probably more so than the common ancestor, it is likely that 
humans acquired features facilitating reciprocity during the period of 
rapid cranial expansion (i.e., the last two million years). This may have 
involved, for example, improved contact management software, for keep-
ing track of who owed whom what. On the other hand, chimpanzees do 
not do a bad job keeping track of a favor bank. The development of 
human language is sometimes suggested as critical to understanding 
human social behavior. I think this is questionable, since human language, 
requiring the descent of the larynx in comparison to chimpanzee features, 
is generally believed to be a relatively recent acquisition. 
Over an extended historical period both before and during the Pleis-
tocene, humans and their ancestors evolved behavioral impellers enabling 
social behavior, domain specific adaptations that are different from those 
dedicated to facilitating optimal foraging. These impellers are based on 
functionally specialized neurobiological subsystems that are, in their ori-
gin, evolutionarily older than our highly developed neocortex. These 
impellers provide guidance sometimes in conflict with that generated by 
other faculties, in particular the deductive logic and mathematical reason-
ing skills we associate so strongly with rationality (the role of skill in sta-
tistical inference is more ambiguous here). Behavioral science will advance 
as we develop a consistent evolutionary accounting of how these systems 
survived forces of selection at different levels and as we develop, through 
observational, experimental, neurobiological, and neuroanatomical 
research, a better understanding of what these different systems are, how 
they work together, and how they sometimes compete with each other in 
guiding human action. 
What has not proved satisfactory has been the effort by economists 
and political scientists to develop a unified theory of human behavior 
based only on a general-purpose reasoning ability devoted to advancing 
5. Einstein's brain was not particularly large, and, on average, a Neanderthal's cranial 
capacity was larger than that of Homo sapiens. Nevertheless, there is broad agreement that 
substantial differences in average cranial capacity between species correlate with significant 
differences in intelligence. 
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the material well-being of the individual actor. Such an approach does 
moderately well in understanding foraging behavior and its modern coun-
terparts. It performs much more poorly, however, as an approach to social 
behavior involving any sort of strategic component. A goal of game theory 
has been to demonstrate the contrary, yet, as we have seen, such analysis 
has important deficiencies as a descriptive or predictive theory of human 
behavior. The need for an alternate approach is driven by, among other 
observations, the peculiar (from the standpoint of normative game theory) 
outcomes of single play and fixed duration Prisoner's Dilemma games and 
the other experimental evidence adduced in chapters 1, 3, and 4. Analo-
gous efforts within an evolutionary framework restricted to selection at 
the level of the individual organism alone (see discussion of Trivers and 
Frank in chaps. 3 and 4) have proved similarly unsatisfactory. 
What is needed is an empirically based characterization of the human 
ethogram providing better predictive power than that realized by the stan-
dard economic model, derived using a priori reasoning and sometimes 
defended as universally applicable by a superficial and incomplete under-
standing of the process of natural selection. This ethogram should reflect 
not just the variety of innate drives possessed by humans but also an 
understanding of human cognition as to some degree modular, reflecting 
the functionally specialized hardwiring that lies behind it. 
For all those who have pursued the elusive quarry of an individual 
level explanation of the origin of cooperative behavior, the methodologi-
cal prescription proposed here is radical. I have discussed some of the 
behavioral evidence supporting it. It is important as well that the evidence 
supporting the proposed view of cognition be marshaled and considered. 
This issue is relevant not only for economists. Although economists have 
been profoundly aware of and often taken great pride in how their disci-
pline differs from other social sciences, in particular sociology and anthro-
pology, its assumptions about human cognition and the role of evolution 
in determining how it now operates are in certain respects quite similar to 
those common to these other disciplines. 
The Standard Social Science Model: A Useful 
Straw Man 
John Tooby and Leda Cosmides have characterized the standard social 
science model (SSSM) as one that presupposes a fundamental division 
between biology and the institutional/cultural environment. The SSSM is 
a straw man, but a useful one. Almost all social scientists have granted that 
biology endows humans with basic drives toward food and procreation 
and away from life-threatening situations and that these drives are mani-
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fested in physiological and emotional states such as hunger, sexual desire, 
and fear. Even John Watson, the father of American behaviorism, did 
allow a role for unconditioned propensities for fear, anger, and love. The 
thrust of his efforts, however, was to minimize the emphasis on instincts 
reflected in the work, for example, of William James. 
But the modular view of cognition involves considerably more than 
the proposition that innate drives may be more widespread than behavior-
ists are comfortable acknowledging. Modularity goes to the heart of com-
mon social scientific assumptions regarding the cognitive means used by 
humans to pursue their ends. Thus, whereas a behaviorist psychologist 
and an economist might differ over whether a drive was truly innate and 
thus neither conditionable nor extinguishable, both, like many other social 
scientists, would find congenial the idea that humans pursue the satisfac-
tion of the drive through the use of a general reasoning and learning capa-
bility not specialized to particular domains of cognition. For example, the 
standard social science view has been that, using this general capability, we 
learn language through imitation and reinforcement, in the same way that 
a child learns not to touch a stove because it may be hot. 
The SSSM can be seen, therefore, as embodying two related proposi-
tions. First, whatever biological influences may have operated on essential 
human predispositions in our prehistory, these have been almost entirely 
superseded by environmental/cultural factors, thus minimizing the role of 
innate drives or desires. Second, cognition operates using a general-pur-
pose mechanism. Categories and data structures arise entirely as the result 
of experience, rather than being partly hardwired at birth, and the same 
kind of advanced reasoning algorithms are applied to data regardless of 
their domain (Tooby and Cosmides 1992; Pinker 1997,44--45). 
Tooby and Cosmides' characterization, it should be noted, glides 
over some important differences in the perspective and approach of eco-
nomics as compared with other social sciences. The key difference has con-
cerned the role accorded culture. Microeconomics does not fit neatly into 
the SSSM because of the privileged status it has traditionally granted 
methodologically individualist models that are at best agnostic about cul-
tural influences on behavior (preferences are to be taken as given; their ori-
gin "non disputandum est"). Traditional nineteenth- and twentieth-cen-
tury sociology and anthropology might be characterized as having taken 
the view that cultural structures and the social norms they define "non dis-
putandum sunt." Economists, on the other hand, generally remain silent 
regarding or object to the view that influences on social behavior must be 
overwhelmingly cultural; the explanatory status of culture or the institu-
tional environment has always been problematic within the discipline. 
However, none of these three disciplines has been sympathetic to the 
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proposition that the underlying categories and data structures organizing 
cognition might have a biological, unconditioned foundation or that rea-
soning algorithms might be specialized to particular domains. Here is 
where the real similarity with other social sciences lies: most economists, 
like "most intellectuals [,] think that the human mind must somehow have 
escaped the evolutionary process" (Pinker 1997, chap. 1). That is, for 
economists as much as for other social scientists, the mind floats freely in 
its own realm, untethered to biological or neurobiological substrates. The 
reasoning abilities it enables are assumed to be general, not specialized to 
particular domains. Categories into which knowledge is organized are 
assumed not to be prespecified, or differentially favored, at birth. Finally, 
there is little place within the methodological stance typically adopted for 
the proposition that evolution, operating over the millions of years of pre-
history, has endowed us with functionally specialized cognitive modules 
that operate independently of our "general reasoning ability" and may 
trump or augment the guidance of mathematical reasoning, propositional 
or categorical logic, or standard procedures for statistical inference. 
It is a significant leap for economists, almost as much as for other 
social scientists, to abandon a comfortable Cartesian dichotomy between 
mind and body and systematically explore evolutionary influences on 
human behavior and cognition, particularly the proposition that cognition 
(and consequently behavior) may be influenced by brain subsystems 
adapted evolutionarily to particular types of situations. Structural func-
tionalists often appealed to evolutionary analogies to explain why certain 
features of social organization persisted: obviously they did so because 
they were beneficial to the group; social adaptations that did not meet this 
criterion did not survive. But, as we have noted, there was, in that tradi-
tion, no systematic exploration of how such adaptations could ever have 
become established, overcoming the obvious selection against them at the 
individual level. 
Economists, on the other hand, have been perfectly happy appealing 
to Darwin as justification for the assumption that humans are driven by 
material self-interest advanced by a general-purpose reasoning capability 
(humans are self-interested and pursue their goals rationally). As we have 
seen, however, the standard economic model has, using this engine alone, 
not been able to account for the origin and persistence of altruistic behav-
ior, some form of which underlies most social adaptations. 
Evidence for Early Acquisition of First Move(r) Altruism 
The chronology of evolutionary branching and the characteristics of com-
mon ancestors are critical to my claim that propensities enabling complex 
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social organization predate the evolutionary refinement of higher reason-
ing skills we associate with the more recent growth in cranial capacity-
and thus that attainment of such organization is not dependent on or the 
consequence of the sophisticated cognitive and ratiocinative skills rational 
choice theorists are prone to emphasize. How are we able, in spite of a gap-
ing hole in the ape fossil record in Africa from about five to fourteen mil-
lion years ago, to state with confidence that humans and their ancestors 
have a history of social organization that goes back at least five to ten mil-
lion years (Cosmides and Tooby 1992, 164)? 
The claim is based on a confluence of evidence from different sources. 
But it begins with our ability to be precise about evolutionary branching 
and in particular to state that six million years ago we shared a common 
ancestor with two other surviving chimpanzee species. As indicated, tradi-
tional foundations for such a claim, fossilized skulls and skeletons, are not 
by themselves sufficient to establish chronology at this level of precision. 
The details of the currently accepted branching chart have been estab-
lished on the basis of advances in the calculation of differences among 
species in molecular composition, in particular of DNA, in conjunction 
with the use of the known fossil record to calibrate these clocks. 
Since the early 1950s and the work of Watson and Crick we have 
known that DNA is the key to understanding an organism's structure and 
performance. Deoxyribonucleic acid is a large molecule constructed in the 
form of a twisted ladder. The components of the rails are alternating sugar 
and phosphate molecules. Attached to each sugar, and forming the rungs, 
are pairs of nitrogen-containing "base" molecules: adenine (A), cytosine 
(C), guanine (G), and thymine (T), each pair held together by weak hydro-
gen bonds. Adenine always pairs with thymine, and cytosine always pairs 
with guanine. The DNA in each human cell consists of about 3.1 billion 
base pairs inherited from both parents. Much smaller sequences of mito-
chondrial DNA, inherited only from one's mother, float in organelles out-
side of the cell nucleus, the basis for continuing investigation of the long-
standing historical controversy regarding the relationship between 
Thomas Jefferson and Sally Hemmings, as well as developing insights into 
historical patterns of human migration. 
The 3.1 billion base pairs in the human genome, laid end to end, 
would measure about two meters in length. Every cell in one's body, with 
the exception of the somatic cells, contains exactly the same information 
distributed among forty-six chromosomes. Genes are portions of the 
genome consisting of strings of base pairs marked by start and stop codes. 
Differentially concentrated among the different chromosomes, they con-
tain sequences of base pairs that code for protein assemblage (exons) inter-
spersed with strings that do not (introns). Genes code not only for struc-
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ture-how an organism will develop as it grows from a fertilized egg-but 
also for performance, influencing how the organism will function as it 
matures. 
The key developmental function of DNA is to direct the assemblage 
of complex proteins from twenty amino acids. This assemblage is carried 
out with the participation of messenger RNA molecules in protein facto-
ries made of RNA and proteins known as ribosomes and is done accord-
ing to a code "written" in triplets of base pairs (codons) in the organism's 
functional DNA. The code was deciphered in 1966, thirteen years after 
Watson and Crick discovered the double helical structure of DNA. Shared 
by all living things on this planet, it is the strongest evidence that life on 
earth is descended from a common ancestor, a conclusion reinforced by 
the similarity of the chemical and physical design of cells throughout the 
living world and the evidence on chirality (handedness). DNA in all organ-
isms is right handed (coiled up like a right handed double helix), even 
though there is no principle in chemistry or molecular biology preventing 
the construction ofleft handed DNA (Davies 1999, 70-74). 
Readers interested in viewing an updated map of the genome and 
obtaining a sense of how it is being used in commercial and academic 
research should consult <http://www.celera.com>. the website of the pri-
vate corporation founded by Dr. Craig Venter, or <http://genome.ucsc 
.edu>, which provides a window into the complementary work done by 
the government- and foundation-supported consortium that initiated the 
sequencing effort. Competition between these two efforts culminated in 
the joint announcement of completion of a draft sequence in June 2000 
and the simultaneous publication of reports by the two groups of prelimi-
nary analyses in February 2001 (International Human Genome Sequenc-
ing Consortium 2001; Venter et al. 2001). 
These analyses indicate that there are between twenty-five thousand 
and forty thousand human genes, a much lower range than the estimates 
of one hundred thousand commonly cited as little as a year earlier (thirty 
thousand appears to be the current consensus estimate). Genes (coding 
DNA) occupy collectively a small portion of the genome. Of its 200 cen-
timeters, roughly 197 are noncoding (sometimes called "junk" or non-
functional) DNA-residues of evolutionary history that may have an indi-
rect influence on structure or performance in ways now not well 
understood. Certain sections are residues of bacteria or retroviruses that 
attacked human ancestors millions of years ago and have left their genetic 
signatures. Others are pseudogenes, once functioning genes that accumu-
lated so many mutations as to become noncoding. And perhaps 50 cen-
timeters contain strings of base pairs with, as far as we can now tell, no rel-
evant genetically coded information. 
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Because most of the coding (as well as noncoding) DNA is the same 
for all humans-the reason we are all similar in design-more than 199 cen-
timeters of any human's genome are exactly the same as that found in every 
cell of every other human. And approximately 198 are identical to that 
found in every cell of every chimpanzee. Minor differences are enough to 
direct the assemblage of organisms that are in many respects identical, but 
nevertheless belong to different species. Indeed, all mammals are remark-
ably similar genetically, a point reinforced by completion of the sequencing 
of the mouse and human genomes. Of thirty thousand human genes, all but 
about three hundred have a homologue in the mouse, even though our last 
common ancestor lived one hundred million years ago, putting some two 
hundred million years of evolutionary distance between us. 
"Functional" or coding DNA comprises between 1.1 and 1.5 percent of 
the genome, most of which is identical across individuals. The 0.1 percent or 
less of base pairs (nucleotides) that differ within human populations 
(approximately 800 per million base pairs according to Venter et al.'s latest 
estimates) produce polymorphisms that give rise to the genetic component 
of human variation. It is important to emphasize the overwhelming genetic 
similarity of all humans and, for that matter, members of closely related 
species. But there are understandably strong economic incentives to gaining 
an understanding of genetic influences on individual variation within 
human populations. Thus a great deal of commercial and academic research 
is now focused on the less than 0.1 percent of base pairs that may differ. 
As the completion of the first draft of the human genome neared in 
1998, major resource flows moved to the identification of single nucleotide 
polymorphisms (SNPs) and the investigation of their correlation with sus-
ceptibility to particular diseases. Both diagnosis and treatment stand to 
benefit. With the ability cheaply to genotype an individual, it will become 
possible to design drug treatments likely to be most effective and best tol-
erated by a particular individual. As of June 2000, over 147,000 SNPs had 
been posted to the website maintained by the National Center for Biotech-
nology Information <http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/SNP>. Progress in 
identifying these has been extraordinarily rapid. The International Human 
Genome Sequencing Consortium (2001) reported 1.4 million SNPs, Ven-
ter et al. (2001) 2.1 million, and the NCB I website, as of December 8, 2000, 
posted information on over 2.5 million of them. In conjunction with such 
projects as the genetic study of the entire population ofIceland now being 
conducted by the firm deCODE genetic <http://www.decode.com> and 
established research programs on identical and fraternal twins (Hunt 
1990, 54-56), it is certain that over the next decade and beyond research 
will identify more and more genetic correlates not only of disease suscepti-
bility, but also of phenotypic variation, both physical and behavioral. 
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The full implications of these scientific achievements are only begin-
ning to be digested, but it is hard to imagine that the social and behavioral 
sciences can remain unaffected by them. A basic understanding of what 
has and is being accomplished through these efforts is necessary to evalu-
ate claims about heritability of both physical and behavioral traits and 
because of its bearing on advances in our knowledge of evolutionary his-
tory, upon which I now focus. 
The writing of evolutionary history consists in determining the 
branch points at which paths leading to surviving and extinct species 
diverged. Fossils, which can be dated using evidence on the geological 
strata in which they are found and techniques based on known decay rates 
for radioactive isotopes present in accompanying organic material, have 
traditionally been the primary sources for this history. In the past decade, 
however, advances in biochemistry have revolutionized evolutionary his-
tory. As a consequence, we are now able to fill in some gaps in the fossil 
record and resolve other long-standing issues by measuring how the DNA 
in one surviving species differs from that in another. 
One technique, DNA hybridization, involves taking samples from 
two species, splitting them into single strands of DNA by applying heat, 
and then mixing single strands from each species (Sibley and Ahlquist 
1984). The more closely related are the species, the tighter will the strands 
bond as the mixture cools. One then measures to what temperature one 
must reheat the combined strands in order to again separate them by caus-
ing the mixture to melt. The more closely related the species the more heat 
is required to separate the DNA hybrid bonds, and the number of degrees 
by which the melting point of the mixture falls short of the melting point 
of DNA from a single species is roughly proportional to genetic difference. 
A one degree centigrade difference is equivalent to about a 1 percent 
genetic difference. 
Paleontological evidence can then be used to calibrate how rapidly 
the "clock" of molecular change operates. We know from the fossil record 
that monkeys diverged from apes 25-30 million years ago and now differ 
in DNA by about 7.3 percent. Gibbons branched out about 22 million 
years ago. Orangutans diverged from chimps and gorillas between 12 and 
16 million years ago and now differ in about 3.6 percent of DNA. Gorillas 
diverged about 8 million years ago and differ from humans in about 2.3 
percent of their base pairs. 
The molecular composition of our DNA differs from that of chim-
panzees by less than 2 percent and from that of bonobos by slightly less, 
one of the bases for the current consensus that the early hominid line 
diverged from that leading to the two chimp species approximately six mil-
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lion years ago, about half the previous estimate (Sibley and Ahlquist 
1984), Estimates of genetic difference based on amino acid sequences in 
proteins, mitochondrial DNA, and globin pseudo gene DNA all support 
this conclusion (Brown 1990, chap. 9; Diamond 1992, 22-24). We can 
make these inferences with confidence even though the paleontological record 
does not provide us with a fossilized skeleton of our common ancestor. Aus-
tralopithecus afarensis, the first definite fossilized hominid, appeared about 
four million years ago. 
The evolutionary lines leading to modern day bonobos and chim-
panzees split about three million years ago (de Waal and Lanting 1997, 3), 
with chimpanzees evolving a male dominated, status conscious society 
characterized by much physical violence, while bonobos evolved in more 
sexually egalitarian directions, exhibiting little physical violence among 
themselves. Are bonobos or chimpanzees the more accurate mirror for 
humans? We cannot say definitively, although bonobos are the only 
species, with the exception of Homo sapiens, to practice face-to-face (ven-
tro-ventral) copulation. 
The two species of chimpanzees, Pan troglodytes and Pan paniscus, 
the common chimpanzee and bonobo respectively, are our closest living 
relatives. Jared Diamond (1992) has argued that they belong in the same 
genus as Homo sapiens, basing his position on the proposition that taxon-
omy ought to be driven by evidence on genetic distance. 
Homo sapiens, Pan troglodytes, and Pan paniscus each represent a dis-
tinct evolutionary pathway from a common ancestral species that lived six 
million years ago. Traits shared by these three surviving species give us 
clues as to the social and behavioral characteristics of the common ances-
tor but may also show similar evolutionary pathways to common out-
comes; thus none can necessarily be taken as reflecting characteristics of 
the common ancestor. Observation of the two Pan species does, however, 
lead to a sharply restricted set of attributes that can be considered 
uniquely human. It used to be claimed, for example, that humans were the 
only tool users, the only species with self-awareness (as tested by ability to 
recognize one's features in a mirror), the only species to engage in face-to-
face copulation, and the only species to murder its own. Each of these 
propositions has now been shown to be false. Claims regarding how 
unique are the human understanding and use of language continue to be 
debated, in the face of demonstrated capabilities of chimps, bonobos, and 
other primates. 
The biological laboratory represented by our closest living relatives is 
shrinking, with the number of wild chimps now estimated to be about 
150,000, down from one to two million a century ago. Of these, the num-
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ber ofbonobos is estimated to be only 10,000-25,000, of whom only about 
100 are in captivity worldwide, compared to over 1,000 chimpanzees (de 
Waal and Lanting 1997,172).6 
The ethologist Franz de Waal has studied both chimpanzees and 
bonobos in detail. In his 1982 book Chimpanzee Politics he provides com-
pelling evidence of reciprocal altruism among chimpanzees, as well as a 
Machiavellian male dominated society obsessed with power and status. de 
Waal's work is not, as it is sometimes portrayed (Dawkins 1998), an overly 
sentimental portrait of our relatives, although he admits freely to having 
initially and naively overestimated their cooperative problem solving abil-
ities (de Waal and Lanting 1997, 84). So did Jane Goodall. As is true 
among our own human relatives, it turns out that there is plenty of evi-
dence of meanness, nastiness, and, in some cases, downright viciousness, 
including murder, displayed particularly toward nongroup members. Hos-
tility between human groups bears an eerie similarity to that seen in 
chimps. Chimps patrol territorial boundaries, seek out isolated nongroup 
members, and kill them (Goodall 1990, chap. 10). But chimps also know 
how to play Tit-for-Tat, form alliances, and, as a consequence, establish 
cooperative relations with each other. 
Bonobos, originally called pygmy chimps, display much less physical 
violence toward each other, use sex as a means of defusing potential 
conflict, and have a distinctive, more female dominated social structure 
(de Waal and Lanting 1997). They also, as does Pan troglodytes, establish 
and maintain cooperative relations among each other. So, of course, do 
humans. We can see different aspects of the human ethogram reflected in 
the two chimp species, for example, face-to-face copulation in bonobos 
and male dominated groupings permeated with a concern for status, terri-
toriality, and access to females in chimpanzees. But all three surviving 
species live in groups based on cooperative interaction. Based on this evi-
dence, and paleontological evidence of early hominids and their campsites 
(Isaac 1983), it is reasonable to extend the history of hominid and preho-
minid social organization at least back to the point where our evolution-
ary route diverged from that leading to chimpanzees and bonobos. 
Genetic tendencies facilitating such behavior were almost certainly wide-
spread in our hominid and hominoid ancestors and most likely already 
pervasive in the small groupings out of which more complex human soci-
eties emerged. 
Since there is documented observational evidence of chimpanzees 
practicing Tit-for-Tat, or reciprocal altruism, it is almost certain that the 
6. Data on total number of wild chimps from Wall Street Journal, February I, 1999, p. 
Bl. Bonobos have a smaller head but are otherwise about the size of an Australopithecus. 
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basic genetic predispositions and cognitive capabilities enabling social 
behavior antedate the development of larger cranial capacities that have 
permitted as an unintended7 consequence advancements in human capa-
bilities for statistical inference, logic, and the elaboration of complex 
mathematical and game theory models. 
It is putting the cart before the horse to suggest that reciprocal altru-
ism as it is practiced by humans emerged as the result of cogitating agents 
armed only with highly developed capabilities for logic and lacking any 
specialized (and evolutionarily prior) genetic predispositions toward such 
behavior. More likely is it that during the Pleistocene epoch-roughly two 
million years ago until the end of the last Ice Age and the beginnings of the 
Neolithic revolution ten thousand years ago---complex social organiza-
tion moved increasingly beyond that enabled by propensities to make 
grants of first move(r) altruism involving forgoing of first strike (failure to 
harm) and began to include a higher frequency of grants providing 
affirmative assistance to non-kin. While the game theoretical structures of 
grants involving forbearance and affirmative help are identical, it is the 
growing importance of the latter that accounts for the greater range and 
complexity of human reciprocity compared to that observable in chim-
panzee and bonobo groups and, most likely, our common ancestor. Adam 
Smith viewed human exchange as rooted in what he viewed as a natural 
human propensity to truck and barter, and in the growing frequency of 
these affirmative grants we may see its origin. 
We cannot be certain why cranial capacity expanded so much, but we 
know that it did, forcing female pelvises to widen about as far as they 
could without threatening bipedal locomotion and causing human babies 
to be born at a much less developmentally advanced stage than is true for 
chimpanzees. There are many candidates for explaining this expansion, 
sometimes divided into those emphasizing the challenges of dealing with 
the nonhuman environment, the ecological intelligence hypothesis, and 
those, the social intelligence hypothesis, that stress the challenges of deal-
ing with conspecifics. Early contenders, such as the imperatives of tool use, 
are today accorded less credence given the accumulating evidence that 
such use is not uniquely human and the millions of years over which cra-
nial capacity grew rapidly while tool use remained primitive and unchang-
ing. One must also be skeptical that it is associated with a shift to meat eat-
7. Again, I extend the metaphor of considering the operation of natural selection as a 
designer. There clearly were no designer and no intentionality in the process. My point is that 
advances in the understanding of logic, arithmetic, and higher mathematics are features of 
the last several thousand years of human existence, far too short a time for natural selection 
to have played any role in their development or for their development to have had significant 
influence on natural selection. 
232 Altruistically Inclined? 
ing: as noted, it is not clear that the cooperative hunting skills displayed by 
humans are superior to those exhibited, for example, by lions. 
Robin Fox has argued that our small brained hominid progenitors 
stumbled onto the evolutionary advantages of developing transmittable 
culture, increasing the premium on learning capabilities and the ability to 
represent ideas or concepts symbolically, which in turn created selection 
pressures for more CPU and RAM (Fox 1989,29-30). Others have more 
specifically emphasized the challenges of interacting with the human, as 
opposed to the nonhuman, environment, leading to an arms race in which 
politics, both sexual and nonsexual, placed a premium on evolving, at con-
siderable biological expense, ever larger brains (Ridley 1993, chap. 10). 
But we need to be specific about the range of skills involved in this arms 
race. If human survival in interactions with other conspecifics depended 
on figuring out the Nash equilibrium in one-shot or fixed and known dura-
tion PDs, then good logical and mathematical skills would be the key to 
evolutionary success. Clearly, however, there must be more to it than this. 
Whatever the case for linking the growth of cranial capacity to the 
imperatives of social interaction, development must have occurred within 
the context of a social "intelligence" based upon a widespread and evolu-
tionarily earlier predisposition to make grants of first move(r) altruism. It 
is simply implausible that the evolution of bigger brains, making available 
larger memory as well as language in its human implementation, was a 
precondition for hominid social organization at the level observable in 
chimpanzee or bonobo groups. The studies of the two Pan species, with 
their more limited cranial capacities, are evidence in themselves against 
this view. 
Large Brains and Prisoner's Dilemmas 
Beyond observing that relatively small brained chimpanzees and bonobos 
live in cooperative groups extending beyond kin, we can offer several 
reflections on why an expansion of brain capacity plays an ambiguous role 
in helping humans "solve" Prisoner's Dilemmas. Learning more about the 
game does not help us solve it, if by solving we mean arriving at the coop-
erate-cooperate profile. Being smarter in the sense of being more proficient 
at mathematical reasoning or formal logic does not help solve it, since 
these skills drive us toward mutual defection. Possessing language and, 
hence, the ability to communicate with one's counterparty does not in the 
least change the normative counsel of defection. Proficiency in statistical 
inference presupposes the availability of data based on past histories of 
interaction and becomes relevant only once interaction is expected to 
extend beyond one play, even if of fixed duration, and we are prepared to 
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entertain the possibility that our counterparty may, irrationally, choose a 
cooperative or conditionally cooperative strategy. Similarly, the ability, 
based on facial expression, body language, voice stress, or intonation, to 
forecast the likelihood of cooperation or defection in advance of play can 
be quite valuable but only assuming the problem of getting beyond the 
one-shot PD has been solved. 
The cognitive apparatus necessary to form fully "rational" expecta-
tions is more sophisticated than that needed to form adaptive expectations 
and frees problem solving from strict reliance on trial and error methodol-
ogy or hardwired behavioral heuristics.8 Human reliance on rational 
expectations is, however, not unique but rather a matter of degree of 
sophistication. In the 1920s the German psychologist Wolfgang Kohler 
documented problem solving by chimpanzees based on planning and fore-
sight, thus providing one of the first challenges to the simple behaviorist 
model (de Waal and Lanting 1997, 36). The ability to employ more sophis-
ticated expectations formation mechanisms would have made us better 
foragers or, more generally, better interactors with the natural environ-
ment. And it would have made us more successful at playing more com-
plex PD games, given that it was building on an already well-established 
PD solution module necessary to solve simpler ones. 
One of Robert Frank's most striking experimental contributions has 
been his demonstration that humans are fairly good at predicting who will 
defect and who will cooperate in single play PD games, provided they are 
able to talk with their counterparties for half an hour previous to playing, 
even when players have never met before and confidentiality precludes 
their ex post knowledge of actual play (Frank 1988, 139--43, 157). Three 
out of four times, a player correctly predicts cooperation by a counter-
party; defection is correctly predicted six out often times. Players achieved 
a mutual cooperation rate of 68 percent in the experiment. 
Recent neurobiological research by Antonio Damasio and his col-
leagues makes a strong case that the ability to make these forecasts is local-
ized in the region of the brain known as the amygdala. Normal subjects 
consistently and with high agreement identify pictures of faces of individ-
uals they consider trustworthy and those whom they do not. Individuals 
8. The concept of rational expectations heavily influenced macroeconomic theory in 
the late 1970s and 1980s, where it was used to argue that costless inflation could be achieved 
simply by announcing a lower growth rate of the money supply. Humans, it was argued, were 
smart enough to anticipate the long run consequence, rather than be forced to learn through 
the experience of gradually falling inflation accompanied by high unemployment. The 1982 
recession, although not disproof of the basic principle, did raise questions about whether or 
not it was rational, ex ante, to find credible Paul Volker's October 1979 announcement of a 
change in monetary regime. 
234 Altruistically Inclined? 
for whom brain scans have identified damage to the amygdala are consis-
tently unable to do so (Adolphs and Damasio 1998; Damasio 1999, 
66-67). They are unable to process the nonverbal cues in facial expressions 
that, in part, enable Frank's subjects to do as well as they do in prediction. 
For humans predisposed to play cooperate, the availability of these 
forecasting abilities reduces somewhat the individual level fitness disadvan-
tage associated with that propensity. By facilitating "assortative mating," it 
increases the power of group selection to favor predispositions to play such 
strategies by increasing the variation of altruist frequency between groups. 
Why this is so can be appreciated by realizing that if there is no variation in 
such frequency between groups, group selection is powerless. 
It would be interesting, in this regard, to try to teach pairs of chim-
panzees the game and see how they play. The idea is not completely out-
landish. David Premack, for example, has shown that chimps can isolate 
cause. Shown before and after pictures of an apple cut in half or a paper 
scribbled on, they can identify what object caused the change (Premack 
1976). Why shouldn't they be able to learn a PD game? My prediction is 
that we would see cooperation in 25 to 50 percent of experimental subjects 
in single play games, rates lower, but not an order of magnitude lower, 
than, those exhibited by human subjects. This similarity of behavior, were 
it confirmed, would stand in sharp contrast to all sorts of tests calling on 
the enhanced capabilities of the human neocortex in which human-chimp 
comparisons would be almost nonsensical. 
Although there is no formal difference in the game theoretic structure 
of altruistic acts that involve failure to harm, as opposed to those that 
affirmatively provide benefit, the incidence of acts of the latter type is 
higher in humans than in other species and provides the foundation for the 
exchange of different goods or services, different not just in their particu-
lar identity but in kind. It is the latter that ultimately leads to the develop-
ment of complex economies. Because of the difficulty of establishing a 
double coincidence of wants, however, quid pro quo exchange is unusual 
in primitive human as compared with more advanced societies and was 
almost certainly unusual in early hominid groups. 
Generalized reciprocity can be understood as a series of nonsimulta-
neous unilateral transfers taking place over time that are, nevertheless, in 
the long term expected to have some rough balance. The absence of com-
plex simultaneous exchange in hunter-gatherer societies is not the conse-
quence of their possessing different behavioral predispositions. We see 
more unilateral transfers in such societies (transfers that do not appear to 
be part of an exchange transaction) not necessarily because their denizens 
are inherently more altruistic than we are but because they lack the social 
contrivance of money. 
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Whereas such transfers among non-kin are never unlimited (thus 
their interpretation as generalized reciprocity) their occurrence takes place 
against a backdrop established by first move(r) altruism, initially of the 
former (forbearance) kind, then of the latter (affirmative help) kind. One 
needs mutual failure to harm through forgoing of first strike to get the ball 
rolling. One then needs a first move(r) willing to make a unilateral transfer 
without knowledge of whether it will be reciprocated or guarantee that it 
will be. 
I do not mean to suggest that humans have evolved to the point where 
the practice of first move(r) altruism in unstructured situations is auto-
matic or universal. Clearly it is not. Genotypic influences on this predispo-
sition have not necessarily evolved to the point of fixation: polymorphism 
is likely, and deviant tendencies may persist at low and stable levels. More-
over, in any individual the predisposition toward first move(r) altruism 
must almost certainly be evoked by environmental cues and can be atten-
uated in their absence or in the presence of different ones. Socialization, 
the particular form of cultural norms, and political structure can all 
influence how these tendencies play out in particular instances. 
But only in some instances should we view norms as exerting an inde-
pendent influence on aggregate behavior. For example, norms forbidding 
incest between siblings and between parents and children can be viewed as 
universal and codifying, whereas explicit norms against marriage among 
first cousins are more likely of the second type, not necessarily adaptive 
but having relatively more to do with political conflicts involving property 
inheritance than the prevention of defective children (Betzig 1992; Ridley 
1993,242-43). 
Aristotle argued that every organism or thing had both accidental 
and essential features. Cultural differences represent that which is acci-
dental. What unifies us as humans is the essential. The meaning and inter-
pretation of facial expressions signifying joy, grief, shame, or anger are 
essential (Ekman and Friesen 1975). The meaning and interpretation of an 
embrace may be culturally accidental. And although the particular lan-
guage that we learn is determined by cultural inheritance, the ability to 
handle a complex language is a genetic trait both unique and essential to 
humans (Crick 1994, 11). 
Language Acquisition 
Chimpanzees, bonobos, and humans represent three evolutionary paths 
from a common ancestor. The brain and other structures of that common 
ancestor, in turn, reflected hundreds of millions of years of prior evolution. 
This evolutionary perspective gives credence to the view that humans (and 
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the other chimps) are likely to possess functionally specialized mental 
organs, some with a longer evolutionary lineage than others. But where is 
confirmatory evidence based on the study of humans showing that it is 
meaningful to speak of specialized neurobiological subsystems affecting 
cognition and behavior? 
The most compelling evidence comes from the study of language 
acquisition and the structure of human grammars. Humans are hardwired 
at birth with deep structures shared by all human languages. The Skinner-
ian view that infants learn these principles (Skinner 1957) is inconsistent 
with the disproportionality between the sheer quantity of stimuli infants 
would have to receive to discriminate, through learning alone, among all 
potential forms of grammar and the quantity of stimuli they actually 
receive. 9 
Linguists have by and large accepted the views first advanced by 
Noam Chomsky in his 1957 book Syntactic Structures and forcefully artic-
ulated in his 1959 review of Skinner's Verbal Behavior (1957). Chomsky 
argued that the brain possesses functionally specialized subsystems per-
mitting infants to acquire language and imposing deep structural unifor-
mities on all known human grammars. These capabilities operate inde-
pendently of the influence of local cultural variation. All children, 
irrespective of their intelligence levels or nationality and regardless of 
whether they are encouraged to do so, begin to learn language at the same 
age (seven to eight months), speak whole words by about age one, and by 
age six speak in complete grammatical sentences. As they acquire lan-
guage, infants use the same sounds and learn them, within a given lan-
guage, in the same sequences. English speakers, for example, learn a 
before i and u and learn p, b, and m before t. Vocabulary acquisition is 
extraordinarily rapid. By age eighteen, the typical U.S. high school gradu-
ate knows about forty-five thousand words, which works out to an aver-
age of over twenty-five hundred words a year learned starting at age one. 
Whereas most human children must be formally taught to read, they do 
not need such instruction to learn to speak. 
Finally, although grammars vary across languages, there are certain 
deep structural rules, forming a universal human grammar, that are never 
violated. In a language with both inflectional endings (e.g., indicating plu-
rals and possessives) and derivational endings (that might, e.g., change a 
verb to a noun), the inflectional ending always follows the derivational 
ending. For example, the verb form "throw" can become the noun form 
"thrower" by adding the derivational ending -er. This can then be inflected 
using a plural or possessive ending to form "throwers" or "thrower's." 
There are approximately five thousand known human languages, one 
9. This problem is known as the "poverty of the stimulus." 
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thousand on the island of New Guinea alone (Diamond 1997,31; Ruhlen 
1987), None of these languages violates the order in which inflectional and 
derivational endings are added, and yet there is no reason, from a software 
engineering standpoint, why this order should be inviolate. 
Similarly, no human language forms questions simply by reversing 
the entire word order of a sentence, and yet that might seem a perfectly 
natural thing to do were one "designing" a language from scratch. All 
human languages have a word for good; in some bad is indicated by not 
good, but in none is the reverse true. In this case good is considered 
unmarked, bad, marked. Similarly for the words deep and shallow, wide 
and narrow, many and few, with the first of each pair considered 
unmarked. In English, because many is unmarked, we often say, "How 
many did you buy ... " but rarely "How few did you buy?" All human lan-
guages indicate whether a noun is subject or object either by word order or 
by inflection. Some rules reflect binary switches: languages go in either of 
only two directions, but "choice" of one brings with it a set of reliably pre-
dictable implications. If standard word order is subject-verb-object (as in 
English) the language will use prepositions and usually place question 
words at the beginning. If the standard word order in a language is sub-
ject-object-verb, it will have question words at the end and use postposi-
tions. Finally, one might note this intriguing commonality: in all societies, 
the average duration of a line of poetry is approximately three seconds 
(Turner and P6ppeI1983). Is this purely accidental? 
These conclusions, and many others, suggest that humans are born 
with a hardwired taxonomic structure for different kinds of words and 
relations among them (categories of words and rules of universal gram-
mar) that gives us an innate ability to acquire language and that acquisi-
tion is not simply the result oflearning and imitation (Brown 1991,78-80; 
Pinker 1994,150-51,233--40; Trefi11997, 52-54).10 Studies of the language 
capabilities of individuals with particular types of brain damage locate this 
wiring in Broca's area of the frontal lobe and, just behind it, in Wernicke's 
area on the parietal lobe, both areas that expanded greatly in the last half 
million years of evolution. 11 Because language is of relatively recent evolu-
tionary lineage, it cannot itself have been a precondition for complex 
10. Ironically, Chomsky has been skeptical that one can tell a coherent story about how 
these structures evolved under the pressures of natural selection and has been a leader in 
rejecting the idea that one can find any precursors of human language ability in our close ani-
mal relatives. One need not accept all of his positions to recognize the impact of his scholar-
ship (see Pinker and Bloom 1990). 
11. As Lumsden and Wilson put it, "Language is not just the inevitable spinoff of a 
generalized intelligence. It is the peculiar product of a recently created division of labor 
among specialized portions of the brain and novel epigenetic rules" (1983, 107). 
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social organization. The characteristics of human languages and our abil-
ity to acquire them are nevertheless relevant for the themes of this book 
because they provide powerful evidence for the principles both of cogni-
tive modularity and of cross-population universals in human cognition. 
These are remarkable discoveries, for they suggest that the appropri-
ate metaphor for our minds at birth is not that of an unformatted hard 
drive but rather one that has been, at the genetic factory, preformatted and 
partitioned and has had system and application software, including that 
appropriate for databases, preinstalled. As Pinker has observed, "Some of 
the organization of grammar would have to be there from the start, part of 
the language learning mechanism that allows children to make sense out of 
the noises they hear from their parents" (1994, 125). Suppose we were to 
rewrite the preceding sentence to read as follows: "Some of the organiza-
tion of social relations would have to be there from the start, part of the 
social relations learning mechanism that allows children to make sense out 
of the behavior they witness from their parents (and others)." Such a 
proposition would be just as revolutionary and shocking but, I suggest, no 
less true. 
Infant Cognition 
Evidence that humans enter the world with their brains preformatted to 
organize sensory inputs into predetermined categories and relationships 
among them is reinforced by research in infant cognition. Some of the fol-
lowing conclusions will appear startling, so a word on methodology is in 
order. The youngest infants used as subjects for these experiments are 
three to four months of age. Experimenters first familiarize infants with 
the initial phenomenon to the point of boredom and measure their base-
line visual attention. They then alter a stimulus. If infants pay attention to 
the new phenomenon by staring at it longer, experimenters interpret this 
as evidence that the babies are startled or surprised by it. On the other 
hand, if no departure from the baseline level of attention is registered, 
experimenters conclude that what the infant sees is consistent with his or 
her existing mental models of how the world should work. The behavior 
the researchers attempt to detect is similar to the special visual attention 
adults pay to apparatus when watching a magician whose feats seem to 
violate known physical laws. These techniques are used, for example, to 
determine that infants are surprised by a demonstration of a solid object 
apparently passing through another solid object (Spe1ke 1991). 
Researchers wish to test very young children, because they are trying 
to isolate what taxonomic categories and relations among them infants 
bring with them into the world. Such primitives, it is argued, cannot be 
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attributed to learning along the traditional behaviorist operant condition-
ing model any more than can be childhood mastery of rules of grammar. 
Obviously, postnatal learning effects cannot be entirely ruled out. But 
prior to the age of three or four months, infant behavior is too unstable to 
make testing using this methodology practical. Moreover, by this age chil-
dren's stereovision, visual acuity, visual attention, and motion detection 
have come on-line. On the other hand, subjects are still very young, only 
barely able to see, let alone reach and touch, and have not yet begun to 
acquire language. 
Extending the frontiers of this kind of research, Kotovsky and Bail-
largeon (1998) have shown that 2.5-month-old infants have a basic under-
standing of collision events and that 6.5-month-old infants understand 
how the size of a moving object affects the trajectory of a struck stationary 
object. If a medium sized cylinder rolls down a ramp and knocks a toy bug 
a certain distance, they are surprised if a smaller cylinder knocks the bug 
farther, but not if a larger cylinder does. 
The results from these kinds of experiments are consistent with the 
hypothesis that infants understand the concept of an object as something 
whose parts tend to move together. This is no mean feat of visual process-
ing, even for adults. Our eyes tell us we see objects as "a stretch of the 
visual field with a smooth silhouette, a stretch with a homogeneous color 
and texture, or a collection of patches with common motion" (Pinker 
1997,317). Interpreting a two-dimensional retinal image in a fashion that 
permits the inference of objects is of tremendous utility in deciphering the 
world, since parts of objects tend to move together. 
It is clear from experiments by Spelke and Kelman that infants, by 
this age, possess the concept of an object and that they infer that some-
thing is a coherent object based on observation of parts moving together. 
Infants exposed to what looks like a long stick moving up and down, with 
its middle portion covered by a screen, register surprise if the screen is 
removed and there in fact turn out to be two objects rather than one. 
Shown an obscured nonmoving object whose ends have the same color and 
texture, they display no surprise if the screen is removed and they see two 
objects. Even if the single object has a different size, color, or texture at 
either end, so long as parts move together, they infer a single object. It is 
conceivable that this inference has been learned in the three months since 
they were born. But since so little time has elapsed, it is much more prob-
able that this concept is hardwired into babies at birth: they display a 
grasp of the concept of an object (a coherent set of parts moving together) 
well before they have any words for it. 
Here, based on similar experimental methodology, are some other 
concepts we can conclude that infants already possess at the age of three to 
240 Altruistically Inclined? 
five months. They can do crude mental arithmetic, understanding the con-
cept of two or three (Wynn 1990, 1992). They believe that two solid objects 
cannot simultaneously occupy the same space and express surprise if tricks 
suggest the contrary. They assume inanimate objects pursue continuous 
trajectories and are cohesive, and they believe that there can be no action 
at a distance. Infants are born into the world with a "relatively rich, 
innately specified understanding of causality, especially in terms of the 
physical world" (Hauser 1996, 557). All of this is background to the really 
extraordinary experimental results, which concern what infants bring to 
the table with respect to the domain of social relations. 
Given the demonstration that infants arrive in the world already 
understanding the previously described primitives, psychologists now con-
structed video displays in which, for example, a dot moves up an inclined 
plane, falls back, and moves up again, only to be knocked back by a sec-
ond dot or pushed gently up by a third dot. From such experiments, 
researchers have been able to show that an infant can distinguish objects 
that move only when acted upon by another object from those that are or 
appear to be self-propelled (Premack and Premack 1994a, 150). Infants 
interpret as intentional an object that starts and stops its own motion. That 
is, they interpret such objects as animals (including other humans) and try 
to attract such objects by making faces, as opposed to their techniques for 
interacting with objects not so identified, for which pushing is the pre-
ferred mechanism (Pinker 1997, 322). 
The evidence that infants can interpret intentionality is critical in 
making the argument that humans are hardwired to make what we have 
come to call moral judgments. That is because moral qualities can only be 
attributed to intentional objects. The evidence is also highly suggestive 
that, as in the case of language, some categories for organizing data rele-
vant to social interaction are pre formatted at birth and not the conse-
quence of postnatal learning. 
In addition to the concept of intentionality, human infants appear to 
be hardwired to give privileged status to five other key concepts. Together, 
these six primitives form a "grammar" of social interaction in much the 
same way that Chomsky's primitives provide a deep structural grammar 
within which human languages are learned. In addition to intentionality, 
these are positive/negative valence, reciprocation, possession, power, and 
group (Premack and Premack 1994a). 
Infants assign valence to one object's interaction with another 
depending on two criteria: whether the action is hard (-) or soft (+) and 
whether the action has the effect of restricting (-) or maintaining (+) the 
"liberty" of the object either to remain in motion along a given trajectory 
or to remain at rest. The first criterion can be observed in very young 
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infants (even invertebrates are attracted by weak stimuli, repelled by 
strong stimuli). Slightly older infants make use of a second criterion, help-
ing or hurting, in assigning a valence to an action. A precondition for the 
attribution of helping or hurting is the determination that an object is both 
intentional and goal oriented. As noted, an intentional object starts and 
stops its own motion. Attribution of goal orientation requires that object 
A direct a repeated series of actions all at the same target. A bouncing ball 
is seen as engaged in play. Put a vertical line next to it, however, and 
infants perceive the ball as attempting to get over the top of the line. It is 
the repeated attempt to overcome failure, rather than immediate success, 
that leads to the attribution of goal. 12 Finally, the actions repeated must 
vary slightly. Absent variation, one risks losing the attribution of inten-
tionality. 
Infants assign to object B a positive or negative valence depending 
upon whether they perceive it as helping or hindering object A achieve its 
goal, maintain its liberty, or improve its aesthetic performance. They may 
also attribute helping to actions by B that permit A to perform an action 
(bounce higher or faster) in a more aesthetically pleasing fashion. 
The concept of reciprocation refers to the expectation that the action 
of an intentional object on another will be followed by a reversal of roles, 
in which the acted upon becomes the actor, and that the positive or nega-
tive valence of the original action will persist once the actors have changed 
roles. 
Infants are also hardwired to understand the concept of possession, a 
concept that can apply to both intentional and nonintentional objects. 
Infants assign valence to acts directed toward possessed nonintentional 
objects; they do not do so if the object is not possessed. Infants do not 
expect possessed recipients to reciprocate, even if they are intentional. 
Thus a possessed recipient is not permitted to retaliate but is excused from 
the obligation of reciprocating. Children, as possessed intentional objects, 
are not required to reciprocate the transfers from their parents; neither are 
they permitted to strike back at them in retaliation for punishment. Thus, 
children are born with a preformatted distinction between altruistic 
behavior that requires reciprocation (that between two humans of roughly 
equal power) and that which may not (behavior between a parent and a 
child, in which there is a relationship of power and possession, or the 
grants made by a sovereign to subjects, which may recapitulate that rela-
tionship). 
Finally, the concept of group is understood as an assembly of inten-
12. Consistent successful choice among alternatives can also lead to the attribution of 
goal. Thus repeated failure is not a necessary condition for the attribution of goal. 
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tional objects of equal power (not possessed by each other). The infant 
expects such objects to move together and act together as a group. Physi-
cal likeness promotes concept of group but is not necessary for it. Mem-
bers of a group are expected to act in similar fashions, not to act negatively 
toward one another, and to engage in reciprocation on behalf of other 
members. 
These six primitives are rapidly acquired because, to use Pinker's 
characterization of the acquisition of language, "of a harmony between 
the mind of the child, the mind of the adult, and the texture of reality" 
(Pinker 1994, 157). As Tooby and Cosmides put it, "Natural Selection 
shapes decision rules and the cues they monitor" (1990, 405). 
Because human babies require so much parental investment when 
they are born (and adults who provided that care were selected for, 
because they were more likely to pass on genes predisposing to such 
behavior), and because parents limit aggression among siblings (again, 
because parents who kept siblings from killing each other were more likely 
to pass on more of their genes), it is possible for babies born with a propen-
sity to refrain from first strike both to survive and to have such behavior 
reinforced by the cultural process of socialization. This is not to say there 
are no first strikes but rather that there is hardwired receptivity to 
restraints on them. 
It is also likely that we are born with the equivalent of a "mental 
Rolodex," a database for individuals on which are recorded updated his-
tories of past interactions, along with information on their status relation-
ship: those of power (no reciprocation expected for favors), rough equal-
ity (reciprocation expected), and possession (favors to be granted; no 
reciprocation, or reciprocation of a different kind, expected). 
In summary, Chomsky has demonstrated beyond any reasonable 
doubt that we are born with a preformatted filing system for organizing 
different kinds of words as well as deep structural rules for linking them 
together. None of the 5,000+ known human languages violates these rules. 
Similarly, we are born with a preformatted filing system for organizing 
social interaction and with a set of deep structural rules governing social 
interaction. These rules drive universal elements of human culture. The 
aversion to incest among those with whom one has been raised between 
the ages of two and eight and the propensity to punish murder (with the 
possible exception of infanticide) of members of one's group do not repre-
sent triumphs of cultural evolution but rather are human universals that 
have an important biological component. 
Evolutionary pressures have selected for hardwired taxonomies, just 
as much as the innate aversion to having sexual relations among those 
with whom one was raised. Learning depends on cues received from the 
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external environment. But this learning is structured. Evolution has 
selected organisms to be particularly sensitive to stimuli that can be reli-
ably detected and could reliably predict the hidden structure of conditions 
that determined the success of alternative courses of action over millions 
of years prior to the Neolithic revolution. 
In arguing that preformatted taxonomies structure our view not just 
of biological forms but also of social categories and relations, we are argu-
ing that aspects of our language instinct (the words are Pinker's) also 
structure our understanding of the world. This argument is fundamentally 
different from the many anthropological stories-now discredited-about 
how particular language structures determine a particular view of the 
world in different cultures. Eskimos do not have four hundred different 
words for snow, and the Hopi language does not evidence a culturally dis-
tinct view of time. There is simply not much left of the hypothesis 
advanced by Edward Sapir and Benjamin Whorf that culture or environ-
ment determines language, which in turn influences worldview (Sapir 
1958; Edgerton 1992,27; Malotki 1983; Pinker 1994, 63-66; Whorf 1963). 
What we are concerned with here is what is essential about human 
cognitive construction of the world-and the degree to which that is 
reflected in innate taxonomic categories and relations among them. Since 
a primitive grammar of social relations can be demonstrated in infants as 
young as five months old, it is difficult to believe that this is due to social-
ization or learning, any more than the acquisition of grammatical rules in 
the learning of language. Millions of years of natural selection have pro-
vided humans with hardwired modules when they are born, modules that 
govern expectations about the behavior of other intentional objects, as 
well as, implicitly, their own. We see in this primitive grammar the evolu-
tionary residue that has selected in favor of organisms prepared to make 
grants of first move(r) altruism and to reciprocate toward other group 
members, including those who may not be closely related. 
Neurobiology 
Our brains are highly complex organs, consisting of overlays of systems 
with different evolutionary histories. The higher mental facilities that cre-
ate and process language and visual imagery attempt to impose order on a 
cognitive and emotional landscape that is in fact highly disordered, as the 
study of dreams suggests. People who successfully engage in reciprocal 
relations by initially exhibiting altruistic behavior of either the helping or 
the failure to harm variety, even when doing so exposes them to danger, 
and in so doing pass up opportunities for immediate gain, cannot be rely-
ing entirely on their faculties for logical and mathematical reasoning to 
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guide and encourage this behavior. Careful ratiocination would counsel 
defection, a course of action that can be justified on both opportunistic 
and prudential grounds. 
The modern experience of this is not, for reasons already noted, to be 
commonly found within established social groupings. It can be experi-
enced in negotiations between potentially or actually hostile groups, or 
between members of different groups, or between representatives of hos-
tile states, or in personal relationships that may be breaking up or becom-
ing established and where the prediction of future interaction is highly 
uncertain. As suggested in chapter 1, it remains an important puzzle why a 
world consisting of sovereign states, absent a world government (I exclude 
here the influence of the United Nations), does not degenerate into con-
tinual warfare. While people often observe that actions speak louder than 
words, the maintenance by states of extensive diplomatic apparatus is tes-
timony to belief in the value of talking, consistent with experimental 
findings in Prisoner's Dilemma games that the ability to communicate 
affects outcomes, even though there is no normative reason that it should. 
The incoherent treatment by Frank of deterrence and disarmament issues 
is reflective of the limitations of the standard economic model in address-
ing these issues. 
When individuals, faced with such challenges, offer grants of first 
move(r) altruism, they must be influenced by other, functionally special-
ized mechanisms that have been evolutionarily adaptive and have neuro-
biological foundations. Treatment of the role of emotions and their neu-
robiological foundation is not essential to the arguments developed here: 
evidence on behavior alone is sufficient. Nevertheless, the results of 
research in neuroanatomy and neurobiology reinforce arguments already 
made by providing us a look inside the black box. 
The physiological manifestations of an emotion and the feeling or 
mental image of it are part of a complex of behavioral adaptations linking 
genetically programmed predispositions to probabilistic influences on 
behavior within the domain of social interaction. Introspection suggests 
that what we perceive as emotions, our feeling of emotions, is related in 
some way to our willingness to make grants of first move(r) altruism. We 
perceive our emotions as both gifts and at times unwanted baggage 
bestowed on us as social animals by our evolutionary heritage. Here 
Trivers is probably on the right track in arguing that the complex demands 
of initiating and sustaining relations of reciprocity form the evolutionary 
foundation of a variety of human emotions. The feeling of "liking," he 
argues, predisposes toward offering a favor (a unilateral transfer) or for-
going first strike-first steps in initiating relationships that may potentially 
emerge as reciprocal over time. 
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The propensity to anger, which almost always has a self-righteous 
component, protects those whose repeated bestowal of favors on non-kin 
might lead them to excessive vulnerability. Since anger is often the conse-
quent of unreciprocated favors, it provides an emotional impeller for 
behavioral strategies that involve at least temporary retaliation not clearly 
in the self-interest of the retaliator. Controlled anger may thus help impel 
implementation of a Tit-for-Tat strategy. 
Gratitude helps calibrate the desire to reciprocate and how large the 
reciprocation should be. Sympathy, Trivers argues, alerts individuals to 
favorable opportunities to earn gratitude (where one feels sympathy for 
another in distress, it is often the case that a favor that costs the grantor lit-
tle may induce a large degree of gratitude in the grantee). Trivers is not 
necessarily implying that the feeling of these emotions is the result of such 
calculations but rather that the consequences of the actions such emotions 
induce may have a favorable evolutionary calculus. 
Guilt is a cost that cheaters bear if they are found out; cheating 
(defecting) publicly revealed produces shame (Trivers 1971; Pinker 1997, 
402-3). The problem of initiating and sustaining relations of reciprocal 
altruism is so central to human existence that both our emotional and our 
reasoning capabilities have undoubtedly been influenced by it through 
evolutionary mechanisms at both individual and group levels. These 
observations give us insight into mechanisms that may sustain complex 
social organization, in which context they seem transparently adaptive 
(functional). But whereas Trivers excels in understanding mechanisms that 
maintain social interaction once established, he does not address why or 
how these emotions would have been adaptive in the absence of complex 
social organization. Recall that Trivers eschews appeal to any selection at 
the group level, in keeping with the prevailing scientific consensus of the 
1970s and 1980s and in contrast to the argument of this book. 
Second, I question Trivers's implication that these mechanisms, or all 
of them, are of relatively recent evolutionary origin. We tend to assume 
that humans are the only animals who experience consciousness, or have a 
well-developed emotional repertoire, but increasing evidence suggests we 
are not unique in this regard. Certainly, a presumption that chimpanzees 
or bonobos, for example, lack consciousness seems untenable. Much of 
the neurobiological hardware underlying our emotional repertoire must 
have preceded the growth of cranial capacity with its vastly expanded neo-
cortex. 
Neurobiological isomorphism suggests, for example, that human 
subsystems controlling fear are virtually indistinguishable from those pos-
sessed by birds and reptiles (LeDoux 1996). Emotions are externally man-
ifested, and we can easily attribute them to lower animals, simply based on 
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these manifestations. Indeed, normal humans can reliably attribute them 
to movements of a chip on a computer screen Gagged fast movements are 
coded as angry, recoiling movements as fearful). Patients with damage to 
the amygdala, on the other hand, can accurately characterize the move-
ments of the chip in a technical sense but fail in intuiting the emotional 
subtext (Damasio 1999, 66-67, 70). Recall that the amygdala is also impli-
cated in ability to forecast trustworthiness based on nonverbal cues and is 
a structure not part of the evolutionarily recent neocortex, consistent with 
my argument that predispositions enabling complex social organization 
are of older evolutionary lineage. 
Growing experimental evidence, as well as corroborative data from 
neurobiology and neuroanatomy, suggests that "reasoning" with respect 
to social interactions is the consequence of the operation of a functionally 
specialized set of distinct brain subsystems that operates in parallel with 
those responsible for mathematical reasoning, statistical inference, and 
logical analysis. The same, it appears, is likely to be true for what we per-
ceive as emotions (Griffiths 1997). Indeed, there is evidence that both of 
these systems occupy similar areas of brain anatomy, in particular the 
amygdala and parts of the prefrontal lobes (Anderson et al. 1999; Dama-
sio 1994, 1999). Imaging studies show both the prefrontal cortex and the 
amygdala lighting up when subjects wrestle with emotionally salient prob-
lems (Hauser 2000,14). 
It appears likely, then, that our pantheon of emotions works collabo-
ratively with "reasoning" specialized to the domain of social relations, 
providing the backdrop for the emergence of relations of reciprocity. Both 
the emotional armorarium and the domain specialized reasoning system 
become increasingly less necessary for their maintenance once established. 
That is, once relations of reciprocity become relatively established the 
behavioral guidance of this domain specialized reasoning system and that 
of the more general system we associate with capabilities in logic and 
mathematics become more congruent. In market relations, when prices are 
perceived as parametric, exchange has been drained of virtually all emo-
tional content. 
Thus the more complex and highly developed are social and economic 
organization, the more they can apparently be navigated by the same tech-
niques whereby hunter-gatherers and their animal predecessors foraged 
for food. The purely competitive model of the economy is the apotheosis 
of this development: there are no consumer or producer cartels and no 
unions, and consequently all prices are parametric. No behavior appears 
anymore to involve strategic interaction. Economic interactions that in 
actuality have an irreducible social component nevertheless confront the 
individual as a series of games against nature, in which one's own behav-
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ior has no direct effect on the environment And it is thus that economic 
models premised on assumptions that humans operate solely on the basis 
of "higher level" reasoning systems provide tolerably good predictions in 
analyses of the behavior within a strictly competitive economy. 
This leads to the illusion that domain specialized "reasoning" sys-
tems, including emotional systems that may help us forecast those likely to 
be trustworthy, are not relevant in understanding the origin of complex 
social and economic organization. A central theme of this book has been 
argument against this illusion. As game theoretic analysis reveals, a will-
ingness to perform altruistic acts is necessary in the initiation of a pattern 
of non simultaneous transfers (reciprocity). As the experiments summa-
rized in chapter 1 reveal, many humans are willing to make these grants, 
even when considerations of reputation or expectations of repeat encoun-
ters have been controlled for. 
So the behavior is a real phenomenon. What remains at issue is the 
explanation for it, and the solution proffered here is that we have hard-
wired predispositions toward so doing. Natural selection has apparently 
endowed us with the ability, in making such moves, to ignore or suppress 
the counsel of reason, narrowly and precisely defined: namely, that there is 
no strictly rational justification, as Nash would have understood it, for 
expecting reciprocity and that, indeed, to offer it initially makes one vul-
nerable. 13 That with a frequency greater than zero we systematically sup-
press such guidance is impossible to deny, and where such suppression 
occurs in established social settings in which Tit-for-Tat players predomi-
nate, it rarely requires a second thought Those trying to bring peace to the 
Balkans, on the other hand, face the issue of origination on a daily basis. 
Note that this perspective on the interplay between "reason" (as 
understood by economists) and other domain specific reasoning/emo-
tional systems differs radically from popular interpretations, even those 
that embrace some version of modularity. Writing in 1977, Carl Sagan, 
drawing on the work of Paul Maclean (1973), described the "triune" struc-
ture of the brain: three anatomical modules distinguished by different 
structures and functions, marked by different evolutionary histories and 
characterized by different concentrations of dopamine and cholinesterase. 
The core of the brain, Maclean argued, emerged three hundred million 
years ago in reptiles. Wrapped around this was the limbic system, first 
observed in primitive mammals two hundred million years ago. The outer 
13. Environmental influences can overpower genetic predispositions. Those who have 
been abused as children may find it difficult to love or trust, even though they may be quite 
intelligent. Their highly developed skills at logical inference help them understand with great 
precision the nature of the Prisoner's Dilemma, but they may remain incapable of exiting 
from it, trapped in a recurring psychology of defection. 
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layer was the neocortex, or new mammalian brain, only sixty-five million 
years ago. While Maclean's categories are not universally accepted by cur-
rent researchers (see Ledoux 1996), his basic point that the brain consists 
of neurobiologically distinct components with different evolutionary his-
tories is. 
Sagan speculated that the "R-complex," or reptilian brain, governed 
"human bureaucratic and political behavior" (Sagan 1977, 60). He then 
asked whether there was any hope for humanity and answered optimisti-
cally by noting the size of the neocortex (the seat of higher brain func-
tions-reason), which enabled us to "resist the urge to surrender to every 
impulse of the reptilian brain." Sagan went on to discuss the second mod-
ule, the "limbic system," viewed as the seat of emotion. 
Our knowledge of the brain's structure and functioning has advanced 
since Maclean and Sagan wrote, although their emphasis on modularity 
remains valid. But Sagan's faith that human "progress" can and will be 
reflected in the domination by reason (neocortical functions) of other 
"lower" and older brain systems needs qualification. It is indeed closely 
related to the Lorenz/Freud thin veneer story, with "reason" substituting 
in the role previously played by culture/socialization. Sagan's error would 
appear to lie in identifying "political and bureaucratic behavior" so exclu-
sively with its dark side. One can argue that Nash equilibrium play-rea-
son-leads away from cartels just as much as it leads away from Nurem-
berg rallies and all they connote. But as we have seen, high level reasoning 
also leads inexorably to a logic of first strike, if reason is defined narrowly 
and precisely. The short-circuiting of the behavioral guidance suggested 
by the logic that leads to this conclusion has been critical to human evolu-
tion and remains so for its survival, even if it has the potential to metasta-
size into the hostility toward the other that reached its apotheosis in Nazi 
Germany. 14 
Research in neuroanatomy and neurobiology offers increasing 
promise of helping us understand how this suppression happens. Finance 
scholars often joke that one needs only two human emotions to fathom the 
behavior of the stock market: fear and greed. To engage in nondefection 
behavior in a situation where one is initiating a reciprocally altruistic rela-
tionship, individuals must triumph over both: the fear that cooperation 
will be exploited by one's counterpart and the opportunistic desire to take 
advantage of possible "chump" (cooperative) behavior by one's counter-
part. Both of these emotions, which reinforce the dictates of dispassionate 
reason, must be suppressed or trumped by other emotions and/or domain 
14. Moreover, we need to be fair to reptiles: by all accounts they too possess powerful 
inhibitors on intraspecific violence. See Maynard-Smith and Price 1973 on snakes. 
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specialized "reasoning" systems, since logic clearly supports the counsel of 
both greed and fear (see chap. 4), impelling one toward defection. We need 
to understand not only how some specialized aspects of our cognitive 
apparatus, closely associated with those that produce emotions, systemat-
ically drive a wedge between the predictions of standard economic models 
and observed behavior but also why they evolved. 
Neurobiology and neuroanatomy have received little attention either 
from rational choice theorists or behavioral economists. The idea that 
these subjects have relevance to behavioral science is controversial, per-
haps no more so than among cognitive scientists in the artificial intelli-
gence field. Patricia Churchland, for example, describes the unreceptive 
intellectual landscape she encountered when, as a cognitive philosopher, 
she began to learn neurophysiology in a medical school (Churchland 
1995,22). 
One cannot help but be impressed, however, by the clinical histories 
documented in Anthony Oamasio's 1994 book Descartes' Error, his more 
recent book The Feeling of What Happens (1999), and a broad range of 
coauthored scientific publications in which he establishes a strong neu-
roanatomical claim for the proposition that different functionally special-
ized parts of the brain, including those responsible for producing emo-
tional responses, are together jointly responsible for our ability as humans 
to make decisions that permit us to initiate and sustain "normal" social 
relations. Oamasio observes that in patients with damage to the prefrontal 
lobes and/or the amygdala social impairment often goes along with a 
reduction in observable emotional affect. 
This leads Oamasio to argue that emotions are key to our ability to 
decide "rationally." His understanding of rationality is of course the broad 
view that argues cooperation in a single play PO to be rational, not the 
narrow definition insisted upon by Binmore that I endorse. Oamasio's evi-
dence that decisions of patients with damage to the prefrontal lobes and/or 
amygdala are not rational is that these actions are "more often disadvan-
tageous to their self and others than not" (Oamasio 1999,41). Again, this 
gets to the deep question of what it means to make a rational choice in the 
context of the sort of problem Alchian and Williams faced. 
The model developed in this book maintains that humans possess 
specialized reasoning systems for dealing with social interactions, systems 
that have been selected for at the group level and in so doing have 
benefited the genes predisposing toward them but not necessarily the 
organisms exhibiting the resulting behavior. These systems counsel actions 
that cannot be defended as rational using Nash's criterion. At the same 
time, we have evolved capabilities for logical and mathematical reasoning 
that can be and often are used to identify what actions best serve the mate-
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rial interests of the individual organism and define, normatively, what 
rational action in game theoretic terms means. 
In many cases observed in the field, these systems do not conflict in 
their guidance, because social interaction is embedded in contexts of 
repeated interaction where considerations of reputation matter. They will 
diverge in the absence of such structured interaction or in experimental sit-
uations that control for these factors, such as one-shot PD games with 
anonymity. If we wish to understand the origin (not the maintenance) of 
systems of reciprocity, it is critical that we recognize this divergence and 
the apparent power of "reasoning" systems specialized to the domain of 
social interactions to override what we consider rational using a precise 
and narrow definition. 
One interpretation of Damasio's clinical results is that he has 
identified individuals whose capabilities to be rational narrowly defined 
are intact but whose ability to be rational in the sense Damasio under-
stands it has been destroyed, making them quite capable of performing 
tasks that enable them to score high on intelligence tests (see also Ander-
son et al. 1999) but at the same time incapable of negotiating even mild 
social dilemmas. If we restrict reason to what is commonly measured on 
intelligence tests, then the traditional opposition of emotion and reason, 
reflected in Sagan's observations and against which Damasio argues, can 
be defended. But reason, narrowly defined, can no longer be given quite 
the star billing Sagan intends. 
The issue comes down again to whether we view Williams's initial 
cooperative move in the first PD games as rational. If the term rational is 
defined narrowly and precisely, it is difficult to so view it, a conclusion that 
Nash reached and Binmore reinforces. But many will argue that 
Williams's play was in some sense reasonable if not exactly rational and 
find this conclusion validated by the empirical finding that Williams (and 
ultimately Alchian) ended up doing better venturing contingent coopera-
tion than each would have using a strict defect strategy. Thus we can, 
along with Damasio, wave our hands and reason that cooperation "must" 
be rational because it appears more often than not to be advantageous. 
Those of us who reach this conclusion will however, be evidencing a rea-
soning system specialized to the domain of social interaction, one that has 
short-circuited or rejected the counsel of our logical faculties, which easily 
demonstrate that, at least in a single play PD, defect strictly dominates: it 
is superior for us individually regardless of the play of the counterparty. 
In any event, Damasio's clinical histories provide us with the results 
of neuroanatomical experiments on humans that ethical protocols would 
never permit us to initiate ourselves. The most dramatic story, around 
which Damasio builds his 1994 book, is the case of Phineas Gage. In 1848 
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Gage was the construction foreman on the Rutland and Burlington Rail-
way in Vermont, responsible for blasting operations as a new roadbed was 
laid. On a warm summer afternoon, Gage, as usual, carefully and system-
atically supervised preparations. A hole was drilled in the rock and then 
filled halfway with blasting powder. Normally a fuse was inserted, the 
remainder of the hole filled with sand, and the charge tamped down with 
an iron bar that Gage had had made specially for this purpose. On that 
afternoon, however, Gage was distracted and began to tamp down the 
charge before his subordinate had added the sand. As the iron hit rock, it 
generated a spark, igniting an explosion that turned the iron into a projec-
tile, one three inches in diameter, weighing more than twelve pounds, mea-
suring more than a yard in length, and with a seven-inch taper at its top. 
This missile rose from Gage's hands, entered his left cheek from below, 
passed through the back of his left orbital cavity, through the front of his 
brain on the left side, and finally out the top of his skull. Accompanied by 
a whistling sound much like a Fourth of July rocket, it landed one hundred 
feet away, covered with blood and parts of his brain. 
Gage, however, was not dead. Awake, he was lifted into a wheelbar-
row by members of his crew and taken to a local hotel, where with some 
assistance he got out himself and was able to provide full details of the 
accident to the arriving physician. Two months later, after Gage survived 
fever and infection, his doctor pronounced him cured. 
But he was not. His personality had been transformed in the sense 
that he was not capable of distinguishing between appropriate and inap-
propriate behavior. For the rest of his life he was unable to hold a steady 
job or form lasting human attachments. Yet his speech was unaffected, as 
was vision in his remaining eye, and he exhibited no other noticeable cog-
nitive defects. 
The significance of this case history is that it provides dramatic evi-
dence that cognitive and affective functions are indeed localized in partic-
ular regions of the brain. This view, although broadly accepted today, was 
strongly contested in the middle of the twentieth century by researchers 
who argued for a more holistic approach to brain function. Karl Lashley's 
research, for example, seemed to show that brain damage to individuals 
was a function of the extent of damage, not its location (Lashley 1929; see 
also Gardner 1974). Damasio, however, details numerous other cases of 
individuals who because of tumors or accidents have damage to the pre-
frontal lobes. These individuals in general have undiminished cognitive 
capability, as measured by standard tests, but (a) their affect is fiat, they 
lack emotion-this can be corroborated to some degree with skin conduc-
tance tests and (b) they are unable to function effectively as social individ-
uals. In particular they do not seem to be capable of maintaining, inter-
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preting, and acting upon what Cosmides and Tooby call their "social map 
of the persons, relationships, motives, interactions, emotions and inten-
tions that make up their social world" (Cosmides and Tooby 1992, 163). 
Damasio's more recent research (1999) places emphasis as well on the 
study of individuals with damage to the amygdala. 
These clinical histories suggest that parts of the brain, independent of 
those that underlie cognitive processes associated with vision, language, 
logic, mathematical reasoning, or statistical inference, control emotional 
responses and that absent access to the common panoply of those 
responses, individuals are not able to negotiate and/or interpret the fine 
calibration of behavioral responses necessary to initiate and sustain recip-
rocally altruistic relations. Damage in certain identifiable regions of the 
brain will reliably diminish an individual's ability effectively to negotiate 
social interactions while leaving intellectual powers unimpaired. This is an 
important finding. Damasio's clinical and experimental investigation of 
the role and neuroanatomical foundation of emotional subsystems is more 
profound and nuanced than Frank's often incoherent interpretation of 
them simply as "precommitment" devices. 
A cognitive system specialized to the domain of social interaction is 
the most plausible explanation for the behaviors identified in the experi-
mental results summarized in chapter 1.15 Pure calculations of individual 
self-interest cannot account for the repeated observations that individuals 
achieve cooperative solutions to Prisoner's Dilemma games, even single 
play games. A "higher level" reasoning system may fully understand that 
defecting is the superior individual strategy, irrespective of the choice of 
the counterparty, yet be overruled---countermanded-by the system spe-
cialized to social interaction. Thus Williams plays cooperate, with full 
knowledge that it is not a rational play (unless Alchian is assumed irra-
tional), and many of us endorse what Williams does as reasonable, irre-
spective of what Nash tells us. 
If a cognitive system specialized to social interaction, perhaps work-
ing hand in hand with our emotional armorarium, predisposes us to over-
come fear, short-circuit the counsel of logic and reason narrowly defined, 
and engage in the generosity of first move(r) altruism, evolution has also 
equipped us with an exaggerated, indeed sometimes obsessive, interest in 
the behavior of others and willingness to punish those who take advantage 
of us or violate group expectations, even when doing so imposes costs on 
ourselves. We have seen this willingness to punish in the collective goods 
15. The extent to which the behavioral outcome is the result of conscious reasoning, the 
extent to which the hardwiring may involve propensities to teach or learn these behavioral 
patterns, or the extent to which these patterns are simply strategies that get selected for is not 
relevant to the basic argument. 
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experiments where free riders can be fined and in the ultimatum games 
described earlier. The Cosmides and Tooby/Gigerenzer and Hug experi-
mental results described in the final section of this chapter give us an addi-
tional perspective on these predispositions. It is tougher to see this "pun-
ishing" behavior as "generous" in quite the same way as unilateral grants 
of negative or affirmative altruism to another, although the same type of 
selection must have favored both. None of this behavior can be accounted 
for as the result of narrowly rational decision making or selection, at least 
upon first appearance, at the individual level alone. 
The clinical data discussed reveal, as does other evidence, that our 
ability to make "good" decisions in situations involving social interaction 
depends on the separate and joint operation of different brain structures-
neurobiological subsystems that have different physical locations in the 
brain and different evolutionary histories. There is no formal reason, for 
example, why preplay communications should make any difference what-
soever in the outcome of a Prisoner's Dilemma game, but abundant exper-
imental evidence indicates that it does (Frank 1988, chap. 7; Dawes 1988, 
197; Rabin 1998,22). Damasio's work, particularly if combined with the 
evidence from evolutionary psychology and behavioral economics, helps 
us understand why. 
Our brains are the result of a long evolutionary history, some por-
tions with a longer history than others. We have the intellectual and cog-
nitive powers, thanks to our evolutionarily newer neocortex-to utilize 
and comprehend natural language, analyze game theoretic problems, and 
perform complex mathematical calculations. Our closest animal relatives, 
chimpanzees and great apes, biologically very similar to us, lack compa-
rable capabilities, although they may possess them in more rudimentary 
form. But they share with us the gift of consciousness that our more dis-
tant animal relations lack, as well as the ability to initiate and sustain 
coalitions and other forms of social relations among non-kin. Their polit-
ical and social behavior bears many more analogues to that observed in 
humans than does their mathematical ability. Thus it is unlikely that the 
higher intellectual capabilities observed in humans, in comparison with 
chimpanzees, have a great deal to do with understanding the fundamentals 
of human social and political interaction. The starting point for many 
social contract theorists, and most modern social scientists, has been to 
assume the contrary. 
We retain brain functions, particularly those that govern such emo-
tions as anger and fear or permit us to "intuit" those likely to be trustwor-
thy, with much longer evolutionary histories than those that make possi-
ble language, and as Joseph LeDoux has shown, these systems, in 
particular those that produce fear as a response to danger, are remarkably 
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similar throughout the mammalian world and possibly also among birds 
and reptiles. Complementing Damasio's work, LeDoux's research has 
helped chart the neurological wiring that enables emotional subsystems to 
countermand the counsel of "higher level" reasoning. Even as our eyes, 
ears, and other sense organs send information to the appropriate cortical 
areas for conscious processing, parallel wiring, similar to that shared by 
far distant animal relatives, connects visual, auditory, and somatosensory 
input directly to the amygdala, the almond shaped brain organ implicated, 
as already noted, in the physiology of emotion. This wiring permits emo-
tional responses without input from the cortex. These responses are faster 
and cruder than those generated by the cortical route. Our different brain 
subsystems pull us sometimes in different directions, and the prefrontal 
lobes may playa role in mediating between these channels. With effort and 
discipline we can sometimes act on the basis of reason, narrowly and pre-
cisely defined, not our emotional impulses. But this does not invariably 
lead to improvement in our material condition. One of the reasons that it 
is so easy for our emotions to intrude on the operation of reason, and often 
so difficult for the reverse to occur, is that the wiring connecting cortical 
areas with the amygdala is much weaker than that traveling in the oppo-
site direction (LeDoux 1996,265). 
Implications 
The implications of this reconception of the structure of our mind are only 
beginning to be digested. The general acceptance of the Chomskian view 
of language acquisition in lieu of the operant conditioning response 
approach advanced by B. F. Skinner has had little effect on the presump-
tion by micro economists and other social scientists that their central task 
as behavioral scientists is to understand cognition and explain behavior as 
the consequence of a single general-purpose reasoning capability. Social 
scientists may accept Chomsky's verdict that general-purpose association 
learning devices are incapable of explaining a child's inference of rules of 
grammar: the database to which infants are exposed through heard speech 
is simply too limited to make this possible. But the process of language 
acquisition continues to be treated implicitly as exceptional in its reliance 
on specialized subsystems. 16 
To do otherwise is to begin to conceive of humans as organisms 
whose behavior is driven not only by rational choices made consciously 
16. This predisposition persists in spite of the enormous evidence offunctional special-
ization throughout the human body. For a skeptical, and in my view unpersuasive, critique 
of the Chomsky/Pinker view oflanguage acquisition, see Sampson 1997. 
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but also by the biological inheritance of a panoply of genetically prepro-
grammed scripts (or a propensity to learn and teach them), scripts whose 
survival has been predicated on their ability to favor the propagation of 
the genes that control them. It is obvious to anyone who has blinked when 
an unexpected object comes flying toward one's eye, or who has sat up and 
taken notice when an attractive member of the opposite sex enters a room, 
that we embody such scripts and that our behavior can be influenced by 
them. In some cases (the blink reflex), we have little control over our reac-
tion; in others (what we do in response to the presence of an attractive 
woman or man), we can choose. But neither Pavlov's discovery that invol-
untary reflexes could be associated with new stimuli nor Skinner's demon-
stration that voluntary behaviors could be conditioned through rewards 
leads most of us to believe that our blink reflex or sexual impulses are pre-
dominantly learned. 17 
To recognize that genetics influences behavior is not inexorably to be 
a genetic determinist. We do have control over our voluntary behavior in 
particular circumstances-that is why we call it voluntary-and it is mean-
ingful in these areas to talk about our responsibility for it. Rather, that 
recognition leads to the argument that these biologically inherited scripts 
influence behavior in a probabilistic sense. 18 Moreover, in providing us 
tools to address challenges that are likely to be life cycle specific, our hard-
wiring may only provide epigenetic rules (to use the terminology of Lums-
den and Wilson) that facilitate learning by canalizing the acquisition of 
information and privileging certain categories. With respect both to their 
direct influence on behavior and their influence on the acquisition of cul-
ture, our genes give rise to predispositions, not irrevocable instructions 
about how to act in particular situations whose specifics could not be pre-
dicted in any event by the "as if" programmers of natural selection any 
more than the IBM programmers of "Deep Blue" could provide specific 
instructions covering how to respond to all conceivable moves by Kas-
parov given all possible configurations of a chess board. 
The search for the origins of behavioral influencers using evolution-
ary models involves considering how well particular behavioral tendencies 
are likely to have favored offspring of individuals exhibiting them, in com-
17. In a telling observation, David Allyn (2000, 191) has noted that although pornog-
raphy troubles conservatives because it is seen as a threat to social order, it troubles tradi-
tionalliberals because its persistent appeal is so inconsistent with the tabula rasa view of 
learning and cognition. 
18. Richard Dawkins makes this point well in his book The Selfish Gene (1989). Per-
haps because of the potentially inflammatory title of his book, Dawkins has been unfairly 
categorized as a genetic determinist, and people have reacted to a social Darwinist agenda 
they have, with little evidence, projected onto his work. 
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parison with the impact on fitness of different tendencies in other organ-
isms of the same species. As discussed earlier, the evolution of complex 
social organization among hominids requires as a sine qua non a willing-
ness to avoid attacking first: first move(r) altruism forms one part of the 
Tit-for-Tat strategy. 
Propensities toward altruistic behavior toward non-kin-of which 
this is a kind--cannot have been favored by individual level selection when 
first appearing in populations. Altruistic behavior definition ally is behav-
ior that increases the relative fitness of other organisms at the expense of 
the acting organism. Therefore, if the behavioral propensities survived, at 
some point in our long evolutionary history the strength of group selection 
must have outweighed the negative effect of individual level selection, 
allowing situations of structured interaction among non-kin to emerge. 
The four necessary conditions for this to have occurred have already 
been outlined: (1) There must have been a population that periodically 
divided into relatively small groups. (2) The groups must have varied with 
respect to the proportion of their members with behavioral predispositions 
toward altruism. (3) Groups with more individuals willing to make grants 
of first move(r) altruism must have produced more offspring. (4) Progeny 
must have mixed periodically or otherwise competed in the formation of 
new groups. The sufficient condition for first move(r) altruism to be 
favored by natural selection is for the group level selection effect to have 
been stronger than the individual level effect (Sober and Wilson 1998, 26) 
(see chap. 2). 
Cheater Detection Modules 
I conclude this chapter with discussion of evidence that humans possess 
not only a module predisposing to the practice of first move(r) altruism 
but also a domain specific adaptation that gives us a particular concern 
with detecting cheating on social rules. This propensity can dramatically 
affect human ability to solve problems in propositional logic and, I will 
argue, predispose them to act in a manner not necessarily rationalizable as 
in their own interest. In particular, the obsession with detecting cheating 
and punishing violators leads individuals to act in ways that could not 
have been favored, at their initial appearance, by individual level selection 
but that must necessarily, through group selection, have favored genes 
predisposing to such behavior. 
The foundations of this argument have been established in previous 
chapters. Retaliation against cheaters only makes sense from an evolu-
tionary standpoint focusing on the individual organism when propensities 
to do so are already widely shared within the group. But again, showing 
Altruism, Rule Violators, and the Case/or Modularity 257 
that a propensity to retaliate against cheaters can sustain itself once 
broadly established does not provide an account of origin. Retaliation 
costs the retaliator and produces no individual benefit. Once cheating has 
occurred the behavior the retaliatory threat was "designed" to deter has 
already taken place, and whatever benefits accrue as the result of such 
punishment accrue disproportionately to the group. The optimal strategy 
for the individual is not to monitor and not to punish but to free ride on 
the behavior of others who do so. Exactly the same range of arguments 
involving the practice of first move(r) altruism, and the degree to which it 
could have been favored by individual level selection, apply in this case. 
The proposition that a modular view is relevant in understanding 
social behavior owes a great deal to research by Leda Cosmides and John 
Tooby in the United States and Gerd Gigerenzer and his associates in Ger-
many. They have not attempted (as have I) to apply the concept ofmodu-
larity to Prisoner's Dilemma games or issues involving first move(r) altru-
ism. Nor have they explored at what level evolutionary forces must have 
operated in favoring a cheater detection module. But they have, in remark-
able and compelling experiments, established its existence. 19 
The initiation and emergence of reciprocity in the context of nonsi-
multaneous transfers require two key components: a first move(r) willing 
to perform an altruistic act and a mechanism for keeping track of whether 
or not such grants have been reciprocated. Trivers predicted the latter: "As 
selection favors subtler forms of cheating, it will favor more acute abilities 
to detect cheating" (1971, 48). Cosmides and Tooby's and Gigerenzer's 
research shows that we have evolved functionally specialized systems that 
help us do this, systems so powerful they will override the counsel of logi-
cal analysis in certain cases and, in other cases, apparently vastly improve 
our ability to conduct it. Our ability to detect violations of conditional 
rules is much higher when these rules involve a social norm. We are 
obsessed with detecting and punishing cheaters on social rules: those who 
receive a benefit but do not abide by a "rule" codifying reciprocity in what 
can be thought of as an n-person Prisoner's Dilemma. 
Cosmides and Tooby studied the ability of individuals to detect vio-
lations of rules of the form if p, then q using an experimental design known 
as the Wason selection test. Subjects have explained to them a certain rule 
of this form. They are then shown a set of four different cards, each of 
19. For a less enthusiastic evaluation, see Davies, Fetzer, and Foster 1995, an article 
that seems to be one of the few systematic critiques in print. Many of their criticisms involve 
rather fine points oflogic that do not, in their entirety, detract from the force of the Cosmides 
and Tooby contribution. In particular, the critique does not adequately credit the contribu-
tions of Cosmides and Tooby in finding a coherent way of organizing the disparate experi-
mental results utilizing the Wason selection task. 
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which contains an antecedent (p or not p) or a consequent (q or not q). On 
the reverse side of the cards is the associated consequent or antecedent. 
Subjects are asked to indicate which cards need to be turned over to verify 
that there have been no violations of the rule if p, then q. The correct solu-
tion from the standpoint of propositional logic is that one must turn over 
all cases of p and all cases of not q to ensure that no errors have occurred. 
The consequent not p and the antecedent q (whatever they are) cannot 
establish a rule violation and therefore from the standpoint of formal logic 
need not be examined. 
The reasons for this are as follows. Turning over not p is not relevant 
because the rule says nothing about the consequent of not p. Looking at 
the other side of q is also not relevant because the condition is if, not iff 
(i.e., we have a conditional, not a biconditional, statement). There might 
well be other antecedents that also implied q. Turning over q will either 
show p, which will be according to the rule, or not p, which will not be a 
violation of the rule. 
For example, suppose you have instructed the university registrar to 
code all letter grades ofC with the number 3. There have been errors in the 
past, and you have some doubts as to whether the rule is being followed 
correctly. You have four cards in front of you. They show, respectively, 
the letter C, the letter D, the number 3, and the number 7. On the other 
sides of the number cards are the corresponding letter grades. On the other 
sides of the letter grades are the corresponding coded number grades. 
Which cards do you need to turn over to make sure that no errors have 
been made? Since the applicable rules are if the letter grade is C, then the 
numerical code is 3, you need to turn over the card with the letter C on it 
(P), to make sure it is coded 3, and you need to turn over the 7 card (not q), 
to make sure it does not correspond to a letter grade of C. Turning over 
the D card (not p) cannot detect a rule violation, since there is nothing in 
the rule that says how the letter grade D is to be coded. Turning over the 
number 3 cannot detect a rule violation, since it may be true that grades 
other than C (such as C- or D) are also coded 3. 
If this is confusing to you, take heart. Where the rule is purely formal, 
as it is here, undergraduate subjects from U.S. universities (Harvard and 
Stanford) don't do very well, batting on average about 25 percent. Appar-
ently, whatever tools eons of evolution have given us, facility with the 
propositional calculus is not one of them. But where the setting is recast as 
one in which subjects are responsible for detecting some kind of human 
cheating on a social rule, success soars, in some cases tripling (to the range 
of75 percent correct). This is an astonishing result. 
For example, assume the setting is as follows: you are a bouncer in a 
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bar, where the rule is, if you are drinking beer, you must be over twenty, 
You see four individuals. For two of them you can tell what their age is but 
cannot see what they are drinking (one is over and one is under twenty). 
For two others, you can see what they are drinking but cannot tell how old 
they are (one is drinking beer, the other Coke). Typically more than 75 
percent of U.S. subjects and more than 90 percent of German subjects are 
able to ascertain that you should check the person drinking beer (P) and 
the person under twenty (not q).20 From a logical standpoint, this problem 
is identical to the grade coding problem. 
My initial reaction in reading the results of these first experiments was 
that perhaps a situation involving cheating triggered an adrenalin rush or 
some other hormone that concentrated people's minds, making them "bet-
ter" at solving the logic problem. Checking coding mistakes in the first 
problem is boring; perhaps catching underage drinkers in a bar is not. It 
turns out this hypothesis can be decisively rejected. A problem involving 
detecting cheaters does not necessarily make subjects better at solving an 
identical problem of logical inference. In some designs the experimenters 
cleverly switched the antecedent and consequent, so that the correct 
answer to the inference problem no longer involved detecting cheating 
(although the problem itself still appeared to involve a social contract). 
For example, change the rule to if you are over twenty, then you are drink-
ing beer. The rule has, because of this switch, become a descriptive rule, 
like the registrar problem, rather than a de on tic rule (one involving a must 
or should implication). Subjects still overwhelmingly counsel finding out 
what the underage patron is drinking and checking how old the beer 
drinker is, whereas the correct approach to sniffing out rule violation now 
is to check what the overage patron is drinking and find out how old the 
Coke drinker is (turn over p and not q). Subjects persist in examining cases 
that would permit them to detect cheating on a social contract, not those 
that would permit detection of violations of the logical rule. The concern 
with detecting cheating is so powerful that it overrides the guidance of our 
faculties for logical inference. In all of the experimental designs, the rea-
20. Gigerenzer and Hug (1992), in replicating Cosmides and Tooby's results using Ger-
man university students, found the same roughly 50 percentage point difference in perfor-
mance between social contract and non-social contract problems, although performance on 
all problems was higher than among U.S. students (Harvard undergraduates in Cosmides's 
original experiments). Gigerenzer and Hug attribute these differences in part to the more rig-
orous training that German students receive in Gymnasium and in particular to a group of 
six subjects who insisted on strictly applying the logic of the propositional calculus to the 
problems, regardless of how the answers "felt" to them. This highlights the degree to which 
success with this calculus is a learned competency, not selected for in Pleistocene times, in 
contrast to a finely honed ability to detect violations of expectations of reciprocity. 
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soning challenges are formally identical. Nor does the familiarity of the 
contextual setting appear to affect performance. What differs is the emo-
tive content of the challenge.21 
In some of the experimental designs explored subsequently by 
Gigerenzer and Hug, the concern with cheating is shown to be context 
dependent. Suppose the rule is if an employee gets a pension, he or she must 
have worked for at least ten years. The definition of cheating depends on 
whether one is employer or employee, although the logical problem is the 
same. For example, from the standpoint of the employer, the cheater is the 
employee who has a pension but has worked for less than ten years. For 
the employee, the employer has cheated if there is an employee who has 
worked more than ten years but has no pension. Yet performance differs 
greatly depending upon whether subjects are first told they are the 
employer or the employee (Gigerenzer and Hug 1992, 153-56; Cosmides 
and Tooby 1992, 181-89). "Employees" are determined to uncover cheat-
ing by employers, even where it represents the incorrect solution to the 
problem of logical inference, and "employers" are determined to uncover 
cheating by employees, regardless of whether it represents the correct solu-
tion to the problem oflogical inference. The hypothesis that different parts 
of the brain govern logical inference and reasoning about social contracts 
is supported by evidence from schizophrenics, which frequently shows 
impaired performance on the former but not the latter. 
The striking results of these experiments have been replicated in other 
studies. Discovering these patterns is akin to holding up a sheet of paper 
one thinks is blank and suddenly perceiving a watermark-a phenotypic 
imprint of the legacy of millions of years of evolutionary history. It is pre-
cisely because, compared to other animals, we are more altruistic, even to 
non-kin, and as a consequence end up practicing so much more reciproc-
ity involving affirmative assistance, not just passive failure to harm, that 
our cheater detection capabilities are so highly developed. 
Multiple Adaptations for Social Exchange 
This cheater detection module and the related behavioral predisposition to 
punish violators of social rules complement the propensity to practice first 
move(r) altruism evident in the experimental results concerning single play 
or fixed duration Prisoner's Dilemma games, the voluntary provision of 
public goods, and elsewhere. To the extent that they consider this issue, 
Cosmides and Tooby have adopted strictly conventional accounts of the 
21. As the authors put it, "humans have rules of inference that are specialized for 
cheater detection" (Cosmides and Tooby 1992, 189). 
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origin of reciprocity (i.e., those associated with the work of Trivers, Axel-
rod, or Frank). I have argued that, in accounting for the origin of complex 
social organization, a predisposition to practice first move(r) altruism, 
supporting by "reasoning" propensities specialized to the domain of social 
interaction, is as important as a module devoted to cheater detection. 
A predisposition to practice first move(r) altruism is, like cheater 
detection, a domain specific adaptation. It short-circuits and contravenes 
the prescriptive advice of our deductive logic, which counsels defect (first 
strike) in a one-shot PD, in a manner as striking as the process whereby the 
cheater detection module overwhelms whatever limited capabilities we 
may have for solving problems in the propositional calculus. The persis-
tent and replicable tendency for a substantial fraction of human subjects 
to play cooperate in single play or fixed duration PD games is the equiva-
lent, for this module, of the watermark represented by Cosmides and 
Tooby's experimental results. 
Cosmides and Tooby's work demonstrates the existence of content 
specific adaptations of a reasoning process affecting social relations, precisely 
what is denied by the assumption that our intelligence derives from a general-
purpose reasoning ability, one leading to a narrow and very precise definition 
of rationality. Their arguments regarding our obsession with cheaters are 
corroborated by findings of Mealey, Daood, and Krage (1996) that experi-
mental subjects are better able to remember faces of individuals who have 
been characterized to them as cheaters. Cummins (1999) extends the Cos-
mides and Tooby/Gigerenzer and Hug results in important directions by 
demonstrating the extent to which triggering of the cheater detection module 
may be associated with high rank within a dominance hierarchy. 
Edward O. Wilson has remarked upon our preoccupation with and 
our exceptional abilities to sniff out cheaters in discussing how much 
attention we pay to these matters. "[Cheating] excites emotion and serves 
as the principal source of hostile gossip and moralistic aggression by which 
the integrity of the political economy is maintained" (E. O. Wilson 1998, 
172). Natural selection has endowed us with a strong drive to detect those 
who fail to reciprocate when an opportunity subsequently presents itself 
and with a self-righteous anger that motivates retaliation or subsequent 
refusal to deal with such parties, even where such behavior is not in our 
own best interest and even when the failure to reciprocate involves third 
parties. As I have suggested, this predisposition, so important "in preserv-
ing the integrity of a political economy," is also what, under the right polit-
ical conditions, can be mobilized to sustain group attacks on out-groups. 
The propensity, at cost to ourselves, to punish "rule violators" is thus a 
two edged sword, giving rise to much that is ugly in the human ethogram. 
But it was an essential precondition for the development of complex social 
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organization. Margins of subsistence were sufficiently thin during the mil-
lions of years over which evolution took place that first move(r) altruism 
could not have been indiscriminate. Indiscriminate altruism could not per-
sist without grave detriment to the practitioner and a likely reduction in 
genetic fitness. To have any chance of persisting, first move(r) altruism had 
to be coupled with an ability to keep track of whom one had dealt with and 
their subsequent behavior and a willingness to punish nonreciprocity. 
The research on the Wason selection task shows conclusively that we 
have a cheater detection module that operates independently of whatever 
competencies we have for propositional calculus: sometimes improving 
our performance on it, other times causing it to deteriorate, basically over-
riding it. The experimental evidence of cooperative behavior in Prisoner's 
Dilemma games and those involving the voluntary provision of public 
goods is strong evidence that under certain circumstances, we operate 
according to a first move(r) altruism predisposition, supported by "rea-
soning" modules specialized to the domain of social interaction that sys-
tematically override the counsel of logic and mathematical reasoning. 
The existence of these cognitive modules is consistent with what we 
know oflanguage structure and acquisition, as well as visual perception, in 
which there are functionally specialized modules that permit us to see a 
snowball in our living room as white and a lump of coal outside as black, 
even though the latter reflects substantially more light; or detect edges in 
objects; or convert two-dimensional retinal images into representations of 
three-dimensional objects (Marr 1982). The assertion that modules directly 
influence reasoning about and behavior affecting our social relations is 
more difficult to accept, than, for example, when perceptual modules are 
exploited to create optical illusions. This idea is harder to accept because of 
the way in which these modules apparently short-circuit the counsel of 
what we view as our highest evolved competencies-logic and mathemati-
cal reasoning-and the way, at least in the former case, they are inconsis-
tent with the fundamental behavioral assumption of the standard economic 
model (for a similar line of argument, see Stanovich and West 2000). 
The two key adaptations addressed, first move(r) altruism and 
cheater detection with its associated propensity to punish, short-circuit 
cognitive and behavioral mechanisms that undergird the standard eco-
nomic model. They have strong evolutionary rationale, if we allow for 
group selection and in particular modularity. No research effort has done 
more to sensitize economists and other social scientists to the likelihood of 
modularity than the heuristics and biases program pioneered by Daniel 
Kahneman and Amos Tversky. It is one of the great ironies, therefore, 
that it has so little to tell us about these cognitive and behavioral adapta-
tions. Chapter 6 explains why. 
CHAPTER 6 
Modularity and the "Heuristics and 
Biases" Research Program 
Much of economic theory has been guided by a methodology that, in its 
more enthusiastic moments, seems to glorify the irrelevance of empirical 
research on how people actually behave (see, e.g., Selten 1998). In this light 
it is not surprising that with one or two important exceptions, economists' 
knowledge of or interest in experimental methods historically has been 
limited. In recent years, multidisciplinary participation in experiments 
using human subjects has begun to change this and has been associated 
with an increased willingness to use these methods and consider the impli-
cations of what they show. As Selten's comments indicate, these results are 
now, in the area of strategic interaction, so broad and so consistent in their 
identification of deficiencies in the predictions of standard models that a 
number of theorists have found it desirable to rethink what explanatory or 
predictive claims are actually made for normative theory.l 
A second program has been pioneered by Amos Tversky and Daniel 
Kahneman and popularized among economists by Richard Thaler and 
others. From the standpoint of intellectual history, perhaps even more 
significant than its particular findings is the fact that, whether they dismiss 
or embrace the heuristics and biases research program, most economists 
are aware of it. The program has had a distinctly higher profile and a 
larger impact to date on economics than the experimental research identi-
fying anomalous behavior in situations of strategic interaction (see the 
prologue and chap. 1). 
There are some overlaps between these two bodies of work, but for 
reasons outlined subsequently, their areas of inquiry are largely disjoint. 
Most of the research in the heuristics and biases program has involved (a) 
defects in the way we use data to form and update beliefs and (b) the study 
1. In games against nature, we make choices, but payoffs depend on outcomes "dealt" 
to us by natural processes, not on the decisions of other humans. These outcomes are not 
known to us in advance, although the various possibilities and their likelihoods can often be 
described probabilistically. Both playing roulette and deciding where to go fishing are games 
against nature. Techniques of statistical inference are relevant, however, for the latter but not 
the former problem. 
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of choice in games against nature (decision theory). Decision theory places 
great emphasis on human capabilities for statistical inference. It empha-
sizes as well the actual process of making choices within risky or uncertain 
environments. Such capabilities are simply not relevant for decision mak-
ing in a one-shot PD, because the counsel of normative game theory 
(defect) is independent of consideration of how the other party may play. 
Decisions in situations of strategic interaction are not the only types 
of decisions humans make. Many of the others do involve games against 
nature-foraging, for instance---circumstances where intuitive abilities to 
perform statistical inference can be quite valuable. Choice, for instance, 
about where and how intensely to search for food had critical implications 
for our hunter-gatherer ancestors-and their ancestors. The heuristics and 
bias research program, taken in its entirety, suggests that we are objec-
tively poor at such inference. In the language of modularity, Kahneman 
and Tversky can be viewed as stating that domain specific modules, heuris-
tics and biases, cause us to analyze formally identical problems in different 
ways. They call this process framing, and it represents an obvious viola-
tion of the assumptions of rational choice theory-different from those 
documented earlier but a violation none the less. 
There are real questions, however, why, from an evolutionary per-
spective, some of the short-circuiting Kahneman and Tversky identify 
should have been favored by natural selection, particularly with regard to 
human capabilities to calculate updated probabilities conditional on new 
data in accordance with Bayes' law.2 Ironically, the heuristics and biases 
program appears to provide the strongest evidence for modularity in areas 
where we would least expect it from an evolutionary standpoint, and it has 
little to say about areas where it is essential to account for the origin of 
complex social organization. 
Although Kahneman and Tversky were trained as psychologists and 
began their research very much within established disciplinary traditions, 
their seminal work now underlies an empirically based challenge to the 
dominant methodology in economics. Within their work one finds empha-
2. Bayes' law, formalized by Thomas Bayes in the eighteenth century, is a systematic 
means of calculating posterior probabilities based on prior probabilities and new informa-
tion. Suppose two different individuals are responsible for securing my departmental suite, 
Tom 80 percent of the time and Dick 20 percent. I know from prior experience that Tom is 
responsible, and leaves the main door unlocked only 10 percent of the time, whereas Dick is 
less so, and forgets to close up 9 times of 10. My prior probability is that there is an 80 per-
cent chance that Tom will secure my office. But if I find the door unlocked tomorrow morn-
ing, what is the posterior probability Tom was on duty? Bayes' law tells me it's still about a 
third. In 100 nights, on average, Tom would leave the door open 8 times (80 x .1), and Dick 
18 times (20 x .9), so the probability Tom was on duty, given that the door was unlocked, is 
81 (8 + 18) = 4/13. 
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sis on anomalies-behavior inconsistent with the predictions of the stan-
dard model-and on a series of "biases" in human reasoning that account 
for them. 
These biases, the program claims, arise under empirically replicable 
conditions in which learning and calculation will violate the prescriptions 
of logic, probability theory, and/or Bayesian statistical inference. Contin-
uing in a tradition established by Herbert Simon, Kahneman and Tversky 
have advanced, as explanation of these biases, a variety of heuristics-
rules of thumb-whereby humans do well enough, most of the time, in 
making their judgments. They add to the Simon tradition, however, an 
emphasis on how these heuristics sometimes produce not random errors 
but systematic deviations from the "normatively correct" judgment. 
The Kahneman and Tversky program is partly concerned with how 
people think and reason and how they draw inferences from data. Here it 
focuses on whether human beliefs or expectations are formed rationally: 
according to the best available logical or statistical algorithms. Their 
research and that inspired by it search for regularities in the ways humans 
process information, regularities that are at variance with what should 
happen if reasoning were strictly logical, based on known rules of proba-
bility, or followed "normative" rules of statistical inference. These include, 
for example, the representativeness heuristic, which causes people to 
assume incorrectly that parts of a phenomenon will necessarily exhibit 
characteristics of wholes; the availability heuristic, in which the subjective 
probability of an event increases depending upon the ease and vividness 
with which it can be visualized; and the anchoring heuristic, whereby the 
subjective estimate of an outcome is influenced by the starting point, or 
status quo. 
The latter heuristic is typical of the overarching Kahneman and 
Tversky emphasis on frame dependence: inferences about and choices 
regarding a formally identical problem will be influenced by the context 
or frame in which it is presented. Frame dependence is inconsistent with 
assumptions implicit in the Skinnerian model of operant conditioning. In 
challenging that model, Kahneman and Tversky also challenge the model 
of learning and decision making underlying the standard economic 
model, in particular the expected utility framework, the approach to deci-
sion making under risk or uncertainty first advanced by von Neumann 
and Morgenstern in an appendix to their 1944 book on games and eco-
nomic behavior. 
Kahneman and Tversky have argued repeatedly, based on their 
experimental results, that individuals will treat formally identical prob-
lems differently depending upon how they are presented. For example, a 
military commander is in a pinch. Ifhe does nothing six hundred of his sol-
266 Altruistically Inclined? 
diers will die. He has a choice of two escape routes. Under option A, two 
hundred soldiers will escape. Under option B, there is a 113 chance that all 
six hundred soldiers will be saved and a 2/3 chance that none will be saved. 
What is the appropriate counsel to the commander? 
Now consider a commander in a situation where six hundred of his 
soldiers are again at risk and with two possible escape routes. His advisers 
tell him that under option A, four hundred soldiers will die and under 
option B there is a 113 chance that none will die and a 2/3 chance that six 
hundred will perish (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). In the first "framing" 
of the problem, a preponderance of experimental subjects recommend 
option A-they are apparently attracted by the certainty of saving two 
hundred lives. In the second case a preponderance of subjects choose 
option B, the riskier option, apparently attracted by the possibility of sav-
ing all six hundred. But the two problems, Kahneman and Tversky 
argued, are formally identical, and expected utility theory predicts that 
options A and B should be equally preferred under the two presentations: 
in particular, these findings contradict the assumptions that preferences 
should be stable or invariant to how a problem is presented. 
Under option A the fate of the remaining four hundred soldiers is left 
unspecified. Kahneman and Tversky presume that subjects, if they are log-
ical, should reason that they die. Perhaps, since their fate is not explicitly 
stated, subjects conclude that there is still some positive probability they 
might be alive. Under the second scenario, the four hundred under option 
A are unambiguously dead, but the fate of the remaining two hundred is 
not explicitly stated. Perhaps we reason that there is some likelihood that 
a number of them are dead as well. If such reasoning were operative we 
could conclude that the expected number alive is actually greater with 
option A under the first scenario than under the second, explaining the 
preference for it. 
These possibilities are raised not to suggest that this interpretation 
disposes of the anomaly-I doubt that it does-but to indicate how care-
fully results must be scrutinized before concluding that we are faced with a 
regularity with real, out-of-sample predictive power. Kahneman and Tver-
sky rarely consider why we reason as we do. In this instance the evolution-
ary logic for a preference for saving more members of "our" group is per-
haps so obvious it needs no further consideration. But in other instances, 
bringing to bear considerations of the challenges posed by ancestral envi-
ronments and the adaptations that likely resulted can be of considerable 
usefulness in this task of critical scrutiny. 
As an example of the representativeness heuristic, humans expect 
"parts" of a phenomenon to exhibit characteristics of the whole, and in 
particular they expect this to be true with respect to the degree of random-
ness exhibited by a series of statistically independent realizations. Whereas 
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this heuristic works well in reasoning from information on parts of an 
apple or a piece of wood to characteristics of its entirety (and vice versa), 
it works poorly for phenomena involving probabilistic outcomes. Thus 
people tend to assume that because 100,000 flips of a (fair) coin are very 
likely to produce a proportion of heads (or tails) very close to .5, it is also 
true that 10 flips of a coin are very likely to produce 5 heads and 5 tails (a 
50 percent split). The binomial distribution tells us otherwise (the correct 
probability of exactly 5 heads in 10 tosses is less than a fourth-.246). 
Most subjects have very poor intuition about these matters. Because truly 
random processes were rare in ancestral environments, there is an evolu-
tionary explanation, discussed in greater detail in what follows, for why 
this is so. 
Closely related to this bias is a tendency, in thinking about the out-
comes of random processes such as coin flips, to underestimate the likeli-
hood of runs of heads or tails, say, three or four in a row. In general, 
humans are too willing to attribute structure, in particular, positive auto-
correlation, to the results of a random process, identifying a "hot hand" in 
the performance of basketball shooters, the equivalent of a string of heads, 
when the performance records are statistically indistinguishable from 
what would be produced by the rough equivalent of a string of coin tosses 
(Gilovich 1991, 11-17). When asked to characterize what they think a 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~fu~~~ 
because they tend to assume that the proportion of heads will be roughly 
50 percent even in very small series of realizations (such as two or four). A 
related phenomenon, Kahneman and Tversky claim, is that humans lack 
an intuitive understanding of the fact that the variance of an estimate of a 
population parameter, say, the mean of a population, shrinks as the size of 
the sample upon which the estimate is based increases. This last claim has, 
however, been disputed (see Cosmides and Tooby 1996; and subsequent 
discussion). 
As an example of the availability heuristic, one can point to the com-
mon tendency for subjects to increase disaster preparations after a memo-
rable event, such as an earthquake, even though there may be no objective 
evidence that the probability of a second disaster has increased as the con-
sequence of the one that just occurred (Kunreuther et al. 1978) and the 
reverse may be true, inasmuch as pressure on a fault has now been 
relieved. 3 
As an example of an anchoring heuristic, Kahneman and Tversky 
3. Of course, sometimes major aftershocks do occur, in which case it would have been 
rational to stay out of one's house. Similarly, canceling plans to fly to Europe after the TWA 
800 crash lVouldhave been rational if the crash had been due to a terrorist bomb, presaging a 
series of attacks on U.S. flag carriers. So the availability heuristic does not necessarily serve 
us poorly. 
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asked subjects to estimate the number of African nations in the United 
Nations. The experimenters first spun a wheel with numbers from 0 to 100 
on it and then asked subjects whether their estimate was higher or lower 
than this apparently randomly chosen number (the wheel was actually 
rigged to stop at either 10 or 65). The median estimate of the number of 
African countries in the United Nations was 25 for those who received 10 
as an anchoring point and 45 for those who received 65 as an anchoring 
point. 
The Kahneman and Tversky research program has produced a vari-
ety of striking findings and, due in part to the efforts of behavioral econ-
omists, has been one of the more "successful" interdisciplinary conversa-
tions in which economists have engaged over the last quarter century. In 
spite of this success, the program in its current incarnation does not offer 
a substitute for or a fully adequate complement to traditional economic 
theory as the foundation for an empirically based science of human 
behavior. 
I adduce several reasons for this. First, the burgeoning menu of 
heuristics and biases has proved capable in a number of instances of 
accounting, ex post, both for a phenomenon and its opposite. Second, new 
research indicates that some of the findings of Kahneman and Tversky 
that do not suffer from this defect are less far reaching in their implications 
for cognition or behavior than was first apparent. Finally, the program 
has essentially nothing to say about the cognitive underpinnings ofbehav-
ioral predispositions central to the origin of complex social organization. 
It focuses on the rationality of judgments-how beliefs and expectations 
are formed in games against nature-not on the rationality of optimiza-
tion in games with other humans. 
My intent in pointing out limitations in the heuristics and biases pro-
gram is not to suggest-as have some of its critics-that the decision-mak-
ing assumptions embedded in the standard economic model form a com-
plete and satisfactory foundation for a comprehensive empirically based 
behavioral science. Enough has been said in earlier chapters to indicate 
that this is not my position. In critically examining some of the applica-
tions of behavioral economics to finance, for example, I do not intend to 
endorse the traditional view that financial markets are, after all, efficient, 
even though some of my concerns are echoed by those who do hold that view. 
My critique of the contributions of this program revolves in part around 
how adequately, if in some cases at all, it has accounted for phenomena 
that are indubitably anomalous from the standpoint of the standard eco-
nomic model and in part around whether in some instances the Kahneman 
and Tversky approach has overstated the behavioral implications of biases 
it has identified. 
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It is perhaps ironic that the Kahneman and Tversky program, which 
has done so much to sensitize economists to the possibility of modular-
ity, should end up being criticized for having gone too far, through its 
emphasis on framing, in its questioning of the relevance of the Skinner-
ian operant conditioning model, the prototypical domain general learn-
ing mechanism. 
The Orthodox Alternative 
Because of a series of startling experimental results accumulated over 
more than a quarter century, the heuristics and bias approach is now on 
the verge, among those who recognize the lack of correspondence between 
the predictions of normative economic theory and a large body of obser-
vational and experimental evidence, of becoming, if not orthodox, at least 
the orthodox alternative. Attainment of this status means that its claims 
warrant greater scrutiny. Much of what Kahneman and Tversky and those 
working in this tradition have discovered and documented will withstand 
such reexamination: they have generally been very careful in their exposi-
tion. But the interpretation of results will alter, and the scope of their rele-
vance may narrow, in some cases quite significantly. And given the larger 
explanatory responsibility of an approach that aspires to comprehensive-
ness, we must also focus more precisely on what types of behavior the pro-
gram has not elucidated. 
Participants in this research program can take pride in their careful 
demonstration that in many instances human behavior does not corre-
spond well to the predictions of the standard economic model. But ulti-
mately we need more than just the identification of anomalies. It has been 
relatively easy ex post to adduce various heuristics with psychological res-
onance to account for a result, but it has proved more difficult to develop 
a framework with strong predictive power, inasmuch as different proposed 
heuristics may suggest that behavior will go in two entirely opposed direc-
tions. As Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler noted in 1986, "Parsimony 
requires that a new behavioral assumption should be introduced only if it 
specifies conditions under which observations deviate significantly from 
the basic model and only if it predicts the direction of these deviations" 
(1986,233). 
This is a sound methodological precept and one equally relevant to 
the exploration of the domain specific adaptations in cognition and behav-
ior that have figured prominently in earlier chapters. I believe that these 
"new behavioral assumptions" or modules can withstand this test. For 
example, "first move(r) altruism" predicts that when subjects find them-
selves in a single play PD, their behavior will deviate from the predictions 
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of the standard model in the direction of more nondefection. Estimates of 
the magnitude of the deviation require a statistical, empirical methodology 
whose normative relevance is not admitted in canonical theory. Its size 
may vary in a predictable fashion as a function of whether prep lay com-
munication is allowed or how large are the temptations to defection, but 
the existence of the deviation as an empirically important phenomenon is 
hard to question at this point. 
Similarly, the "cheater detection" module predicts that when faced 
with problems of propositional logic in a context where a social rule is at 
stake, subjects will focus disproportionately on uncovering evidence of 
cheating, irrespective of the "normatively correct" solution to the prob-
lem, as a prelude to punishing such behavior or making certain it is pun-
ished by others. More generally, this module is reflective of a propensity to 
punish violations of norms, even when deterrence has failed and the act of 
punishment does not serve the individual interests of the actor narrowly 
defined. 
If one does an overall assessment of the heuristics and biases program, 
however, the multiplication of heuristics and their often very general 
definition have created a situation where this precept is not always being 
observed. One way in which the focus of the program may be sharpened is 
to insist that when the menu of heuristics and biases can account both for a 
phenomenon and its opposite, we have an underspecified model. Another 
way is to subject it to the discipline of an evolutionary perspective. 
First, though, it is important to understand why the Kahneman and 
Tversky research program has proved of such limited relevance in under-
standing the origin of complex social organization. Those dissatisfied with 
the gaps between the predictions of economic theory and observational 
and experimental data should understand that their dissatisfaction can be 
at best only partly resolved within this body of work. 
As advertised in the title of their 1974 article (Tversky and Kahneman 
1974) and their 1982 book (Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky 1982), the pro-
gram is principally concerned with judgment, and, implicitly, decision mak-
ing, under uncertainty. It is about the ways in which humans do and do not 
make good use of available information in situations where there are many 
unknowns and where relations among variables are neither necessary nor 
sufficient but are probabilistic. The choice situations investigated in this 
program concern circumstances where outcomes for the individual do not 
depend directly on the choices of other individuals. Thus, if there is concern 
with games in the Kahneman and Tversky research program, it is princi-
pally with games against nature, not against other humans.4 
4. An exception to this is the large experimental literature on fairness, some of which is 
discussed in chapter 4. 
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In contrast, at the core of the challenge of establishing and maintain-
ing social relations is a problem, captured in the single play Prisoner's 
Dilemma, where the outcome for each depends on the choice made by the 
other but where, at least from the standpoint of normative game theory, 
neither the acquisition of more information nor the refining of skills in sta-
tistical inference makes any difference whatsoever in the conclusion about 
how one should play. The Kahneman and Tversky program can be at best 
only a partial challenge to the standard economic model because it 
addresses only a subset of deviations of human behavior from the "basic 
model" and perhaps not the most fundamental ones. 
To be fair, neither Kahneman nor Tversky has claimed that their 
research is relevant to the problem of explaining, for example, first 
move(r) altruism.5 They have tried to stick with problems where the "nor-
matively correct" solution is apparently uncontroversial, although, as we 
will see, this effort has not been entirely successful. To appreciate the 
issues at stake, consider how the heuristics and biases program would 
approach the issue of decision making in a Prisoner's Dilemma. The stan-
dard methodology is to look at a particular decision-making problem; 
define the "normatively correct" solution to it; measure behavioral devia-
tion from the counsel of the normative rule; describe that deviation as a 
"bias"; and then identify the "heuristic," or quick and dirty decision-mak-
ing rule, that is responsible for the bias. One reason Kahneman and Tver-
sky do not address the PD problem may be because, as Rapaport and 
Chammah note in discussing the game back in 1965, "whatever choice is 
recommended by 'rational considerations' has something wrong with it in 
spite of the fact that nothing remains unknown about the situation. In 
other words, the chooser cannot do better by finding out more." The "nor-
matively correct" decision can be identified as defect, but intuition may 
rebel against this identification. 
The challenge of dealing with a Prisoner's Dilemma does not have to 
do with the human brain's difficulty in grasping the choices and their con-
sequences, nor is it that individuals are overwhelmed with information, 
some of which may be ambiguous. The dilemma does not involve difficulty 
in applying the propositional calculus or Bayes' theorem or calculating the 
binomial distribution. The payoffs are clearly specified, and information 
about the prior behavior of the other player(s) is irrelevant to the decision 
problem because it does not affect the dominance of the defect strategy. 
Thus neither the Kahneman and Tversky results about biases in the way 
information is processed nor the emphasis by Herbert Simon (1987) on 
limitations in the information processing capabilities of humans, a tradi-
5. Amos Tversky died in 1997. 
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tion out of which the Kahneman and Tversky research emerged, is ger-
mane to understanding the first of the key behavioral propensities upon 
which human altruism to non-kin and, ultimately, complex social organi-
zation depend. 
Moreover, to assert that the normatively correct rule for the PD prob-
lem is defect, and to claim it as the gold standard against which actual 
human behavior should be measured, with deviations identified as 
"biases," will likely lead to philosophical objection. How many social sci-
entists are prepared to characterize the play of cooperate in a one-shot PD 
game as a deviation from the "normatively correct" decision, a bias we 
should try to correct? Some hard core adherents to the standard economic 
model perhaps will, but the issue would, no doubt, be contested. As sug-
gested, one can reasonably interpret a propensity to make grants of first 
move(r) altruism as a "heuristic," or rule of thumb, that has been favored 
by natural selection, albeit at a level above that of the individual organism. 
I am personally not prepared, however, either to claim that playing a 
strictly dominated strategy is rational or to advocate or initiate a system-
atic program to "debias" humans by eliminating this heuristic, even were 
that possible, and even though in some cases, such as reducing cartel sta-
bility, facilitating the breaking up of terrorist cells, or weakening inter-
group conflict based On within group solidarity, it might be socially 
beneficial. Such benefits would vanish in a more complete accounting, for 
we would discard along with the bathwater the behavioral foundation for 
complex social organization above the level of the family. 
The two player one-shot PD problem is an unusual case because the 
intuitive unattractiveness of the normative rule is widely acknowledged. 
But it is increasingly apparent that in a number of the decision challenges 
studied by Kahneman and Tversky the "normatively correct" decision 
rule they identify is less obvious or straightforward than the investigators 
have suggested. This is particularly so with respect to their conclusions 
about how poor we are as intuitive statisticians. 
Base Rate Neglect? 
One of the most frequently repeated conclusions of the program is that 
humans exhibit a systematic tendency to ignore base rate data in calculat-
ing posterior probabilities in the light of new information. The issue can be 
illustrated with a problem often used in these experiments. In the standard 
medical diagnosis problem, subjects are told that a test to reveal a disease 
with a One in One thousand incidence has a 5 percent false positive rate and 
are asked to calculate the probability that an individual testing positive 
has the disease. Sophisticated medical practitioners, for example, Harvard 
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Medical School residents, appear appallingly unable to give the norma-
tively "correct" answer: approximately 2 percent.6 Since subjects com-
monly answer that the probability is 95 percent, they have apparently 
failed to incorporate in their judgment the information on the very low 
incidence, or base rate, of the disease. 
The application of Bayes' theorem is not in principle a complex task. 
A computer can process the information with a few lines of programming. 
The idea that natural selection was unable to "design" such a computer 
seems puzzling when placed alongside the remarkable success of human 
vision, which no human engineers have been able fully to reverse engineer, 
in light of the utility of inference capabilities in facilitating foraging and 
enabling complex social organization and in light of the ability of animals, 
including single celled animals, to "learn" using inductive algorithms. 
Kahneman and Tversky do not generally ask why the brain operates 
as it does: their task, as they see it, is to understand how it operates. The 
Simon tradition attributes biases to computational complexity, but such 
an appeal seems of limited relevance here, since the calculations involved 
are in principle simple. Could one attribute these results to some hereto-
fore unidentified "module" that can short-circuit "normal" processes of 
logical or statistical inference? But if some kind of module conflict is the 
explanation for the poor performance on the medical diagnosis problem, 
we advance to the next question: why would evolution select for a module 
that made us perform so poorly as intuitive statisticians? 
Such questions have not generally been asked within the heuristics 
and biases research program.7 Partly as a consequence, the biases docu-
mented have begun to take on the status of museum pieces: artifacts 
6. This conclusion assumes that the person tested was drawn randomly from the popu-
lation and that the rate of false negatives is 0: everyone who has the disease tests positive for 
it. Under these circumstances, if one randomly tests 1,000 people, one will likely pick up 50 
false positives and I true positive, giving a posterior probability that an individual testing 
positive for the disease actually has it of 1151, or about 2 percent. Another famous experi-
mental test is the taxicab problem: 85 of the cabs in a city are green, 15 blue. A witness to a 
nighttime accident identifies a blue cab as involved, but color identifications after dark are 
known to be only 80 percent accurate. What is the probability the cab actually was blue? The 
correct answer is about.41. In 100 identifications, one would expect to "see" 29 blue cabs, 12 
that actually were blue (15 x .8) and 17 that weren't (85 x .2). Twelve out of 29 is about 41 
percent, so even though one can correctly identify cab color 80 percent of the time, the prob-
ability it is blue given that one saw it as blue is just over half that, because there are so few 
blue cabs (we assume the blue cabs are just as likely to be on the road at night as the green 
cabs). The issue is whether we are biologically predisposed to process these problems more 
easily when they are stated, as they are here, in frequentist terms. 
7. An exception is Einhorn, who argues that the persistence of suboptimal rules in the 
face of Darwinian selection is not a contradiction, because it is only relative advantage vis-a-
vis one's environment that matters (Einhorn 1982,283). 
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enclosed in glass cases, maintained at constant temperature and humidity. 
They are cherished and nurtured, admired for their beauty and apparent 
ability to account for anomalous behavior. In some cases, however, in a 
matter that suggests problems from a scientific standpoint, biases have 
been used to "explain" both a phenomenon and its exact opposite. 
Even those cases that do not suffer from this problem need to be 
brought out of the museum and studied in the light of evolutionary con-
siderations. We need to know which ones surviving this screen would have 
been truly important from the standpoint of relative fitness. As it now 
stands, the anomalies elicit the same kind of fascination we associate with 
optical illusions or mathematical puzzles, like the St. Petersburg problem.8 
We study them, it is argued, for the same reasons we study optical illu-
sions: because they can provide a key to how the mind works and, it is 
claimed, because by educating people to recognize these illusions, we can 
help them make better decisions (Nisbett and Ross 1980, xii). But to what 
degree are these cognitive illusions, like optical illusions, generated in part 
by the framing of problems in ways that defeat, or show in an unfavorable 
light, capabilities that are in fact more robust and have a stronger evolu-
tionary rationale? How much of their effect is due to the fact that the 
experimental problems are presented in ways that come in "under the 
radar screen" of our cognitive processors? 
By drawing two lines of equal length, with arrowheads flared in on 
one and out on the other, we can trick the brain into thinking one line is 
longer than the other. But most of the time we do very well indeed injudg-
ing the relative length of two parallel lines. Is there a danger that in focus-
ing on the ubiquity of processing errors we have developed an unbalanced 
view of human inductive capabilities? One of the difficulties is that the 
heuristics and biases research program takes as given the one true norma-
tively correct answer to the kinds of problems it poses. The history of sta-
tistical theory is one of heated controversy about how best to make infer-
ences, not a uniform march to consensus. 
Economists are generally taught differences between a classical 
hypothesis testing approach on the one hand and a Bayesian perspective 
on the other, but this underestimates the degree of diversity in statistical 
approaches. In fact, the Fisherian emphasis on significance levels is not 
identical to the Neyman/Pearson/Wald approach to discriminating 
8. One is offered the opportunity to flip a coin. If heads on the first toss, one gets $1. If 
heads does not appear until the second toss, $2; the third toss $4; the fourth toss $8, and so 
on. The mathematical expectation of the game is infinite, but few reasonable people-in par-
ticular those who have some risk aversion-will wager their fortunes to play it. The St. 
Petersburg paradox stimulated von Neumann and Morgenstern to develop a theory of 
expected utility, rather than expected value, to explain choice under uncertainty. 
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between two hypotheses based on the relative costs of Type 1 and Type 2 
errors. Disagreements between Fisher and Neyman and Pearson were 
public and severe. Gigerenzer and Murray have made a strong case that 
the hybridization of these two approaches in "classical statistics" is a cre-
ation of textbook writers (Gigerenzer and Murray 1987). 
Both approaches are, in turn, different from the explicit subjectivity 
inherent in a Bayesian approach, in which, aside from textbook problems 
involving colored balls in urns, base rates are not known objectively or, 
where prior frequency data are available, there are legitimate differences in 
subjective views about exactly how narrow a category one should use in 
calculating such base rates. In the medical diagnosis problem, doctors 
apparently rebel against using base rate data because they see each patient 
as unique, rather than as part of a class for which past frequency data may 
be relevant. As Gigerenzer and his colleagues noted in 1989, before his 
adoption of a more explicitly evolutionary perspective in trying to dis-
criminate among these: 
If we put some of the various cognitive functions that have been 
seen as intuitive statistics together, we get a picture of an eclectic 
brain whose different homunculi statisticians control different func-
tions. Elementary functions such as sensory detection, discrimina-
tion, and recognition in memory are controlled by a statistician of the 
Neyman-Pearson-Wald school, causal reasoning by a Fisherian sta-
tistician, perceptual estimation and judgment by a statistician of the 
Karl Pearson school, and induction and opinion revision by a 
Bayesian statistician. To read the current psychological literature on 
cognitive functioning, it would seem as if each of the homunculi oper-
ated in ignorance of the other, and by dogmatic adherence to a single 
statistical school. (Gigerenzer et al. 1989,233) 
Some of the interpretations of the relevance of findings in the Kahne-
man and Tversky program are misleading because of suggestions of 
greater consensus than exists regarding what should be the normative 
"gold standard" of the basic model. As a consequence the research has 
tended to portray the intuitive statistical capabilities of the average human 
in a less favorable light than is warranted. None of us is perfect, and 
identification of cognitive illusions can obviously be enormously valuable. 
Indeed, my sense is that the greatest contribution of the program and the 
methodological and philosophical issues it raises so far has been to illumi-
nate our practice as social scientists and to point toward ways in which 
that practice might be improved. 
The development of double blind experimental methodology in med-
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ical research, for example, is a triumph of human ingenuity and reasoning. 
Much of our belief in the effectiveness of certain treatment rules is not 
based on such studies, however, and is often biased by the general absence 
of data on outcomes for those who did not receive the treatment. This is a 
bias that Kahneman and Tversky's work has identified and encouraged us 
to overcome. We admit to college or hire for our departments based on a 
personal interview, and we have a strong incentive to believe that this 
expenditure of time is worthwhile and that the contribution of profes-
sional judgment adds value. But this is largely faith, since we have no 
knowledge of how those we rejected would have performed had they been 
admitted or hired and we are generally not prepared to, or in a position to, 
conduct the experiments necessary to ascertain the true efficacy of the 
treatment. 
But although we are often much poorer scientists than we could be, 
we are not necessarily as poor intuitive statisticians in our day-to-day life 
as the research results have suggested. And this is important, because evo-
lutionary considerations suggest we should be relatively good intuitive 
statisticians, better than Kahneman and Tversky suggest, in solving com-
plex problems of statistical inference, particularly those associated with 
foraging. 
The observation that many of the Kahneman and Tversky results are 
puzzling from an evolutionary perspective has canalized research effort 
among evolutionary psychologists in an effort to discover what really is 
responsible for them. Recent research has now shown, in designs such as 
the medical diagnosis problem, that humans are actually quite good at 
applying Bayes' theorem, provided both inputs given and output requested 
are stated in frequentist terms, rather than as single event probabilities. 
This discovery was foreshadowed in research by Fiedler (1988) on the 
"Linda" problem. Told that Linda is a bright, single, outspoken 31-year-
old philosophy major who in college had been deeply concerned with dis-
crimination and social justice and had participated in antinuclear demon-
strations, subjects are asked to rank order the respective probabilities that 
(a) Linda is a bank teller and (b) Linda is a bank teller and active in the 
feminist movement. Most subjects in the original experiment and in subse-
quent replications commit what Kahneman and Tversky call the conjunc-
tion fallacy. They rank the latter probability higher than the former, even 
though, because the set of bank tellers must be greater than or equal to the 
set offeminist bank tellers, this is a logical impossibility. 
Fiedler (1988) showed that if the question were rephrased, results 
were quite different. Instead of asking subjects to rank single event proba-
bilities, they were asked instead, "To how many out of one hundred 
people who are like Linda do the following statements apply?" Seventy to 
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80 percent of subjects then correctly state that the frequency of bank tellers 
will be greater than the frequency of bank tellers active in the feminist 
movement. In other words, once the problem is restated in frequentist 
terms, the apparent conjunction bias disappears. 
Subsequent experimental results indicate that when problems are 
posed in frequentist terms, subjects are quite capable of intuitively apply-
ing Bayes' theorem to inputs defined as frequencies rather than subjective 
probabilities, producing outputs in which base rate neglect disappears. 
Elaborating on broader work by Gigerenzer and Hoffrage (1995), Cos-
mides and Tooby (1996) have demonstrated exhaustively that the same 
type of rephrasing eliminates base rate neglect in the medical diagnosis 
problem. A mounting body of evidence suggests that in fact a number of 
the biases identified by Kahneman and Tversky disappear when problems 
are rephrased in this manner. Their conclusions that humans are not capa-
ble of processing these problems correctly and that the explanation for this 
is inadequate weight given to base rates must at least be reconsidered. It 
appears that although humans are not very good Bayesians where prob-
lems are phrased in the language of single event probabilities, they are 
quite good intuitive Bayesians where they operate on frequencies. Similar 
clarifications have been obtained with respect to the "overconfidence" bias 
(Gigerenzer, Hoffrage, and Kleinbi:ilting 1991). 
One might respond that these restatements in frequency terms just 
make the problems easier or "too easy." But that response points critically 
to what we need to explore. We need to understand, from an evolutionary 
perspective, why certain ways of posing the problem are more easily 
processed by the human mind than others. One might also argue that these 
results simply confirm the Kahneman and Tversky emphasis on the impor-
tance of framing. The difference in approach, however, is that the search 
for frames that are likely to trigger different or better performance by 
humans is guided by evolutionary considerations. This can make a big dif-
ference in directing research in certain directions and in increasing the pro-
ductivity of our research effort. 
The concept of the meaningfulness of a single event probability 
remains controversial among statisticians, and the choice as to whether 
one sees him- or herself as a Bayesian as opposed to a "frequentist" is as 
much philosophical as scientific. The Gigerenzer and Hoffrage/Cosmides 
and Tooby position is that since the "modern" understanding ofprobabil-
ity and percentages is less than two centuries old, it is extremely unlikely 
that evolution selected our cognitive facilities to be proficient working 
within this framework. On the other hand, it is likely that we have been 
selected to update and maintain frequencies and draw inferences from 
such data. "From animals to neural networks, systems seem to learn about 
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contingencies through sequential encoding and updating of event frequen-
cies" (Gigerenzer and Hoffrage 1995, 686). Indeed, studies of animal for-
aging behavior, particularly among bumblebees and birds, have indicated 
they are able to effectuate the well-calibrated feats of statistical inference 
that humans, according to the biases and heuristics program, cannot 
(Brase, Cosmides, and Tooby 1998,4).9 
Kahneman and Tversky's position, in a published debate with 
Gigerenzer, is that "the refusal to apply the concept of probability to 
unique events is a philosophical position that has some following among 
statisticians, but is not generally shared by the public" (Kahneman and 
Tversky 1996, 585). They go on to claim that "whether or not it is mean-
ingful to assign a definite numerical value to the probability of survival of 
a specific individual, we submit a) that the individual is less likely to die 
within a week than to die within a year and b) that most people regard the 
preceding statement as true-not as meaningless, and treat its negation as 
an error or a fallacy" (586). In his rebuttal Gigerenzer argued first that 
faced with an individual near death, many people will, quite reasonably, 
attribute a higher probability to that individual's dying within the next 
week as opposed to the period of time represented by the remainder of the 
year excluding the immediately upcoming week, an interpretation of the 
problem he sees as perfectly reasonable.lO Moreover, he asks pointedly, 
"How can people's intuitions be called upon to substitute for the stan-
dards of statisticians, in order to prove that people's intuitions systemati-
cally violate the normative theory of probability?" (Gigerenzer 1996, 593). 
The lesson to be taken from this debate is that the choice of a norma-
tive baseline against which "deviations" are measured is more arbitrary in 
many cases than has been suggested. Kahneman and Tversky argue that 
humans do not give sufficient weight in making their judgments to the 
information that can be extracted from base rates. But there will always be 
legitimate issues regarding whether a base rate is relevant for the particu-
lar problem at hand. Induction "works" well when the underlying process 
is stable and the chosen reference category appropriate. Neither of these 
determinations can be made unambiguously. Induction might fail to yield 
9. Recent research by Knowlton, Mangell, and Squires (1996) adds support to the 
proposition that we are armed with tools that make us good intuitive statisticians. Knowlton 
and colleagues presented subjects with one, two, or three offour possible clues as to whether 
it would rain or shine the following day. The clues had predictive power, but the links were 
complex and probabilistic. After as few as fifty trials, subjects were able to predict the 
"weather" with 70 percent accuracy, even though they were completely unable to articulate 
the structure of the underlying model. 
10. Kahneman and Tversky's rhetorical point is that the period "within a year" sub-
sumes the period within a week; therefore the probability of the latter cannot be greater than 
the probability of the former. 
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good predictions because the underlying structure has in fact changed, or 
because the reference category is not appropriate to the problem, or 
because there never was in fact any structure, as in the case of a roulette 
wheel. 
Finally, in terms of the posited behavioral predisposition systemati-
cally to underweight base rate information, we should recall that this ten-
dency is in direct conflict with the conclusions of some of the original 
experiments in this paradigm, those conducted by Ward Edwards (1968). 
Edwards found that subjects were too conservative in updating probabili-
ties based on new information. In other words, they gave too much weight 
to base rates (Gigerenzer et al. 1989,219). Other experimenters have also 
documented conservatism (Camerer 1995, 601-2), and Edwards's work 
and his conclusions coexist uneasily with the Kahneman and Tversky 
heuristic. 
Griffin and Tversky (1992) try to reconcile these apparently contra-
dictory findings, arguing that people put too much emphasis on the 
strength of evidence (they neglect base rates) and not enough on its weight 
(they undervalue evidence that is weak but based on a large sample). On 
the other hand, Deirdre McCloskey has repeatedly admonished econo-
mists to pay more attention to the size of coefficients and less to their sta-
tistical significance, suggesting that economists suffer from just the oppo-
site bias: they overvalue evidence that is weak but based on a large sample, 
such as economically unimportant but statistically significant coefficients 
(1983,496-98; 1985; 2000, 187-207). The existence of analyses suggesting 
biases in opposing directions is symptomatic of a more general problem 
besetting the heuristics and biases program. A tendency systematically to 
overweight base rate data and a tendency systematically to underweight 
base rate data cannot both be essential human predispositions. If these 
heuristics are to be developed into a model with real predictive capability, 
more specification, ex ante, of conditions under which one or the other is 
likely to obtain is needed. 
One can of course construct and logically justify another normative 
standard-ignore all base rate data-that summarily disposes of the pre-
ceding debate. This may strike some as silly, but its logic follows naturally 
from Hume's concerns with what W. o. Quine would later call the "scan-
dal of induction." The beauty of an evolutionary approach is that we do 
not have to go down this route. It does not matter for our purposes 
whether the use of induction can be logically justified and thus whether 
decisions based on such a methodology are rational. What matters is 
whether selection pressures would have permitted posited predispositions 
to persist. All that we need in order to explain why humans use inductive 
reasoning is the presumption that those organisms that had a propensity 
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to do so enjoyed a reproductive advantage over those that did not, but-
tressed with statistical evidence that behavior of individuals is to some 
degree reliably predictable by past overt behavior. 
From this perspective, it is no longer a puzzle why animals, including 
single celled organisms, can "learn," using inductive algorithms. Induction 
worked, and it works, when it does, because much of the world consisted 
and consists of relationships and processes that have sufficient structural 
stability that it is meaningful to talk about reference categories, keep tab-
ulations of base rates, and take action in accordance with estimates of con-
tingent probabilities based on past experience. Insurance companies try to 
identify and operate over structurally stable processes and exhibit more 
caution around those that are not. So, too, do individual humans. This, 
then, is an evolutionary explanation for why we do-not a philosophical 
justification for why we should-use induction. If we are interested in 
understanding essential features of human nature, that is all we need. 
Accepting the practical usefulness of induction, a prerequisite for any 
serious study of statistical analysis or decision theory, how people do and 
should handle base rates in actual decision problems is often as much a ques-
tion of art as science. Kahneman and Tversky interpret the results of the 
medical diagnosis problem as showing that people may err in attributing 
uniqueness to events that are reasonably considered part of common cate-
gories for which past frequency data (base rates) are relevant. Their inter-
pretation turns on how reasonable we find it to equate testing people for a 
disease with trying to determine the color of balls one draws from an urn. 
Doctors, and, to an even greater extent, clinical psychologists, cherish 
the belief that their experience and trained intuition give them an ability to 
make individual level (clinical) predictions that will be, on average, supe-
rior to those obtainable using actuarial methods. Recent research on the 
value added by the subjective judgment of experts to diagnoses relative to 
what can be predicted from a random linear combination of objective data 
shows that this belief is largely a matter of hubris (Dawes 1988, chap. 10). 
We would no doubt benefit if doctors had better training in probability 
and statistics. At the same time, there will always be legitimate questions 
about the relevance of the reference class for which base rate data are pre-
sented. What does seem clear is that people can understand problems in 
statistical inference much better when they are posed in frequency terms, a 
finding that has implications for instructional strategies in medical schools 
and elsewhere. 
Intuitive Estimates of Hazard Functions 
Some, perhaps many, of the Kahneman and Tversky results will prove 
more robust. We may understand these better, however, if we examine 
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them from an evolutionary point of view. It does seem evident, as noted, 
that in confronting random processes people expect that the proportion of 
outcomes in a series of trials will tend to be equal to the probability of a 
particular event in a single trial. Thus in trying to infer whether a process 
is truly random, subjects are prone to misclassify outcomes with long 
strings of "hits" (e.g., strings of heads or tails in a sequence of coin tosses) 
as possessing structure, or duration dependence, when they are in fact the 
result of a random process. 
This phenomenon is evident in the belief among basketball players 
and fans that when you're hot you're hot and when you're not you're not. 
If streak shooting is a myth, then the probability of making a basket on the 
next shot is independent of the previous record of successes and failures. 
Whether there has been a streak of zero baskets, one basket, two baskets, 
three baskets, or more, the likelihood of making the next shot should be 
unaffected. Belief in streak shooting implies belief in duration dependence: 
that the likelihood of making the next shot depends in part, at least for a 
while, on the string of immediate past successes. 
The problem is similar although not identical to the gambler's fallacy. 
The belief that because the roulette wheel has come up red four times in a 
row there is now a greater probability it will come up black also implies a 
hazard function that changes depending on the duration of the previous 
streak. In both instances predictions are biased because humans underes-
timate the likelihood that random processes can produce long strings of 
identical outcomes. In the case of the roulette wheel, however, there is sim-
ply no way to rationalize belief in duration dependence, since, if the wheel 
is true, the gambler has available mechanical information about its con-
struction that should lead to the conclusion that its realizations are inde-
pendent of each other. In the case of streak shooting, it is at least concep-
tually possible that shooting success is duration dependent: a string of 
successes could increase a player's confidence and improve the odds of 
making the next few shots. 
In both cases, though, we have belief in a changing hazard function, 
whereas for a random process the hazard function is flat over time (Kiefer 
1988). Many natural processes, such as storm fronts or animal stampedes, 
do have an underlying structure and a changing probability of continua-
tion based on duration (a changing hazard function). Evolutionary forces 
may have hardwired in us a tendency to place a high subjective prior prob-
ability that a time series process has such a structure. Given the paucity of 
devices for producing series of truly random outcomes in hunter-gatherer 
environments, this bias may have been adaptive in our prehistory, though 
it outfits us poorly for forays into casinos or stock markets. 
Gambling casinos and stock markets were not features of hunter-
gatherer existence. From a logical standpoint it may seem perfectly obvi-
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ous to students of statistics and probability theory that applying econo-
metric time series (ARIMA [autoregressive integrated moving averageD 
techniques to the prediction of roulette wheel outcomes is silly. But naive 
subjects do not have this intuition, which is gained only with study and 
sometimes with difficulty. Influential finance theorists are persuaded that 
the stock market is, like roulette wheel outcomes, a random walk. Yet 
technical analysts continue to try to squeeze information about the future 
from the past, applying time series techniques to data in the hope ofmak-
ing money. We cannot state as unambiguously that this effort is a waste of 
time, because the securities markets are more complicated machines for 
producing outcomes than is a roulette wheel, whose basic design, assum-
ing it is fair, is transparent. 
Nevertheless, continuing investment in technical analysis should 
probably be interpreted as further evidence that humans are predisposed 
to believe that statistical processes have structure: that useful data for pre-
dictive purposes can be garnered from past realizations of the process. The 
bias may not serve our interests in casinos and stock markets, but it prob-
ably does in most of our interactions with the natural world. Moreover, 
once one is beyond a single play environment, it can be valuable in situa-
tions of strategic interaction, where it may trump the counsel of canonical 
game theory that leads to the conclusion, as Telser put it, that reputation 
or reliability is not an inherent personality trait and therefore that data on 
past overt behavior are not germane for predictions of counterparty 
action. 
The Kahneman and Tversky program has its origins in well-estab-
lished traditions in cognitive science and has consequently not been con-
cerned with how our reasoning processes may have been affected by adap-
tation to encountered environments. In spite of the program's iconoclasm 
with respect to the standard economic model, Kahneman and Tversky 
approach the mind in the spirit of treating it as a black box and trying to 
find out how it works by asking what it does. An alternate approach has 
been championed by evolutionary psychologists. It insists first on taking 
advantage of our knowledge that this black box was "designed" by natural 
selection over millions of years of hunter-gatherer existence. That infor-
mation permits us to channel research effort in directions that are likely to 
be particularly fruitful and to probe more deeply when confronted with 
experimental results that seem inconsistent with this indisputable fact. 
Cosmides and Tooby illustrate the differences in results that these 
two approaches may produce through the following analogy. Suppose one 
is handed a black box and asked to investigate how it works. Applying the 
standard approach of cognitive science, one might discover that if placed 
upon loose papers it will prevent them from being blown away in the wind. 
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One might also discover that one can warm one's hands on it during a cold 
winter morning. And, through trial and error, one might stumble upon the 
fact that one can kill someone by throwing the device into his or her bath. 
Thus, three years of National Science Foundation funding would lead to 
the conclusion (in Cosmides and Tooby's language) that what one has 
here is an electric powered heat-generating paperweight (Cosmides and 
Tooby 1994a, 95). 
If, on the other hand, one stopped before plunging ahead and first 
explored what the item had been designed for, one might pause to examine 
the box in which it was packaged and discover that the device had been 
designed to toast bread. This information could permit the construction 
and execution of a more focused and ultimately more productive inquiry 
into how it worked. With respect to the human mind, the equivalent of the 
information on the appliance box is knowledge that the system modules 
were "designed" by natural selection to solve recurrent problems in 
hunter-gatherer life. 11 
An explicitly evolutionary perspective has been less necessary in the 
relatively successful research programs in language acquisition and visual 
perception, where the functions of the subsystems investigated are more 
or less obvious. With respect to human social relations, the evolutionary 
perspective and assumptions about how evolution operated are more crit-
ical. From this perspective, many of the Kahneman and Tversky results 
seem puzzling. In their 1974 article, Tversky and Kahneman argued, "in 
general, these heuristics are quite useful, but sometimes they lead to 
severe and systematic errors" (Tversky and Kahneman 1974, 1124). On 
balance, however, the heuristics and biases research program has focused 
on the errors, not on the putative usefulness of the heuristics (Gigerenzer 
1991, 101). 
Kahneman and Tversky have shown that we are not very good at 
employing a number of advanced statistical, logical, and mathematical 
skills. But this is not in itself terribly surprising to students who have strug-
gled through such subjects; most of us need structured education to under-
stand them. Modern statistics is only a few centuries old, mathematics per-
haps a couple of millennia. We have formal educational institutions for 
transmitting and developing accumulated human knowledge in these 
11. My own view, defended at length in chapter 5, is that the repeated emphasis by Cos-
mides and Tooby on the Pleistocene is too limited and can lead to an underemphasis on mod-
ules that may have an older evolutionary lineage. In particular, I argue that the propensities 
necessary to enable complex social organization were likely evident six million years ago in 
the common ancestor of the three surviving chimpanzee species and thus predate the devel-
opments and refinements stressed by Cosmides and Tooby in their emphasis on the Pleis-
tocene. 
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areas: unlike the case of language, people do not pick up these principles 
automatically. Although children learn how to speak without instruction 
and without encouragement, they do not necessarily learn how to read, 
how to write, or how to do more than rudimentary arithmetic. Do away 
with formal education and you will not do away with language: the over-
whelming majority of children will still learn to speak and understand spo-
ken language. However, most of them will be illiterate and innumerate. 
Literacy and advanced numeracy are accidental by-products of our evolu-
tionary history. The ability to speak, as well as the ability to learn induc-
tively by keeping track of frequencies, on the other hand, is probably 
essentially human, whereas the ability to grasp number concepts larger 
than four is not (Ifrah 2000, 6-10). 
Cosmides and Tooby argue that we are endowed with relatively good 
domain general capabilities for keeping track of statistical frequencies and 
updating them based on new information. 12 In particular, they maintain 
that tabulating frequencies, as opposed to percentages, enables one also to 
keep track of the sample size and thus the reliability of frequency based 
prediction. Thus 7 out of 50 and 70 out of 500 both yield an "event prob-
ability" of 14 percent, but one can place more reliability in the latter esti-
mate because of the larger number of trials. Thus they imply that if data 
are tabulated in the evolutionarily favored input format, we actually have 
a good intuitive understanding that the variance of the estimate of a pop-
ulation parameter decreases with the size of the sample upon which the 
estimate is based. 
Maintaining data in a frequency format also makes it easier to update 
statistics upon the arrival of new information, and it is easy after the fact 
to construct from these databases new reference categories. For all these 
reasons they argue that the ability to collect, manage, and update frequen-
tist probabilities (but not single event probabilities) has been selected for. 
This capability is "designed" to deal with life span specific challenges that 
individuals face: in other words, challenges whose content does not neces-
sarily recur over thousands of generations and for which it would be evo-
lutionarily useless to produce hardwired behavioral predispositions. 
In contrast, selection for a hardwired module predisposing against 
sexual relations among those with whom one has been raised, whose dele-
terious genetic consequences are a recurring feature of the evolutionary 
environment; or selection for a module dedicated to detecting cheaters; or, 
12. Some readers may initially find this confusing (I did) since Cosmides and Tooby's 
emphasis on domain generality here stands in striking contrast to their emphasis on a spe-
cialized module that can be evoked in the cheater detection studies of the Wason selection 
experiments. 
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I would argue, selection for a module predisposing to first move(r) altru-
ism is readily explicable. Humans need not learu these lessons over and 
over through trial and error. The hardwired module is specialized to a 
recurring problem; the domain general capability as good intuitive statis-
ticians is specialized to deal with life span specific problems. 
The underlying methodological principle, again, is to organize 
research by first asking questions about "design," with the assumption 
that natural selection operated to solve recurring problems of ancestral 
existence. Thus adaptation to ancestral environments provides us with 
color correction modules that enable us to see grass as green both at high 
noon and at dusk, even though the objective properties of light reflected 
off vegetation are quite different at these two periods. In contrast, our 
color correction modules are worthless as one tries to find one's green car 
under the sodium lights of an airport parking lot, hardly a challenge that 
was a recurring feature of Pleistocene existence. 
Too Many Heuristics? 
It is now time to ask whether behavioral economics without an evolution-
ary perspective-essentially the Kahneman and Tversky research pro-
gram---can provide the foundations for an empirically based behavioral 
science. Gigerenzer expresses his concerns with the results of this research 
approach. 
It is understandable that when heuristics were first proposed as the 
underlying cognitive processes in the early 1970s, they were only 
loosely characterized. Yet, 25 years and many experiments later, 
explanatory notions such as representativeness remain vague, 
undefined, and unspecified with respect both to the antecedent condi-
tions that elicit them and also to the cognitive processes that underlie 
them. My fear is that in another 25 years researchers will be stuck 
with plausible yet nebulous proposals of the same type: that judg-
ments of probability or frequency are sometimes influenced by what 
is similar (representativeness), comes easily to mind (availability) and 
comes first (anchoring). The problem with these heuristics is that they 
at once explain too little and too much. Too little because we do not 
know when these heuristics work and how; too much because, post 
hoc, one of them can be fitted to almost any experimental result. 
(Gigerenzer 1996, 592) 
He grants that Kahneman and Tversky have had an enormous stim-
ulating effect on research. 
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But the sheer proliferation of studies is not always identical to 
progress. An ever-larger collection of empirical results, especially 
results that seem to vary from study to study in apparently mysterious 
ways, can be more confusing than clarifying. If the psychology of 
judgment ultimately aims at an understanding of how people reason 
under a bewildering variety of circumstances, then descriptions, how-
ever meticulous and thorough, will not suffice. 
He concludes his exchange with Kahneman and Tversky in this fash-
ion: "As I see it, there are two ways in which a theory can fail: by being 
wrong or by being indeterminate. The latter may be worse for scientific 
progress, because indeterminate theories resist attempts to prove, dis-
prove, or even improve them" (Gigerenzer 1996, 596). Somewhat ironi-
cally, the Kahneman and Tversky program is now having levied against it 
some of the same criticisms long applied to the standard economic model 
where rational choice is understood to mean that people act in satisfaction 
of their desires. 
Gigerenzer's judgment may be overly harsh, but what frustrates him 
can be illustrated by considering a recent work applying the Kahneman 
and Tversky framework to behavior in financial markets: Gary Belsky and 
Thomas Gilovich's Why Smart People Make Big Money Mistakes (1999). 
Gilovich has been a pioneer in behavioral psychology, and although this 
book is directed at a popular audience, it references and attempts to distill 
many of the important conclusions of the Kahneman and Tversky pro-
gram. The work does contain a great deal of sound financial advice, what-
ever its underlying rationale, advice almost completely consistent with my 
own financial strategies, one of the reasons I probably find it sound. 13 Still, 
the book might better be titled "Smart People Make Big Money Mis-
takes." That statement is undoubtedly true, is illustrated profusely in the 
work, and would still resonate with an upscale readership that knows its 
truth. 
It is in claiming to explain (not simply point out) these errors ("Why 
... ") that behavioral economists sometimes seem to border on proffering 
snake oil, because they suggest that these errors were ex ante predictable. 
For example, drawing on the work of Thaler, Belsky and Gilovich suggest 
that bonuses are normally spent quickly, rarely making it to the bank, 
because there is different mental accounting for them. Thaler has made a 
real contribution in developing and documenting the framework of men-
tal accounting (1990). The questions at issue are its implementation and 
13. These include advice to buy and hold index funds, a key conclusion of the efficient 
market perspective. 
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the explanation of why particular accounting schemes rather than others 
are used. The Thaler story about the treatment of bonuses is inconsistent 
with Milton Friedman's permanent income hypothesis, which provided an 
explanation for the divergence between time series and cross section stud-
ies of the consumption function and for which there is a considerable body 
of supporting empirical confirmation at the aggregate level (1957). Fried-
man's theory was, of course, at variance with the standard Keynesian 
treatment of the consumption function, which viewed consumption 
behavior as determined by current receipts of money. The Keynesian view 
would suggest no differential treatment of a bonus as compared with reg-
ular income: both would be run through the standard consumption func-
tion and induce additional spending in accordance with the marginal 
propensity to consume. Thaler's and Belsky and Gilovich's views seem to 
go to the opposite extreme from Friedman's; these researchers argue that 
the propensity to spend out of a bonus is higher than out of current 
income. Perhaps the behavior that Thaler tries to capture applies only to 
households that are liquidity constrained, unable to borrow to smooth 
their lifetime consumption streams and thus faced with a propensity to 
consume out of transitory income = 1. 
The idea that people segregate their money into mental accounts that 
they treat differently, ignoring the essential fungibility of cash, has psy-
chological resonance. In order to advance the theory so it has real predic-
tive power, however, we need to know under what conditions people use 
certain accounting schemes rather than others. There are several possibili-
ties. The first, which can possibly be dismissed, is that these categories are 
completely idiosyncratic, in which case knowledge that they exist would 
give little predictive power in the aggregate. The second possibility is that 
there are systematic patterns in these accounting schemes that are learned 
and therefore culturally determined, just as there are different languages 
and different national accounting conventions. A third possibility is that 
there are some universal or essential ways in which individuals set up these 
categories, frameworks, and taxonomies that have been evolutionarily 
selected and are hardwired at birth. None of these types of questions has 
been asked within the heuristics and biases program. Consequently, 
merely demonstrating the operation of segregated mental accounts does 
not take us very far down the road to an empirically validated theory with 
real predictive power (for an empirical investigation of these issues, see 
Levin 1998). In the particular application at issue, what we need more of is 
evidence that leads to a systematic and predictable account of how people 
set up and spend from different types of accounts. The prediction that 
people will put nearly all bonus money into savings, the conclusion of the 
Friedman analysis, could, although it was certainly not interpreted in this 
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way by Friedman, be explained as reflecting the operation of mental 
accounting. But it is exactly the opposite behavior from that "explained" 
by Thaler. 
At the start of their book, Belsky and Gilovich are candid about the 
apparent indeterminacy of the heuristics and biases program, resulting 
from the ease with which one can access a heuristic from the current menu, 
regardless of in which direction the "bias" goes. 
We don't want readers of one chapter to throw up their hands in dis-
may when the next chapter seems to be saying something quite oppo-
site. In chapter 7, we'll talk about herding, which is the tendency 
many people have to rely too much on the opinions or actions of oth-
ers .... On the flip side, however, chapter 6 focuses on people's ten-
dency toward overconfidence, which causes them to have more 
confidence than they should in the reliability of their own judgment or 
experience. How can we reconcile these two concepts? We can't, 
really. The fact of the matter is that sometimes people make mistakes 
because they behave like sheep, and sometimes they err because they 
behave like mules. The critical task is to try and identify which ten-
dency is harming us in which circumstance and then try to break the 
habit. (Belsky and Gilovich 1999, 26) 
Here is an admirable and disarming frankness about the limitations 
of the approach. But the limitations remain. Let us consider another 
example. An inherent human aversion to realizing losses has been used to 
explain both why people sell out too quickly when the stock market falls 
and why they hold onto their losers too long in hopes of recovering losses. 
We have a problem, however, if a heuristic or psychological principle is 
used to account both for a phenomenon and its opposite. Some scholars, 
for example Shefrin and Statman (1985), have argued that there is a pre-
disposition, based on an essential human tendency, loss aversion, for 
people to sell their winners too early and hold on to their losers too long. 
deBondt and Thaler (1985, 1987), on the other hand, argue that stocks 
that have done extremely poorly over the past three years do much better 
subsequently than those that have done extremely well. If deBondt and 
Thaler are correct, and mean reversion is common because of systematic 
investor overreaction, and Thaler is coprincipal in a mutual fund that has 
done well managing money according to these principles, then investors 
who sell their winners and hold their losers are doing exactly the right 
thing. But if some stocks are losers (i.e., have fallen greatly in value) it can-
not be the case that, in the aggregate, some people are fools for holding on 
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to them at the now lower value and, at the same time, other people are 
fools for not acquiring them. 
Ex post, depending on whether the stock subsequently recovers, 
many people will view themselves as foolish for having done one or the 
other. But ex post regret is not the same thing as ex ante foolishness. There 
will be others in each instance who feel exactly the opposite of foolish. 
Advocates of behavioral economics invite readers or listeners to recognize 
a psychological mechanism they identify as "explaining" ex post a behav-
ior now regretted. This is an extremely effective rhetorical device, but it is 
not a scientific validation of the predictive capabilities of the framework. 
Given the broad menu of heuristics and biases, we are getting to the 
point where there is one sure thing in this uncertain world: whatever one 
does as the market or an individual security crashes or soars, (1) there will 
be occasions when you will experience regret, (2) there will be an article in 
behavioral economics that will helpfully inform you that what you did was 
wrong, and (3) this article will offer (ex post) an "explanation" of why you 
did it! (Belsky and Gilovich 1999, 61). This is hyperbole, but the scientific 
issue is an important and troubling one. 
The authors cite research by Terence Odean (1998), who finds that 
people are more likely to sell stocks that have risen in price than those that 
have fallen. But this is not irrational if, as deBondt and Thaler have 
argued, stock prices exhibit mean reversion as the result of systematic 
investor overreaction to good or bad news. 14 Of what use is reference to a 
"sunk cost fallacy" if it explains both why people dump their winners too 
quickly and dump their losers too quickly? People are urged to forget the 
past (Belsky and Gilovich 1999, 75) but to avoid the fallacy of having too 
short a memory (148). Failure to act, the result of decision paralysis, will 
cost you money, but of course so too will precipitous action. The same 
ambiguity about the value of historical evidence is reflected in Robyn 
Dawes's 1988 book, where he concludes that "I have no simple solution to 
the problems raised here" (Dawes 1988, 120). He cautions against mind-
less extrapolation from the past but, quoting George Santayana, also 
warns that it may well be true that "those who do not remember the past 
are condemned to relive it." 
With respect to regret-inducing decisions based on historical data, 
which are, after all, what most of us must base our decisions on, behav-
ioral economics has available too many ex post explanations for why one's 
decision making was flawed. On page 176, Belsky and Gilovich (1999) sug-
14. Ignorance of regression toward the mean is another bias behavioral economists 
rightly warn against. 
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gest that several hundred years of stock market history have shown that all 
too often stock market investors buy stock in companies or shares in 
mutual funds, presumably for sound reasons, but then sell their shares the 
minute "the market" turns against them. But of course not dumping 
shares the moment the market heads south is precisely what opens an 
investor to the criticism that he or she is holding on to losers too long! 
According to historical accounts, the heuristics and biases research 
program got its start in an observation by its progenitors that Israeli flight 
instructors undervalued the effectiveness of reward and overvalued pun-
ishment, simply because, due to regression toward the mean, poor perfor-
mances statistically tended to be followed by better ones and exceptionally 
good flights by more average performances. Thus rewards seemed to pro-
duce deterioration in performance and rebukes the reverse, even though 
no such inference should have been drawn. Human subjects fail to under-
stand the spurious correlation due to regression to the mean. 
The current weakness in behavioral economics involves the claim to 
having explained, rather than simply described, outcomes that are anom-
alous from the standpoint of the standard economic model, which in 
finance gives rise to the efficient markets paradigm. Because of heuristics 
that can "explain" biases in either of two opposing directions, the appar-
ently successful retrodiction is spurious, although, as in the case of the 
Israeli flight instructors (whose spurious correlation had a different ori-
gin), this apparent success has strengthened belief in the efficacy of the 
approach. There is something for everyone: people who hold a stock too 
long and people who sell it too quickly both experience regret about the 
choices they have made. Behavioral economics appears to provide an 
explanation for both mistakes. But not both of these mistakes can be the 
consequence of human behavioral propensities that are essential. 
It is possible to find evidence that under some circumstances at some 
ages, some people suffer from overconfidence. Adam Smith believed that 
young males suffered systematically from an exaggerated estimate of their 
own invulnerability, explaining their willingness to enter military careers. 
The majority of automobile drivers believe that they are better than the 
average driver. But the entire full service brokerage industry can be inter-
preted as evidence that some people at some ages under some circum-
stances also suffer from underconfidence. 15 Where behavioral economics 
in the aggregate has sometimes overreached is in claiming to have 
identified essential human predispositions that can account for an anom-
15. Even though virtually all of the information full service brokers can offer is avail-
able free of charge elsewhere, customers apparently lack confidence in their ability to make 
their own judgments or enjoy having another to blame if things go badly. 
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aly even though the body of experimental and observational evidence 
underlying that predisposition is ambiguous and sometimes points in the 
opposite direction. 
The problem of indeterminacy of prediction is illuminated in a 1988 
work on gambling by Wagenaar, addressing what people do after they 
have experienced a streak of wins or losses: "The representativeness 
heuristic predicts that people will increase their bet after a run of losses, 
and decrease it after a run of gains." (lfthe probability of winning is, let us 
say, .5, then people mistakenly assume that what will be true of the pro-
portion of wins for a very large number of trials-it will approach .5-will 
also be true, or be representative, for a small number of trials.) 
This is indeed what about half the players of blackjack do .... But the 
other half show the reverse behaviour: they increase their bets after 
winning, and decrease them after losing, which is predicted by the 
availability heuristic. After a run of losses, losing becomes the better 
available outcome, which may cause an overestimation of the proba-
bility oflosing. [The] repertoire of heuristics predicts both an increase 
and decrease of bet size after losing, and without further indications 
about conditions that determine preference for heuristics, the whole 
theoretical context will be destined to provide explanations on the 
basis of hindsight only. (Wagenaar 1988, 13) 
The ambiguity of the heuristics and bias approach is actually reflected 
in Kahneman and Tversky's seminal 1979 article on prospect theory, 
where they predict "that a person who has not made peace with his losses is 
likely to accept gambles that would be unacceptable to him otherwise" 
(Kahneman and Tversky 1979, 287; my italics). How can we predict in 
advance under what conditions an individual will have made peace with 
his losses? 
Wagenaar's work is cited in Jon Elster's 1999 work Alchemies of the 
Mind (Elster 1999, 7). Elster is acutely aware that a framework that pre-
dicts, given certain conditions, a particular behavior about half the time 
and its exact opposite the other half lacks any real predictive power. And 
yet there is clearly a very strong intuitive appeal, and consequently a mar-
ket, for such models. Elster's provocative discussion of proverbs (11-13) 
provides insight into the appeal of the heuristics and biases approach. He 
identifies a number of compelling instances in which popular proverbs 
providing absolutely contradictory advice simultaneously coexist. Haste 
makes waste, but he who hesitates is lost. Absence makes the heart grow 
fonder but out of sight, out of mind. A study of proverbs reveals that again, 
regardless of what you do, the master of proverbial wisdom will be able to 
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adduce a wise saying explaining why what you did was wrong (or right). 16 
No matter what behavior is observed, there will be a proverb apparently 
providing an (ex post) explanation of why it happened. Such discourse 
may be entertaining, and in each case the mechanism identified may 
appear to have psychological resonance. But this exercise in providing 
appealing after the fact "explanation" is not scientific, in the sense that 
absent an ability to specify under what conditions one or another mecha-
nism will kick in, the analysis does not give rise to testable hypotheses. 
One cannot help but observe that to some degree, the success of the 
heuristics and biases program, with its large menu of heuristics from which 
to choose, is remarkably similar to the success over many centuries of per-
sisting proverbs. Elster makes a plea for the relevance of ex post explana-
tion via reference to mechanisms. It is in some sense an appeal to Coase's 
position in opposition to Friedman's (see the prologue). Thus Elster 
should be understood as defending the type of "explanations" offered by 
the heuristics and biases literature. But his argument is unconvincing. 
What he advocates cannot be termed behavioral science. For centuries 
people have ex post attributed bad luck to walking under a ladder or hav-
ing one's path crossed by a black cat, even though, as in the gambling 
example earlier, there is no systematic relationship between these events 
and the type ofluck subsequently experienced. As Dawes notes, good sto-
ries may be psychologically compelling, but they often lack validity (1994, 
76). The progress of science has been based on rejection, not acceptance, 
of mechanisms that lack validity. 
In important cases we may be better able to validate the operation of 
mechanisms, and this type of explanation is certainly what Elster is argu-
ing for. But in these instances, and where the accounts we offer do not 
claim or do not have out-of-sample predictive power, I think it is more 
straightforward to indicate that what we are offering is historical, not sci-
entific, explanation. I expand on this point in chapter 7. 
Elster is pessimistic about the possibility of a true behavioral science, 
a pessimism reflected in his remark that "any economist worth his or her 
salt is able to tell a story demonstrating that a given piece of behavior is 
rational, and any sociobiologist showing that it is fitness enhancing" 
(Elster 1999, 15). Elster's characterizations, of course, have an element of 
truth to them. Critics of evolutionary explanations of adaptations often 
call them "just so stories," and the same appellation can legitimately be 
applied to many forays into the explanation of behavior, some more seri-
16. It is interesting that stock market forecasters also appeal to proverbs to explain or 
rationalize their actions. For example, the trend is your friend or don'tfight the tape. See Shef-
rin 1999 (67). 
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ous than others, by economic theorists. But identifying instances of such 
sophistry is a prelude to criticism insisting that disciplines that claim to be 
scientific develop models with true out-of-sample predictive power. Elster 
asks us to accept this feature of the economic and/or sociobiological enter-
prise as inherent in the enterprise. Such acceptance surrenders any aspira-
tions to true behavioral science and requires, in my view, that both eco-
nomics and sociobiology/evolutionary psychology be reclassified as 
humanistic studies: areas of inquiry that do not aspire to the development 
of testable, refutable hypotheses. 
If, as Elster shows, popular essayists such as Montaigne (Elster 1999, 
16) provide numerous instances of advice and the exact opposite of that 
advice, we can conclude that what we have in Montaigne's essays is enter-
taining literature, not a practical guide to action. If, as the heuristics and 
biases literature reveals, we have an explanatory framework that is ready and 
able to explain the existence under specified circumstances of both a phe-
nomenon and its opposite, we must conclude that what we have is not behav-
ioral science, at least insofar as such an enterprise aspires to prediction. 
The problem with Elster's intelligent and insightful analysis is that it 
seems to end up as a defense of pop sociology or pop economics. There is 
ample evidence that humans enjoy the search for ex post explanations that 
make their behavior apparently comprehensible. At some intuitive level, 
these "explanations" provide value. But when different mechanisms are 
equally capable of explaining both a phenomenon and its opposite, we have 
lost out-of-sample prediction. In my 1981 work on North and Thomas I 
characterized (and implicitly criticized) their "model" as predicting that 
high land-labor ratios would be associated with the absence of coercive 
labor regimes except where they weren't, as in the instances of U.S. slavery 
and eastern Europe after the plague. Whenever we have a model within 
which specified conditions "explain" both a condition or course of action 
and its exact opposite, we have the illusion of explanation without its real-
ity. We are offering narrative history, which is to be commended, provided 
it is so identified, but suggesting that we are providing scientific explana-
tion, which is not, because the claim in this case is unwarranted. 
Elster points out correctly that most attempts to specify social sci-
entific "laws" are not deterministic but are statistical or probabilistic: thus 
they are incapable of explaining individual cases, although they may be 
able to provide a useful prediction of the behavior of a larger group. He 
defends the study of mechanisms on the grounds that although they also 
cannot predict individual cases, they "can at least explain individual events 
after the fact" (1999, 44). But these ex post "explanations" are not the 
same as explanations based on models or algorithms with out-of-sample 
predictive power. They are historical, not scientific, and it is important not 
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to confuse one with the other. Elster's plea for disaggregation (44) is not 
really an argument against the search for relations with predictive power, 
even if that predictive power is only probabilistic or statistical, but rather 
a suggestion that disaggregation may improve our search for them. 
Both the heuristics and biases approach and a great deal of standard 
economic analysis come dangerously close to providing, after the fact, 
"just so" stories. Behavioral science cannot call itself that if it remains lim-
ited to such accounts. Thus, if we are overwhelmed with evidence that 
people are both overconfident and underconfident, we need to start care-
fully dis aggregating the data by age, sex, and domain to see if there are 
truly robust tendencies that we can identify as essential. If so, such predis-
positions should have out-of-sample predictive power. Considerations of 
selection pressures in the environment of evolutionary adaptation may 
help canalize the search for such mechanisms or help us understand those 
we stumble upon. 
The argument that research in behavioral economics and finance 
needs to be more disciplined by an evolutionary perspective must be 
understood carefully. Appeal to Darwin has often been a knee-jerk reac-
tion by proponents of the standard economic model whenever its behav-
ioral presuppositions are questioned. The understanding of the levels at 
which natural selection may operate is more catholic here, and the aim of 
an emphasis on the importance of adaptation in ancestral environments is 
to canalize experimental research and its interpretation in directions that 
may be more productive in the long run. 
In his Nobel lecture, Maurice Allais wrote that "a theory which can-
not be confronted with the facts or which has not been verified quantita-
tively is, in fact, devoid of any scientific value" (1997, 6). It is remarkable 
how many of the criticisms of behavioral economics, particularly that of 
indeterminacy, have begun to echo complaints levied against the standard 
model and the applications of the rational choice approach in other 
domains. 
CHAPTER 7 
The Invisible Hand and the 
Blind Watchmaker 
The heuristics and bias program has generated a body of striking experi-
mental results that all serious students of human behavior need to address. 
It has increased our receptivity to what can be learned from experimental 
methods. And it has introduced into our vocabulary the important concept 
of framing: the idea that people may reason about and respond differently 
to the same formal problem presented in different contexts. The research 
generated and language employed by this program are very much conso-
nant with the postulate of cognitive modularity developed in chapter 5. 
But the conversation between heuristics and biases researchers, on the 
one hand, and rational choice theorists, on the other, has not led and does 
not appear to be leading in the direction of a comprehensive empirically 
based behavioral science. Setting aside the challenge posed by an expand-
ing menu of heuristics, such a science must ultimately address not only 
issues historically of interest to decision theorists but also those in the 
purview of game theory. Simply put, the Kahneman and Tversky program 
has little to say about the most troublesome behavioral deviations from 
those predicted by the standard normative model, deviations troublesome 
because they are foundational to an understanding and explanation of the 
origin of complex social organization. 1 
1. For exceptions, see Dawes and Thaler 1988 and Shafir and Tversky 1992. In the lat-
ter paper, the authors question the relevance of altruism (they refer to it as ethical thinking) 
in explaining mutual cooperation in the single play PD game by showing that cooperation 
levels go down if the second player is informed in advance of what the first has done (irre-
spective of whether the first player chooses cooperate or defect). For example, knowledge 
that the first player has cooperated moves some second players from the cooperate to the 
defect column, presumably because knowledge that the first player has cooperated increases 
the temptation for defection (the highest possible payoff is now available with certainty). But 
it also moves some players-a smaller number but a larger percentage increase-away from 
defect to cooperate. According to canonical game theory, of course, none of the players 
should have been in the cooperate column in the first place: any level of cooperation above 
zero is a deconfirmation of the predictions of Nash's analysis. Shafir and Tversky attribute 
the willingness to cooperate when the outcome is not known to "quasi magical thinking"-
pointing out that millions are prepared to vote when the outcome is uncertain, apparently 
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These deviations appear most strikingly in situations involving strate-
gic interaction. They include predispositions to play cooperate even in single 
play PD games and, where repeated interactions have been established, to 
monitor others obsessively for signs of violations of social rules and to pun-
ish those who do not reciprocate. It is discomfiting to label these deviations 
as biases, for the term brings with it the implicit suggestion that human 
progress lies in eliminating them. The problem here is not that subjects fail 
to make correct logical or statistical inferences; the issue is not deficiency in 
the rationality of beliefs or expectations. When an individual rejects a pro-
posed division in a one-shot ultimatum or dictator game, for example, it 
cannot involve a problem in the way beliefs have been formed, nor is there 
even any element of uncertainty about what the outcome will be. 
Reading the contributions in the Hogarth and Reder collection 
(1987), particularly those by Simon and Thaler, one has a sense not of the 
integration of new experimental results into the ongoing development of a 
progressive discipline, as would typically be the case in a natural science, 
but rather of an intellectual logjam. Matters are scarcely different a dozen 
years later. 
The logjam can be broken, I believe, if two things happen. First, those 
committed to a rational choice approach need fully to understand that 
evolutionary theory does not preclude selection for behavioral predisposi-
tions at levels above that of the individual organism. Abandoning the 
facile view that evolutionary theory provides ironclad justification for the 
assumption of strict behavioral egoism is an essential step. Too often has 
an improper understanding of the constraints that natural selection places 
on the evolution of human predispositions constricted thinking, leading to 
head in the sand denials of evidence of other-regarding behavior; to almost 
schizophrenic approaches (witness Frank; see chap. 4 in this volume) 
among those committed to acknowledging such data; and to prolonged, 
contorted, and unsuccessful attempts to explain phenomena that, within 
the framework developed in this book, are not anomalous. 
Those skeptical will wish to examine, consider, and/or dispute the evi-
dence that group or multilevel selection has operated in human and other 
populations, but were that to happen, and as that happens, the terrain of 
discourse will alter from one involving mostly logic to one involving a 
more productive balance oflogic and evidence. For others, recognizing the 
possibility of multilevel selection should undo an intellectual straitjacket 
and open the way for more systematic explorations of essential human 
believing that their participation can somehow influence the outcome, but few will partici-
pate after the outcome has been determined. Thus conflicts about announcing predicted win-
ners of national elections before polls on the West Coast or Hawaii have closed. 
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predispositions and the conditions under which they will and will not man-
ifest themselves. 
Bruce Bueno de Mesquita has observed, "We must not be lulled by 
apparent empirical successes into believing that scientific knowledge can 
be attained without the abstract, rigorous exercise oflogical proof' (1985, 
128). The behavioral assumptions underlying the application of the axiom 
based choice theory he favors presuppose a process of natural selection 
that operates only at the level of the individual organism. Game theory 
premised on self-regarding preferences can be helpful in illuminating 
mechanisms that sustain cooperative solutions once established. What it 
has not provided is an intellectually coherent account of origin, any more 
than, within an evolutionary framework, have models based on individual 
level selection alone. 
If we are serious about predicting human behavior, we can do better. 
How? By using systematically developed empirical regularities to character-
ize behavioral predispositions that, in environments in which they exist only 
at low frequency, do not advance the material welfare of the actor-and the 
domains in which these are likely to manifest themselves. Such action ten-
dencies, in low frequency environments, are not rational in the sense defined 
at the start of the book. This category includes the type of behavior coun-
seled by nonconsequentialist ethical systems that, in contrast to utilitarian-
ism,2 for example, do not condition the search for what is right on consid-
eration of the consequences of actions. Some of what we do, voting for 
example, or playing cooperate in a one-shot PD, or rejecting positive offers 
in a single play ultimatum game with anonymity, cannot plausibly be 
explained as the consequence of strategic thinking, even though, because of 
the high value placed on such thinking in our societies, we will often bend 
over backward trying to persuade ourselves that the contrary is true. 
And preserving a role for choice defensible as rational in explaining 
the maintenance of cooperative or reciprocal relations requires rethinking 
the logic and implications of the hard and fast distinction commonly made 
between games against humans and against nature. The former are 
assumed to involve strategic interactions for which the logical and mathe-
matical tools of game theory are sufficient. Nonstrategic interactions, on 
the other hand, are assumed to benefit from the use of algorithms for mak-
ing statistical inferences, with the notable exception of games of chance 
and mechanisms like stock markets that may mimic them. 
2. The assumption of utility maximization, which underlies rational choice theory, does 
not require acceptance of utilitarianism, which embraces interpersonal comparisons of util-
ity. But both entail the belief that behavior is or should be goal oriented and thus evaluated 
in terms of its consequences. 
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Are techniques of statistical inference applied to past data relevant for 
predicting the behavior of an individual human or a group of them? Is it 
rational to form expectations of the behavior of others using these algo-
rithms? Is it rational to predict our own behavior from such data? The 
approach of game theory generally assumes not: it assumes that our behav-
ior and that of others are a function only of the situations we find ourselves 
in, not our dispositions. 3 But a great deal of evidence, including the obvious 
point that we are animals with an evolutionary history and thus not sepa-
rate from nature, suggests that the position is a poor one to adopt from a 
practical standpoint. Humans do and probably should use such expecta-
tions, not only in influencing behavior when not choosing rationally, but 
also in coordinating on certain equilibria when they do. Expectations based 
in part on data on past behavior of similarly situated humans, or the par-
ticular individual(s) in question, may be more rational in the sense that the 
word is applied to expectations than those that are not.4 
Experimental research on human subjects will continue to playa crit-
ical role in identifying these regularities. But like other once revolutionary 
endeavor such enterprise can, over time, become routinized and the rate of 
scientific advance slow. What can be beneficial in maintaining focus and 
breaking logjams is adoption of an explicitly evolutionary framework con-
ditioning the interpretation of results and the direction of research effort. 
Recent work by Gigerenzer and Hoffrage (1995) and Cosmides and Tooby 
(1996) (see chap. 6) indicates that this is a promising approach in helping 
us understand, for example, which items of the menu of heuristics and 
biases are truly robust, rather than artifacts of the way experimental ques-
tions have been posed, and, where different heuristics may imply contra-
dictory behavior, under what conditions we are likely to observe one 
rather than another. 
The value added that these scholars have contributed by focusing an 
evolutionary spotlight on research in the heuristics and biases tradition, 
however, does not require them to address or accept the possibility of 
group selection, nor do they. While enthusiastically endorsing their call to 
3. Aside, one might argue, from the assumed disposition efficiently to pursue our mate-
rial welfare. 
4. We can focus the issue by considering the problem of whether or not to allow a pris-
oner to be paroled. Is a consideration of the opportunities and potential penalties the indi-
vidual will face upon release the only grounds for attempting to predict behavior? Or is the 
record of behavior while in prison relevant in deciding whether or not to parole? Presumably 
Telser would argue the former. Debate about the appropriate criteria is mirrored in psychol-
ogy, with the distinction between an emphasis on situational factors, arising from a behav-
iorist social learning perspective, and an emphasis on dispositional factors: the proposition 
that humans may have personality traits and indeed that these may, to some degree, be 
heritable. 
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examine the results of experimental research under an evolutionary lens, I 
distinguish broadly between the research on decision theory (most of the 
heuristics and biases literature) and that on game theory, the body of work 
summarized in chapter 1. Wherever we study strategic interaction, it mat-
ters a great deal that the evolutionary perspective include awareness of 
controversies surrounding the different levels at which natural selection 
may operate. 
Adopting an evolutionary perspective does not mean assuming the 
brain was designed to solve the challenges oflife unique to the 11,000 years 
after the beginnings of the Neolithic revolution, nor does it imply that 
there has been much time to evolve genetically in response to the industrial 
revolution and the onset of modern economic growth in the past 250 years. 
To the degree that design appears to be adaptive, it is because of environ-
mental challenges common to the hunter-gatherer existence and the 
epochs preceding it and the era after the agricultural revolution. This point 
is an important feature distinguishing current approaches from those 
characterizing 1970s sociobiology, which tended to presume adaptation to 
currently encountered environments. 
A corollary of a position emphasizing the long time frames over 
which adaptation occurs is that although the cognitive tools refined in rel-
atively recent evolutionary history have as an unintended side effect proved 
useful at solving problems in higher mathematics and advanced probabil-
ity theory, they were not designed to do so. We will therefore gain little 
insight into the design of cognitive structures or behavioral adaptations by 
presuming they were "intended" to address problems that are common 
now but were absent during the Pleistocene era or earlier. There are rea-
sons why it is more common and far easier for people to acquire phobias 
about spiders, snakes, enclosed spaces, heights, and thunder than about 
cars, trucks, or knives, even though the latter set of threats is far more dan-
gerous in modern life. The explanation for these tendencies is evolutionary 
and historical, and the biological substrates responsible are, under current 
conditions, not adaptive, functional, or efficient, to use the lexicons of 
biology, sociology/anthropology, and economics, respectively. 
What was Pleistocene life like? I enjoy wilderness travel in Yosemite 
and the high Sierras: there is something elemental I have always felt about 
such adventure. Pleistocene life on the savannas of Africa might be 
described as the equivalent of an extended backcountry trip without the 
benefit of Gore-Tex, freeze dried food, or bottled fuel. Moreover, it was a 
trip whose routines did not alter for thousands of generations, up until the 
beginnings of agriculture and the domestication of animals, roughly ten or 
eleven millennia ago. It was in that extended human adolescence, the Cos-
mides and Tooby program argues, that the modular structure of human 
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cognition was refined through the trial and error process that Darwin first 
identified. 
But-and here my emphasis differs from Cosmides and Tooby-
these adaptations built on earlier capabilities. One set, for which there had 
been and continued to be strong and continuing selection pressure at the 
individual level, included cognitive and behavioral algorithms facilitating 
foraging. These algorithms lead to our facility with the techniques studied 
in courses in decision theory. They are central to the learning mechanism 
implicit in behaviorist psychology, a mechanism that has been explored 
fruitfully with respect to both human and animal behavior. And in mod-
ern settings they serve the set of behavioral propensities upon which 
microeconomics is generally premised. 
But success at obtaining food from the natural environment is only 
one outcome that has been favored in evolutionary history. So too has 
been the avoidance of death at the hands of other members of the same 
species, a precondition for establishing complex social organization. Other 
cognitive and behavioral modules, specialized to the domain of social rela-
tions among non-kin, were also under selection pressures. They also built 
on evolutionarily older modules, these modules inhibiting intraspecific 
violence, which would not have been favored initially by individual level 
selection. 
Modularity-domain specific adaptations that prespecify taxonomic 
categories and relations among them and in so doing can govern action-
applies to the realm of social relations as much as to language. We know 
that aversion to incest among siblings raised together is universal among 
human cultures. We also know that incest avoidance is evolutionarily 
adaptive because it avoids the negative genetic consequences of inbreed-
ing. Humans do not need to conduct controlled experiments each genera-
tion to discover empirically that inbreeding increases the probability that 
various recessive genes will manifest themselves. 
Studies of Israeli kibbutzim and the sim-pua system in Taiwan sup-
port the conclusion that humans are predisposed to avoid sexual relations 
with those they were raised with between the ages of roughly two and 
eight. 5 These studies are consistent with the view that we do not in fact 
5. Degler (1991, chap. 10) provides a comprehensive history of social scientific treat-
ments of the incest taboo. What is remarkable is how recent is the consensus that the West-
ermarck thesis is correct and that Freud, Malinowski, Levi-Strauss, and a host of other 
anthropologists were wrong. The consensus has been driven by a growing understanding of 
the weakness of functionalist arguments explaining the incest taboo as "necessary" to drive 
exogamy (functionally beneficial in linking kin groups together), empirical studies demon-
strating that incest among animals in the wild is rare (the contrary was assumed as late as the 
1960s), and evidence that unrelated humans reared together have an aversion to sexual rela-
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need to teach children an aversion to incest, although children do have to 
be taught not to touch a hot stove or learn this through trial and error. We 
are born with dedicated modules that embody the evolutionary wisdom of 
millions of years. 
In a similar fashion, the genome stores templates providing the build-
ing blocks for language and its structure, although particular environ-
ments into which a child is born store vocabularies, which are learned 
through standard Skinnerian mechanisms. Nor do we learn to interpret 
the world visually via a domain general Skinnerian mechanism alone. Our 
ability to see is the consequence of an interacting complex of modules ded-
icated to specific domains, such as edge detection, or the maintenance of 
perceived color constancy for objects, even as lighting conditions change 
(Marr 1982). Thousands of generations of natural selection have encoded 
recurring features of the natural environment in specialized modules for 
interpreting the sensory impulses generated by the rods and cones in our 
retinas. 
Implications for the Core Social Scientific Traditions 
For the sociological and anthropological traditions, culture and social 
structure have long been considered emergent properties, neither 
influenced by the genome nor reducible to the characteristics of individu-
als whose behavior they organize. I have argued, in contrast, that acquisi-
tion of certain universal norms is favored by biological, genetically 
influenced predispositions, just as is the acquisition of language adhering 
to the rules of universal grammar. We are differentially prepared to learn 
in certain directions. 
Having said this, an important range of cultural variation remains, 
sustained by patterns of belief about the material world and about what 
others believe. That variation has real consequences for social and eco-
nomic outcomes. The argument is not, therefore, that we should abandon 
the concept of culture but rather that we recognize factors limiting its vari-
ation. If these limits have a biological underpinning, blanket rejections of 
reductionist models are not sustainable. The understanding of culture, 
both its universal and variable components, can, in fact, be undertaken 
with reference to attributes of individuals. 
Methodological individualism has long been a key tenet of the ratio-
nal choice tradition but has typically been paired with restrictive assump-
tions. The latter research is based in particular on studies of the offspring ofIsraeli kibbutzim 
and the marital success (poor) of children reared together in Taiwan under the sim-pua sys-
tem. See also Brown 1991 (chap. 5). 
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tions about essential human predispositions. The argument here poses 
challenges for this tradition as well. Most important, it questions the legit-
imacy of invoking an evolutionary rationale for the assumption of egoism 
narrowly understood. 
Although humans may perceive their behavior toward children, sib-
lings, or even their genetically unrelated spouse as genuinely altruistic, 
they more rarely perceive their other social relations as having this charac-
ter. There are several reasons for this. The first is the popular identification 
of altruism with affirmative altruism-positive acts of assistance-an 
identification that hides from view its more empirically important form: 
failure to harm. Second, altruism directed toward non-kin leads to behav-
ioral interactions that are more explicitly organized on a quid pro quo 
basis, that is, on the basis of reciprocity. In its developed state it is, objec-
tively, mutualistic rather than altruistic. This often reciprocal character 
makes it difficult to recognize and acknowledge the altruistic predisposi-
tions necessary for such behaviors to originate. 
Because organized social existence is regulated by a widespread will-
ingness to punish those who violate its regularities, a marginal invader of 
such a group can find it rational to behave according to these norms. If 
such behavior is rational, as defined at the start of this book, it cannot be 
altruistic. Once the basic structure of a cooperative group has been estab-
lished, once Tit-for-Tat players dominate the group, for example, cooper-
ative behavior by the marginal invader becomes increasingly self-serving. 
Conditionally cooperative behavior has been drained of altruistic conse-
quence and is no longer altruistic, although its form remains unchanged. 
Propensities to behave in unambiguously altruistic ways, necessary for 
cooperation based on mutuality to originate, fade into the background, a 
reservoir that is called upon in exceptional circumstances, where the struc-
ture of civil society, or social relations, or the particular intermediate level 
coalition or relationship is called into question; or where individuals are 
trying to initiate a new regime of cooperation and reciprocity where only 
hostile relations existed before. 
It is only in these circumstances, or under controlled experimental 
conditions, that fundamental behavioral propensities that made and make 
possible humans' extraordinary reciprocal social life again show them-
selves clearly. In such instances playing cooperate in what could be a one-
shot PD again has a truly altruistic character, because it may risk the 
organism's survival in a fashion that might, but might not, establish or 
reestablish relations ofreciprocity. Episodes of this type form the founda-
tion of much dramatic literature and art, are often featured in news 
reports, and bring into sharp relief issues of individual character and 
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human nature that are disguised or suppressed during more ordinary 
times. 
Thus it is that the assumptions reflected in the standard economic 
model, and the explanation of order as reflecting the operation of an invis-
ible hand, seem to be confirmed by introspection: it seems to be the case 
that our social relations among non-kin have no altruistic character. In 
established social interaction this is largely true: it is not to the benevo-
lence of the butcher that we appeal in order to get our meat, it is to his self-
love. It is only in the rare moments when civil society breaks down, or in 
the initial stages of love or the final stages of divorce, that we get a glimpse 
of the human propensities that made it possible in the first place, as well as 
those they had to overcome. 
Mandeville's Fable of the Bees has been a touchstone for economists' 
discussion of human cooperation for over two centuries, providing under-
pinnings for Smith's invisible hand metaphor, and the life of the social 
insects formed a backdrop for discussions of human society by the original 
social contract theorists. We know now that the explanation for the high 
degree of social organization among bees, ants, and wasps must be some-
what different from the isomorphic forms among humans. The bees in a 
hive are all closely related and reproduce using a haplo-diploid system. 
Males develop from unfertilized, females from fertilized eggs. Conse-
quently, males have half the complement of chromosomes possessed by 
their sisters. Sisters share on average three-quarters of their genetic inher-
itance with each other but only a quarter with their brothers. 
From the standpoint of inclusive fitness theory, it is not entirely sur-
prising that sisters are highly altruistic toward each other (75 percent 
genetic overlap), somewhat altruistic toward their queen mother (50 per-
cent overlap), and not very altruistic at all toward their brothers (25 per-
cent overlap). The implications of the peculiar inheritance system of 
Hymenoptera and the extent to which the predictions of Hamilton's model 
are borne out by evidence are developed in E. O. Wilson's The Insect Soci-
eties (1971, especially chap. 17; see also Hamilton 1964).6 
Humans groups are comprised of individuals with much greater aver-
age genetic distance between them, and we reproduce using a diploid 
mechanism. A different balance of selection pressures is therefore neces-
sary to explain altruism, especially that exhibited toward non-kin. Because 
of the difference in reproductive systems, the burden that between group 
6. On the other hand, haplo-diploid inheritance does not explain complex social orga-
nization among termites. And whereas most of Wilson's analysis is within the context of indi-
vidual level selection models, the consensus is now moving to allow some role for group, that 
is, between colony, selection as well (Wilson and Sober 1994). 
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selection must bear is higher in explaining the origin of complex social 
organization in humans. 
In thinking about the appropriate relationship between evolutionary 
biology, economics, and social science in general, one cannot help but be 
struck by the apparent analogy between the blind watchmaker and the 
invisible hand. The blind watchmaker is a metaphor for mechanisms lead-
ing to the appearance of design in living organisms: the intricate and mar-
velous results of the operation over generations of natural selection. The 
invisible hand was addressed as an apparently similar marvel: the coordi-
nation of specialized economic activity in the absence of a central planner. 
The two ideas seem on the face of it analogous: in the former the appear-
ance of design results from the "efforts" or "strategies" of genes to repli-
cate; in the latter social and economic organizations seem to arise organi-
cally from the efforts of individual organisms efficiently to advance their 
material self-interest. But the two metaphors have different underpin-
nings. Genes may be "selfish," since they persist only if they foster behav-
ioral predispositions in the organisms containing them that foster their 
persistence. This does not preclude individuals constructed according to 
genetic scaffolding from being predisposed to act in an altruistic fashion. 
To claim that the invisible hand metaphor explains the hidden order 
of society is at best a partial truth. It tells us virtually nothing about the 
origin of complex social organization but rather gives us insight into how 
it is maintained in a market society. What we may interpret as the result of 
the invisible hand is in fact an indirect manifestation of the workings of the 
blind watchmaker, played out within a technological environment unan-
ticipated by the selection pressures of earlier epochs. 
What Smith interpreted as man's natural tendency to truck and 
barter, from which so much follows, reflects the evolution of the general-
ized reciprocity (nonsimultaneous exchange) of hunter-gatherer times to 
the more simultaneous exchange made possible by the invention of agri-
culture, the development of stored food, the social contrivance of money, 
and the greater division and specialization of labor. But the human 
propensity to practice generalized reciprocity in turn reflects the heritage 
of behavioral propensities with more ancient lineages, in particular, a fun-
damental willingness to play cooperate in what could be one-shot PDs. 
Smith explored these propensities extensively in The Theory of Moral Sen-
timents ([1759] 1976).7 
The standard economic model captures in a parsimonious fashion 
important and essential human behavioral propensities. Within circum-
7. Smith spoke of such inclinations as benevolence. sympathy, and empathy, not 
specifically of altruism, a term introduced, and distinguished from egoism, in 1851 by the 
French sociologist Auguste Comte (Batson 1991, 5). 
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scribed spheres of activity it provides good predictions of the direction of 
changes in behavior in response to changes in environmental (situational) 
conditions. But it is incomplete as a general model of human behavior. At 
some level most economists and rational choice theorists recognize the 
weakness of the model-the wide gap between normative predictions and 
actual behavior, particularly where bargaining or strategic interactions are 
concerned-but efforts to develop a comprehensive empirically based 
behavioral science from within the tradition have been stymied. Why? 
Melvin Reder's thoughtful and carefully argued book Economics: 
The Culture of a Controversial Science depicts a discipline uninterested in 
the reasonableness of its assumptions; unconcerned with its poor ability to 
predict, explain, or control; and consequently incapable of developing 
general laws with widespread applicability (Reder 1999, chap. 2). This 
diagnosis is perhaps too harsh in terms of the discipline as a whole. I share 
with William Baumol a minority view that macroeconomics has achieved 
significant scientific advance in the twentieth century, in part because of a 
persistent concern with addressing practical problems such as inflation 
and unemployment, and a development of theoretical models that, in gen-
eral, have been better disciplined by repeated confrontation with data 
(Baumo12000,11).8 
Reder's book nevertheless paints a picture of a field of study that, in 
spite of aspirations to universality, is remarkably insular. Operating 
within a highly elaborated paradigm, particularly in micro economic the-
ory, the discipline frequently exhibits signs of an almost hermeneutical 
imperviousness to deconfirming evidence. Whereas similar behavior char-
acterizes the history of many natural sciences, and whereas philosophical 
8. For example, Milton Friedman's claim that inflation is always and everywhere a 
monetary phenomenon is accepted as broadly true by most economists and as consistent with 
a wide range of historical evidence. Supply shocks or technological innovations affecting 
velocity may lead to one-time upward or downward movements in the aggregate price level. 
But few today argue that a sustained upward movement in price levels over the medium to 
long run is likely to be observed in the absence of a persistent increase in the supply of the 
transactions medium relative to the growth of transactions demand for real balances 
(roughly proportional to real GDP). Similarly, econometric evidence on the interest elastic-
ity of the demand for money has led most economists, including Friedman, regardless oftheir 
views about the conduct of monetary policy, to abandon the view that the demand to hold 
cash is interest insensitive. A final example: supply side economists predicted confidently that 
cutting tax rates would raise total tax revenues. When that did not happen following the Rea-
gan tax cuts in the first half of the 1980s, the implicit labor supply elasticities in the model 
were called into question, and the intellectual stock of the theory fell. In part, the judgment 
of the relatively greater value added in macroeconomics is based on the fact that the subdis-
cipline, aside from monetary theory, hardly existed in 1900, whereas most of the implications 
of the use of foraging algorithms by humans in advanced societies had already been worked 
out by that date. With respect to microeconomics, it is not all in Marshall, but a lot of it is. 
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issues regarding what should be the appropriate tolerance for 
deconfirming evidence apply equally in the social and natural sciences, the 
latter nevertheless have a record of progressivity superior to that of much 
of the social sciences. 
Anticipating a More Integrated Curriculum 
In progressive disciplines, logic and evidence ultimately change people's 
views. Suppose, fifteen years from now, the relevance and implications of 
multilevel selection and modularity have been more widely accepted and 
an integrated curriculum in behavioral science has been adopted across 
institutions of higher education. What would be the place of economic 
inquiry within such a curriculum? Such a curriculum, I suggest, would 
begin with a broad overview of evolutionary theory and what we now 
know of the history of hominid evolution. The emphasis would, to the 
degree appropriate, be on species typical characteristics and would defer 
to specialized courses the intellectual history, evidence, and debates about 
the heritability of individual differences among humans and the existence 
of statistically and behaviorally significant genotypic differences among 
human groups ("races") and between the sexes.9 Evidence from paleontol-
ogy; molecular biology; anthropological studies of hunter-gatherer soci-
eties; and, to the degree relevant, animal studies would be adduced. Evi-
dence from experimental research in economics and cognitive and social 
psychology would be summarized. 
The purpose of this overview would be to lay an evidential founda-
tion for statements about the types of domains within which one can pro-
ductively assume the operation of domain general learning mechanisms 
and the efficient pursuit of an actor's material self-interest. Specialized 
courses in anthropology and sociology, focusing on cultural variability 
within evolutionarily bounded constraints; in political science with an 
emphasis on the consequences of variation in political structure and pub-
lic policies; and in economic history, stressing the implications of develop-
9. Experimental evidence documenting some systematic differences in the operation of 
cognitive mechanisms between males and females is now widely accepted. Arguments with 
respect to race remain much more controversial, in part because racial categories are much 
more poorly defined. There are obvious systematic and functionally important differences 
between the physiological structures of men and women. It would not be surprising if there 
were also some systematic differences in the operation of cognitive mechanisms. This pre-
sumption holds in only the most minor ways in the case of racial differences. Even in the case 
of gender differences, however, we should keep in mind that we are talking about differences 
between the means of two distributions; these differences may not and often will not apply to 
differences between the reasoning mechanisms of a specific man and a specific woman. 
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ments in technology and of law would follow. So too would courses in 
microeconomic theory per se, with a focus on specialized subject matter 
topics and an emphasis on the study of foraging behavior in modern envi-
ronments. 
Optimal foraging models were originally developed to study nonhu-
man animals but have also been applied with considerable success to 
hunter-gatherer societies. The close relationship to economic modeling 
can be seen both in the categories employed and in the techniques used, 
which include constrained maximization and linear programming. Opti-
mal foraging models normally specify a goal (food acquired per unit time), 
a currency (typically calories), constraints (generally time), and choice 
options (where to search, what to search for, what algorithms to use) 
(Kelly 1995, 73-108). 
Studies showing the success of optimizing models in explaining ani-
mal foraging behavior have been interpreted by some as suggesting that 
animals are good economists. We might, in contrast, put the reverse spin 
on this. These studies drive home the point that humans are good for-
agers, just as their ancestors have been for hundreds of millions of years-
not just two million years. The realization that relatively unfettered mar-
kets conduced to economic growth represented a discovery of an 
institutional structure within which human foraging propensities could be 
harnessed for mutual advantage within a complex social environment not 
anticipated when these propensities first emerged. A great deal of micro-
economics can therefore be thought of as the study of optimal foraging 
behavior in an environment never anticipated by the forces of natural 
selection. 10 
By and large, foraging behavior represents a game against nature. But 
human-human interactions are qualitatively different, as are the associ-
ated challenges of establishing and maintaining relations based on expec-
tations of reciprocity. Even in extremely hierarchical social structures, 
such relations characterize interactions at any of a society's different lev-
els, and even in politically unbalanced relationships, there is invariably a 
role for such expectations. To make mutually beneficial reciprocal rela-
tions possible, evolution favored modules other than those facilitating for-
aging, which were not designed, or well suited, to achieve such ends. 
Unlike the foraging modules, these must have required group level selec-
tion to spread, because at low frequencies they do not involve the efficient 
10. Similarly, experiments designed to show that pigeons are good economists study 
foraging behavior in controlled, as opposed to uncontrolled, environments. Optimal forag-
ing depends on the operation of the domain general learning mechanisms upon which behav-
iorist psychology has focused. 
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pursuit of material self-interest and consequently could not have been 
favored by individual level selection. 
An evolutionary perspective allowing for both individual and group 
level selection can help us sort through where and why the standard eco-
nomic model works relatively well and where it does not. Consider three 
domains for its application: navigation and decision within the competi-
tive model, behavior within situations of strategic interaction, and behav-
ior with respect to the holding of financial assets. Arguably the best results 
occur in the first domain, in which prices confront individuals parametri-
cally and what individuals must do is search over the price space of out-
puts and inputs in order to sustain themselves. The model does relatively 
well in predicting the direction of changes in behavior in response to 
changes in incentives (prices) because it is applied to behavior closely anal-
ogous to the foraging activities that hunter-gatherers and their ancestors 
pursued for millennia. Evolution has endowed us with relatively sophisti-
cated search algorithms and intuitive techniques for statistical inference; 
the closer these are to foraging problems, in general, the better the model 
does. 
Markets succeed in converting games against humans into games 
against nature or, in more technical terms, optimization against a fixed 
environment. Economic theory has much greater difficulty in dealing with 
bargaining: situations where parties must decide how they will divide a 
surplus that will vanish if they do not agree (see in particular the contrast 
in the results of market vs. bargaining experiments in Roth et al. 1991). 
This could involve labor-management conflict, disputes about the price at 
which a car is to be bought, or the salary at which an individual agrees to 
leave her old job for a new one. Game theory has had very limited success 
in elucidating the outcomes of such interactions (Roth 1995b). Evolution-
ary analysis, on the other hand, has shed light on the surprising experi-
mental frequency of "fair" divisions in such situations (Skyrms 1996, 
chap. 2). 
Finally, consider the mixed results in the area of finance, discussed in 
chapter 6. Although the predictions of rational choice theory are not 
shockingly contravened, as in single play PD games, these markets are rid-
dled with apparent deviations from what the standard normative model 
would predict. Indeed, outside of experimental data on choice among 
gambles, the study of financial data provides perhaps the most fertile 
arena for identifying the type of anomalies collected by the heuristics and 
biases program. Why are these anomalies so prevalent in this area? 
An evolutionary explanation is that we are dealing with phenomena 
(casinos and stock markets) that lacked even approximate counterparts in 
Pleistocene existence or earlier. In such times there were no established 
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asset exchanges, there was not much stored wealth, and there were few 
truly random processes. Financial markets differ from goods markets. In 
financial markets, the underlying assets traded are homogeneous, at any 
moment of time price dispersion around the world is low, and it is gener-
ally possible for an individual to buy and sell as much of a particular asset 
as he or she wants. Goods markets, in contrast, are usually characterized 
by a dispersion of availability, price, and sometimes quality. Their naviga-
tion, one can argue, is more strongly facilitated by foraging algorithms. 
Humans attempt to apply to truly random processes tools that work 
well in foraging: tabulating histories of past occurrences, maintaining 
updated tables of contingent frequencies, and attempting to predict the 
future based on past history. Casinos exploit this predisposition by pro-
viding players at roulette wheels with pads of paper on which they can 
keep track of recent outcomes. The financial services industry caters to this 
predisposition by providing reams and megabytes of data on past perfor-
mance of individual securities. If financial asset prices are, like realizations 
of roulette wheels, truly random processes, however, "foraging" among 
individual assets is a waste of time, unless one has access to information 
not widely available in the market. Buying and holding an index fund is 
the best strategy, just as not playing roulette in a casino is the best (wealth 
maximizing) strategy. 
Nevertheless, a great many individual investors believe they can sys-
tematically beat the odds at the roulette wheel, and systematically beat the 
index in the stock market. They believe they are operating in environments 
in which foraging theory is applicable, as are statistical inference tech-
niques for predicting future price from past behavior. In doing so, many 
market participants persist in trading off expected return for greater risk, 
as do roulette players, clearly violations of the predictions of the norma-
tive model.!! With the exception of blackjack using a card counting strat-
egy, the expected value of any casino game is negative. In stock markets, 
feverish and expensive attempts to beat the market generally lead to lower 
returns and higher tax liabilities than a buy and hold strategy. 
But the reasons for anomalies in investors' behavior are different 
from those that explain behavior in Prisoner's Dilemmas. In the case of 
financial assets, evolutionary pressures have prepared us poorly to deal 
with truly random processes, for they are a recent development. As a 
result, individual behavior introduces noise into financial asset prices, ren-
II. On the other hand, the random walk hypothesis is not universally accepted, and 
hundreds of thousands of dollars continue to be invested in the development of computer 
models aspiring to discern structure in the apparently chaotic data produced in the financial 
markets. 
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dering questionable the standard economic model's assumption that the 
market is efficient and prices securities at fundamental value based on all 
available information. Consequently individual securities and the market 
as a whole may be undervalued or overvalued for sustained periods of 
time. 12 
In the PD case, in contrast, evolutionary pressures prepared us rela-
tively well but not in ways captured by the standard economic model. 
Microeconomics as Topics in Advanced Foraging 
Within the imagined social and behavioral science curriculum, economics 
would survive as a subject of specialized study, particularly in the areas of 
national income accounting and monetary policy and macroeconomics, 
and as one with a distinct intellectual culture in microeconomics resulting 
from its comparative advantage in the analysis of foraging. But because 
the study of foraging behavior cannot be the exclusive foundation for a 
comprehensive behavioral science, the subject matter definition of eco-
nomics would reemerge as its unifying characteristic. The discipline 
would be reestablished within the more limited Marshallian parameters 
as the "study of mankind in the ordinary business of life." As a means of 
emphasizing rhetorically the important but restricted domain of micro-
economic inquiry, one might even consider retitling the first course in 
microeconomics "Principles of Foraging in Advanced Technological 
Societies" and follow it with more specialized courses such as Intermedi-
ate Foraging, Mathematical Foraging, International Foraging, and For-
aging in Labor Markets. 
An understanding of the taxonomic categories whereby we organize 
thinking about economic interaction, the statistical apparatus (national 
income and product accounts) underlying the measurement of economic 
categories, and the framework relating these categories to each other rep-
resents and would continue to represent a specialized range of knowledge 
historically particular to the discipline. In this imagined integrated cur-
riculum, what would not survive would be the widely proclaimed view that 
the essence of economics is an approach to studying human interaction 
equally applicable across the entire range of human behavior. In spite of 
its failures in the areas of prediction, explanation, and control, and in spite 
of the often ambivalent attitude toward the role of new empirical findings 
12. I am skeptical of the view, however, suggested by the heuristics and biases litera-
ture, that the direction of these pricing errors can be shown to be predictable. Financial mar-
ket prices are not as close to a random walk as efficient market theorists believe, but they are 
closer to it than is the belief of the typical investor. 
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in advancing the subject, economics remains a discipline acutely con-
cerned with its status as science and indeed, as E. O. Wilson notes, pro-
claiming itself the Queen of the Social Sciences. 13 
The claim to royal status has rested implicitly on the discipline's 
incorrect view that it possesses a privileged understanding of the implica-
tions of evolutionary theory for human motivation. That view is facile and 
incomplete. Cognitive capabilities and behavioral predispositions other 
than those typically assumed in economic models have been favored by 
natural selection. Our tasks in part are to try to understand what they are 
using scientific and empirically based methodologies and to use the results 
of such studies to build behavioral models or algorithms with more pre-
dictive success than those that can be deduced from models based on strict 
egoism and the assumption of optimization alone. In the past, none of the 
social sciences has been in the forefront of championing such efforts. 
Responding to challenges that the behavioral assumptions underlying 
the discipline are unrealistic, economists have defended their methodology 
on the grounds that the proof of the pudding is in the eating, that the 
assumptions are simplifying, and that what matters is the relative ability of 
such models to predict and explain observed phenomena. I use explain in 
this context to mean the retrospective prediction of data that played no 
role in the construction of the model or forecasting algorithm. Such a posi-
tion is defensible when adhered to consistently. In practice, however, 
much theorizing has consisted of ex post rationalizations of stylized facts. 
Not only have the models often lacked out-of-sample predictive power but 
the within sample stylized facts explained have sometimes borne a ques-
tionable relationship to the phenomena whose essential features they were 
supposed to capture. 
If we aspire to the status of scientists, and are to dismiss concerns 
about the reasonableness of model assumptions, we must hold ourselves 
accountable according to the standards of prediction and explanation. In 
other words, one can defend "unrealistic" assumptions if the models 
employing them produce tolerably good predictions or explanations, but 
absent that, it's time for business as usual to stop. For example, if the 
assumption that individuals efficiently pursue their material self-interest 
leads to the prediction that players will defect in single play Prisoner's 
Dilemmas, and experimental and observational data repeatedly contradict 
this prediction, it is time to explore alternate approaches. 
These approaches should include the incorporation of empirically 
13. Wilson's treatment of economics is one of the weaker sections of his book. But his 
lack of appreciation for some of its nuances does not minimize the resonance of his judgment: 
that the claims of economics to scientific status have been purchased at a high intellectual 
price. 
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validated cognitive modules that systematically short-circuit the behav-
ioral counsel of foraging algorithms. Instead, when confronted with 
admittedly unrealistic assumptions that predict poorly, rational choice 
theorists often seek to preserve its fundamental assumptions, to provide 
some twist to the model that accounts better for the observed behavior. 
Thus the extraordinary efforts to explain how nondefection in the single 
play or fixed and known duration Prisoner's Dilemma somehow results 
from the efficient pursuit of material self-interest. The quixotic character 
of these efforts is obvious in the literature on the single play version but 
hardly less so in the treatments of the fixed and known duration game. Yet 
many economists and rational choice theorists remain, deep down, wed-
ded to the behavioral assumption underlying the standard economic 
model: that humans calculate how they can best advance their material 
self-interest and act in accordance with these calculations in all domains. 
Humans do calculate, they do optimize, and they are generally inter-
ested in their material welfare. There is sound evolutionary justification, as 
noted, for assuming that we have these capabilities and inclinations, and 
foraging behavior by birds and bees suggests that we are not the only ani-
mals that act in an analogous fashion. But there is nothing magical about 
these assumptions: they do not exhaustively capture human behavioral 
propensities and to treat them as a shibboleth is not justifiable from a sci-
entific standpoint. 
One can of course argue that the behavior of rational choice theorists 
with respect to the treatment of deconfirming or anomalous evidence is no 
better and no worse than that of most natural scientists-or many other 
social scientists. But perform the following thought experiment. Consider 
microeconomics today as it was twenty-five years ago, or even a hundred 
years ago, as does Baumol. Do the same for any of the natural sciences. 
Which shows evidence of greater progressivity? Whereas economists hap-
pily apply this test to other social sciences, they are generally loath to do so 
reflexively. And yet, its aspirations notwithstanding, microeconomics has 
made relatively slow progress in building foundations for a progressive 
empirically based science of human behavior. 
Many economists, particularly those adhering to the intermediate 
position described earlier, do grant an exception to the assumption that 
humans pursue their own individual self-interest, and they are willing to 
assume that children's welfare enters parents' utility functions and that 
parents are therefore prone to sacrifice their own material welfare for that 
of their children. But why? What is the basis for this acceptance? And what 
are the reasons for the hard perimeter limiting the consideration of such 
tendencies to behavior among kin? 
As this book has indicated, there are indeed subtle differences in 
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understanding the origin and maintenance of social relations among kin 
and non-kin. But, with limited exceptions, these differences have not been 
systematically explored by economists. In general, rational choice theo-
rists have given little thought to the criteria that should underlie assump-
tions made about human behavior that extend beyond strict egoism. I sug-
gest that two related criteria should converge in support of admitting a 
behavioral propensity. First, it should be evolutionarily plausible. That is, 
one should be able to provide a plausible account of why genes predispos-
ing to such behavior would likely have persisted and increased in fre-
quency upon first appearance. Second, the propensity should be validated 
by observational and/or experimental evidence. Whether or not a propen-
sity is "rational" in the sense in which that term is used in the standard eco-
nomic model should ultimately be irrelevant or at least subsumed within 
the scope of this enterprise. If a propensity to act "rationally" within cer-
tain domains is a central feature of the human psyche, it is because genes 
predisposing to such calculations and the willingness to act on them have 
been relatively favored. The rationality assumption can have no favored 
or privileged status beyond this. 
Egoistic considerations push individuals in directions that conduce to 
cartel breakup, to the elimination of racial discrimination, away from vot-
ing, away from voluntary contributions toward public goods, and toward 
first strike. We may believe, depending on our political views, that some of 
these effects are socially desirable and some are not. But such normative 
views are irrelevant to a positive social science. To build a discipline on the 
proposition that such motivations exhaust the range of essential human 
predispositions is to lead to the unsustainable conclusion that there are no 
cartels, no racial discrimination, no voting, no voluntary contributions to 
public goods, and no restraint on first strike (defect) in single play PDs. 
The issue for a positive behavioral science is not to tote up a scorecard in 
terms of what is good or bad but to understand essential human predispo-
sitions and to embody them in models or forecasting algorithms with good 
predictive power, at least in an aleatory sense. 
The development of experimental economics, surveyed in the Hand-
book of Experimental Economics (Kagel and Roth 1995), has been valu-
able in moving the social sciences in a more progressive direction. What is 
encouraging about much of the work summarized, for example that on 
public goods provision, is involvement, within the framework of a shared 
methodology, of participants from sociology, social psychology, political 
science, and economics, as well as evidence that minds do appear to have 
been changed (not immediately-that is to be expected-but eventually) 
as the result of experimental results. Research treated in the Handbook 
extends beyond the types of issues explored within the heuristics and 
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biases program (Camerer 1995). It also includes results referenced repeat-
edly in this book, especially those involving Prisoner's Dilemmas; the 
closely related work on the voluntary provision of public goods; and work 
on human bargaining behavior involving ultimatum, dictator, and 
impunity games (see, in particular, Roth 1995a, 1995b; Ledyard 1995). 
Experimental research has the potential to help remake the study of 
human behavior into a discipline more like a natural science, because it 
provides a methodology for testing and validating assertions about essen-
tial predispositions. 
Sociobiology and Gene-Culture Coevolution 
In his 1998 book Consilience, Edward O. Wilson argues that we are and 
should be moving toward a unification of the natural and social sciences, 
a theme he has advocated in one form or another for over a quarter cen-
tury. It is a proposition that many social scientists react to with suspicion. 
On first encounter, the idea seems at best utopian, at worst outlandish. But 
a review ofliteratures in cognitive psychology, evolutionary biology, pale-
oanthropology, and other sciences leads to two unavoidable conclusions. 
First, relative to the social sciences, these disciplines have, overall, been 
more progressive. In the last twenty-five years, scholarly effort has pro-
duced significant new observational and/or experimental data, data that 
have changed the theoretical consensus within these disciplines. In a num-
ber of cases these advances have been facilitated, indeed revolutionized, by 
technical advances in instrumentation, far more so than has been the 
impact of the availability of computers on the social sciences. In spite of 
the often-acrimonious disputes that have characterized and continue to 
characterize these fields, consensus on theory and methodology is more 
broadly shared than is true among and within the social sciences. 
A second conclusion is that much of this scientific advance is relevant 
to the study of human behavior. Both of these observations engender 
qualified sympathy for the program I understand Wilson to be advancing. 
The initial incarnation of that program was reflected in his 1975 work 
Sociobiology, which, as its name suggested, proposed providing biological 
foundations for the social sciences. A legitimate question is whether what 
is advanced in the book you are reading is simply sociobiology redux. The 
answer is no, or at least, not exactly. Early sociobiological treatises often 
reached for the stars and, in so doing, overreached. The overreaching 
resulted in two main features, neither of which is shared by the framework 
informing the previous chapters. 
First, sociobiologists were eager to examine contemporary human 
behavior, identify in what ways it might be adaptive, and thereby explain 
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it. A typical problem was that if natural selection favored behaviors likely 
to lead to the spread of genes predisposing to them, it was hard to account, 
for example, for why families used contraception and for why economi-
cally successful families often tended to have fewer children. In contrast, 
the perspective adopted here is that evolution has favored designs that 
were adaptive to environmental features recurring over millions of years of 
human prehistory. In many instances, because of commonalities between 
that early environment and the one we inhabit today, our designs do seem 
wonderfully adaptive. But in other areas, technological progress since the 
agricultural revolution has so changed the world we live in that we should 
not expect this to be necessarily true, nor is it. 
Second, in some versions sociobiology came to be synonymous with 
biological determinism, which eliminates any role for human freedom, 
choice, or responsibility. Parents and teachers, confronted with a student 
who has played hooky and claims, not that the dog ate his homework, but 
that his genes made him do it, are likely to give such explanations short 
shrift. So should we. Genes may influence predispositions, but except in 
the case of reflex actions, they do not automatically program a response to 
a particular stimulus or situation. The reason for this is obvious. Much of 
the life experience of an individual is so idiosyncratic that it would be 
impossible for evolutionary forces to "anticipate" and hardwire a response 
to categories of circumstance characterized at that fine a level of detail. 
That is why we are endowed with, in addition to specialized domain 
specific cognitive modules, domain general capabilities that permit us to 
learn and reason: logic, mathematical reasoning, and an intuitive under-
standing of statistical inference. There is no particular reason why evolu-
tion might not have favored organisms that, when all was said and done, 
are free to choose. 14 
Because, given perceptual input, humans choose based on discretion, 
not on hardwired rules for specific circumstances, the prediction of any 
individual's behavior in a particular circumstance can be at best proba-
bilistic. Knowledge of evolutionarily favored behavioral predispositions 
holds out the reasonable possibility, however, of giving superior predictive 
capability over larger numbers of individuals or instances. Cultural varia-
tion will, of course, influence behavior, but it will do so within a bounded 
range. IS 
14. As Lumsden and Wilson put it, "genes and free will are partners of necessity and 
not partners of convenience" (1983, 55). 
15. Again, quoting from Lumsden and Wilson, "genes and culture are held together by 
an elastic but unbreakable leash" (1983, 60). Many have interpreted this as arguing for the 
unsustainability of social reform. This is too harsh a reading. Culture cannot go in any direc-
tion it wants, because if it is too "dysfunctional" it will destroy or dramatically reduce the 
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There is a final and important way in which the approach adopted 
here differs from positions advocated by sociobiologists such as Lumsden 
and Wilson (1981, 1983). Criticized for minimizing the role of culture in 
his earlier work, E. O. Wilson made great efforts in his collaboration with 
Lumsden to incorporate a role for it by developing a model of gene-culture 
coevolution, emphasizing environmentally determined "epigenetic rules" 
that canalize learning in certain directions and therefore favor certain 
"norms" over others. In doing so they appealed to the same growing body 
of evidence supporting modularity in cognition that has been a recurring 
theme in previous chapters. Lumsden and Wilson also explored the role of 
feedback through natural selection in leading to the hardwiring of these 
rules, thus, for example, explaining the almost universal avoidance of 
brother-sister incest. 
Where they differ is in positing a much faster rate of coevolution than 
is assumed in this book: "In as few as fifty generations-about a thousand 
years-substantial genetic evolution can occur in the epigenetic rules guid-
ing thought and behavior" (Lumsden and Wilson 1983, 152). Evidence of 
relatively recent environmental influences on genetic variation does exist 
in the areas of the immune and digestive systems. It has long been plausi-
ble to argue, for example, that African Americans' susceptibility to sickle 
cell anemia is due to the increased resistance from malaria, endemic in 
Africa, afforded by the heterozygous form. The absence of lactase 
deficiency among groups with a pastoral heritage is also often cited (Rid-
ley 1999, 192-94; see also Durham 1991). Lumsden and Wilson's sugges-
tion that such mechanisms have produced differences in cognition and 
behavioral predispositions is, however, much less firmly established. 
An implication, which they do not explicitly explore, is that Euro-
peans or perhaps Eurasians might, because of their history, today have 
higher frequencies of hardwired taxonomies favorable for learning about 
and understanding recurrent features of advanced technology than would 
members of Stone Age tribes. If this hypothesis were true, we might expect 
to see significant differences in the blood chemistry of surviving Stone Age 
tribes as compared, with, let us say, Europeans who have been dealing 
number of individuals whose lives it influences. To take an extreme example, a culture that 
extolled the virtues of matricide and patricide as soon as children were physically capable of 
so doing would not long survive. Within the boundaries defined by a broad "functionality" 
constraint, there is space for cultural variation, including "progressive" variants that we may 
not yet have witnessed. The problem with traditional structural-functional analysis is that 
there are many conceivable structures consistent with the constraint. Demonstrating "func-
tionality" does not therefore account for why one structure or another prevails. For that one 
may need historical or case specific methods. The problem is formally identical with that 
associated with rational choice models that generate multiple equilibria. 
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with advanced technology for at least a thousand years (see also Boyd and 
Richerson 1985). Such differences are, however, as in the cases described 
earlier, relatively minor, sufficient to give us insights into historical pat-
terns of migration but unlikely to represent cognitively or behaviorally 
significant effects of gene-culture coevolution (Cavalli-Sforza, Menozzi, 
and Piazza 1994; Lewontin 1972). Jared Diamond argues anecdotally that 
denizens of hunter-gatherer societies have little difficulty mastering 
advanced technology once exposed to it and that there is little to suggest 
that they are in any way less intelligent than we are (he provocatively 
argues the contrary) (Diamond 1997, 19). New Guinean tribespeople, first 
contacted by advanced society in the 1930s, have had little difficulty, 
within a generation, coming to terms with it. And the grammars of lan-
guages used by surviving hunter-gatherer societies are no less complex 
than those used by members of industrial societies (Pinker and Bloom 
1990, 707). 
It is ironic that a move to integrate culture into the study of biological 
influences on cognition and behavior should have a potential to resurrect 
old beliefs about significant differences in inherent capabilities of peoples 
at different levels of technological and scientific development. Tooby and 
Cosmides provide little historical perspective on the origin of the standard 
social science model. But it emerged in the United States in the work of 
Franz Boas at Columbia and his student Alfred Kroeber at Berkeley and 
was specifically directed at an earlier attempt, associated Gustifiably, to 
some degree) with Darwinian ideas, to provide a biological foundation for 
the social sciences. That effort was driven by the idea that just as species 
had evolved from "less advanced" forms, so too had human groups, which 
could be ranked on an evolutionary scale. Such differences, it was argued, 
for example between hunter-gatherers and technologically advanced soci-
eties, had a biological foundation, reflecting innate differences among the 
capabilities of the "races of man." It was against this view, and in favor of 
an essentially universal human nature, that Boas and Kroeber cam-
paigned. Their insistence on a complete severance of culture from biology, 
congruent with positions taken by European sociologists such as 
Durkheim, was intended to prevent such ideas from resurfacing (Degler 
1991, chap. 4). 
It is important to understand that the attack on the SSSM orches-
trated by Tooby and Cosmides, and endorsed with some qualification in 
this book, is not intended to and does not have the effect of resurrecting 
the discredited views against which the SSSM was counterpoised. Models 
of gene-culture coevolution, however, do suggest, in an unintended fash-
ion, that there may be something to these earlier views. The issue is not 
whether the process of gene-culture evolution is theoretically possible. The 
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issues are the timescale involved and the extent to which it is empirically 
relevant for the period after the Neolithic revolution. 
By assigning cognitively and behaviorally significant gene-cultural 
coevolution in response to recurring environmental challenges only to the 
much longer epoch spanning the transitions from Homo habilis to Homo 
erectus to Homo sapiens, we allow the cultural variation of the last ten 
thousand or even thirty thousand years a space of its own, bounded by 
biological constraints but within that space free to vary according to his-
torical or case specific factors and with an independent influence on eco-
nomic and social outcomes. 
Rational Choice Theory within an Evolutionarily 
Informed Behavioral Science 
Economics has its roots in eighteenth century moral philosophy. Like the 
Chicago school economists of the twentieth century, and unlike nineteenth 
century social scientists such as Henri St. Simon, Auguste Comte, and 
Emile Durkheim, such moral philosophers took the individual rather than 
society as the unit of analysis. But they also assumed such individuals were 
reasonable men, hommes eclaires, whose implicit range of cognitive mech-
anisms and behavioral inclinations was broader and less restricted than 
that of twentieth century economic man. 
The eighteenth century "reasonable" individualist retreated under the 
attack of nineteenth century sociology, presaged by Condorcet or one of 
his correspondents who in 1792 first used the term social science. Accord-
ing to nineteenth century sociology, society was a more fundamental 
entity than the nation-state, was more than the sum of its individual mem-
bers, had its own dynamics, and required its own "social science" to under-
stand and explain it (Gigerenzer et al. 1989,39). The development of state 
statistical offices and comprehensive demographic, economic, and social 
data in the nineteenth century also posed a challenge to the "reasonable 
man" individualist view. 
Although statistics clearly implied that "society" was the sum of its 
individual members, such data were also used to conclude that societies or 
cultures had features-emergent properties-that were more than the sum 
of their individual components. Thus Durkheim used data showing that 
countries and sociocultural groups had relatively stable and unique pat-
terns of crime, suicide, and marriage rates as evidence that such concepts 
as society, culture, and national character were meaningful (Rosenberg 
1980, chap. 2). 
Much of the battle among the social sciences in the last half of the 
twentieth century has recapitulated these earlier disputes about whether 
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the individual or society/culture is the appropriate unit of inquiry, with 
economists and psychologists generally adopting the former position and 
classical sociology/anthropology the latter. Of course twentieth century 
economic man is not exactly the eighteenth century homme eclaire. One 
might say that he has retained the individualism but dispensed with the 
"reasonableness." 
The standard economic model embodies behavioral motivations and 
an optimizing technology that served well our ancestors' foraging activi-
ties and were selected for over hundreds of millions of years at the level of 
the individual organism. The model is useful for analyzing and to some 
degree predicting the modern analogue offoraging: search and decision in 
competitive goods, services, and assets markets in which prices confront 
all actors as parametric. But with respect to the origin of complex social 
organization at the macrolevel, or with respect to the formation of coali-
tions, friendships, economic cartels, or political alliances, in other words, 
social organization at initial and more intermediate levels, the model per-
forms poorly. The reason is that operation within all of these situations of 
strategic interaction brings into play domain specific modules such as 
propensities to play cooperate in what could be one-shot PDs, or to mon-
itor and punish those who do not reciprocate, which could not have arisen 
as the result of selection at the individual level. One needs an evolutionary 
framework incorporating multilevel selection to account for them. 
Ifwe are to construct a coherent empirically based behavioral science, 
those specializing in the study of optimal foraging will need more seriously 
to recognize the domain specific applicability of its techniques and, in 
other areas, allow the perspective to be complemented by scientific 
research relevant to the study of strategic behavior. The apparent claim by 
some economists that not only does it not matter if the assumptions of the 
model are unrealistic, but it also does not matter if the resulting model 
predicts poorly, is not sustainable. The view of economics as the search for 
ways to make what works in practice work in theory (Reder 1999, 12) is an 
almost perfect recipe for ex post rationalizations that seem to explain but 
in fact lack both explanatory coherence and retrodictive/predictive power, 
precisely because they are ex post rationalizations. 
Yet we would be foolish to deny the powerful influence of internally 
coherent theoretical frameworks to which adherents attach strong subjec-
tive probabilities of validity. The physicist Arthur Eddington wrote half 
seriously that no fact should be accepted as true until it had been 
confirmed by theory. Lumsden and Wilson observe (and they are by no 
means the first) that "unless an attractive theory exists that decrees certain 
kinds of information to be important, few scientists will set out to acquire 
the information" (1983, 63). 
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One of the goals of this book has been to advance the development of 
such a framework, an attractive theory that links an evolutionarily 
informed search for behavioral predispositions and cognitive mechanisms 
widespread in human populations as a means of strengthening the foun-
dations of a comprehensive, empirically based behavioral science. An 
unusual and unlikely combination of ideas underlies this approach: admit-
ting group as well as individual level selection, allowing for the modularity 
that permits altruistic as well as egoistic inclinations, and accepting the 
principle of methodological individualism. Each poses challenges of intel-
lectual digestion, inasmuch as each is a hot button issue for, respectively, 
evolutionary theory, the economics/rational choice tradition, and sociol-
ogy/anthropology. Each, however, has much to recommend it, and collec-
tively they open up new avenues for productive inquiry. 
To the manifest discomfort of sociologists and anthropologists, econ-
omists have aspired to a social science with widespread applicability across 
time and space. The standard economic model has been based on explor-
ing the implications of a set of predispositions that are essentially human. 
The inability of the approach to meet its universalistic aspirations is 
explained not necessarily because the quest itself is quixotic but rather 
because this set of predispositions is incomplete and because economics 
has shared with other social sciences a view of cognition with little space 
for the type of hardwired taxonomic categories and relations among them 
stressed by researchers in linguistics and visual perception. Nevertheless, 
the economist's quest for a comprehensive social science, unique among 
the disciplines, remains a worthwhile aspiration. 
Traditional sociology and anthropology have been hostile to rational 
choice approaches but not for this reason. Rather, hostility has been 
driven by doubts, fueled by belief in the overwhelming centrality of cul-
ture, that the concept of essential human behavioral predispositions is 
meaningful. Movement toward a more unified and scientific framework 
for the study of human behavior requires us to take seriously such inclina-
tions and the evolutionarily conditioned influence of specialized brain sub-
systems on them. 16 I have emphasized earlier what this would mean for 
economics, but the acceptance of this view poses at least as much of a chal-
lenge, in different ways, for other social scientists. The issues here do not 
16. Among economists, Gary Becker has perhaps pushed hardest in this direction. His 
suggestion that human preferences over generalized commodities do not vary much between 
the rich and poor, or even between members of different cultures or societies, is a reflection 
of this aspiration (Becker 1976, 8). Some experimental evidence consistent with this position: 
newborn infants (regardless of acculturation) prefer sweet to bitter, and they prefer sweet in 
the following order of preference: sucrose, fructose, lactose, and glucose (Lumsden and Wil-
son 1983, 69). 
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represent the same turf battles that have been waged for decades. This is 
not simply a question of sociologists and anthropologists reclaiming 
ground "lost" to economics or vice versa. 
Why is the prospect of admitting group level selection, and what it 
may imply for human behavioral propensities, troubling to many theo-
rists? I believe it is because within the rational choice tradition so much 
theory operates in an empirically undisciplined atmosphere. Thus to admit 
anything other than egoistic preferences is apparently to open the 
floodgates to assumptions about human behavior-often derisively attrib-
uted to sociologists and anthropologists-that rational choice theorists 
know intuitively to be wrong. But we cannot advance theory within a 
largely data free zone and claim that what we are doing is science. 
Implications for Models of Human Behavior 
Heterodox scholars who have experimented with the implications of 
unconventional utility functions can argue that much has changed in eco-
nomics within the past quarter century, and can cite their own efforts as 
evidence in favor of this view. But it is also true that much has not 
changed. A recent article by Edward Lazear (2000) contains a useful sur-
vey of contributions made by economists to problems not traditionally 
viewed as within the purview of the field. But its title, "Economic Imperi-
alism," testifies that ambitions for territorial expansion are alive and well. 
This emphasis on turf battles is enormously debilitating. Lazear identifies 
the distinguishing features of the economic approach with the assumption 
of rationality, the use of constrained maximization techniques, the concept 
of equilibrium, and an emphasis on efficiency. A flavor of his rhetorical 
posture can be garnered from this excerpt. 
Economics is not only a social science, it is a genuine science. Like the 
physical sciences, economics uses a methodology that produces 
refutable implications and tests these implications using solid statisti-
cal techniques .... Other social sciences that are unwilling to assume 
maximization are in the position of being unable to predict in new sit-
uations. (Lazear 2000, 99-100) 
Most troubling about Lazear's stance are the criteria he uses for eval-
uating the success of a social scientific discipline. In spite of the mantle of 
science, which he wraps around economics (but not other social sciences), 
and the incantations about the importance of testing hypotheses using 
solid statistical techniques, the most frequent appeal in the article is to val-
idation of success via a "market test." Economics is viewed as successful 
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because it has attracted the most students and has had the most outbound 
influence on other subdisciplines (Lazear 2000, 99). This is an ultimately 
indefensible criterion for validation, regardless of who advances it. 
Such evidence can be suggestive, but a good rank and tenure commit-
tee does more than count citations. It may be that a discipline has attracted 
adherents because of its predictive and explanatory successes. But it can 
also simply be because the tenets of the approach or the elegance of the 
models happen to satisfy practitioners' aesthetic or expressive needs. 
Economists-and rational choice theorists in general-have been quick to 
apply this critique to others but reluctant to apply it reflexively. Such 
appeal mayor may not be correlated with whether models provide good 
explanatory or predictive power. 
The success of a contribution in satisfying aesthetic or expressive 
needs is an appropriate criterion for judging work in the arts and humani-
ties but not in the sciences. Science is not a popularity contest. Organized 
religions count hundreds of millions of believers. Surely the number of 
adherents to a particular religion is not a measure of the scientific validity 
of its basic tenets. Psychoanalysis was wildly popular in the United States 
in the 1950s and early 1960s in the absence of any evidence that recovery 
rates of patients receiving the therapy (about a third) were systematically 
different from those who received no treatment. 
At its inception, the bases of scientific belief were radically distin-
guished from those underlying religion. It is this radical worldview, with 
its emphasis on observation and prediction, that underlies scientific 
achievement over the past several centuries. If, as social scientists, we are 
to do more than pay lip service to that tradition, we must hold ourselves 
accountable to tests of explanation and prediction. When these tests are 
failed, repeatedly, it is not acceptable to fall back on the Coasian view that 
we can continue to embrace a model simply because of its "intuitive" 
appeal-which may simply be another way of saying that it satisfies our 
expressive or aesthetic tastes or needs. 
The justification for constructing models in the social sciences cannot 
ultimately be the satisfaction of these needs. Ronald Reagan used to tell 
stories that from his vantage point certainly "should have been true" 
(Fitzgerald 2000). The stories clearly satisfied his expressive needs, but a 
historian concerned with evidence could legitimately point out that many 
were inventions, in some cases recollected dialogue from some of his films. 
We must also sometimes reject beautiful models, as did Francis Crick. 
There can be no warrant in the social-or natural-sciences for retaining 
a model that consistently predicts poorly simply because it feels intuitively 
correct. No discipline in the social sciences, including economics, can 
avoid attention to or be unaware of the role that aesthetic and expressive 
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needs sometimes play in producing attachments to a particular model or 
approach. 
The techniques of constrained maximization provide the basis for 
mathematical models of the operation of a powerful foraging module that 
all humans possess, honed over hundreds of millions of years of evolu-
tionary history. But it is not the only cognitive module governing human 
behavior. Lazear implicitly believes that it is and that therefore con-
strained maximization techniques are the only appropriate tools to be used 
in developing behavioral predictions. 
The assumption of the universal applicability of a foraging module 
cannot be justified on axiomatic grounds or by a casual appeal to pop Dar-
winism. When models based on it repeatedly fail predictive tests, one has a 
strong signal that it is being inappropriately adduced or at least that there 
is something else going on as well. There are then complementary direc-
tions in which one can proceed. The first is to retain the constrained max-
imization metaphor but introduce "unorthodox" (as Lazear calls them) 
utility functions, in such a manner that their maximization yields the 
observed behavior. For examples and review of recent work along these 
lines see Rabin 1993, Camerer 1997, or Bolton and Ockenfels 2000. 
What is encouraging about this work is the extent to which the behav-
ioral assumptions underlying the models are more carefully justified with 
respect to evidence on human behavior than is typical in models informed 
by the stronger version of rationality and the extent to which scholars 
committed to this enterprise are often equally committed to active partici-
pation in advancing experimental research as a means of testing, modify-
ing, and refining the theory. At the same time, given the acknowledged 
incentives of the profession, which have historically placed a very high pre-
mium on formalization, it may be desirable to go a bit slow. 
Heterodox models have many of the strengths and weaknesses of 
sociologists' appeal to norms and in a sense they represent an attempt to 
translate Parsons's "autonomous social structure" into the language of 
utility functions. When one gets down to the micro level of individual 
human behavior, however, there are many possible ways in which this 
might be done, and that is the current difficulty. Some formulations stress 
unconditional propensities to cooperate, some of which are obviously nec-
essary to understand cooperation in one shot PD games. Rabin's model 
stresses that people act in anticipation of how others will act toward them; 
their willingness to act reciprocally is contingent upon the expectation of 
behavior of others. The dynamic Rabin characterizes is likely to be helpful 
in understanding some of the cross-cultural and cross-individual variation 
observed in behavior in these games (Roth et al. 1991; Henrich et al. 2001). 
But it is ofless use in understanding baseline deviations from Nash or sub-
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game-perfect equilibrium levels. Still other formulations, such as Fehr and 
Schmidt 1999 or Bolton and Ockenfels 2000, stress a posited taste for fair-
ness by assuming that individuals obtain disutility from unequal out-
comes. They too have undoubtedly captured part, but only part, of the ele-
phant. Work is now underway in many quarters trying to identify domains 
in which the predictions of such models differ and then to conduct empir-
ical tests as a means of trying to differentiate among them. 
Formal modeling must ultimately prove its mettle by elucidating or 
calling to our attention empirical phenomena otherwise overlooked, and 
in general providing out-of-sample predictive power superior to alterna-
tive approaches, such as the more purely statistical. The record to date of 
such efforts, even heterodox efforts, has been mixed (Charness and Rabin 
2000). Like the normative approach in sociology and anthropology, most 
of this work so far has contained little explicit consideration of where these 
"unusual" tastes come from. Are commonalities, in terms of a "taste" for 
fairness, a willingness to cooperate if one expects others to, or a baseline 
inclination to cooperate, simply accidental? What can be characterized as 
essential and what learned, and thus, in principle, manipulable? 
An effort to provide a systematic and compelling evolutionary ratio-
nale for essential human cognitive and behavioral predispositions can 
assist in advancing this enterprise. It can do so at a most basic level by, in 
a Bayesian sense, modifying our priors, making us more likely to find cer-
tain results plausible. In the process, it can help canalize experimental 
research, as the work of Gigerenzer and Hoffrage/Cosmides and Tooby 
has demonstrated with respect to our capabilities as intuitive statisticians 
(see chap. 6). 
The most obvious benefit of adopting the more nuanced Darwinian 
perspective advocated in this book is a weakening of priors in favor of the 
strong version of rationality insofar as it applies to preferences or goals 
(people act in all domains in order to advance their material interests 
efficiently). It should make us more interested in and more receptive to 
experimental and observational evidence demonstrating the particular 
nature of behavioral predispositions or action inclinations at variance 
with those inherent in strong rationality and less likely to reject ab initio 
heterodox models that try to model these on the grounds that essential 
human behavioral predispositions are axiomatic or so obvious that they 
can be identified in an armchair. It should provide us an additional com-
fort level in finding plausible certain empirical results and modifying mod-
els accordingly as, for example, did Hamilton's analysis of kin selection in 
encouraging theorists to abandon strong rationality by including family 
members' utility in objective functions (see Becker 1976). 
The research frontier now involves relations among non-kin. One of 
The Invisible Hand and the Blind Watchmaker 325 
my objectives in this book has been to emphasize that allowing for group 
selection undoes the intellectual straitjacket that otherwise requires dis-
missal of the possibility that relations among non-kin are driven ultimately 
by anything other than the efficient pursuit of material self-interest. The 
efforts to develop an improved behavioral science based on a close inter-
play between modeling and empirical testing are at an early stage and will 
progress more slowly if large numbers of social scientists dismiss such 
research as irrelevant for predicting how people behave. 
Note, however, that my position is based more on challenging the 
narrow range of goals and preferences consistent with strong rationality 
than on questioning human abilities to form rational expectations in the 
Muth sense. Of course we have deficiencies in this regard. But we don't do 
badly in this area because our capabilities depend on and benefit from for-
aging algorithms that have been selected for, honed, and refined by natural 
selection over millions of years. We use rational expectations both when 
we act, and assume others act, in ways that can be justified as consistent 
with the strong version of rationality, and when we don't, or assume that 
others do not. Thus, in an ultimatum game, rejection of positive offers can 
never be justified as consistent with strong rationality. Nevertheless, evi-
dence (differences in offers in dictator and ultimatum games) suggests that 
the amount one proposes may be influenced not only by interest in the 
counterparty's welfare, or a taste for more equitable division, but also by 
a rational expectation of the likelihood of rejection based on past observed 
frequencies. Again, a rational expectation of human behavior in the Muth 
sense can differ from an expectation of behavior based on the assumption 
that people will act rationally. 
While the effort to construct alternative utility functions has in 
many ways been constructive, and stimulated additional rounds of 
empirical testing, there are also arguments for deferring it until more 
solid empirical regularities have been established and rough consensus 
achieved on them. This is particularly so where the value of perhaps 
hastily constructed blackboard models is not obvious in comparison 
with other predictive techniques not dependent on a choice theoretic 
technology. I? 
Constrained maximization models need not require strictly egoistic 
preferences, but metaphorically they do imply a single general purpose 
reasoning module. As indicated in chapter 5, there is a substantial body of 
17. Excessive concern with the elaboration of "the model" to the neglect of what it can 
actually inform is a phenomenon evident in other social sciences as well. See Rule's discus-
sion of Parsonian sociology as developed by its most recent exponent, Jeffrey Alexander 
(Rule 1997, chap. 4). 
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evidence, both direct and indirect, including information on actual brain 
wiring, that suggests that this assumption is unrealistic in ways that mat-
ter. Consequently, there is reason to doubt that the metaphor is entirely or 
universally appropriate in modeling human cognition and behavior, either 
in the sense that it captures essential features of underlying mechanisms or 
in the sense that it will actually add predictive value in comparison with 
alternate approaches. It is a method in which rational choice theorists of 
the orthodox or unconventional variety have a lot invested, but that 
should not in and of itself commend it to us as essential to our inquiry. 
There remains the problem that heterodox work of any stripe elicits 
among many orthodox economists much the same reaction as does the 
appeal by sociologists to "norms." It is sometimes said these models don't 
"feel" right, that they "seem" intuitively wrong. As just mentioned, there are 
important issues regarding the appropriate timing and content of a hetero-
dox research agenda. But the reactions here go beyond differences within 
the heterodox program and reflect skepticism about whether it has value at 
all. If the profession is to progress in a scientific fashion, it cannot collec-
tively allow so much of its development to be driven by aesthetic preference. 
Here is where, as I have argued, a broader evolutionary perspective 
can be particularly salutary. Behind the intuition expressed by skeptical 
theorists lies the specter of pop Darwinism, a view of Darwin as expositing 
a model of natural selection that can operate only at the individual level. If 
group selection is a possibility, then a considerably wider range of essential 
human predispositions becomes consistent with evolutionary theory. 
Important examples developed in this book include what I have termed a 
PD solution module. On the other hand, if the possibility of group selec-
tion is not admitted, we are more likely to continue to tolerate and inhabit 
a quasi-scientific world of coherent, internally consistent, perhaps even 
beautiful models that don'tfit the data. 
There is little doubt that the incentives to formalize will continue 
because it is an activity to which the rational choice tradition has histori-
cally awarded some of its highest accolades. The way of thinking that 
justifies this tradition, however, has in many instances been based on a 
deep-seated belief that the most important behavioral and cognitive 
assumptions underlying the work are, in the end, so obviously true as to be 
axiomatic. Pop Darwinism has hovered in the background for those 
within the tradition who may waver. A central thrust of this work has been 
to question both the underpinnings of pop Darwinism and consequently 
the axiomatic quality of the strong version of rationality. 
Every scientific discipline has dealt with the fact that practitioners 
bring to their work prior beliefs and aesthetic preferences governing how 
they think research should proceed and what empirical observations are 
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likely to be viewed as plausible. But in those sciences that have managed to 
be progressive, evidence and logic ultimately change minds. Pop Darwin-
ism has powerfully affected prior beliefs in research in the social and 
behavioral sciences. It needs to be abandoned. We are ultimately faced 
with a choice: aesthetically pleasing, mathematically tractable, badly pre-
dicting models inconsistent with a broader evolutionary theory or a sci-
entifically progressive research effort building on some of the results sur-
veyed in these pages. 
Lazear argues that social sciences unwilling to assume maximization 
are simply "unable to predict in new situations." I disagree. Faced, for 
example, with the problem of predicting behavior in single play PDs, one 
can go with the standard choice theoretic methodology, which gives a nice, 
clean, unambiguous, and wrong prediction. One can try to tinker with util-
ity functions to square their maximization with results, but to what end? If 
players were pure altruists, with the welfare only of the counterparty at 
issue, cooperate would be a strictly dominant strategy, but this does not 
track the data well either. We may ultimately be able to construct formal 
models with superior predictive power. But I doubt this will be possible 
unless their components have strong evidentiary foundations in experi-
mental and observational data. 
There are alternative non-model-based predictive approaches, for 
example, a probabilistic or statistical methodology sometimes denigrated 
by theorists. Such an approach deviates from the view that the maximiza-
tion metaphor is appropriate or useful in all domains, but why should such 
a claim be privileged? The forecasting methodology used can be simple-
a prediction based on past frequencies of non defection in experiments; or 
more sophisticated-using regressions with dummy variables for whether 
prep lay communication was allowed and including variables for the size of 
the temptation for defection. In either case, the resulting prediction is 
likely, I maintain, to be superior to one based on choice theoretic method-
ology given our current state of knowledge. 
We need to be careful in distinguishing exactly how this statistical 
approach differs from the possible use of data by actors in standard mod-
els. A rational choice approach can, for example, allow a role for use by 
players of a statistical methodology in explaining how humans coordinate 
on a cooperative equilibrium in a PD game of indefinite duration. And such 
methods could arguably be normatively relevant in a fixed and known 
duration game to the degree that they were used to forecast a propensity of 
one's counterparty or counterparties to play irrationally. But, at least in the 
latter case, there is an asymmetry here, reflecting the fundamental attribu-
tion bias. To the degree that the relevance of statistical techniques is admit-
ted, it is to predict the behavior of others, who may, presumably, have incli-
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nations and dispositions, in contrast to the actor employing the technique, 
who is assumed to be clear eyed and influenced only by situational factors. 
Obviously, this asymmetry cannot be universally applicable, since each 
individual in the group of others is herself an actor. Finally, of course, nei-
ther a descriptive nor a normative rational choice approach can allow any 
role for a forecasting algorithm in the single play game because forecasts 
are irrelevant: defection is strictly dominant. 
But we can allow such a role. As social and behavioral scientists, we 
have an interest in prediction different from that of either player in the 
one-shot game. Our payoffs are measured not by the rewards each player 
receives but by how well we predict what each of them does. Ifwe are actu-
ally one of the players, it comes down, in part, to how well we predict our 
own behavior. My claim is that for social and behavioral scientists, a sta-
tistical methodology is relevant for us in each of these games, in none more 
so than in the single play game. The search for essential human predispo-
sitions, for which the study of single play games is so important, is the 
search for appropriate base rates in a comprehensive empirically grounded 
behavioral science. 
There ought to be a place in our forecasting methods for well-estab-
lished empirical regularities, such as positive non defection rates in one-
shot PDs, the fact that one cannot offer much less than 30 percent of the 
stake in an ultimatum game and expect it to be accepted, or the evidence 
that most human subjects are not prepared to reason more than two or 
three stages via backward induction (Camerer 1997). None of these regu-
larities has an obvious choice theoretic foundation. But there is no stone 
tablet that says all human behavior can or should be modeled using the 
mathematical metaphor of constrained maximization. That metaphor is 
probably a very good characterization of the cognitive operation of forag-
ing modules. When people play cooperate in a single play PD or reject a 
positive offer in an ultimatum game, I believe that the behavior is not 
driven by a single general-purpose foraging module, but by conflicting 
guidance from different ones. 
Experimental and observational data have the potential to establish 
robust empirical regularities about the conditions under which specialized 
modules kick in and what, for example, is required to trigger the likelihood 
that humans will frame a choice as a PD solution problem. It makes no 
more sense for a social scientist to throwaway these data than it does for 
a psychiatrist to ignore data on past behavior in trying to predict whether 
a mental patient or a presently incarcerated prisoner is a threat to society. 
If we have well-established empirical regularities describing how 
people play in particular types of situations, why not use them for predic-
tive purposes? From such regularities, in conjunction with the use of con-
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strained maximization techniques where applicable, a more powerful 
social science can ultimately be constructed (for similar argument, see 
Crawford 1997,236). For illustration of how such regularities can be used 
practically in addressing real world policy issues, see Korobkin and Ulen 
2000. 
The distinction between the two roads followed when the standard 
economic model fails predictive tests corresponds roughly to that made 
between "conventional" and "unconventional" attempts to deal with the 
experimental evidence indicating violations of expected utility theory 
(Starmer 2000). The difference between Starmer's subject and the one 
addressed here, however, is that whereas skeptics question the practical 
relevance of evidence that people systematically violate the theory of 
expected utility (Starmer 2000, 368), it is very difficult to question the prac-
tical relevance of evidence that the rate (the base rate) at which subjects 
play cooperate in single play Prisoner's Dilemmas deviates systematically 
from zero. 
The concern that rational choice proponents such as Lazear exhibit 
with respect to exporting its methods to new domains may be reflective of 
their limited scientific advance since the time of Marshall. If we are able 
only to make small improvements in the power of our tools, it would be 
nice if progress could be measured in the expansion of their applicability. 
To the degree that such efforts produce models with good predictive or 
explanatory power, efforts should be encouraged. But the argument for 
devoting substantial resources to the elaboration of models that are ele-
gant, internally consistent, and "intuitively appealing" but are consistently 
contradicted by data can be advanced only with the most careful 
justification. 
When Prediction Fails: The Role of 
Historical Explanation 
When using the term explanation along with prediction, I have indicated 
that I mean out-of-sample explanation. What of models that track the 
data from which they are constructed but lack predictive power, for exam-
ple, those that generate or can rationalize multiple equilibria? Such mod-
els ultimately depend for their closure on historical explanation. In adduc-
ing historical explanation we have reached the limits of behavioral science. 
We acknowledge that a particular branching could not have been predicted 
ex ante. 
What does historical explanation involve? It involves telling stories. 
As an economic historian, I value highly this enterprise, which will be part 
of any complete account of a phenomenon we investigate. But there is a 
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reason history departments are not included within social science divisions 
within universities. A good historian will use objective-scientific-meth-
ods to evaluate documents or data and draw inferences from them. But the 
explanations advanced are retrospective and case specific. They are sci-
entific in the sense that the mechanisms described are founded on evidence 
and logic. But they are not scientific in the sense that they do not give rise 
to refutable propositions. The reason for this is not that the basic structure 
of the causal argument is different, but rather that historical explanations 
are so narrowly specific that they are by definition applicable only to the 
instances examined. There can be no out-of-sample prediction because 
such explanations are intended to apply only to the particular circum-
stances in question. The situation is so unique that there is available no 
appropriate reference category and there are no previously collected data 
relevant for prediction. Such explanations can be "tested" not with new 
data but only with thought experiments-counterfactual history-in 
which antecedent conditions are hypothetically removed and hypothetical 
consequences examined. 
To call historical explanations unscientific would be unfair. Myths 
are beliefs based neither on evidence nor on logic and thus clearly lacking 
scientific foundation. Myths are one item good historians assiduously 
avoid trafficking in. So perhaps ascientific is the better word to describe 
such explanation. 
The work of historians may be dismissed as "just telling stories." It 
should not be. A historian may trace, for example, the consequence of a 
particular Supreme Court decision. She will not claim, and rightly so, that 
its outcome was knowable in advance. Had it been an easy case, it never 
would have advanced to the highest court. Tracing its consequences and 
the mechanisms whereby they are experienced is a valuable contribution to 
our understanding. And a good historian will go back and discuss the rea-
soning and political maneuvering whereby the Court was able to fashion 
its decision. This is explanation, but it is historical, in the sense that there 
is no claim to positing a model with out-of-sample predictive power, no 
claim (or there should be no claim) that the decision was ex ante pre-
dictable. In fact, unsupported after the fact claims that outcomes were pre-
dictable ex ante are common in historical and journalistic accounts. But 
these should be treated with skepticism, because they imply an underlying 
social scientific model that has not been validated by ex post out-of-sam-
pIe retrodiction. There is no reason to apologize for historical explanation, 
but it serves us poorly to claim social scientific explanation when we have 
not provided it. 
Similarly, delineating the consequences of particular technological 
trajectories is valuable, even when a particular trajectory could not have 
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been predicted in advance. It was not inevitable that the United States 
would adopt a television standard (NTSC) inferior in a number of ways to 
the PAL and SECAM standards emerging subsequently in Europe and 
elsewhere. 18 But once the U.S. standard was adopted network externalities 
produced lock-in, as path dependency theorists such as Arthur (1989) and 
David (1985, 1994) have argued. Lock-in is not necessarily forever, and 
the gradual replacement of this standard by high-definition television 
(HDTV) will end it, but in this case it will have endured half a century. 
Historical argument begins when we have exhausted our ability to 
provide scientific explanation. The process of evolution is necessarily a his-
torical one, and thus the chain of events that gave rise to conditions under 
which life evolved on earth and eventually yielded Homo sapiens is 
unavoidably path dependent. But evolutionary explanations involve path 
dependency on a much grander timescale than the preceding examples. 
Suppose we accept the claim that there are common features of human 
societies we can call universal culture. This book argues that these com-
monalities are not explainable as the inevitable consequences of the inter-
action of rational self-interested agents, as the canonical economic model 
would have it. Nor are they the result of a statistically unlikely concatena-
tion of accidents producing similar outcomes in region after region of the 
world, as a variant of the sociological/anthropological tradition, or a the-
orist emphasizing the path dependent character of norms and institutions, 
might argue. Nor are they the consequence of localized invention followed 
by universal diffusion. 
Instead, at the bedrock of universal culture, as at the bedrock of uni-
versal grammar, we find evolutionarily designed hardwiring. In both cases, 
cognitive modularity is central to understanding the functioning of these 
legacies, and in the former case, and perhaps the latter, group selection is 
a necessary mechanism in this design process. In both cases, historical 
explanation begins earlier. in delineating the evolutionary processes that 
produced the human genome. 
Models that, by demonstrating a multiplicity of equilibria and there-
fore predicting an inability to predict, add to our understanding when in 
fact the phenomenon is difficult to predict. Unquestionably, appeal to his-
torical or path dependent explanation will be part of any evolutionary 
account. But it is important not to throw in the towel too soon. It is too 
easy to excuse our predictive failures on the grounds that human behavior 
is notoriously difficult to predict. In fact, within certain domains human 
18. NTSC (National Television System Committee) began broadcasting in 1954. PAC 
(Phase Alternation Line), developed in Germany, is based on NTSC. SECAM (Sequential 
Couleur avec Memoire) was developed in France. 
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behavior in the aggregate is easier to predict than some natural processes, 
such as the weather. We should push scientific methods as far as they will 
take us in this direction before we switch into historical mode. And we 
should be prepared to use statistical methods where mathematics and 
deductive logic alone perform poorly. 
Behavioral science is good enough, or should be good enough, for 
example, to enable us to make good predictions of how one hundred ran-
domly chosen pairs of human subjects will playa one-shot PD. My back 
of the envelope prediction is that, irrespective of from where the sample of 
subjects is drawn, about half will achieve mutual cooperation, upward of 
two-thirds if preplay communication is allowed. Historical argument is 
not front and center in this exercise, although the species typical hard-
wiring underlying the result does have an explanation that is ultimately 
historical. It is not necessary in developing this prediction that I posit a 
utility function maximized under constraint. If you probe and ask what 
metaphor or model I have of mechanism, I will reply that it is one in which 
the foraging apparatus that pushes us toward the Nash prediction is short-
circuited by another module specialized to the domain ofPD type interac-
tions. But as we await the neurobiological and neuroanatomical research 
that may further validate this view, I am perfectly content to rely on a sim-
ple statistical algorithm, based on prior experimental data, because I am 
confident it will outperform the more elegantly derived conclusions of the 
standard economic model based on the strong version of rationality. 
Conclusion 
This voyage began with issues of data and method. Where has our journey 
left us with respect to these issues? 
1. The purpose ofthe social and behavioral sciences is to forecast and 
retrospectively predict human behavior, and the purpose of build-
ing models of behavior is to facilitate this enterprise. What we are 
after is a methodology for producing rational forecasts. Forecasts 
(expectations) are rational if they take advantage of all available 
data and are produced using the best available statistical and/or 
logical algorithms. 
2. The model building exercise is only as good as its predictive and 
explanatory successes. The enterprise cannot be defended, at least 
as part of a social science, simply because, in the opinion of the 
model builder, the models intuitively provide insights into the 
process under study. To a man with a hammer the whole world 
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looks like a nail. To a social scientist invested in a rational choice 
methodology and the techniques of constrained maximization 
associated with it, every aspect of human behavior looks like a 
constrained maximization problem. 
3. This book began with the problem of predicting behavior within a 
Prisoner's Dilemma, in the limit, a single play PD. The methodol-
ogy of constrained maximization, applied to this situation of 
strategic interaction, yields an unambiguous prediction: there is a 
unique Nash equilibrium, one involving mutual defection, and it is 
the one players should arrive at. Similarly, the analysis of an ulti-
matum game yields a unique (subgame perfect) equilibrium, also 
the outcome at which rational players should presumably arrive. 
From the standpoint of a set of aesthetic values typically held by 
rational choice theorists, these predictions have much to recom-
mend them. They are "choice theoretic," and they do not make use 
of "ad hoc" behavioral assumptions. Historically, these have been 
powerful evaluative criteria in economic discourse: the first beto-
kening a "good" model, the second one that is "bad." And the pre-
dictions make very efficient use of data, in fact extremely efficient 
use, since they make no use of data at all. Talk about parsimony! 
Data on the past behavior of the players, or of others like them, is 
of no relevance in forming the prediction, and even if it were rele-
vant descriptively, it wouldn't matter normatively, because defec-
tion is strictly dominant. Given all of these "aesthetic" criteria in 
their favor, one feels almost embarrassed continuing to point out 
that as predictions, they are repeatedly, overwhelmingly, unambigu-
ously contravened by experimental data. 
4. When this critique is raised, skeptics often ask what is the alterna-
tive. First, we must again remind ourselves why we are in this busi-
ness. Predictive success is what matters. The elegance or beauty of 
the model is ultimately irrelevant. Francis Crick constructed a 
beautiful, elegant hypothesis about how triads of base pairs coded 
for assemblage of proteins from among amino acids. The analysis 
was so beautiful, said some scientists, it should have been true. But 
it was not, and when experimental evidence inconsistent with it 
appeared, Crick abandoned his hypothesis (for details, see Ridley 
1999, 50-52). Beauty is not always a guide to truth. And some-
times beauty is in the eye of the beholder. In the case of the single 
play PD, a simple statistical forecast based on the past behavior of 
the players, or of similar players, will almost invariably provide a 
superior forecast of behavior than does the Nash equilibrium pre-
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diction. One can throw whatever pejorative terms one wants at the 
forecast: ad hoc, not choice theoretic, mindless, inelegant. But its 
predictive success is superior. 
S. This book has gone considerably beyond this simple point. It has 
tried to get under the hood of human decision making, studying 
the evidence for cognitive modularity that makes intelligible this 
behavior in the context of straightforward self-serving behavior in 
other domains. And it has explored the history of design of the 
human behavioral machinery, its evolutionary history, arguing 
that the operation of natural selection provides fewer restrictions 
on the range of essential human predispositions than rational 
choice theorists have generally supposed. 
6. Faced with two predictive technologies, one viewed as elegant that 
predicts poorly and one viewed as inelegant that predicts well, 
which is it? If we are to do science, it must be the second. 
The methodology of constructing models of constrained maximiza-
tion works well in explaining and predicting foraging behavior and its 
modern analogues. On the explanatory side, the idiom does a good job in 
capturing metaphorically the cognitive modules that facilitate foraging-
in humans, sheep, birds, and bumblebees. The neat thing about the 
method is that in the right domains, it permits tolerably good predictions 
of behavior in the absence of data on the past actions of the individual or 
individuals in question. But we need to recognize the limitations of the 
method and also that, as a practical matter, most of us would not throw 
away data on past performance of individuals in question if we were trying 
to make such predictions. 
The psychology of William James, which placed heavy emphasis on 
instincts, was eclipsed in the twentieth century by the behaviorism of John 
Watson and B. F. Skinner. But the concept is coming back in vogue, with 
Stephen Pinker, for example, emphasizing a language instinct. I doubt it is 
helpful to suggest that humans are maximizing anything when they learn a 
language. They just do it, because genes predisposing to such behavior or 
cognition have been favored in the past. 
The title of this book asked whether we are altruistically inclined. The 
question posed can now be answered in the affirmative, although in 
slightly different ways than has been traditional. We are altruistically 
inclined toward our children, parents, and other relatives, as the theory of 
kin selection has recognized since the 1960s and as most of us have been 
willing to allow. But our relations with non-kin also have an altruistic 
foundation, reflected experimentally, among other ways, in our willing-
ness to play cooperate in single play PDs. In these relations with non-kin, 
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what altruism initiates, interest can help sustain. Our ongoing interactions 
with others can, under the right conditions, be sustained by calculations of 
interest alone and be favored by individual level selection. But they cannot 
originate as the result of such calculations, nor can they arise evolutionar-
ily through selection operating only at the individual level. 
The sobering news for the rational choice tradition is that its pre-
ferred modeling techniques are limited in their applicability. But the 
canonical version of the sociological/anthropological tradition also faces a 
challenge. The reification of social structure is not, as Parsons suggested, a 
solution to the problem of order. Explanation of the universal component 
of that structure can be pushed back further. Opposition to any possible 
biological or genetic influences on "culture" is not sustainable, and 
methodological individualism can be defended, although not with the 
same implications as those commonly imagined by economists. 
At the same time, while biology may determine underlying parame-
ters of universal culture, just as it does for universal language, there is 
much room for cultural and institutional variation. And, in contrast to 
variation in specific languages, such variation is likely to be consequential 
in terms of social and economic outcomes. Thus, just as there will continue 
to be a role for constrained maximization techniques in, for example, the 
study of market behavior, there remains an important role for the descrip-
tive, case specific methodologies of the traditional sociologist and anthro-
pologist, as well as the narrative and closely related techniques of the his-
torian. In fact, if they are to be used productively, these approaches need 
to be employed in a complementary fashion. 
Responding to the continuing challenge involved in bridging the 
divide between the rational choice and the sociological/anthropological 
traditions will require the development of a social science that, in a more 
progressive fashion, systematically incorporates new experimental and 
observational data-including the results of research within the natural 
sciences-within an evolutionarily conditioned theoretical framework. 
That process, and continuing debates about exactly where we set the 
boundary between historical and social scientific explanation, will benefit 
from the participation of scholars throughout our disciplines. In none of 
these, however, does the historically dominant approach entail a privi-
leged understanding of what will be necessary in this effort. 
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